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ABSTRACT 
 
Most literatures on international law have been observed to neglect or give 
scanty attention to the contribution of Islamic law towards the development 
of modern international law, particularly the principles relating to the 
diplomatic immunity and privileges. It has often been maintained, especially 
by some Western commentators that there is no modicum of materiality 
between Islamic siyar and the rules of conventional international law; as 
such, Islamic law has nothing to offer the international legal system. The 
current spades of global terrorism which are allegedly perpetrated in the 
name of Islam against diplomatic institutions have further widened this 
perceived incongruity between the two legal regimes. This study therefore 
critiques and also evaluates the exactitude of the contention that the sources 
of the two legal regimes are incompatible. This study equally examines the 
compatibility in the diplomatic principles between Islamic diplomatic law and 
international diplomatic law. It also contends that the attacks on diplomats 
and diplomatic facilities are antithetical to the classical principles of jihaad and 
Islamic diplomatic law. It further argues that the need to harmonise the two 
legal systems and have a thorough cross-cultural understanding amongst 
nations generally with a view to enhancing unfettered diplomatic cooperation 
should be of paramount priority. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Background 
The perennial nature of the concept of according respect and giving 
protection to the persons of envoys of other communities and nations is 
attested to by history of ancient times. It has, however, been speculated that 
the practice of protecting the envoys from attacks and personal injuries has 
been in existence from time immemorial.1 Various studies into the history of 
ancient civilisations whether in Asia, Middle East, Ancient Near East, Africa, 
Europe or North America have always revealed the high degree of inviolability 
attached to the personality of foreign messengers.2 The concept of 
immunities and inviolability of diplomatic envoys is recognised by various 
religious beliefs; sanctioned by customs; and fortified by reciprocity.3 
Historically, most religions have underscored the essence of the inviolability of 
envoys to the extent that attack on the persons of ambassadors was 
condemned as an impious act.4 With this, therefore, no particular civilisation, 
nation or community can possibly claim to be the sole originator of this 
universally acknowledged concept. 
                                                 
1 See JC Barker, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, England 
2006), p.29 while referring to the work of Harold Nicolson that it is not beyond probability 
that the communities of the cave-dwelling anthropoid apes would have by diplomatic means 
resolved amongst one another a day’s battle. Nicolson, Diplomacy (2nd edn., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1969), p. 6 
2 LS Frey and ML Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity, (Ohio State University Press, 
Columbus, Ohio 1999), p. 3 
3Ibid., p. 4 
4Ibid., p.12 
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The need to give respect and protection to foreign representatives of other 
sovereigns constituted the bedrock of the law of nations of ancient times just 
as it does in today’s international law. Meaningful negotiations between 
sovereign polities have been made possible by the instrumentality of 
diplomatic protection, the essence of which need not be overstressed.  
 
Hardly can any nation or community survive isolating itself from others, 
particularly in this era where globalisation is fast becoming, if not already 
become, the new world order. The significant role of the diplomatic 
personnel, at a period like this, cannot be undermined.5 This is so because 
the task of developing, formulating and implementing states’ foreign policies 
heavily rest on the shoulders of the diplomatic personnel. In the same vein 
also, detailed analysis of contemporary issues emanating from different parts 
of the world are often carried out by the diplomats being one of its essential 
responsibilities.6 The sensitive nature of the office of a diplomat and the 
enormous task attached to the office require that adequate protection be put 
in place for the person of the diplomat, his family and also the diplomatic 
mission. The amount of protection given to diplomatic agents stems from the 
great importance past civilisations attach to the need for nations to remain in 
                                                 
5 See Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘VCDR’). This Convention came into force on 24 April, 1964 and was done in Vienna, 
Austria. The choice of Vienna as the venue of the Convention was informed by the fact that it 
played host to the very first international Conference on the status of diplomatic agents in 
1815. See LS Frey and ML Frey, op cit., p.480; See United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 
95 available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf 
[accessed 12 October, 2008]. See also Article 5 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (hereinafter referred to as ‘VCCR’). This Convention was also done at Vienna and 
came into force on 19 March, 1967; see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 596, p. 261 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf 
[accessed 12 October, 2008] 
6 JC Barker, op cit., (2006) p.16 
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constant communication and unimpaired interrelations. And for this to be, it is 
only imperative that the diplomatic establishment must not be left 
unprotected. 
 
Respect is accorded to the inviolability of envoys even by warring nations. 
This, at least enables them to maintain contacts with their enemies. The need 
for communication between sovereign entities also underscores the 
importance of giving proper protection to the envoys. This has today, taken 
the form of permanent diplomatic and consular establishments in virtually all 
capital cities. This sacrosanct position of diplomatic envoys has been 
succinctly described by the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘ICJ’) thus: 
 
There is no fundamental requisite for the conduct of 
diplomatic relations between states . . . than the inviolability 
of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that throughout 
history, nations of all creeds and cultures have observed 
reciprocal obligations for that purpose…7 
 
In the same way, the inviolability and immunities of diplomatic envoys have 
long been recognised and freely observed under Islamic law. This was 
demonstrated, for instance, by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)8 during the 
                                                 
7
 US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1980) ICJ Rep. 3 at 42 para 91 
8This abbreviation (pbuh) that means ‘Peace be upon him’ is the translation of the Arabic 
eulogy used after the name of Prophet Muhamad 
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famous Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 AD),9 when one Abu Raafi’i, a Quraysh, 
representing the Makkans at a meeting indicated his intention to revert to 
Islam. There and then, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) told him thus: 
 
I do not break a covenant or imprison envoys [you are an 
ambassador], but return, and if you feel the same as you do 
just now, come back.10 
 
With this, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) not only recognised the sanctity of the 
ambassadorial post of the envoy not to be detained, but that host countries 
should not take advantage of envoys residing in their territory for their own 
benefit. 
   
There is no record of any past civilisation or nation where the desecration of 
the inviolability of the envoy was institutionalised or to say the least, 
tolerated. This must not, however, be understood to mean that foreign 
agents in the early period were freer from attacks than today. Far from it! 
                                                 
9 It is also known as ‘Sulh al-Hudaybiyyah’. It is the treaty that was signed between the state 
of Madina as represented by Prophet Muhammad on the one hand and the Quraysh tribe of 
Makkah as represented by Suhayl bin ‘Amr on the other hand. The treaty was signed in 
March, 628 CE at a place called al-Hudaybiyyah which was on the edge of the sacred territory 
of Makkah. See, WM Watt, Muhammad at Medina, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan 
1981), Pp. 46-52; see also, Sh. Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakfuri, ‘Al-Hudaibiyah Treaty’, 
http://www.islaam.com/Article.aspx?id=461 (accessed 3 December 2008) The treaty of 
Hudaybiyyah is usually considered as a locus classicus when talking about diplomacy in 
Islamic law because, in the words of Bassiouni, ‘its negotiating history demonstrate the 
sanctity of emissaries, that a violation of an amassador’s immunity is a casus belli, and that 
no ambassador may be detained or harmed. See, MC Bassiouni, ‘Protection of Diplomats 
Under Islamic Law’ (1980), 74, No.3, AJIL, p.611  
10Partial Translation of Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 14, Jihad (Kitab al-Jihad), Hadith Number 
2752 http://www.muslimaccess.com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/014.html [accessed 12 
September, 2011]. See also M Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf 
Publishers, Lahore, Pakistan 1961), p. 148 
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Considering the peculiarity of the concept of diplomatic inviolability to nearly 
all known civilisations, one may therefore want to ask: why are diplomatic 
missions and personnel still subjects of terrorist attacks? Many reasons have 
been canvassed for what appears to be responsible for these violent attacks. 
For instance, a one time British diplomat who was also a victim of an 
attempted kidnap attributed the reason for these gruesome attacks to ‘the 
special status of the diplomatic agent’.11 Also, violence against diplomatic 
agents, according to Barker, could be politically motivated by those protesting 
against the policies of either the sending State or the receiving State.12 These 
terrorist attacks range from the minor to the meanest, such as kidnapping13 
and killing14 of diplomatic personnel and seizure of embassies.15  
 
It would not be a stretch to say that a healthy diplomatic mission along with 
threat-free diplomatic personnel will, in no small way, contribute towards the 
guarantee of enduring international diplomatic relations. Crimes, such as 
                                                 
11 G. Jackson, Concorde Diplomacy: The Ambassador’s Role in the World Today, (Hamish 
Hamilton, 1981), Pp.92-3 
12 JC Barker, op cit., (2006), p.15 
13 On the 22nd of September, 2008, Mr. Abdul Khaliq Farahi, the Afghanistan ambassador 
designate to Pakistan was kidnapped by gunmen who also killed his driver. See 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_details.asp?id=137541 [accessed on the 29/03/2009]. 
Less than two months thereafter, on the 13th of November, 2008, another diplomat, 
Heshmotollah Attarzadeh Niyaki (Commercial Attaché to the Iranian Peshawar Consulate, 
Pakistan) was again abducted by gunmen after killing the policeman assigned to guard him. 
See also http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP376391 [accessed on 29/03/2009] 
14 The dual terrorist bomb attacks on the United State Embassies both in Kenya and Tanzania 
on 7 August, 1998  where over 220 lives were lost and about 4,000 others wounded is 
recorded to be the most devastating attack to be unleashed on the diplomatic missions. See 
JC Barker, op cit., p. xi. On the 4th of June, 2006 a Russian diplomat (Vitaly Vitalyevich Titov) 
was shot dead in Baghdad while other four diplomatic employees were abducted. See 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,198054,00.html [accessed on 29/03/2009]. In August, 
2008 there was an attempt on the life of the Head of the United States Consulate in North 
western Pakistan, Lynne Tracy 
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Aug26/0,4670,Pakistan,00.html [accessed on 
29/03/2009] 
15 The 1979 seizure and detention of the United States Diplomatic staff in Tehran. 
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murder, kidnap and arson against diplomatic agents and diplomatic facilities 
constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. Recognising 
the danger embedded in the terrorist attacks on diplomats and diplomatic 
missions, a good number of multilateral conventions were initiated and 
drafted, prominent among which are: the 1971 Convention to Prevent and 
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and 
Related Extortion That Are of International Significance16 and the 1973 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomatic 
Agents and Internationally Protected Persons.17 It is rather disturbing that in 
spite of the current positive developments made by most States in 
criminalizing terrorist acts in their domestic laws and regulations,18 terrorist 
activities particularly against diplomats and diplomatic missions can still not be 
said to have abated. Can the reason for these attacks on diplomats and 
diplomatic missions be attributable to inadequacies in the Conventions or 
absence of international cooperation? Or should we just throw our hands in 
the air and conclude that the ’terrorists, whether they argued for the 
reinstatement of old laws and customs or for the destruction of the existing 
system to pave the way for a newer, more utopian order, no longer heeded 
the old taboos.’19 Either of these questions will have to be looked into with a 
view to proffering answers to them; bearing in mind the fact that terrorist 
                                                 
16 This Convention was signed in February 2, 1971 and came into force in 1973 See 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv16-english.pdf  
17 The Convention was signed in December 14, 1973 and came into force in 1977 See 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_4_1973.pdf  
18 United Nations Security Council Letter dated 17 August 2011 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee establish pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism 
addressed to the Secretary-General, (UN Doc. S/2011/463), para. 12 
19 LS Frey and ML Frey, op cit., (1999), p.508 
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outbursts are mostly precipitated, as observed, by disruptive conditions, rapid 
economic change, and political instability20 
   
What has now attracted a major concern amongst the Islamic law scholars is 
the rate at which Islam has now been stigmatised with terrorism, most 
especially, after the September 11, 2001 incidence.21 It could however, be 
argued that the misinterpretation and misapplication of the rules of jihaad by 
few Muslim groups that are often, non-state actors seem to justify the 
position of those who impute terrorism to Islam. In the same vein, it could 
also be further argued that the gross misperception of the entire concepts of 
jihaad in relation to Islamic international law22 by some non-Muslims remains 
a major problem. This problem was rightly depicted by Esposito when he 
gives an example of an American Senate leader who confessed that ‘I know a 
lot about many things but nothing about Islam and the Muslim world – and 
neither do most of my colleagues.’23 Another issue of great concern which 
falls under the search light is the rampancy of the acts of terrorism directed at 
diplomats and diplomatic missions, most especially within the Muslim States 
which are often carried out by individual or group of individuals in the name 
of Islam.24  
                                                 
20 Ibid Pp. 507-508  
21 K Dalacoura, ‘Violence, September 11 and the Interpretations of Islam’, (2002), 16, 
International Relations, p.269 
22 The meaning of Islamic international law is given at Pp. 4-43 of this dissertation.   
23 JL Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, (Oxford University Press, Inc., New 
York 2002), p.120 
24 Ibid p.151 If one carefully follows records of terrorist attacks in recent times, one may be 
favourably inclined towards Esposito’s submission that: “In recent years, radical groups have 
combined nationalism, ethnicity, or tribalism with religion and used violence and terrorism to 
achieve their goals: Serbs in Bosnia, Hindu Nationalist in India, Tamil and Sinhalese in Sri 
Lanka, Jewish fundamentalist in Israel, Christian extremists in the United States. However the 
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Diplomatic inviolability and immunities, being an age-long concept of 
international law, have received academic contributions from both the 
classical writers as well as the modern writers.25 For instance, Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645) who is believed to be the father of international law says in his 
famous treatise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis26 regarding the rationale behind the 
diplomatic immunity enjoyed by an ambassador that: 
 
 . . . it is natural to suppose, that nations have agreed, in the case 
of ambassadors, to dispense with that obedience, which every one, 
by general custom, owes to the laws of that foreign country, in 
which, at any time, he resides. The character which they sustain, is 
not that of ordinary individual, but they represent the Majesty of 
the Sovereigns, by whom they are sent, whose power is limited to 
no local jurisdiction.27 
 
Mattingly also writes while analysing the work of Bernard du Rosier (1404-
1475) on the immunity and personal inviolability of diplomatic envoys that: 
                                                                                                                                            
most widespread examples of religious terrorism have occurred in the Muslim world.” Also 
see DA Shawartz, ‘International Terrorism and Islamic Law’ (1991), 29, Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L., p.630. “International terrorism is a global challenge. Most significantly, a substantial 
number of terrorist acts are perpetrated by or upon Muslims, or within Islamic lands.” It must 
however, be pointed out that this does not and cannot justify the imputation of terrorism to 
Islam. 
25 E Young, ‘The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations’, (1964), 40, Brit. Y. B. Int’l 
L., p.147 In acknowledging numerous treatises that had been produced on diplomatic 
relations, this article refers to such names as Pierre Ayrault, Gentili, Jean Hotman and Grotius 
alongside their remarkable works that were produced between the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. Whereas, Shaybani’s treatise on the Islamic law of nations, which 
includes diplomatic relations, was produced about 800 years before the works of these 
writers. See, MA Boisard, ‘On the Probable Influence of Islam on Western Public and 
International Law’, (1980), 11, No.4, Int. J. Middle East Stud., Pp.447-448 
26 H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Published 1625, (Classics of International Series, Ed. 
Scott, 1925) 
27 Ibid, Section 4 
 .24 
 
 
Ambassadors are immune for the period of their embassies, in their 
persons and in their property, both from actions in courts of law 
and from all other forms of interference. Among all peoples, in all 
kingdoms and lands, they are guaranteed complete freedom in 
access, transit and egress, and perfect safety from any hindrance 
or violence.28 
 
In the same vein, Shaybani, the father of Islamic international law, says in his 
magnum opus, ‘Kitab al-Siyar al-Saghir,29 regarding the need to treat a 
foreign envoy with respect once he carried with him a letter of credence in 
the following words: 
 
If a Harbi is found in the Territory of Islam and claims to be an 
emissary and produces a letter from his King to this effect, he will 
be provided security if the letter is confirmed to be really from the 
King. He will be secure till he delivers the message and returns [to 
his territory].30 
 
It has however, been observed that most of these contributions, particularly 
by western scholars, surrounding the development of this ancient but 
fundamental branch of international law give much credence to the influence 
                                                 
28 G Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (Jonathan Cape, London 1955), p. 45 
29 MA Ghazi Trans.,  Kitab al-Siyar al-Shaybani – The Shorter Book on Muslim International 
Law (Adam Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi 2004) 
30 Ibid, p. 63 
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of the Greek and Roman civilizations without giving a deserving attention to 
the contribution of the Islamic civilization.31 Although, diplomatic mission in 
the early part of Islam was not permanent as we have it today. It was 
temporary because emissaries at that time were usually despatched to foreign 
lands to give notice of alternative options before the commencement of 
hostilities and to resolve post-war problems.32 But by the twelfth century, 
Islam had already put in place permanent representation in the form of the 
modern day consulates. While prior to the twelfth century, legation in a 
permanent form was unknown to the West.33 The idea of sending emissary 
abroad with all the power to represent the State in the form of modern 
diplomacy started in Italy (the Republic of Venice) in the late fifteenth 
century.34  
 
 
It has been observed that some writers, especially in the field of international 
law, do not see any congruity between the classical concept of  Islamic 
international law and modern norms of international law.35 Consequently, 
they give scant recognition to the legal position of diplomatic relations under  
                                                 
31 MA Boisard, op cit., (1980), p.430 esp. p.446 
32 S Mahmassani, ‘The Principles of International Law in The Light of Islamic Doctrine’, in 
Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p.264-265 
33 Ibid., 265; See, MA Boisard, op cit., (1980), p.442  
34 See, T Hampton, ‘The Diplomatic Moment: Representing Negotiation in Early Modern 
Europe’, (2006), 67:1, MLQ, Pp. 82-83 
35
 See CA Ford, ‘Siyar-ization and Its Discontents: Intenationla Law and Islam’s Constitutional 
Crisis’, (1995) 30 TILJ p.500. See also M Berger, ‘Islamic Views on International Law’ in P 
Meerts (ed), Culture and International Law (Hague Academic Coalition, The Hague 2008) 
p.107; DA Westbrook, ‘Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate 
Expressions of World Order’, (1992-1993) 33 VJIL p.883 and AI Bouzenita, ‘The Siyar – An 
Islamic Law of Nations?’, (2007) 35 AJSS, p. 44 
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Islamic law. They have also given the so-called dichotomisation of the world 
into dar al-Islaam36 (abode of peace) and dar al-harb37 (abode of war) a 
fundamental justification against a permanent peaceful diplomatic relations 
between the Muslim world and the rest of the world.  
  
1.2 Research Question 
The main research question has to do with the compatibility between  Islamic 
diplomatic law and international diplomatic law which further leads to the 
following inquiries: i) To what extent is Islamic diplomatic law, especially with 
the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah 628 AD which is regarded as a model of Islamic 
diplomatic law,38 compatible with international diplomatic law? ii) How do 
Muslim States conduct diplomatic relations with non-Muslim states and also 
amongst themselves? iii) How do Muslim States treat the violation of 
diplomatic law particularly by non-state actors in the name of jihaad? 
 
1.2.1 Whether and To What Extent Is Islamic Diplomatic Law 
Compatible with International Diplomatic Law? 
 
This question requires comparing a set of main principles of Islamic 
diplomatic law with the principles of international diplomatic law such as the 
                                                 
36 This literally means the abode or house of Islam and technically it refers to a domain where 
power lies with the Muslims, the rules of Islam implemented and Islamic rituals performed 
without any inhibition. See Sheikh Wahbeh al-Zuhili, ‘Islam and International Law’, (2005), 
87, No. 858, Int’l Review of the Red Cross, p. 278 
37 This literally means the abode or house of war. But technically it refers to the relationship 
between an Islamic state and neighbouring non-Muslim states with which it has not signed a 
peace treaty or pact. See The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, (Brill, Leiden), Vol. 2, p. 
126 
38 See PS Smith, ‘Of War and Peace: The Hudaibiya Model of Islamic Diplomacy’ (2006) 18 
Fla. J Int’l. L. 167  
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immunities and inviolability of diplomatic agents; concept of treaties 
(mu’aahadaat) as it relates to the principle of pacta sunt servanda; the 
concept of aman (safe conduct); the legal principle of reciprocity. This 
question, in a sense, is a comparison of substantive principles of diplomatic 
law in the two legal systems: Islamic law and international law. It is argued 
that the foundational principles in  Islamic diplomatic law and international 
diplomatic law are compatible. However, if there are incompatibilities, a 
detailed procedures on how to resolve the differences between the two legal 
systems leading to harmonised interpretation and application  are laid down 
in chapter 3. For instance, the principle of maslahah which is generally 
translated to mean ‘public welfare’ or ‘public interest’ could be resorted to as 
a reconciliatory concept in a situation where the principles of Islamic 
diplomatic law and international diplomatic law appear to be incompatible. In 
Islamic jurisprudence, recourse can be made to the principle of maslahah, 
that is by making rules based on the general interests of the Muslim 
community where there are no applicable provisions in the primary sources of 
Islamic law – the Qur’an and the Sunnah.39 It must be borne in mind that 
while applying the principle of maslahah, it must not run contrary to the 
fundamental objectives of the Shari’ah (maqaasid al-Shari’ah).  
 
                                                 
39 See NA Shah, Islamic Law and the Law of Armed Conflict: The Conflict in Pakistan, 
(Routledge, Aningdon, 2011), p. 16 
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Meanwhile, Article 31(3)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties40 (hereinafter referred to as ‘VCLT’), empowers the judges of the 
International Court of Justice or International Tribunal to give consideration to 
relevant external sources while interpreting international norms. This, in the 
words of Tzevelekos, ‘should always be done following the so-called 
“principles of harmonization,” according to which, when a plurality of norms 
affects the same subjects the interpretation should always attempt to achieve 
conciliation.’41 International law also allows interpretive declarations and 
reservations to be entered at the time of signature and accession, subject to 
the compatibility with the object and purpose test of a given treaty.42 A 
reservation will be presumed to have been entered once a statement purports 
to exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in its application to the 
State.43   
 
Before we get to the comparative study of the substantive principles, it is 
important to clarify some definitional issues and mention how both legal 
systems evolved over centuries and what are their main sources. This will 
require the evolutionary study of Islamic diplomatic law and  international 
                                                 
40 This Convention was done at Vienna on 23 May, 1969 and was entered into force on 27 
January, 1980. See the United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 also available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf [accessed [20 
January, 2009] 
41 VP Tzevelekos, ‘The Use Article 31 (3) (a) of the VCLT In the Case Law of the ECtHR An 
Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human 
Rights Teleology? Between Evolution and Systemic Integration’, (2010) 31 Michigan Journal 
of International Law, p. 631  
42 See Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The convention was 
entered into force on 27 January 1980 and it is contained in the United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 See 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf [accessed on 
23/08/2011] 
43 Article 2 (1) (d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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diplomatic law and their legal sources. Diplomatic immunity is an age-long 
practice that has been generally attested to among various civilisations by 
scholars of history and international law.44 Right from the early days of Islam, 
the inviolability and immunities of diplomatic envoys have been recognised 
and freely observed. For instance the prophetic statement that ‘. . . if it were 
not the tradition that envoys could not be killed, I would have severed your 
heads,’45 which later forms the locus classicus in Islamic diplomatic law is very 
instructive. This explains why the notion of diplomatic immunity occupies an 
important position in Islamic siyar, translated as Islamic international law. 
Islamic diplomatic law forms part of Islamic siyar.  
 
It is generally viewed that diplomatic law is considerably sourced from the 
customary rules of international law.46 However, the importance of 
international treaty and general principles of law as sources of international 
diplomatic law cannot be over-emphasised. For example, treaty has always 
remained functional to diplomatic law when a state agrees to accept the 
personnel or representative of the other State. Likewise, Islamic diplomatic 
law, which also forms an integral part of Islamic siyar, are all inseparable 
components of Islamic law since they share the same sources with it.47 The 
divine sources are the Qur’an and the Sunnah followed by the mechanisms of 
                                                 
44See JC Barker, op cit., (2006), p. 26; Nicolson, op cit., (1969), p. 6 
45 Ibn Hisham, As-Seeratu-n-Nabawiyyah, (Darul Gadd al-Jadeed, Al-Monsurah), p. 192 
46 See R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it, (OUP, Oxford 
1994), Pp. 86-87; MJL Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester 1968), p. 5 
47 See AI Bouzenita, ‘The Siyar – An Islamic Law of Nations?’ (2007) 35 AJSS, p. 174; S 
Mahmassani, op cit., p. 235; S Khatab and GD Bouma, Democracy in Islam (Routledge, 
London 2007), p. 174 
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ijtihaad, which are given as follows: ijmaa’, qiyaas, maslahah, istihsaan and 
‘urf, otherwise known as the methods and principles of Islamic law. 
 
The sources of the two legal systems are viewed and generally examined 
together with a view to finding areas of compatibility by taking into account 
various opinions canvassed by scholars of Islamic law and international law. 
The possible areas of tension between the two legal systems are also 
discussed in a way to bring about reconciliation by harmonising the 
differences. Detail explanation of this is contained in chapter 3 of the study. 
 
1.2.2 Muslim States Practice 
The second inquiry will focus on the practice of some Muslim States48 with the 
view to confirming the extent of their compliance with the principles of 
Islamic diplomatic law and international diplomatic law in their relationship 
                                                 
48  It should be known that there is a difference between ‘Islamic States’ and ‘Muslim States’. 
Islamic State is believed to be a country that adheres and applies fully the principles of 
Islamic law. While the Muslim State, on the other hand, refers to country that has a majority 
Muslim population. Therefore, in this study, Muslim States will mean States that are 
predominantly Muslim majority, which also includes States that specifically declare 
themselves as ‘Islamic Republics’ and those States that declare Islam, in their Constitutions, 
as the States religion.  See MA Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law, (OUP, 
Oxford 2003), p. 8; M Berger, op cit., (2008), Pp. 109-110; and H Moinuddin, The Charter of 
the Islamic Conference and the Legal Framework of Economic Co-operation amongst its 
Member States: A Study of the Charter, the General Agreement for Economic, Technical, and 
Commercial Co-operation and the Agreement for Promotion, Protection, and Guarantee of 
Investments Among Member States of the OIC  (Claredon Press, Oxford 1987) p. 11. It must 
be noted, however, that the meaning of ‘Muslim States’ does not necessarily cover all the 57 
States that are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), because there are 
some member States such as Togo, Uganda, Republic  of Benin, Gabon, Mozambique and 
Suriname that cannot be said to have majority Muslim population. Members of the OIC are:  
Azerbaijan, Jordan, Afghanistan, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, 
Uganda, Iran, Pakistan, Bahrain, Brunei-Darussalam, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina-Faso, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sudan, Syria, Suriname, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Iraq, Oman, Gabon, Gambia, 
Guyana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, Comoros, Kyrgyz, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, 
Cote D’Ivoire, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Malaysia, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria and Yemen. See the official website of the OIC http://www.oic-
oci.org/member_states.asp [accessed on December 23, 2008].  
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with the non-Muslim States. This is important because it will form one of the 
foundational bases for comparison between the application of Islamic 
diplomatic and international diplomatic law in this study. At least, there is the 
need to know the extent at which the Muslim States conform with 
international diplomatic law in their various diplomatic interactions amongst 
themselves, and with other non-Muslim States. 
 
It should be noted that most of the Muslim States have signed and ratifiedthe 
two globally recognised diplomatic and consular legal frameworks: the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (hereinafter referred to as ‘VCDR’) and 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter referred to as ‘VCCR’). 
As such, they are duty bound to carry out their commitments under the terms 
of the international treaties. The Muslim States that will be considered are the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Libya. For 
example the 2011 killing of the two Pakistanis by Raymond Davis, an 
American, who was considered by the United States government as having a 
diplomatic status; the 1979 Iranian invasion of the American Embassy in 
Tehran; and the 1983 shooting from the Libyan Embassy killing a British 
woman police officer are practical instances of how some Muslim States 
respond to their diplomatic responsibilities. This study will critically analyse 
and examine these three cases using the parameter of the principles of  
Islamic diplomatic law. The study will also consider whether Muslim States 
see any incompatibility between Islamic diplomatic law and international 
diplomatic law. We would need to check whether Muslim States have entered 
 .32 
 
reservations or interpretive declarations to the relevant international treaties 
and on what basis. If there are instances of reservations or interpretive 
declarations, efforts will be made to see whether the Islamic or international 
legal principles could be interpreted in a particular way to get a harmonised 
interpretation.  
 
1.2.3 The Attacks of Muslim Armed Groups on Diplomats and 
Diplomatic Facilities. 
While the third inquiry raises a crucial question as Muslim armed groups have 
attacked and continue to attack diplomatic missions and personnel. The 
recent killing of a Saudi Arabian diplomat and string of attacks on the United 
States and other Western diplomatic missions and personnel in Pakistan are 
typical examples. The assertion made by Kelsay and Johnson that ‘[not] all 
Muslims are prepared to reach an accommodation with public international 
law’49 is not far away from the truth. This is so because there are some 
Muslims who strictly stand by the Sharia’h to the extent that they would not 
accept ‘the legitimacy of any non-Islamic legal system’.50 Kelsay and Johnson 
further state that they ‘include members of some of the radical, fundamental 
groups in the Muslim world’.51 They tend to find justification in their 
interpretation of the concept of jihaad as the basis for their attacks. In their 
rebellion, they take up arms against Muslim State governments as well as 
foreign nations who support Muslim States in their efforts to suppress these 
                                                 
49 AE Mayer, ‘War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law’ in J Kelsay and JT 
Johnson, Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspective on War and Peace in 
Western and Islamic Traditions (Green Press, New York 1991), p. 199 
50 Ibid  
51 Ibid 
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domestic rebellions. These rebellions are generally described as terrorism and 
extremism. It is important to see the response of the Muslim States to this 
misinterpretation and misapplication of the principles of jihaad, and how the 
Muslim States eventually treat the violation of international diplomatic law by 
these Muslim groups, who are mostly non-State actors. It is also important to 
state that the rebellious acts of these non-State actors may not inform the 
interpretation of international law or Islamic international law principles since 
they are not considered as a sovereign entity. However, the practice of non-
State actors may provide evidence of how the two legal principles of 
diplomatic immunity are applied in and by Muslim States. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Approaches to the Study 
This study analyses the two legal systems: international diplomatic law and 
Islamic diplomatic law with a view of ascertaining the presence of any 
compatibility or tension in their respective principles. In order to further 
appreciate this analysis, the study acknowledges the different approaches 
adopted by scholars in arriving at their various conclusions. Three of these 
different approaches (non-compatibility approach, compatibility approach and 
reconciliatory approach) will be briefly discussed below: 
 
 
1.3.1 Non-Compatibility Approach 
The question of non-compatibility between Islamic siyar and international law 
has generated controversy among writers of international law. The exponents 
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of the exclusivist theoretical view argue that modern international law along 
with its principles do not and cannot accommodate any rules or principles of  
Islamic international law due to the absence of any grounds of congruency 
between the two legal regimes. Berger was very blunt in his view regarding 
the non-compatibility between the two legal systems, and he maintains that 
‘Islamic international law may be of great historical interest and Islamic 
source of inspiration for Islamic militants, but it has no relevance whatsoever 
for contemporary international law’.52 Also in summarising the argument on 
the cognitive differences between Islamic international law and public 
international law, Westbrook came to the conclusion that ‘Islamic law has no 
authoritative place for institutions, particularly nations, and institutional 
authority is basic to public international law. . . Islamic law takes meaning 
from certain narratives, and those narratives are inapposite to public 
international law.’53 To make his statement very clear, he sums it up by 
stating that ‘Islamic international law, in the sense used by the scholars 
surveyed here, cannot speak to international environment composed of 
institutions, and so cannot address the business of public international law.’54  
 
The attempt of those who perceive Islamic siyar as being compatible in its 
sources-doctrine with the modern international law has been strongly 
criticised by Ford as attempts to ‘merely whitewash genuine discrepancies 
                                                 
52 M Berger, op cit., (2008), p. 107 
53 DA Westbrook, op cit., (1992-1993), p. 883 
54 Ibid  
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between international norms and the principle grounding the siyar’.55 He 
further itemised areas which he sees as gronunds of non-compatibility in the 
following words: ‘The siyar cannot be said to be genuinely compatible with 
modern international jurisprudence with respect to treaty principles, 
customary law, general principles of law, precedent, or even the teaching of 
eminent publicists.’56 The question of whether the sources of Islamic siyar are 
incompatible with the sources-doctrine of international law, as mentioned 
above, is carefully considered in Chapter 3 of this study where it is argued 
that there are some elements of compatibility between them even though 
they appear incompatibility in their respective origin. 
  
1.3.2 Compatibility Approach. 
This approach is expounded by considerable number of Muslim scholars.57 
The approach emerges from the argument on how the sources of the two 
legal systems are perceived and how some fundamental principles of Islamic 
law are applied, such as the concept of jihaad; the concept of dividing the 
world into dar al-Islaam (abode of peace), dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar 
as-sulh (abode of treaty); and the law of treaties. The proponents of this 
approach contend that the basic principles of Islamic siyar are not only 
identical with the modern principles entrenched in international law, but that 
                                                 
55
 Christopher A. Ford, ‘Siyar-ization and Its Discontents: International Law and Islam’s 
Constitutional Crisis’, (1995), 30, Texas Int’l Law Journal, p. 500 
56 Ibid  
57 S Mahmassani, op cit., (1968);J Rehman, Islamic States Practices, International Law and 
The Threat From Terrorism: A Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the New World Order, 
(Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2005); and HM Zawati, Is Jihad A Just War? War, Peace and 
Human Rights Under Islamic and Public International Law, (The Edwin Mellen Press, Wales 
2001)    
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they ‘may even be said to be part of that doctrine or philosophy’ that 
constitute international law.58 They also contend that there are elements of 
similarities in the sources of Islamic international law and the sources of 
public international law as stated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as ‘SICJ’). For instance, 
in the analogical deduction made by Zawati, while comparing the similarities 
in the two legal systems, he says that: 
 
The texts of international covenants may be compared to the 
texts of the Holy Qur’an and the true Prophetic hadiths. In many 
respect, the international agreements are equivalent to the 
treaties made by the Prophet Muhammad, the rightly-guided 
Caliphs (al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun) and later Muslim rulers. 
Moreover, the opinions of Western scholars often parallel the legal  
opinions and works issued by Muslim jurists.59  
 
This study considers the compatibility approach, not to contrive a ground of 
absolute similarity in the sources of these two legal systems or to forge 
recognition and relevance for Islamic law within the contemporary 
international legal order. But rather, to find grounds of commonality within 
the doctrinal sources of diplomatic law of Islam and international diplomatic 
law with a view to realising for the benefit of humanity the universal principles 
set out in the UN Charter. 
                                                 
58 S Mahmassani, op cit., (1968), p.205 
59HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 6 
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1.3.3 Reconciliatory Approach 
The third approach is in a way connected with the compatibility approach in 
the sense that where absolute compatibility is not achievable then, a 
reconciliatory bridge that is capable of linking the two legal systems will have 
to be resorted to.60 This, in a nutshell, also explains, in addition to the 
compatibility approach, the approach this study may adopt. 
  
There are many Muslim scholars and also non-Muslim writers who suggest 
the adoption of the reconciliatory approach. Amongst them are Shihata,61 
Khadduri,62 Baderin,63 Shah,64 Badr,65 Weeramantry66 to mention but a few. 
For example, Khadduri sees the active involvement of Muslim States in the 
activities of the United Nations and its agents and international conferences 
as a demonstration that ‘the dar al-Islam [abode of Islam] has at least 
reconciled itself to a peaceful co-existence with dar al-harb [abode of war]’.67 
It may also be correct to suggest that the participation of Muslim States in 
these international gathering may be as a result of embracing the third 
division of the world into dar as-sulh (abode of treaty). At least, it has long 
been established, in the words of Shihata, that once ‘fighting ceased to be 
                                                 
60 See NA Shah, Women, The Koran and International Human Rights Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2006), Pp. 8-13 
61 I Shihata, ‘Islamic Law and the World Community’, (1962) 4 Harvard Int’l C J, p. 107 
62 M Khadduri, ‘Islam and Modern Law of Nations’, (1956) 50 AJIL, Pp. 370-371 
63 MA Baderin, ‘The Evolution of Islamic Law of Nations and Modern International Order: 
Universal Peace through Mutuality and Cooperation’, (2000) AJISS, p. 59 
64 NA Shah, op cit., (2006), Pp. 8-13 
65 GM Badr, ‘A Survey of Islamic International Law’, (1982) 76 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc., p. 58 
66 CG Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective, (Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 1988), p. 166 
67 M Khadduri, op cit., (1956), Pp. 370-371 
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normal state of affairs between the two Dars [the two worlds], a third division 
[dar as-sulh] was formed to contain the territories which had treaty relations 
with Dar al Islam’.68 Of course, international treaty plays a very important role 
in nations actively participating within the international community.  
 
Also, it has been observed by Weeramantry that there is an urgent need for 
negotiation between ‘non-Islamic’ and ‘Islamic’ countries on a lot of matters 
including ‘war and peace’ which will facilitate a common understanding and 
co-operation. He cited the case of US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
where the American government kept referring to well-accepted principles of 
diplomatic immunity all from the Western law perspective, without making 
any reference to Islamic law which is equally ‘rich in principles relating to the 
treatment of foreign embassies and personnel’.69 His conclusion, however, 
epitomises the essence of the reconciliatory approach thus: 
 
Had such authority been cited by the USA, it would have had a 
three-fold effect: its persuasive value would have been immensely 
greater; it would have shown an appreciation and understanding of 
Islamic culture; and it would have induced a greater readiness on 
the Iranian side to negotiate from a base of common 
understanding.70 
 
                                                 
68 I Shihata, op cit., (1962), p. 107 
69 CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p. 166 
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In addition, Badr also contends that there are specific principles of Islamic 
siyar that ‘lend themselves to consolidating and expanding the scope of 
contemporary international law.’71 He mentions the sanctity of agreements 
and the rule of reciprocal treatment as the principles of Islamic siyar which 
also encompass the whole body of international law.72  
 
After all, if international law of today is to remain truly international, there is a 
need for a ‘greater participation by the other legal systems in the formulation 
and development’ of its general principles. This becomes necessary because, 
as Baderin asserts, Muslim countries have ‘an important role to play in the 
modern international order through an evolutionary interpretation and 
injection of the paradigmatic ideals of Islam into the pragmatic policies of the 
modern international order’.73 
 
1.4 Significance of the Compatibility Approach 
Methodological differences make the study of compatibility particularly 
important. Moreover, as one intends to adhere to the compatibility approach 
while analysing legal questions in this study, it may also become necessary to 
apply the reconciliatory approach to resolve legal tension if need be. 
However, it is important to first consider whether Islamic law is comparable 
with the contemporary international law. Just as domestic law has been found 
                                                 
71 GM Badr, op cit., (1982) p. 58 
72 Ibid, p. 59 
73 MA Baderin, op cit., (2000), p. 59  
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to be comparable with international law,74 it is also possible to have a 
comparative analysis between Islamic law and international law. It should be 
remembered that States that have adopted Islamic law as their legal system 
such as Saudi Arabia, Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Islamic Republic of 
Iran considered it as their domestic law as well.  Islamic law, though, seen as 
a religious law due to the Qur’an and Sunnah which are basic divine texts of 
the Muslims being its primary sources.75 The fact remains that Islamic law 
governs the activities between God and man on the one hand, and the 
dealings between man and man on the other hand.76 This presupposes that it 
covers both religious and secular aspects of the law. Within the secular 
domain of the law, comes Islamic international law which regulates the 
conducts of the Muslim States with the international community.77 
Comparative study has been considered necessary for the purposes of (1) 
analytical jurisprudence that is the comprehension of the conceptions and 
principles of the two legal systems that is being compared; (2) historical 
jurisprudence that is the understanding of the purpose of development of the 
two legal systems under consideration; and (3) ethical jurisprudence that is 
having a better analysis of the practical merits and demerits of the two legal 
systems.78 Aside from the purposes mentioned above, in the words of 
Salmond, ‘the comparative study of law would be merely futile’.79  
                                                 
74 See A Cassese, International Law, (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2005), p. 213 
75 NA Shah, Self-Defense in Islamic and International Law: Assessing Al-Qaeda and the 
Invasion of Iraq, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008), p. 6  
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid 
78 J Salmond, (Glanville L. Williams ed.) Jurisprudence  (10th edn., 1947), Pp. 7-8 cited in BA 
Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, (Thomson West, USA 2004), p. 300  
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This study tends to make use of the analytical and historical jurisprudential 
purposes in its comparative approach with the aim of deducing any 
compatibility between Islamic diplomatic law and international diplomatic law 
which aims at achieving the following objectives. First, to see whether Islamic 
law accord the same inviolability and immunities to diplomatic envoys as 
international diplomatic law. Also, to examine whether non-state actors’ 
actions against diplomatic missions can be successfully prosecuted in Muslim 
states? Second, if both legal systems are compatible, could Islamic diplomatic 
law complement international diplomatic law? And third, if on the other hand, 
both systems of law are incompatible, can there be ways of reconciling both 
legal systems? In addition, to see the application of international diplomatic 
law in Muslim States in a fashion that is compatible with Islamic law. 
  
1.5 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
In an era where the world is fast coming together under the canopy of 
globalisation, it will be necessary to bring the Islamic legal system under the 
scrutiny of international legal mechanisms for the purpose of having a cross-
fertilisation of the two legal systems. Most especially in a period when Islamic 
law, particularly Islamic siyar with its components for instance, Islamic human 
rights law, Islamic environmental law, law of armed conflict in Islam, is being 
critically evaluated vis-à-vis modern international law. This also happens to be 
a period when the legal atmosphere in most of the Muslim countries does not 
fully reflect the standard sets down by Islamic law. However, regardless of 
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the short fall in the practices of these Muslim States, this does not diminish 
the importance  of  Islamic law principles as presented in the conclusion of a 
Seminar on Human Rights in Islam thus: ‘Regrettably enough, contemporary 
Islamic practices cannot be said to conform in many aspects with the true 
principles of Islam. Further, it is wrong to abuse Islam by seeking to justify 
certain political systems in the face of obvious contradictions between those 
systems and Islamic law.’80   
 
The aim of this study may therefore be suggestive of the title of the entire 
research:  ‘Islamic Diplomatic Law and International Diplomatic Law: A Quest 
for Compatibility.’ That is, looking at the areas of compatibility and possibly, 
tension between Islamic diplomatic law and international diplomatic law. 
Where the principles are compatible, then they complement each other. But 
in case of conflict in their principles, we may then have to resort to available 
Islamic juristic principles as well as the principles of international law, with a 
view to bringing about reconciliation between the two legal systems. 
Therefore, the objectives and aims of this study are: i) To facilitate a better 
understanding of the relationship between international diplomatic law and 
Islamic diplomatic law; and ii) To ultimately maximise diplomatic protection by 
clarifying and developing Islamic diplomatic law which may eventually, 
complement international diplomatic law.81 
                                                 
80 International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights in Islam: Report of  a Seminar held in 
Kuwait in December, 1980 (1982), p. 7 
81 This falls in line with the view expressed by Weeramantry regarding the famous case of US 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran that if the US had cited the diplomatic principles as 
enshrined in the Islamic law in addition with the international law principles, ‘it would have 
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It is hoped, however, that these aims and objectives will find a common 
ground within the doctrinal sources of Islamic diplomatic law and international 
diplomatic law.82 
 
1.6 Methodology and Terminology 
This study is mainly based on the qualitative research method. It compares 
the fundamental sources of Islamic law, they are the Qur’an and the Sunnah, 
with the sources of international diplomatic law – international conventions, 
international customs and general principles of law. The study also considers 
the notion of ijtihaad which is utilised to devise the methods by which Islamic 
law could be further advanced. These methods are known as the concepts of 
ijma’a and qiyaas. These sources and legal methods of Islamic law are guided 
by principles such as local customs (‘urf), public interest (maslahah) and 
juristic preference (istihsaan). It is obvious from the nature of the aims stated 
above that substantial part of this study particularly the theoretical aspect of 
it will involve documentary analysis based on a black letter approach. In other 
words, the research methodology will be based on a traditional legal analysis, 
relying on information that already exists in some form, such as books, 
journal articles, case reports, legislations, statements and resolutions by the 
United Nations, the work of other international inter-governmental bodies and 
historical records. There will also be the need to engage in on-the-spot first 
                                                                                                                                            
induced a greater readiness on the Iranian side to negotiate from a base of common 
understanding’. CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p. 166  
82See Article 1(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 1945 (San Francisco) available at  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml [accessed 06 October, 2008]  
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hand analysis of the current laws and practices in some Muslim States where, 
for example, Islamic law is in force which, in a sense, could constitute case 
studies. This will afford me an opportunity of knowing how  Islamic diplomatic 
law relates with and accommodates diplomatic personnel from non-Muslim 
countries, and how the non-Muslim countries have, in turn, reciprocated by 
hosting the Muslim diplomatic personnel in their respective countries. 
 
The study also recognises the difficulty in the vocabulary used in some 
chapters particularly for those who are not familiar with the Arabic 
terminologies. I have carefully set out their meanings in a brief glossary. Also, 
in this study, the word ’siyar’83 has been used as a rough equivalent of Islamic 
international law. Literally, the term ‘siyar’ means ‘a particular manner of 
conduct as recorded in the biography of an exemplary person’,84 and it could 
also, when used in a singular form (seerah), refer to any biography but 
generally, it is used in reference to the biography of Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh). In discussing Islamic international law, it is generally used by jurists 
to mean the conduct of State relationship with other communities and 
nations. The usage of the term siyar was first popularised in the second 
century of Islam by the Hanafi jurists particularly, Muhammad ibn Hasan As-
Shaybani (d. 804) although, the actual meaning of the word siyar was not 
given by Shaybani.85 As-Sarakhsi (490/1096) who wrote commentary on 
Shaybani’s Siyar gave a clear definition of siyar as describing ’the conduct of 
                                                 
83Also referred to as ‘As-Siyar’ when used as a definite noun 
84 JL Esposito (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, (OUP, 2003), p. 297 
85 Ibid; S Mahmassani, op cit., (1968), p. 235; M Khadduri (tr), op cit., (1966), p. 40 
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the believers in their relations with the unbelievers of enemy territory as well 
as with the people with whom the believers had made treaties, who may have 
been temporarily (musta’mins) or permanently (Dhimmis) in Islamic lands; 
with apostates, who were the worst of the unbelievers, since they abjured 
after they accepted [Islam]; and with rebels (baghis). . .’86 Various issues 
touching on  Islamic international law are mostly discussed by jurists under 
siyar. The two terms, ‘siyar’ and ‘Islamic international law’ are therefore used 
interchangeably in this study. It is worth mentioning that the term Islamic 
diplomatic law which is used throughout this study, forms part of the siyar.  
  
1.7 Outline of Chapters 
This study is divided into 7 chapters and an introduction. Chapter 1 touches 
on the general background of the research; the various research questions 
that need to be addressed; and the methodology adopted in carrying out this 
research. Chapter 2 considers the scope and historical origin of diplomatic law 
which covers the definitional problems. While digging into the antiquity and 
universality of diplomatic practice, a probe into the impact and contribution of 
the Islamic civilisation to the growth and development of diplomatic law is 
also taken into account.  
 
Chapter 3 dwells on the sources of diplomatic law both under the 
conventional international law and Islamic jurisprudence in a comparative 
                                                 
86M Khadduri, (tr), op cit., (1966), p. 40, quoting Shams al-Din Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn 
Sahl al Sarakhsi, Kitab al-Mabsut (Cairo, 1960), p. 2 
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fashion with a view to answering the question of materiality between the two 
legal regimes. That is, to what extent can the argument of some writers who 
hold on to the view that there is no element of materiality between  Islamic 
siyar and the rules of modern international law be sustainable? The exactitude 
of this argument of materiality or otherwise is critically evaluated and 
examined by considering the proper meaning and implication of the provisions 
of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
  
Chapter 4 contains a macroscopic overview of diplomatic immunities and 
privileges by expatiating on the three classical theories – representative 
character, exterritoriality and functional necessity - which represent the 
juridical rationale for diplomatic immunity. Also contained in this chapter is a 
quest into which amongst these primary legal theories forms a basis for 
diplomatic immunity under Islamic law. The chapter also discusses events 
leading to the codification of diplomatic relations and the various kind of 
diplomatic inviolability and immunities spelt out in the VCDR and the VCCR. 
This chapter also delves into the important position Islamic law confers on the 
personality of the diplomatic envoy from the Qur’an, Sunnah (Prophetic 
tradition) and historical points of view. This chapter also examines in much 
detail, the relevance of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 AD) to modern 
diplomatic law by considering issues bothering on its compatibility with the 
provisions of the VCDR, VCCR and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (hereinafter referred to as VCLT); the concept of pacta sunt servanda 
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as it relates to treaties; the concept of reciprocity; exchange of envoys; and 
aman - safe conduct.  
 
Since the essence of diplomatic privileges and immunities goes beyond the 
individual interest but to protect and guarantee unhampered channel of 
communications between States, it therefore behoves the diplomatic and 
consular personnel to observe and respect the laws of the receiving States. 
Chapter 5 of this study therefore focuses on the diplomatic practices of some 
Muslim States such as Pakistan, Iran and Libya. The double murder 
committed by Raymond Davis, an American, in Lahore, Pakistan, whom the 
United States claimed had diplomatic immunity will be evaluated in the light 
of the Pakistan diplomatic and consular law and the eventual intervention of 
the Islamic criminal law as operated in Pakistan. In Iran, the Case Concerning 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran where some group of 
militant students invaded and held members of the United States diplomatic 
staff as hostages will be critically evaluated using the parameter of Islamic 
diplomatic law. While the Libyan case has to do with the shooting that came 
out from the Libyan Embassy in London, killing a woman police officer, 
Constable Yvonne Fletcher. Would the case be treated differently under 
Islamic diplomatic law? This question will also be answered in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 6 examines the vulnerability of the diplomatic mission and personnel 
especially in this era when terrorism has become not only institutionalised but 
also internationalised. In doing this, the chapter highlights the doctrine of 
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jihaad under the Islamic law in contradistinction with the acts of terrorism; 
and further considers whether the act of terrorism perpetrated against 
diplomatic missions and personnel is justified under the principles of the 
Islamic jihaad. The chapter then concludes with how the acts of terrorism are 
treated in Muslim countries under the Islamic law.     
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study with recapitulations of general observations, 
evaluations and recommendation.
 .49 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF DIPLOMATIC 
PRACTICE  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The world at large appears to have adopted a uniform kind of diplomatic 
practice which could be described as universal, particularly with respect to the 
exchange of diplomatic missions and personnel and the various types of 
diplomatic immunities attached to them. The amount of immunities given to 
diplomatic agents stems from the great importance ancient civilisations 
attached to the need for nations to remain in constant communication and 
unimpaired interrelations. When we talk of communication between societies, 
an embassy plays a different and vital role in this regard. It is quite different 
from the communication one gets from commercial exchanges; religious 
pilgrims; educational pursuit; transfer of slaves; and communication provoked 
by soldiers during war.1 This is so because of the peaceful role the embassies 
play even during wartime to enhance communication between nations.2  
 
This chapter will first consider various meanings surrounding the word 
‘diplomacy’ and ‘diplomatic law’ and then emphasise its relevance to 
international law. Then, the historical analysis of diplomatic practice in 
                                                 
1D Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2005), Pp. 85-86 
2 Ibid., p. 86 
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different civilizations, such as the Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese, African and 
Islamic civilizations, will be discussed with a view to establishing the 
universality of diplomatic practice. This chapter will also discuss the 
contribution of Islamic law to the development of the concept of international 
diplomatic law by examining the interactions between the Islamic and 
Western civilizations. By so doing, it will then become easier to determine 
whether there is compatibility between Islamic diplomatic law and 
international diplomatic law. 
 
2.2 Defining Diplomacy and Diplomatic Law 
 
It has, however, been observed that the word ‘diplomacy’ along with its 
derivatives, such as ‘diplomatist’ and ‘diplomatic envoys’, only gained currency 
following the institutionalisation of permanent legation in the late eighteenth 
century.3 Contrary to this observation, Jonsson and Hall4 perceive diplomacy 
beyond the modern day structure of state system. According to them, 
diplomacy is a ’perennial international institution that expresses a human 
condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the 
sovereign territorial states of the past few hundred years.’5 To them, 
diplomacy is a phenomenon that is timeless in its existence.  
 
Diplomacy, by its concept and practice, is a field of study that cannot be said 
to reside exclusively in or relate only to a particular discipline. It outstrips the 
                                                 
3 R Jennings and R Watts, (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, (9th edn., Addison Wesley 
Longman Inc., New York 1996) p.1054  
4 C Jonsson and M Hall, Essence of Diplomacy, (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 2005), p.3 
5 P Sharp, ‘For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations’, (1999) 1 
International Studies Review, p.51  
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verges of any particular discipline as it is interdisciplinary in relevance and 
scope.6 In spite of its general relevance to various fields of knowledge, it 
however remains ‘a neglected field of academy study.’7 Nevertheless, there 
have been commendable attempts by many writers towards giving a lucid 
meaning to the term ‘diplomacy’. Satow, for example, in his magnum opus, A 
Guide to Diplomatic Practice, has compendiously defined diplomacy as ‘the 
application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between 
the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their 
relations with vassal states.’8 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary has equally defined diplomacy as the 
‘management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which 
these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the 
business or art of the diplomatist.’9 It is pertinent to mention that Nicolson’s 
liberal realist perception of diplomacy, though firmly rooted in the Graeco-
Roman ancient political theory, is not in substance, different from the 
previous definition given by the Oxford Dictionary.10 Nicolson also makes clear 
his lack of conviction in the indivisibility of foreign policy and diplomacy when 
expounding by way of distinction, ‘the curative methods of diplomacy’ and the 
‘surgical necessities of foreign policy’11 in the following words: 
                                                 
6 W Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in Globalized Relation, (Springer, Berlin 
Heidelberg 2007) p.2 
7 Ibid 
8 E Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, (Longman, Green and Co. London 1932), p.1 
9 See The Oxford Engish Dictionary, Vol. 3, (Claredon Press, Oxford 1933), Pp. 385-386 
10 D Drinkwater, Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005), p. 89. 
11 Ibid. P.90 
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Diplomacy . . . is not an end but a means; not a purpose but 
a method. It seeks, by the use of reason, conciliation and the 
exchange of interests, to prevent major conflicts arising 
between sovereign states. It is the agency through which 
foreign policy seeks to attain its purposes by agreement 
rather than by war. Thus when agreement becomes 
impossible diplomacy, which is the instrument of peace, 
becomes inoperative; and foreign policy, the final sanction of 
which is war, alone becomes operative.12 
 
Meanwhile, Nicolson’s distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy has 
not gone unquestioned. Kissinger, in particularly, has challenged it for being 
inadequate because, according to him, the effectiveness of diplomacy cannot 
be divorced from the domestic structure of the states, which invariably, 
includes international order.13 In acknowledging the fusion that exists 
between diplomacy and foreign policy, Burton also argues that the use of 
diplomacy will be maximized when it includes the entire process of managing 
relations with other states and international institutions.14 The all-involving 
nature of diplomacy brings a considerable amount of exactitude to the 
statement of Lord Strang, a former British diplomat who is reported to have 
said that: ’In a world where war is everybody’s tragedy and everybody’s 
                                                 
12 H Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822, (Constable, 
London 1946) Pp. 164-165 
13 H Kissinger,  ‘The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal’  (1956) 8 World Politics, p. 264 
14 JW Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules, (The University Press, Cambridge 1968), 
p.199 
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nightmare, diplomacy is everybody’s business.’15 The fact is that diplomacy 
can no longer be restrictively seen in its traditional sense as a mere conduct 
of foreign affairs of sovereign nations. It has indeed outlived that era. 
Diplomacy has now become much relevant and related to foreign policy and 
to the process of foreign policymaking.16  
 
It is important to state that likening diplomacy to an obscure art concealed in 
the folds of deceit believing that ‘it can exist only in the darkness of 
mystery’17 will not arguably, garner any momentum. Accepting this contention 
amounts to giving credence to the view that the ambassador can be depicted 
as ‘an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.’18 The mere 
fact that the diplomat is saddled with the task of managing and portraying the 
beautiful image of his country abroad, will not still justify this assertion. This 
is because the functional essence of diplomatic relations transcends the art of 
lie-telling or deceit. The main essence of diplomatic intercourse has, from 
time immemorial been, and still remains an amiable apparatus through which 
nations ensure and maintain regular contacts.19 One cannot but agree with 
the view that contemporary diplomacy now finds comfort in adapting to new 
                                                 
15 This statement is quoted from W Bolewiski, op cit., (2007), p.2 
16 See PC Habib, ‘The Practice of Modern Diplomacy’, (1979) 9 Cal. W. Int’l L. J., p. 485  
17 This assertion is attributed to the eighteenth century French writer, Le Trosne. See AS 
Eban, The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
London 1983), Pp. 384-385 
18 This is the observation of Sir Henry Wotton (1568-1639) contained in the album of 
Christopher Flickmore and quoted from LC Green, ‘Trends in the Law Concerning Diplomats’, 
(1981) 19 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, p. 132 
19 M Griffiths and T O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, (Routledge, 
London 2002), p. 79 
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prevailing conditions.20 This view cannot be far from the truth, more so as it 
has now become apparent that the 21st century diplomacy is not just an 
amicable process of inter-state relations, but an all-purposed modus of 
communication among the international community.21 
 
Diplomatic law, on the other hand, becomes necessary to enhance a smooth 
conduct of official relations and negotiations between independent polities 
including other subjects of international law. It therefore becomes imperative 
that there is in place a set of rules to govern the business of international 
diplomacy. This, in other words, accentuates the essence of diplomatic law 
whose primary aim is not only to facilitate international diplomacy between 
the sending State22 and the receiving State23 but also to govern the 
relationship between representative organs of major players in the 
international diplomatic business.24  
 
Diplomatic law can also, by extension, if considered from a wider perspective, 
refer to the norms of international law regulating all other international law 
subjects such as international organisations, in addition to diplomatic 
institutions.25 It has been observed however, that these international law 
norms regulating diplomatic and consular interactions for ages were basically 
                                                 
20 R Langhorne, ‘Current Development in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now?’, (1997) 8 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, p.23 
21 W Bolewski, op. cit., (2007), p.2  
22
 That is the home State of the head of a diplomatic mission 
23
 That is the State which receives the diplomatic mission and personnel 
24 See R Higgins, ‘The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom 
Experience’, (1985) 79 AJIL, No. 3, p. 641  
25 L Dembinski, Modern Law of Diplomacy: External Missions of States and International 
Organizations,(Springer-Verlag, New York LLC 1988), p.1 
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customary26 before they were later codified and embodied in the two Vienna 
Conventions: the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 VCCR.  
 
It is important to mention that the general scope of this study will be confined 
within the context of diplomatic law as it relates to diplomatic missions and 
their personnel.  
 
2.3 Diplomatic Law in Antiquity 
The pre-historic nature of the concept of diplomatic immunity and inviolability 
has been abundantly stressed in various distinguished scholarly publications.27 
However, a cursory glimpse into the pages of history regarding this very 
important concept of international law will immensely benefit the purpose of 
this chapter. It is of benefit to mention that the intention here is to place 
diplomatic immunity in historical perspective with a view to making a 
comparative elucidation and examination of its practice amongst the various 
ancient civilizations of which includes that of Islam.  
 
The fact that diplomacy by its nature is primordial and also universal in its 
practice regarding the immunities and inviolability of its personnel is 
remarkably attested to by the preamble to the VCDR which commences thus: 
’recalling that people of all nations from ancient times have recognised the 
status of diplomatic agents. . .’ In further confirming the age-long historical 
                                                 
26 Ibid. P.4 
27 Some of these publications include DJ Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International 
Development of Europe, Vol. I (Longmans, Green & Co., London 1905); H Nicolson, The 
Evolution of Diplomatic Method, (Constable & Co. Ltd., London 1954); G Mattingly, op cit., 
(1955); and Frey and Frey, op cit., (1999)  
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relevance of diplomatic institution along with its attendant privileges and 
immunities, no truer remark can be made of it other than that it has 
enduringly ‘withstood the test of centuries’28 in the words of the ICJ.  
 
It has been copiously argued by legal scholars that the law of diplomatic 
immunity, in its prehistoric contexts, owed its existence and relevance to 
religious belief systems rather than to any legal obligations in the name of 
treaties. The special privileges and immunities enjoyed by emissaries in the 
ancient period were not as a result of strict adherence to any law in the form 
of the present day international law.29 The nexus between the sanctified 
position of the envoys and religious beliefs in ancient Greek, for example, is 
discernable from the declaration made by Alexander when he stated that no 
one shall perform the functions of an embassy ’unless he had first washed his 
hands in water poured over them by heralds, and had made a libation to Zeus 
from goblets wreathed with garlands.’30 This obvious influence of religion in 
the early practice of diplomatic immunity is present virtually in all the known 
civilisations of the past. It has however, been submitted that the influence of 
religion on this age-long concept of international law cannot claim to be 
                                                 
28 US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (1980) ICJ Rep. 3, p. 19 
29
 See LS Frey and ML Frey, op. cit., (1999), p. 16 while commenting on the importance of 
religious belief in the imposition of sanction against acts of discretion of the inviolability of 
diplomatic envoys, he maintains that “[h]arming a herald violated divine law, for all power 
and all authority emanated from the gods. Sanctions would inevitably follow.” See also L 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, (3rd edn, The Lawbook Exchange Limited New 
Jersey 2005) p. 769; B Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice, 
(Martins Nijhoff Publishers, London 1988) ; E Young, ‘The Development of the Law of 
Diplomatic Relations’, (1964) 40 Brit. Y. B. Int’l L., p. 142; and JC Barker, op cit., (2006), p.29 
30 See Gentilis, De Legationibus Libris Tres. Vol. II, p. 58 
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dominant.31 But then, it remains a historical fact that early diplomatic practice 
relied, to a greater extent, on the sanctity of religion to safeguard and protect 
the personality of the envoys.32 
 
Various civilizations of the past confirm the universality of early practice of 
diplomatic intercourse and diplomatic inviolability, albeit in varying degrees. A 
glance into the pages of history reveals the presence of historical evidence 
pointing towards the availability of rudiments of diplomatic activities and the 
sanctity of diplomatic personality which are traceable to ancient civilisations of 
the Greeks, Romans, Islam, Chinese, Africans and Indians to mention but a 
few.33 It has, however, been observed that dwellers of medieval societies 
evolved their own methods of declaring wars, resolving conflicts and 
negotiating commercial transactions amongst themselves. These very 
important activities inevitably required the services of intercommunity 
messengers whose freedom of movement, personal immunities and safety 
had to be guaranteed if they were to discharge their tasks effectively.34 An 
insight into the extent to which the concept of diplomatic immunity has left its 
impression on the pages of early history will be better appreciated by 
considering, with substantial amount of precision, some of these civilisations.  
                                                 
31
 JC Barker op cit., (2006), p.33 
32 JC Barker, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: A Necessary Evil?, 
(Aldershot, Dartmouth 1996), p. 34 
33 See JC Barker, op cit., (2006), p.29; M Ogdon, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity, 
(John Byrne & Co., Washington D.C. 1936) pp.10-14; and SV Viswanatha, International Law 
in Ancient India, (Green & Co., Longmans 1925) 
34 R Numelin, The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and 
International Relations, (Oxford University Press, London 1950), p.131. The outcome of the 
anthropological studies of the primitive societies carried out by Dr. Ragnar Numelin revealed 
that emissaries were known to enjoy high degree of generosity and hospitality from their host 
which even went as far as including ‘sexual privileges’. See also G McClanahan, Diplomatic 
Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems, (St. Martin’s Press, New York 1989), p.19    
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2.3.1. Diplomatic Practice in the Greek Civilization 
The classical age of the Greek States was overwhelmed by intra-states wars 
which necessitated the formation of loose and temporary alliances with a view 
to fortifying themselves against their adversaries.35 The services of envoys 
were required to facilitate the endorsement of these alliances and also broker 
peace if need be. Not only were these emissaries granted immunity to enable 
them safely discharge this highly exacting task, they were equally placed 
under the divine protection of Zeus.36 Desecration of the sanctity of any of 
these emissaries was considered to be synonymous to perpetrating a heinous 
sin against the gods.37  
 
The diplomatic system of the ancient Greeks, though considered to be 
parochial and rudimentary in scope and application,38 has often been 
considered as a source of reference when talking about the history of 
diplomatic immunity.39 Just as in most of the ancient civilizations, 
ambassadorial position in ancient Greece was strictly ad hoc in character. 
                                                 
35
 K Hamilton and R Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and 
Administration, (Routledge, London & New York 1995) 
36 According to the Greek mythology, Zeus is the principal god of the Greek pantheon, ruler 
of the heavens and Mount Olympus and the father of other gods and mortal heroes. See W 
Burkert, Greek Religion, (Harvard University Press, 1985), p.125 
37 See G McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems, (St. Martin’s 
Press, New York 1989), p. 21 
38 Raymond Cohen makes this submission while drawing a line of distinction between the 
diplomatic system of the Amarna Period which he considered to be more sophisticated and 
that of the ancient Greek which according to him was ‘both rudimentary and parochial’ 
resulting from its ineffective method of public oratory, lack of organisation and resident 
embassies followed by dearth of documentary records. See R Cohen, ‘Reflections on the New 
Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD’ in J Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic 
Practice, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 1999), p.10 
39
 See E Young, op. cit., (1964), p. 142   
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However, much emphasis was placed on the oratory skills in addition to 
wisdom and respectability of those to be appointed to discharge this highly 
honoured task as they were not professional diplomats. And this explains why 
the ambassadorial assignments in early Greece were usually carried out by 
professional orators or actors. The diplomacy of the Greeks has been 
observed to be characterised by two distinct types of diplomatic 
representatives – heralds and ambassadors.40 The heralds were, in most 
cases, individually sent to deliver messages that were uncomplicated while on 
the other hand, the ambassadors who were usually larger in numbers had the 
task of advocating and negotiating on behalf of their states in the courts of 
other sovereigns. 
 
While acknowledging the unparalleled depth of the mechanism of the Greeks     
international and diplomatic intercourse in the fifth century, having evolved 
concepts touching on the declaration of wars, initiation of peace, exchange of 
diplomatic personnel and many more, one still finds the idea behind the 
Greeks’ diplomacy elusive. Perhaps, this points to why it appears difficult to 
find reason to believe that ambassadors in the ancient Greek states had the 
privilege of absolute immunity and inviolability.41 Ambassadors in the then 
Greek states did not only suffer physical assault in the hands of the receiving 
states, but also endured enormous  physical harm and even death, resulting 
                                                 
40 See DJ Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, (Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 
Wiesbaden 1973), p. 81. Also see K Hamilton and R Langhorne, op cit., (1995), p. 9 where it 
is further observed that the Greeks diplomacy identified three kinds of representatives 
namely: angelos or presbys otherwise known as messenger and elder in charge of brief and 
specific missions; keryx otherwise known as heralds conferred with special rights of personal 
safety; and proxenos which can be said to be analogous to a consul.  
41 DJ Mosley, op cit., (1973), p. 83 
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from the unexpected interception by a third State. An apparent example can 
be seen in the delegation of Corinthian, Spartan and Tegeate envoys that 
were killed in Athens. These envoys were on a mission to Persia to solicit the 
support of the King against Athens. Meanwhile, they stopped on their way 
through Thrace to persuade Sitalces to revoke his alliance with Athens. 
Unknown to them, there were two Athenian envoys who were also visiting 
Sitalces who had also succeeded in persuading Sadocus, the son of Sitacles, 
to get these Peloponnesians arrested and had them subsequently executed in 
Athens.42   
 
In addition to the foregoing inadequacy, Nicolson was able to identify three 
reasons to justify his conclusion that the Greeks ‘made a mess of their 
diplomacy’43 notwithstanding its acclaimed excellent concepts in the following 
words: 
 
In the first place, they were afflicted with what Herodian has 
called ‘that ancient malady of the Greeks, the love of discord’. 
Their jealousy was so poisonous that it stung and paralysed 
their instinct for self-preservation. In the second place the 
Greeks were not by temperament good diplomatists, but bad 
diplomatists. Being an amazingly clever people, they ascribed a 
wrong value to ingenuity and stratagem, thereby destroying 
the basis of all sound negotiation, which is confidence. They 
                                                 
42 Ibid 
43 H Nicolson, op cit., (1954), p. 10 
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were moreover tactless and garrulous; they lacked all sense of 
occasion; and they were woefully indiscreet.... In the third 
place they failed, in their external as in their internal affairs, to 
establish a correct distribution of responsibility between the 
Legislature and the executive.... It was this final fault that 
brought them to ruin.44    
 
2.3.2. Diplomatic Practice in the Roman Civilization 
The diplomatic practice in ancient Rome, though ad hoc in nature, was in the 
same way as the Greeks, firmly embedded in their religious beliefs. The 
Romans practice of diplomatic immunity was not only sourced from its belief 
system, but also had a strong affinity to its ‘custom of respect for the sacred 
character of envoys during the early republican era.’45 All issues relating to or 
emanating from the external relations of the ancient Rome were handled by a 
body referred to as the College of Fetials46 relying on the instrumentality of its 
fetial law. It has also been observed that the making and application of this 
law was again deeply-rooted in the Roman religion.47 Adherence to external 
obligations in the form of treaties was perceived as fulfilment of oaths made 
to the Roman gods such as Jupiter. Perhaps, this might have accounted for 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45
G McClanahan, op cit., (1989), p. 22 
46 The College of Fetials, made up of priests, was established by Numa Pompilius, (753 – 673 
BC) the King of Rome and according to Frank is “a semi religious, semi political board which 
from time immemorial supervised the rites peculiar to the swearing of treaties and declaration 
of war, and which formed, as it were, a court of first instance in questions of international 
disputes as the proper treatment of envoys and the execution of extradition.” In addition, the 
Fetials also carried out ambassadorial functions. See T Frank, ‘The Import of the Fetial 
Institution’, (1912) 7 Classical Philology, p.335  
47 JC Barker, op cit., (2006), p.30 
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the credence given to the College of Fetials as a very important point of 
reference when talking about diplomatic activity in early Rome by writers like 
Hill48 and Frank.49 Aside from the fetials, there were the nuntii or oratores 
(another names) for ambassadors, usually appointed by the Senate from 
amongst the Knights. Upon appointment, they were given credentials and 
specific instructions which also define the extent of their authorities.50   
 
The Romans respect for the inviolability of the person of the foreign 
ambassador was also extended to his property throughout the duration of his 
diplomatic mission. There is no evidence however, that this privilege covered 
the official correspondence of the envoy which in most cases, were subjected 
to tremendous sifting.51 Where any member of a foreign mission violated the 
law, such an envoy would be sent back to his country for appropriate 
punishment.52 The Roman State took serious exception to any act of 
maltreatment against the foreign envoy to the extent that any of its citizens 
found to have breached this hospitium53 would be made to face the 
                                                 
48DJ Hill, op cit, (1905), p. 8 
49 T Frank, op cit., (1912), Pp. 335 and 342. Hamilton and Langhorne have also observed that 
the College of Fetials was the only permanent body evolved in ancient Rome with some 
international relations responsibilities. See K Hamilton and R Langhorne, op cit., (1995), p. 14 
It must however, be mentioned that Nicolson finds it difficult to attribute much importance to 
the fetials institution. To him, the College performed no function different from the Treaty 
Department in the United Kingdom which can best be called an archive for treaty documents. 
See H Nicolson, op cit., (1954), p. 18 
50 H Nicolson, op cit., (1954), p. 17 
51 Ibid., p. 18 
52 Ibid 
53 This simply means hospitality. As practiced in both Greece and Rome, it was of a twofold 
nature. It would be hospitium privatum when established between individuals and hospitium 
publicum when established between two states. These two types of hospitality (private and 
public) have, however, been found to be prominently common amongst all the nations of 
Italy having existed at a very early period amongst them. See W Smith, Dictionary of Greek 
and Roman Antiquities, 3rd edn., (1890), Pp. 619-621 
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consequence of noxal surrender.54 This is another form of extradition 
practiced by the early Romans whereby a person who desecrated the sanctity 
of the hospitium bestowed on the foreign envoy was surrendered to the 
aggrieved nation for necessary punishment.55 Instances of such extradition 
have been amply cited by Bederman56 while discussing the ‘Reception and 
Protection of Diplomats and Embassies.’ There are however, reported 
instances where the Roman authority failed to adhere to its proclaimed 
principle of diplomatic inviolability. One of such failures was when the Roman 
Senate rejected the demands made by the fetials calling for the extradition of 
Fabius Ambustus to the Gauls for waging war against his host, the Gauls who 
received him as ambassador.57 Bederman however, does not see reason not 
to applaud the diplomatic conduct of the Romans which according to him has 
generally complied with established norms in spite of this ugly incident which 
he himself considered to be an aberration.58  
 
The increase in the dominant strength of the Roman Empire has been 
observed to be a factor responsible for the contempt with which the Romans 
treated foreign embassies.59 A visiting emissary, for example, must have 
sought with approval from the Roman General, permission to send envoys. 
                                                 
54 JW Rich, Declaring War in the Roman Empire in the Period of Transmarine Expansion,  
(Collection Latomus No. 149, 1976), p. 109 
55 Ibid  
56 DJ Bederman, International Law in Antiquity, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2004), p. 115. He has made reference to the extraditions of Postumius Albinus to the 
Samnites in 321 BCE; Fabius Apronius to the Apolloniates circa 266 BCE; and Lucius Municius 
Myrtilus and Lucius Manlius to the Carthaginians in 188 BCE for offending against the 
embassies of these foreign entities. 
57 C Philipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. 1 
(Macmillan & Co., London 1911), p. 341-342 
58DJ Bederman, op cit., (2004), p. 118 
59 H Nicolson, op cit., (1954), Pp. 18 and 19 
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Upon arrival, these envoys will have to wait at the outskirts of Rome and then 
announce their presence to the quaestor urbanus, who will not give their 
permission to have them admitted to the Graecostasis60 until thorough 
identification and verification have been made on their credentials.61 Where 
such credentials were assessed to be defective or inadequate, the emissaries 
would not only be denied audience but will be required to, without any delay, 
vacate the territory of the Romans.62 But where their credentials were found 
to be in order, they will be required to wait at this point until an audience is 
arranged for them with the Senate. Not until then will they be allowed to 
address the Senate at the Curia. At the end of the address, they will be 
conducted back to the Graecostasis and thereafter returned to the Curia to 
get the senatorial reply.63  
 
It can therefore be rightly submitted that perhaps, the diplomatic intercourse 
of the Roman Empire with other foreign emissaries whose missions mostly 
revolved around rendering tribute and reaffirming unwavering loyalty to the 
Roman hegemony was a reflection of the imperialistic nature of the Roman 
Empire.64 Such a relationship, in the words of Cohen, can best be described 
as one between ‘suzerain and vassal’65 rather than between two equal 
sovereigns as it ought to be. No wonder, Nicolson unhesitatingly attributed 
                                                 
60 This is a place in the Roman forum where the ambassadors of foreign states were 
privileged to stand for the purpose of attending and listening to debates. See W Smith, op 
cit., p. 577  
61 See DJ Bederman, op cit., (2004), p. 105 
62 Ibid 
63
 H Nicolson, op cit., (1954), P. 19 
64 R Cohen, op cit., in J Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York 1999), p. 11 
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the inability of the Romans to appreciate diplomatic niceties and failure to 
bequeath useful lessons that could aid good negotiations to their being ‘too 
dictatorial’ and ‘too masterful’.66   
 
2.3.3. Diplomatic Practice in the Indian Civilization 
In ancient India, emissaries sent on foreign assignments were of three 
different categories: Nisrishtartha – this was an ambassador endowed with 
full authority to negotiate on behalf of the sending state; Parimitartha – an 
ambassador that must not, on any condition, deviate from his instructions; 
and Sasanahara-duta – though an ambassador, but literally means a 
messenger whose main task was to deliver a message without the authority 
to negotiate.67 Like in many other civilizations of ancient times, the exchange 
of diplomatic envoys in the ancient states of India was of temporary nature 
just as the protection of foreign emissaries was firmly sanctioned by the 
Indian ancient religion. It is evidenced from the Ramayana68 that the duta 
being a mere messenger charged with the duty of delivering the message of 
his master, must not be subjected to any punishment even when found to 
have acted in a provocative manner.69 Similarly, a king who kills an 
ambassador, according to the Mahabharata70, will end up in hell fire along 
                                                 
66 H Nicolson, op cit., (1954), Pp. 22-23 
67 AS Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India, (Motilal Banasidass, 2002), Pp. 300 - 
301 
68 This is one of the two prominent epic poems of India. It was composed about 300 BC by 
Valmiki in Sanskrit and it remains an important part of the Hindu canon. See W Buck and BA 
van Nooten Ramayana, (University of California Press, Los Angeles 2000), p. xiii 
69 AS Altekar, op cit, (2002), p. 301 
70 This is the greater of the two famous epic poems of India. It symbolises the Indian cultural 
heritage. Considered in its Sankrit original text, it is arguably the largest epic ever composed. 
See W Buck and  BA van Nooten, Mahabharata, (University of California Press Los Angeles 
2000), p. xiii 
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with his ministers.71 It must, however, be mentioned that the degree of 
immunity and protection the Indians gave to envoys was not without 
limitation thereby undermining the amount of inviolability an envoy was 
privileged to enjoy in ancient India.72 A foreign envoy, for instance, found to 
have committed a crime, flagitious in nature, would not be protected by 
reason of immunity as he could still be mutilated; but then he must not be 
put to death.73 That a representative of a foreign mission must not, for fear of 
death, be dissuaded from accomplishing their mission occupied a fundamental 
position in the ancient Indian foreign relations which states that ’Messengers 
are the mouth-pieces of kings...hence messengers who, in the face of 
weapons raised against them, have to express as exactly as they are 
entrusted...do not...deserve death.’74  
 
There are historical evidence confirming the existence of diplomatic 
intercourse, not only between the ancient Indian states, but also between the 
Mauryan Empire of India and some of the Hellenistic Kingdoms that emerged 
consequent upon the break-up of Alexander’s Empire75. For instance, history 
has it that during the period of Emperor Ashoka, dutas were sent to far States 
like Syria, Egypt, Macedon, Epirus and Cyrene.76  It has also been recorded 
                                                 
71 AS Altekar, op cit., (2002), p. 301 
72 L Rocher, ‘The Ambassador in Ancient India’, (1958) 7 The Indian Yearbook of 
International Affairs, Pp. 344 
73 HL Chatterjee, ‘International Law and Inter-States Relations in India’, (1958) Calcutta, p. 
66 
74 GVG Kirshnamurty, Modern Diplomacy: Dialectics and Dimensions, (Sasar Publications, New 
Delhi, 1980), p. 49  
75 See Ibid., p. 48; B Sen, op cit, (1988), p. 4; G McClanahan, op cit, (1989), p. 23, KA 
Nilakantha Sastri, ‘International Law and Relations in Ancient India’, (1952) 1 India Yearbook 
of International Affairs. 
76 See B Sen, op cit., (1988), p. 4 
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that Indian embassies on missions of good will were sent to China with 
request of some commercial concessions.77 With this, it therefore becomes 
difficult to agree with the submission made by Bederman that ‘there is simply 
no historical evidence to suggest that there was any substantial diplomatic 
contact between Indian and Chinese cultures, nor between these great Asian 
international systems and those of the Near East and Mediterranean.’78 This 
submission however, forms the basis of him excluding India from prominent 
civilisations that have contributed towards the development of international 
law. It is to be noted that the distance of India has, to some extent, 
accounted for the irregularity in its diplomatic contacts with other 
civilizations.79 Also identifiable in the Indian diplomatic tradition was the 
undaunted will of the Indian envoy to carry out espionage activities in the 
host state on behalf of his country. While overtly orchestrating the claims of 
his State in the court of the host State, he would, at the same time, 
clandestinely be assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the host State 
even if it meant resorting to means that can, at best, be described as 
bizarre.80   
 
2.3.4. Diplomatic Practice in the Chinese Civilization 
                                                 
77 AS Altekar, op cit, (2002), p. 300 
78 DJ Bederman, op cit., (2004), p.4 
79 R Cohen, op cit., in J Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York 1999) p.10 
80 See G McClanahan, op cit, (1989), p. 24. Some of these envoys would go as far as secretly 
engaging the services of prostitutes, dancing girls, umbrella bearers, astrologers thereby 
having access to the king within the court with a view to extract useful information. See also 
GK Mookerjee, Diplomacy: Theory and History,  Vol. 1, (Trimurti Publications, New Delhi 
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The diplomatic tradition of the Chinese can be rightly depicted, just like that 
of Greece, as imperialistic and parochial in nature resulting from its ‘rigidly 
hierarchical and ethnocentric attitude’ as observed by Cohen.81 The ancient 
Chinese empire so much believed in the superiority of its culture to the extent 
that it failed to acknowledge the existence of other civilized nations.82 Since to 
the Chinese, China was the sole world State as it was the centre of 
humanity,83 all other non-Chinese were therefore, regarded as barbarians that 
could only be interacted with as unequal vassals.84 It would therefore be 
unexpected that such a nation will relate diplomatically with other nations on 
equal terms. The failure of the Chinese to see other nations as equals have 
been attributed to their tremendous population; the overwhelming quality of 
their civilization; and the remoteness of their geographical location.85 The 
response of the Chinese Emperor to Lord Macartney’s attempt (acting on 
behalf of King George III of the United Kingdom) to establish diplomatic ties 
with China was an indication of the nature of the Chinese diplomatic practice. 
It states thus: 
 
As to the request made in your memorial, O King, to send one 
of your nationals to stay at the celestial court to take care of 
your country’s trade with China, this is not in harmony with 
                                                 
81 See Cohen, R., op cit, in J Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York 1999), p. 11 
82 G McClanahan, op cit, (1989), p. 24 
83 See AB Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, (Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey 1960), p. 133 
84 See R Cohen, op cit., in J Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York 1999), p. 11 
85 G McClanahan, op cit., (1989), p. 24 
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the state system of our dynasty and will definitely not be 
permitted. Traditionally people of the European nations who 
wished to render some service at the celestial court have been 
permitted to come to the capital. But after their arrival they 
are obliged to wear Chinese court costumes, are placed in a 
certain residence and are never allowed to their own 
countries.86 
 
Of equal relevance in appreciating the parochial nature of Chinese diplomacy 
is the majestic letter of the Emperor of China to King George III of Great 
Britain which reads thus: 
 
Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, 
namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the 
duties of the state. Strange and costly objects do not 
interest me. I . . . have no use for your country’s 
manufactures. . . . It behoves you, Oh King, to respect my 
sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty 
in the future, so that by perpetual submission to our 
throne, you may secure peace and security for your country 
hereafter. . . . Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in 
prolific abundance and lacks no product within our borders. 
There was, therefore, no need to import the manufactures 
                                                 
86 This is a quotation from FS Northedge, The International Political System, (Faber and 
Faber, London 1976), p. 40 
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of outside barbarians for our produce. . . . I do not forget 
the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world 
by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your 
excusable ignorance of the usages of our Celestial Empire. . 
. . Tremblingly obey and show no negligence.87   
 
In spite of these seeming limitations to the traditional Chinese diplomacy, the 
Chinese empire was able to develop a scheme which aptly and amply reflects 
its claim to universal superiority.88 This scheme which has been described as 
being tributary in nature, defined the kind of relationship the Chinese empire 
was willing to have with his neighbours and even far-off States.89 The tribute 
embassy will be accompanied to the capital by the Chinese officials upon 
arrival at the Chinese border. The envoy will not have the privilege of an 
audience with the Emperor until he had been thoroughly taught the protocol 
relating to appearance at court which most importantly, must include the 
Kotow90. A proper assimilation and successful exhibition of these rituals by the 
                                                 
87 See ED Thomas, Chinese Political Thought, (Prentice-Hall, New York 1927), p. 289 
88 See M Rossabi, China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbours, 10th-14th 
Centuries, (University of California Press, Los Angeles 1983), p. 2 
89 These tributary states (Korea, Burma, Annam and Siam) having adopted the Chinese 
institutions, also greatly benefitted from the Chinese culture and protection. In return for 
these benefit, they were obliged to send on regular occasions tributary missions to register 
their appreciations and gratitude to the Chinese Emperor. See AF Wright, The Study of 
Chinese Civilization, Vol. 21, No. 2, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), p. 236 
90 This has generally been defined as a former Chinese custom of knocking the forehead on 
the ground as a symbol of respect or submission. Attesting to its significance in the Chinese 
diplomatic relations, it was reported that the Japanese military general, Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
knelt 5 times on the ground and knocked his head 3 times on the ground at the Chinese 
court direction to evince his allegiance to the Chinese Ming Dynasty for vassal homage. See 
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Kotow [Accessed: on the 21/08/2009]. The 
traditional importance of this ritual can be distilled from the succinct content of the Court 
Letter of 14 August 1793 instructing Cheng-jui of what etiquette was expected of Macartney 
and his envoys in the presence of the Emperor thus: “. . . ought casually in the course of 
conversation to inform him tactfully that as regards the various vassal states, when they 
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tribute envoys in the presence of the Emperor was regarded as a tacit 
acceptance of his superiority, while at the same time acknowledging the 
inferiority of their status as envoys of a vassal state.91 With this, the envoys 
enjoyed a further privilege of moving closer to the Emperor on his throne for 
a majestic conversation. The embassies and their ruler were usually, in return 
for their tributes, bestowed with valuable gifts by the Emperor and at the end 
of which they were given within three to five days to transact with the 
Chinese merchants and then vacate the Middle Kingdom.92 Rossabi has given 
a graphical description of the tributary system of the Chinese Empire in the 
following words: 
 
The tribute system enabled China to devise its own world 
order. . . . Equality with China was ruled out. The court could 
not conceive of international relations. It could not accept 
other states or tribes as equals. Foreign rulers and their 
envoys were treated as subordinates or inferiors. It refused 
entry into China to those who reject its system of foreign 
relations. The Chinese emperor was not just a primus inter 
                                                                                                                                            
come to the celestial Empire to bring tribute and have an audience, not only do all their 
envoys perform the ceremony of the three kneeling and the nine knockings of the head, but 
even the princes who come in person to Court also perform this ceremony”. For full text see 
JL Cranmer-Byng, ‘An Embassy to China Being the Journal Kept by Lord Macartney during his 
Embassy to the Emperor Chi’en-lung 1793-1794’, (2000) Folio Society, UK, p. 145 It has also 
been observed based on Macartney’s speculation that perhaps, his refusal to perform the 
Kotow rituals might have contributed to the reasons behind the refusal of the Chinese 
Emperor to grant any of his requests. See PJN Tuck, An Embassy to China: Lord Macartney’s 
Journal, 1793-1794, (Routledge, 2000)  p. 32   
91 M Rossabi, op cit, (1983), p. 2 
92 Ibid 
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pares. He was a Son of Heaven, the indisputable leader of the 
people of East Asia, if not the world.93       
 
2.3.5.  Diplomatic Practice in African Civilisation 
In the traditional African communities, the people largely recognised and 
observed the principles of diplomatic interactions among themselves and with 
other non-African communities. The Egyptian-Hattite relations which occurred 
about 1350 B.C. could serve as one of the classical examples depicting the 
diplomatic activities of the people of ancient Egypt. It has been recorded as 
narrated by McClanahan that an Egyptian queen, a royal wife of 
Tutankhamen, sent a letter to the Hattite monarch explaining the fact that 
she had no husband and sons. She therefore, requested that if Hittite king 
would allow one of his sons to marry her, that son had the chance of 
becoming the Pharaoh of Egypt.94 The king, of course, gave his permission to 
her proposal after sending envoys to verify the veracity of her story in Egypt.   
The Hittite prince that was to marry the Egyptian was attacked and killed in 
Syrian on his way to Egypt.95 According to Wilson ‘[t]he Hittite army marched 
into Syria, captured the murderers, and led them to the Hittite capital to be 
tried and condemned in accordance with international law.’96 This incidence, 
at least, confirmed the existence of diplomatic understanding along with some 
diplomatic privileges between the Hittite kingdom and ancient Egypt.  
                                                 
93 Ibid p. 4 
94 GV McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems, (C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 
London, 1989), p. 20 
95 Ibid 
96 JA Wilson, The Burden of Egypt: An Interpretation of Ancient Egyptian Culture, (University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951), p. 235 
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In the West African region, for example, different communities were in the 
habit of receiving and sending diplomatic missions from each other.97  It is a 
fact known to history that earliest African diplomatic envoys were known to 
enjoy diplomatic immunity in order to give a measure of protection to their 
persons and personal belongings throughout the duration of their official 
assignments.98 That is, the practice required that they could not be harassed, 
maltreated or even killed, which traditionally conformed with the African 
principle of hospitality that was usually and readily extended to visitors from 
near and far.99 It was the custom, for instance, amongst different 
communities in the West African region, particularly at the beginning and end 
of diplomatic negotiations, to break and serve kolanuts to their visitors as a 
way of expressing their hospitality.100 In the account given by Polk regarding 
the diplomatic intercourse of Nuban101 people, a primitive tribe in Africa, with 
their hostile neighbours, he says that:  
  
The ambassador was often a captive or former slave who knew the 
language, the customs, and perhaps some of the members of 
another tribe. That helped, but he could not rely upon these things 
for protection. Rather, he was protected by ritual status symbolized 
                                                 
97 RS Smith, Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa, 2nd Edition, (The University 
of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1989), p. 7 
98 PJ Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation 
(Thomson/Wadsworth, 2004), 39 
99 RJ Njoroge, Education for Renaissance in Africa, (Trafford on Demand Pub., 2004), p. 122 
100 Ibid. 
101 The Nuban people were known to inhabit the Nuba mountains of South Kordofan state,  in 
Sudan. The Nubans are multiple distinct people who speak different languages. 
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by a special spear. Carrying it, he could go inviolate into villages to 
negotiate with his counterparts. When agreements were reached, 
the chiefs of the path sanctioned them with religious or magical 
rites and threatened truce violators with curses thought to produce 
leprosy.102 
 
Diplomatic envoys were generally referred to as ‘messengers,’ ‘heralds’ or 
‘linguists,’ depending on the tasks assigned to them. They were often chosen 
from among those that were close to the monarchs from among the slaves 
and captives, and occasionally, from members of the royal household. There 
was an instance where the Congolese embassy that was sent to Rome in 
1514 had a royal prince as one of its emissaries.103 In the old Oyo 
Empire,104for instance, the Alaafin of Oyo105 usually have at his disposal, 
those known as the Ilari,106 also referred to as ‘half heads,’ attesting to the 
custom of having to shave half of their heads and applying  magical 
substance into it. The senior males within the Ilaris, according to Smith, 
                                                 
102 WR Polk, Neighbors and Strangers: The Fundamentals of Foreign Affairs, (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997), p. 238 
103 The prince’s name was Prince Dom Henrique. See EM Ma Khenzu, A Modern History of 
Monetary and Financial Systems of Congo, 1885-1995, (Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), p. 26. 
104 The Oyo Empire which was established in the 14th Century, used to be what is today 
Western and some part of the Northern Nigeria. It was one of the largest kingdoms in the 
West African region.. 
105The Alaafin of Oyo, meaning the king, was the head of the Oyo Empire and supreme 
overlord of the people. See GT Stride & C Ifeka, People and Empire of West Africa: West 
Africa in History, 1000-1800, (Africana Pub. Corp., 1971), p. 298 
 
106
 The word ‘Ilari’ means the parting of the hair in a peculiar way. The term ‘Ilari’ has been 
adopted by Yoruba kings in describing the royal messengers (male and female), who upon 
their appointment, must shave have their heads completely shaved with small incisions made 
on the occiput (for the male) and on the left arm. See  S Johnson, The History of the Yorubas 
From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate, (C.S.S. Bookshop, Lagos, 
1921), p. 61 
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‘acted as a bodyguard to the Alafin and also as his messengers to the outside 
world.’107 While the junior ones within the Ilaris were charged with the menial 
and administrative duties in the palace.108 Usually, in ancient Africa, which 
was almost universal, the diplomatic envoys carried a form of credentials such 
as a staff, spear, wand, a cane, baton, a whistle or a sword as official 
symbolic emblems.109 Particularly famous among these credentials were the 
staffs carried by the Ashanti and Dahomey ambassadors which were generally 
adorned with gold or silver leaf.110 
 
Diplomatic missions in ancient Africa, just like in other ancient civilisations, 
were temporarily despatched for different purposes.111 That is not to say that 
the idea of harbouring resident envoys from abroad was completely alien to 
African diplomatic practice. There are, of course, copious instances of rulers 
that had resident representatives in outside communities for the collection of 
tributes or war spoils. For instance, in the early sixteenth century, the Askia 
Muhammad, the ruler of Songhay Empire, was reported to have stationed 
‘some of his courtiers perpetually residing at Kano’112 for the purpose of 
collecting tribute that was due to him from that Kingdom. Similarly, the 
account given by Argyle suggests that the Alaafin of Oyo had his 
                                                 
107 See RS Smith, op cit., p.12 See also S Johnson, op cit.,  p. 62  
108 F Adegbulu, ‘Pre-Colonial West African Diplomacy: It’s Nature and Impact, (2011) 4:18 
The Journal of International Social Research, p. 175 
109
 WR Polk, op cit., p. 238;  
110 See RS Smith, op cit., p. 12. See also K Yankah, Speaking for the Chief: Okyeame and the 
Politics of Akan Royal Oratory, (Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 31 
111 I Roberts (ed.), Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, (OUP, Oxford, 2009), p. 187 
112 JFA Ajayi & F Crowder, History of West Africa, Vol. 1 (Columbia University Press, 1971), 
Pp. 214-215. It is, however, doubtful if the Hausaland of Kano was, in fact, conquered by the 
Songhay Empire.   
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ambassadors stationed in Dahomey, in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, for the purpose of collecting tribute that was due to the Alaafin of 
Oyo, and possibly collect his share of the proceeds from any Dahomean 
military successes.113  
 
African people were conversant with the principles of diplomatic immunity 
since they understood the sacred nature of the duties which the diplomatic 
envoys have to discharge. Therefore, it was considered sacrilegious and, in 
fact, a taboo to maltreat or kill an emissary, in as much as he does not act as 
a spy.114 It is generally common among all peoples, in all kingdoms and lands, 
that when diplomatic envoys had credentials which proclaimed their official 
status as the representatives of any rulers or sovereigns, then, ‘they are 
guaranteed complete freedom in access, transit and egress, and perfect 
safety from any hindrance or violence.’115 That is, they must be adequately 
protected. According to Ajisafe while describing the Yoruba native custom 
regarding diplomatic immunity that the ‘[e]mbassy between two hostile tribes, 
countries, or governments is permissible in native law and the ambassador’s 
safety is assured; but he must not act as a spy or in a hostile way. .  .’116 It 
must be said, however, that there may be instances where diplomatic 
                                                 
113 WJ Argyle, The Fon of Dahomey: The History and Ethnography of the Old Kingdom, 
(Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 25  
114 OO Okege, Contemporary  SocialProblems and Historical Outline of Nigeria: A Nigerian 
Legacy Approach, (Dare Standard Press, 1992), p. 32  
115 G Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (Jonathan Cape, London 1955), p. 45 
116 AK Ajisafe, The Law and Custom of the Yoruba People, (G. Ruledge & Sons, Limited, 
1924)   
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immunity was circumscribed.117  Such cases can only be described as 
exceptional to the general rule of diplomatic practice.  
 
2.3.6. Diplomatic Practice in the Islamic Civilisation 
Diplomatic interaction, being a universal bequest of antiquity was practiced in 
Islam right from the periods of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) (570-632); the 
first four Caliphs (632-661); the Umayyad dynasty (661-750); the Abbasid 
Empire (750-833); down to the Ottoman Empire (1260-1800). This section 
will be looking at various examples from the foregoing periods with a view to 
ascertaining the extent of the practice of diplomatic immunity in the Islamic 
legal system. 
 
2.3.6.1 The Islamic Connotation of ‘Safara’ 
To start with, the Arabic terms ‘saafir’ or ‘rasul’ are often used by 
commentators of Islamic law when referring to diplomatic agent or envoy. 
The word ‘saafir’ which means ambassador is a derivative of the verb ‘safara’ 
with the original meaning of ‘conciliation or peaceful settlement.’118 ‘Rasul’ on 
the other hand, is a word derived from the verb ‘arsala’ which means ‘to send 
or dispatch.’ In practice, the usage of the term ‘saafir’ has generally been 
reserved for diplomatic agent unlike ‘rasul’ which is understood to have a 
religious connotation.119  
                                                 
117 RS Smith, op cit., p. 13 
118 Y Istanbuli, Diplomacy and Diplomatic Practice in the Early Islamic Era, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2001), p. 124 
119See M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1955), 
p. 241. See also S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, (1968), 
Recueil Des Cours: Volume 117 (1966/I), (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p. 265.   
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The Arabs, prior to the advent of Islam were not unfamiliar with diplomacy 
and diplomatic relations whose scope and practice became elaborate and 
widened with the emergence of the Islamic civilization.120 Record has it that 
Umar ibn Khattab was once the Quraishite121 ambassador to other Arab tribes 
prior to the emergence of Islam while the foreign affairs of Makkah was then 
left in the hands of Banu ‘Uday.122 The mission led by Abdul-Muttalib (the 
grandfather of Prophet Muhammad) consisting of his sons and some of the 
leaders of Makkah to have a direct talk with Abrahah who was bent on 
destroying the Ka’bah123 was also considered as a diplomatic conversation - 
‘safaarah’ - according to some historians.124  
 
2.3.6.2 Islamic Diplomatic Law 
It must be mentioned that diplomatic practice in the early days of Islam, just 
as it was the practice in other ancient civilizations,125 was not carried out on a 
                                                 
120 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: 
Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968, p. 264 
121 The Quraysh was the tribe of Prophet Muhammad. This tribe has its genealogy traceable 
to Adnan who was a descendant of Isma’il, the son of Ibrahim. The nobility of the Quraysh 
coupled with their distinguished virtues of oratory, civility and gallantry were unanimously 
acknowledged by other tribes of Arabia. The Quraysh was, sometime in the early sixth 
century, entrusted with the management and control of the sanctuary in Makkah (the 
Kaabah). See SA Ali Nadwi, Muhammad Rasulullah, (The Life of Prophet Muhammad), 
(Islamic Research and Publications, Lucknow 1979), p. 66. For further details on the 
genealogy of the Quraysh and other Arab tribes. See Ibn Hisham, As-Seeratu-n-Nabawiyyah, 
(Darul Gadd al-Jadeed, Al-Monsurah)   
122 See Al-Sayyid al-Jamili, Manaaqib Ameer al-Mu’mineen ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, (Dar al-Kitab 
al-‘Arabi, Beirut, 1985), p. 21 
123 MH Haykal, The Life of Muhammad, (North American Trust Publications, 1976) Pp. 40-41 
124 Y Istanbuli, op cit., (2001), p. 124 
125
 See M Rossabi, op cit., (1983), p. 2 where foreign embassies were only allowed to stay 
within the Chinese Empire within three to five days.  
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permanent basis.126 It was however obvious that no receiving State was 
willing to take the risk of accommodating an envoy for a period longer than 
necessary so as not to compromise their state security. Abu-Bakr, the 
immediate successor of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), was explicit in his 
instruction to Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan regarding foreign envoys that “. . . and 
make their period of stay (residence) at your camps short, so that they quit 
while they are still ignorant. Let them not look about, so that they may not 
see your weakness and know your disposition.”127   
 
The practice of diplomacy in the early days of Islam was not only utilised as a 
necessary post-war tool to pave the way for peace but also resorted to in 
times of peace. An appropriate instance can be seen in the treaties signed by 
the Islamic ummah (community) as represented by Prophet Muhammad and 
the Madinites, the Jews and the Christians and the famous Treaty of 
Hudaybiyyah (628 AD) between the Islamic ummah and the Makkans.128 
These treaties are considered to have been signed not as result of any 
looming war or as a consequence of any hostility. If one also considers the 
overwhelming peaceful intercourse that existed between the early Islamic 
community of the Umayyad period and the Byzantium Empire, in spite of the 
seeming irreconcilable nature of the hostility between these two great 
nations, one would challenge Khadduri’s view that Islam cannot be said to 
have adopted diplomacy ‘essentially for peaceful purposes as long as the 
                                                 
126 M Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publishers, Lahore-
Pakistan 1961), p. 144 
127 Quoted in Y Istanbuli, op cit., (2001), p. 127 from Arjoun, Sadeq Ibrahim, Khalid Ibn al-
Walid (Al-Dar Alsaudiah, 1981), p. 244  
128 J Esposito, op cit., (2003), p. 69 
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state of war was regarded as the normal relation between Islam and other 
nations.’129 In fact, it cannot be truer that this belligerent attitude between 
these two avowed enemies was never allowed to constitute an impervious 
obstacle to harmonious relations.130 No wonder Abdul Malik bin Marwan (684-
705 AD), the fifth Umayyad Caliph, could sign an agreement to pay a weekly 
tribute to the Byzantium Emperor.131 It has also been reported that the 
Islamic State under the reign of the Umayyads executed a diplomatic treaty 
with Cyprus after it had been conquered by Muawiyyah as the then governor 
of Syria, allowing the Cypriots to exhibit dual loyalty to both the Romans and 
the Muslims.  The people of Cyprus, by the said treaty, shall be under an 
obligation to pay an annual tribute to the Islamic state while, at the same 
time, they will not abate their commitment to remit taxes to Byzantium. They 
will also, in addition, be exonerated from partaking in any warfare with the 
Muslims against the Byzantines, provided that they must not fail to warn the 
Islamic State of any impending hostility by the Romans.132 These instances 
among others, give credence to why one may find it arguably unacceptable to 
assume that an unrelenting state of war or bellicosity was the most essential 
hallmark of the relation Islam had with other nations. One cannot, therefore, 
but agree with the submission of Zawati that ‘based on the doctrine of jihaad, 
in which “peace is the rule, war is the exception,” diplomacy has played a 
distinctive role in the peaceful missionary work of Islam.’133  
                                                 
129 M Khadduri, op cit., (1955), Pp. 239-240 
130 See AA Vasliev, ‘Byzantine and Islam’, in NH Baynes and HLB Moss (eds.) Byzantium: An 
Introduction to East Roman Civilization, (Claredon Press, Oxford 1953), p. 311 
131 Y Istanbuli, op cit., (2001), p. 98 
132Ibid, p. 99 
133 HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 75 
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Some writers are of the view that the theory of diplomatic relation was 
embraced by Islam as ‘a temporary necessity’134 considering the ‘Islamic 
concept’ of dividing the world into two – dar al-Islam (abode of peace) and 
dar al-harb (abode of war).135 With the application of the third division of the 
world into dar as-sulh (abode of treaty)136 the Muslim States and the non-
Muslim States were able to interact among themselves peacefully and friendly 
while observing the terms of the treaties. The history of Islam is replete with 
factual instances accentuating the importance of the concept of diplomatic 
relation to the political life of Islam right from its inception. In fact, the spirit 
of diplomatic practice has for long formed and still forms up till today, the 
basis of interaction between the Muslim States and other nations. For a 
comprehensive understanding of the diplomatic practice in Islamic law, this 
chapter will carefully examine the various stages of the Islamic history 
commencing with the period of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).  
 
2.3.6.3. Diplomatic Practice at the Time of Prophet Muhammad 
(570-632 AD) 
Aside from the first set of envoys sent by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) to 
Negus, the Emperor of Abyssinia,137 many more Muslim envoys and 
ambassadors were sent, particularly during and after the signing of the 
famous Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 AD), to other Arab tribes. In a bid to 
                                                 
134 K Hamilton and R Langhorne, op cit., (1995), p. 20 
135 The concepts of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb are discussed in Chapter 6 of this study. 
136 The concept of dar al-sulh is discussed in Chapter 6 of this study. 
137 HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 75 
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convince the Makkans about the good intention of Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh) and the Muslims to enter Makkah only for the purpose of performing 
the ‘Umrah (the lesser pilgrimage) and to return immediately afterwards, 
Prophet Muhammad first despatched Khirash ibn Umayah and thereafter, 
‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan138 to the Quraysh even though Khirash suffered imminent 
attack at the hands of the Qurayshites and it was also rumoured that they 
had killed ‘Uthman.139 There is the need to stress the fact that the conclusion 
and execution of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was made possible as a result of 
the diplomatic acumen tremendously displayed by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) 
as opposed to the confrontational attitude of the Makkans. With this epoch-
making event came the despatch of Muslim envoys to various Kingdoms 
consisting of Arabs and non-Arabs. For instance, Haatib ibn Abi Balta’a was 
sent to Muqawqas, the Governor of Alexandria; Abdullaah ibn Hudhaafa al-
Sahmi was sent to the King of Persia; Dahiyyah ibn Khalifah al-Kalbi to 
Heraclius, the Emperor of Byzantine; ‘Amr ibn Umayya al-Damri was sent to 
the Negus (As’hamah Ibn al-Abjar), the Abyssinian Emperor; ‘Amr ibn al-‘As 
to the Kings of Oman; Salit ibn ‘Amr to the Kings of Yamama; al-‘Ala’ ibn al-
Hadrami was sent to the King of al-Bahrain; Shuja’ ibn Wahb al-Asadi was 
sent to the Ghassanid King; while al-Muhaajir ibn Abi Umayya al-Makhzumi 
was despatched to the Himyarite King; and Mu’aadh ibn Jabal to the Kings in 
Yemen.140  
 
                                                 
138 He later became the third Caliph of the Islamic State after the demise of Prophet 
Muhammad.  
139 See SA Ali Nadwi, op cit., (1979), Pp. 262-264 
140See Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, Ar-Raheequl-Makthtum, (Beirut), Pp. 350-361; HM 
Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 77; MH Haykal, op cit., (1976), Pp.374-377   
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Eloquence, being one of the highly cherished qualities a diplomatic agent 
must possess, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was not oblivious of this fact while 
selecting the bearer of his message in the courts of the then world powers. 
The envoys were men endowed with the power of language particularly 
conversant with the languages and political atmosphere of their hosts. 
Perhaps, this explains why the two eminent authors of ‘Tabaqaat’141 and 
‘Khasaa’is al-Kubra’142 described these envoys as men who have received the 
miraculous gift of languages owing to their ability to speak the languages of  
the countries they were deputed. These envoys were despatched with the 
requisite credentials which were in the form of letters with which they were 
sent, specifically addressed to individual potentates. A typical example of 
these letters was the one addressed to Heraclius, the King of Rome which 
reads thus: 
 
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. This 
letter is from Muhammad, the slave and Messenger of 
God, to Heraclius, the great King of Rome. Blessed are 
those who follow the guidance. After this, verily I call 
you to Islam. Embrace Islam that you may find peace, 
and God will give you a double reward. If you reject, 
then on you shall rest the sin of your subjects and 
                                                 
141 Ibn S’ad, Kaatib al-Waaqidi Muhammad, Tabaqaat, Vol. II, p. 23 
142 As-Suyuti, Jalaalud-Deen Muhammad Ibn Ahmad,  Khasaa’is al-Kubra, Vol. II, p.11 
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followers. O People of the Book,143 come to that which is 
common between us and you; that we will serve non but 
Allah, nor associate aught with Him, nor take others for 
lords besides God. But if you turn away, then say: Bear 
witness that we are Muslims.144      
 
 Needless to mention that a glance through the contents of these letters 
which also served as  what is now known as letters of credence, portrays the 
genteel and cultivated manners of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Interestingly, 
these emissaries were warmly received and their messages favourably 
responded to by the potentates of the respective States to whom they were 
sent except Chosroes, the king of Persia who out of irrepressible rage, tore 
the Prophet’s letter into shreds.145 
 
It has also been documented that Sa’d ibn Abi-Waqqas was the first envoy to 
be sent to China by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). This fact is attested to by 
the Chinese Muslims’ reverence of a tomb in Canton, which up till present 
days bears the name of Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas.146 Also, attesting to the 
existence of diplomatic interaction between the then Islamic world and China 
as far back as the mid-eight century are evidence from the Chinese records 
referring to amir al-mu’minin (a title for the head of the Islamic State) as 
                                                 
143It is ‘Ahlul-Kitaab’ in the original Arabic text. This term is often used in the Quran as 
another name for the Christians and the Jews  
144 See SA Ali Nadwi, op cit., (1979), Pp. 274-275  
145 S Al-Mubarakpuri, op cit., p. 354 
146 PK Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Time to the Present, (Macmillan & Co. 
Ltd., London 1961), p. 344 
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‘hanmi-mo-mo-ni; abu-al-‘Abbas (the first Caliph of the Abbasid dynasty) as 
‘A-bo-lo-ba’; and Haarun (the famous caliph of the Abbasid dynasty) as ‘A-
lun’.147 The intercourse between the Muslims and the Chinese can again be 
inferred from the instruction of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) to the Muslims 
charging them not to relent in their quest for knowledge even if it means 
travelling as far as China.148 
 
Not only were emissaries and ambassadors despatched to foreign lands in the 
early days of Islam as outlined above, records also show that Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) had a designated place in his mosque known as 
ustuwanaat al-wufuud – pillars of embassies – where he received foreign 
delegations and embassies.149 He was not discourteous to foreign visiting 
envoys in spite of the horrendous treatment meted out to his emissaries. A 
typical incidence that came to mind was the killing of Al-Harith ibn ‘Umair Al-
Azdi, an envoy of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), by Shurahbil ibn ‘Amr Al-
Ghassani, who was then the Governor of Al-Balqa’. This envoy was 
intercepted on his way to the ruler of Busra to whom he was sent to deliver a 
letter by Shurahbil who had him tied up and beheaded.150  
 
The historic and bloodless conquest of Makkah by the Muslims was followed 
by an unimaginable wave of deputations from neighbouring Arab States 
                                                 
147 Ibid 
148 The hadith of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) that says ‘Seek knowledge in China if necessary’ 
is quoted in PM Holt et al (eds.), The Cambridge History of Islam Vol. 2B, (CUP, Cambridge, 
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coming to signify their submission to the rule of the Islamic State. No wonder, 
the period is often referred to as Sanat al-Wufud – the year of deputation – 
by writers of Islamic history.151 Among the tribes and States whose emissaries 
the Prophet received were the Banu Tamim; Banu Zubayd; Banu Hanifah; 
Himyar; Kinda; Banu ‘Aamir; and Banu Tayy.152 These envoys, in addition to 
being warmly received, were also presented with gifts and comfortably 
accommodated. It was also the practice in the early days of Islam for visiting 
envoys to be instructed on what protocols to observe when meeting with 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).153    
 
The immunity and personal inviolability of foreign envoys is uncompromisingly 
upheld by Islam as exemplified by Prophet Muhammad’s reaction to the two 
envoys of Musaylimah Ibn Habeeb. These two envoys by the names Ibn An-
Nawaahah and Ibn Uthal, were sent by Musaylimah to deliver a letter to 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) which read thus: 
 
From Musaylimah, the apostle of God, to Muhammad, 
the Apostle of God. Peace be unto you. I, then, inform 
you that I have been associated with you in this 
mission, and that we have half of the territory, and 
                                                 
151 See Ibn Hisham, op cit., Vol. IV, p. 158 
152 Ibid. Pp. 158-182 
153 Y Istanbuli, op cit., (2001), p. 148 
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Quraysh has the other half, but Quraysh is an 
aggressive community154 
 
When these envoys went ahead to stress and confirm their believe in the 
acclaimed prophethood of Musaylimah, the Prophet (pbuh) gave the following 
response which was to become the substratum upon which the Islamic 
concept of diplomatic immunity and inviolability is built: ‘By God, if it were not 
the tradition that envoys could not be killed, I would have severed your 
heads.’ 155 This response gives a vivid picture of the level of respect that was 
accorded to envoys in the early period of the Islamic civilization that under no 
circumstances must an envoy be killed, punished or maltreated. An envoy 
will, however, be declared persona non grata rather than being killed or 
maltreated if found guilty of espionage against the Islamic State or found to 
have committed any of the prohibited acts.156 With this classical 
pronouncement of the Prophet, it therefore, becomes imperative to question 
the veracity of Khadduri’s submission that whilst the envoys are still on the 
Muslims soil and there arose hostility, ‘they (envoys) were either insulted or 
imprisoned or even killed.’157  
   
2.3.6.4 Diplomatic Practice: The First Four Caliphs (632-661 AD) 
                                                 
154 Ibn Hisham, op cit., Vol. IV, p. 192 
155Ibid  
156 See Abu Yusuf, Ya’qub ibn Ibraahim al-Ansari, Kitaab al-Kharaaj, Cairo, A.H. 1352, Pp. 
188-189 and HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 77 
157 M Khadduri, op cit., (1955), p. 244. A similar unsubstantiated conclusion was made by 
Hamilton and Langhorne while talking about the fate of foreign ambassadors within the 
Islamic domain that: “If unsuccessful, a cool dismissal followed; and if war broke out before 
the ambassadors had left, they might be held captive or even executed.” See K Hamilton and 
R Langhorne, op cit., (1995), p. 21 
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Just like in the time of Prophet Muhammad, the era of his foremost 
successors, generally referred to as the rightly guided caliphs, also recorded 
some diplomatic relations with foreign States. In strict adherence to the 
teachings of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), Abu-Bakr, the first Caliph was 
reported to have instructed, as part of his farewell speech, Yazid Ibn Abu 
Sufyan when the later was leading an expedition to Syria in the following 
words ‘in case envoys of the adversary come to you, treat them with 
hospitality.’158 This era witnessed tremendous exchange of envoys between 
the Muslims and non-Muslim states. For instance, apart from Sa’d ibn Abi 
Waqqas (595-664 AD) that was sent to China by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), 
the year 651 AD also recorded the despatch of the Muslim mission headed by 
Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas to the Chinese Emperor, Gaozong of Tang under the 
overall leadership of Uthman Ibn ‘Affan (579-656 AD), the third Caliph.159 It 
has been further reported that the eight century witnessed more than thirty 
missions from the Muslim state sent to the Chinese Empire.160 
 
2.3.6.5 Diplomatic Practice: The Umayyad and Abbasid Periods 
(661-750 AD) 
The diplomatic intercourse of the then Islamic empire with neighbouring 
Kingdoms according to Zawati, has attained the height of ‘sophistication’ 
during the period of the Umayyad and most especially, the era of the Abbasid 
                                                 
158 Arjoun, Sadiq Ibrahim, ‘Khalid Ibn al-Walid’, Al-Dar Alsaudiah, 1981, p. 244 
159 JN Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (University of 
Washington Press, 1997), Pp. 25 and 29 
160This has been recorded by the Chinese historian, Feng Chia Sheng, see M Nasser-Eddin, 
Arab Chinese Relations, (Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, Beirut) p. 15 
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dynasty.161 The large amount of peace treaties conclusively negotiated with 
other Kingdoms, at that time attested to the diplomatic successes achieved by 
these Muslim states.162 Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan (602-680 AD), an Umayyad 
Caliph, was known for his preference for diplomatic methods which has been 
observed to be a reason behind the longevity of his reign.163 Hitti, in his 
Makers of Arab History, refers to the Caliph’s statement which signifies the 
level of his penchant for diplomacy thus: ‘I apply not my lash where my 
tongue suffices, nor my sword where my lip is enough, and if there be one 
hair binding me to my fellow men, I let it not break. If they pull, I loosen, and 
if they loosen, I pull.’164 These periods also witnessed quite a number of 
Muslims sent on diplomatic missions to the courts of various potentates for 
reasons ranging from political, commercial to social purposes. And in some 
other occasions, just for the purpose of exchanging friendly gifts.165  
 
The period of the Abbasid has particularly been acknowledged to have 
expanded, in no small magnitude, the ambit of the international connections 
the Islamic State had with other nations, especially, in the area of 
commerce.166 The Abbasid sovereigns created the office known as Nizam-ul-
Hadratain which was in charge of employing ‘special envoy to transact 
confidential business with neighbouring potentates.’167 No wonder the foreign 
                                                 
161 HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 78 
162 Ibid  
163 Y Istanbuli, op cit., (2001), p. 87 
164 PK Hitti, Makers of the Arab History, (St. Martins Press, New York 1968), p. 43 
165 SA El-Wady Romahi, Studies in International Law and Diplomatic Practice, (Data Labo Inc., 
Tokyo 1981), p. 302 
166 B Sen, op cit., (1988), p. 5 
167 SA ‘Ali, A Short History of the Saracens, (Taylor & Francis, 2004), p. 622  
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relations of the Abbasid Caliphate have been identified and greatly applauded 
for being a monumental factor upon which rest the enormous power, glory 
and progress recorded by the caliphate.168 It is most likely correct that the 
emergence of siyar, as a new area of jurisprudence in Islamic law at that 
point in time must have been prompted by this outstanding advancement in 
the Muslims foreign relations. Historians have identified Harun Ar-Rashid 
(reigned 786-809 AD) as one of the most outstanding and powerful Caliphs of 
the Abbasid dynasty. Under his reign the four famous schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence169 were established and he was the one who requested Abu 
Yusuf (d. 798 AD)170 to author his magnum-opus, Kitab Al-Kharaj’, which up 
till today, remains a valuable reference when considering issues touching on 
foreign relations under the Islamic law.171 
 
Of great significance was the mutual friendly relations established between 
the two great powers of that period as represented by Harun al-Rashid in the 
East and Charlemagne in the West. The Islamic empire under the leadership 
of Harun al-Rashid and the Franks had strong and cordial diplomatic 
                                                 
168 PK Hitti, op cit., (1968), p. 297 
169 The four schools of Islamic jurisprudence generally belong to the Sunni schools of law. 
They are; a)  The Hanafi School founded by Abu Hanifah Nu’man Ibn Thaabit (circa 699-767) 
with followership in Iraq, Syria, Central Asia and India; b)The  Maliki School founded by 
Maalik Ibn Anas al-Asbaahi (circa 710-796) with followership in North Africa, West of 
Egypt,Sudan, Sub-Saharan West Africa and Moorish Spain; c) The Shafi’i School founded by 
Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shaafi’i (circa 767-820) with considerable followership Southern 
Arabia, Egypt, East Africa, Southern Asia and part of Central Asia; and d) The Hanbali School 
founded by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (circa 780-855) with followership in Saudi Arabia and Saudi 
sponsored institutions abroad. For further details see MH Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An 
Introduction, (Oneworld Publications, Oxford 2008), Pp. 70-86; B Lewis and BE Churchill, 
Islam: The Religion and the People, (Wharton School Publishing, New Jersey 2009), p. 30-31      
170 His full name is Yaaqub Ibn Ibraahim al-Ansari. He was one of the prominent students of 
Abu Hanifah, the founder of the Hanafi School. He held the position of a judge in Baghdad 
prior to his elevation to the high position of a Chief Justice (qaadi al-qudaat) under Harun al-
Rashid who requested him to write the book ‘Kitaab al-Kharaj’. See J Esposito, op cit., (2003) 
171 Y Istanbuli, op cit., (2001), p. 87 
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relations.172 This friendly relations between the Frankish Emperor and Caliph 
Harun, the essence of which is although, tainted with suspicion,173 will always 
be remembered for the warmly reception given to the Franks emissaries and 
the lavish gifts they returned with. Hitti has, while describing the immensity of 
the gifts presented to the Frankish embassies by al-Rashid, referred to the 
following statements attributed to a Frankish author that ‘the envoys of the 
great king of the West returned home with rich gifts from “the king of Persia, 
Aaron”, which included fabrics, aromatics and an elephant.’174 According to 
the accounts given by Vasiliev on the nature of the hospitality lavished on the 
Muslim embassies despatched to Constantinople, he says that ‘[it] was 
minutely elaborate, and the ambassadors were welcomed with all sorts of 
brilliant court ceremonies, diplomatic courtesies, and the astute display of 
military strength.’175 In the same way the Byzantine diplomatic envoys were 
impressively received in Baghdad by the Muslim Caliph with full paraphernalia 
of Oriental magnificence.176 Also there are records of ambassadors been 
                                                 
172 Ibid., p. 101 
173 The pursuit of self-interest has been observed as the main reason or factor that brought 
these two imperial powers together. Charlemagne has been depicted as one who saw in 
Caliph Harun al-Rashid an ally against his rivals, the Byzantium while Harun, on the other 
hand, is portrayed as a person who saw in Charlemagne an ally against his bitter opponents, 
the Umayyads of Spain. See PK Hitti, op cit., (1968), p. 298   
174Ibid. Hitti and some other writers have expressed much surprise over the utter silence of 
Muslim historians regarding this exchange of embassies and gifts between the Islamic Empire 
and the Frankish monarch. It can as well be observed, however, that this utter silence by the 
Muslim writers may not be unrelated to the doubts surrounding the historicity of the entire 
event. See N Daniel, The Arabs and the Medieval Europe, (Longman Group Limited, London 
1979), p. 50     
175 AA Vasiliev, ‘Byzantium and Islam’, in NH Baynes and H Moss (eds.), Byzantium: An 
Introduction to East Roman Civilization, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1953), p. 312  
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received from the Chinese Emperor and from India along with plentiful gifts 
for the Caliph, and they also received reciprocal treatments in return.177  
 
2.3.6.6 Diplomatic Practice: The Ottoman Era (1260-1800 AD) 
  
The Ottoman Empire came into historical limelight in about 1260 and steadily, 
it kept expanding towards the West and the East crushing the strength of the 
Byzantine, Serb, Bulgarian Kingdoms, the Anatolians and even, the Mamluk 
Sultanate stationed in Egypt was not spared.178 In 1500, the Ottoman Empire 
was arguably, one of the most powerful nations in the world. The Ottoman 
armies made an attempt in 1529 and 1683 to overrun Habsburg Vienna. At 
that time, the strength and power of the once invincible Ottoman Empire 
began to dwindle to the extent that the Ottoman State started to lose their 
military superiority over to the West. The two wars against the Russians and 
the Austrians which the Ottomans failed to win that resulted in the treaties of 
Carlowitze in 1699 and Passarowitze in 1718 marked ‘the resulting shift in the 
balance of power between the Ottoman Empire and the West.’179 
 
Diplomatic relations of the Ottoman Empire with other nations had always 
remained cordial although, prior to 1700, it was said to be on an ad hoc basis 
                                                 
177 SA Ameer Ali, Short History of the Saracens, (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London 1955), Pp. 
250-251; PK Hitti, op cit., p. 299   
178 D Quataert, op cit., (2005), p. 1 
179
 FM Gocek, East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford University Press, New York 1987), p. 4 
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which almost ‘came close to being a form of permanent diplomacy.’180 
Successive Ottoman Sultans that reigned many centuries before Selim III 
would only send out representatives to other nations if it becomes 
necessary.181 From the eighteenth century onwards, the Ottoman diplomacy 
started drifting towards a more permanent one by stationing residential 
embassies in major European capitals that once played hosts to its temporary 
ambassadors. In 1793 for example, the first permanent embassy of the 
Ottoman Empire was established in London and few years later, more of it 
were established in Paris, Vienna and Berlin.182 But the question is why did 
the Ottoman Empire adopt a temporary diplomacy when its military strength 
was pre-eminent? Could it be as a result of its inclination towards the 
principles of Islamic international law that the world is divided into two – dar 
al-Islam (the abode of peace) and dar al-harb (the abode of war)? Or is it 
that the Ottoman Empire was mainly adhering to its own created method of 
diplomacy? Answers to these questions become necessary in order to 
appreciate what really influenced the Ottoman kind of diplomatic interactions 
with other foreign nations. 
 
Historically, the Ottoman Sultans were in the habit of sending diplomatic 
envoys to friendly foreign nations for the purposes of greeting ascension to 
the thrones; discussing treaties and ratifying peace agreements; conveying 
                                                 
180 E Yurdusev, ‘Studying Ottoman Diplomacy: A Review of the Sources’ in AN Yurdusev (Ed), 
Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional? (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire 2004), p. 167   
181 B Ari, ‘Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period’ in AN Yurdusev (Ed), Ottoman Diplomacy: 
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credentials on behalf of the Sultan; frontier demarcations; and continuation of 
peaceful and friendly relations.183 The journey of the emissaries to foreign 
courts for negotiations and other diplomatic contacts is usually very short and 
upon conclusion of their visits, all diplomatic affairs came to an end. 
 
The Ottomans system of capitulations which is predicated upon each country 
having its own laws, is very popular, although, not unique to the Ottoman 
Empire alone. The Chinese for instance were known to have something 
similar to the Ottoman concept of capitulations. Once the Ottomans received 
foreign ambassadors, they are unilaterally granted capitulations throughout 
the period of their stay even though it is non-reciprocal. The grant of 
capitulation is synonymous with the modern day concept of diplomatic 
privileges and immunities. Immediately the capitulatory favour is granted to a 
diplomatic envoy, the envoy is henceforth deemed to be under the laws of his 
king or republic.184 Foreign emissaries were considered as guests within the 
Ottoman domain, and as such, provision of free food, travel accommodations 
and also daily allowance were all guaranteed.185 Anybody with capitulatory 
status within the Ottoman Empire enjoyed full exemption from Ottoman taxes 
and custom duties.186  
 
It has, however, been contended that the Ottomans embraced and adopted a 
negative attitude toward diplomacy as a result of their faithfulness to “Islamic 
                                                 
183 B Ari, op cit., in AN Yurdusev (Ed), Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional? 
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precepts” which dictates that permanent diplomatic missions should not be 
sent to the European capitals.187 There is an assumption that there cannot be 
a smooth diplomatic intercourse and exchange of diplomatic personnel by 
way of reciprocity between the Muslims and non-Muslims.188 This contention 
properly fits with the account of Naff when he says that the Ottoman Empire 
in their relations with Europe were under the guiding principle of ‘the 
inadmissibility of equality between Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and Dar 
al-Harb (the abode of war, i.e. the Christian West).’189 Meanwhile, most of the 
European States kept sending resident ambassadors to Istanbul as far back 
as the sixteenth century even though the Ottoman Empire did not deem it 
appropriate to reciprocate, but instead, embraced a unilateral diplomacy with 
respect to its European neighbours.190 
 
There are four theoretical arguments behind the origin and nature of the 
system adopted by the Ottoman Empire. The first argument is that the 
Ottoman Empire is a direct or indirect continuation of and derivation from the 
                                                 
187 See T Naff, ‘Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III 
1789-1807’ (1963) 83, Journal of the American Oriental Studies, p. 296 where he says: 
‘Ottoman thinking in diplomacy, as in all matters of government, derived from the Muslim 
concept of the state, which was rooted in the Shari’a (Holy Law); traditionally, the Shari’a 
provided for all the exigencies of life and government, thus making the Muslim state, in 
theory, self-sufficient. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire was pre-eminently a Shari’a state.’ 
See also MS Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919, (Longman, London 1993), 
Pp. 9 and 71 
188 AN Yurdusev, ‘The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy’ in AN Yurdusev (Ed), Ottoman 
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189 T Naff, ‘Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and 
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Byzantine Empire.191 The second argument is that the origin and character of 
the Ottoman Empire could be traced to the movements of migrating Turkish 
tribes.192 As such, the Ottoman Empire falls within the Turkic tradition. The 
third was the ghazi state theory. That is the Ottoman State was ghazi based 
in that it was predicated upon the Islamic precept and the concept of 
jihaad.193 While the fourth argument sees the Ottoman Empire as 
exemplifying nomadic empires emanating from tribal institutions.194 Many 
scholars have, however, widely argued in support of the ghazi thesis that the 
Ottoman Empire was an Islamic empire.195 Taken that the Ottoman territories 
were seen as the land of Islam; its army as the soldiers of Islam; and taken 
that the Ottoman Empire would not hesitate to go to war in case they are 
attacked or Islam is being threatened;196 and the entire Empire claimed to be 
governed under the Islamic law. But can it be said to be truly and strictly an 
Islamic empire in all its ramifications?    
 
It is doubtful to say that the Ottoman Empire in its governmental and 
administrative activities strictly complied with Islamic law. After all, the 
Ottomans were known for their adherence to the Turkish local customs and 
                                                 
191 HA Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Osmanlis, 1300–
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tradition, one of which is the right to make laws for the running of State 
affairs which the Ottoman sultans always resorted to by issuing the qanun-
nameas, otherwise known as ‘books of law’.197 At best, it is safer to suggest 
that there was an amalgamation of Islamic law and the Turkish tradition in 
the administration of the Ottoman Empire.198 For instance, during the reign of 
Mehmed II in 1454, he granted Capitulations otherwise known as ahdname199 
to the Venetians with the understanding that the decision was in accordance 
with the existing custom referring to the former capitulatory agreements that 
existed between the Byzantine Empire and the Venetians.200  
 
The theoretical notion of perpetual war existing between the Muslim and the 
non-Muslim States may be difficult to justify. Especially so, when one 
considers the context and implication of Qur’an 8 v 61201 which urges the 
Muslims to make peace in as much as the non-Muslims are inclined towards 
peace. Moreover, whether jihaad implies a state of regular or perpetual war 
                                                 
197 H Inalcik, op cit., in M. A. Cook (ed.), A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976), p. 47-48 
198 Bulent Ari analysed that the Ottoman state did observe basic Islamic principles in many 
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within the territories of the Ottoman Empire not under the Ottomans laws, but under the laws 
of their own countries. 
200 See N Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: Its History, Origin, and Nature (Johns 
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translation of the Qur’an in The Qur’an: English Meaning and Notes by Saheeh International 
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against the non-Muslims remains contestable.202 Furthermore, is the 
additional concept of dar as-sulh (abode of treaty), where the Muslims and 
the non-Muslims live in peace while observing the terms of the treaties. It 
takes away the duality or dichotomization of the entire world into the 
perpetual dar al-Islaam (the abode of peace) and dar al-harb (the abode of 
war) once the dar as-sulh (peaceful co-existence based on treaty) is resorted 
to. In addition, the reason for the argument that Islam prescribes an 
impenetrable duality in terms of dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb, as expressed 
by Yurdusev, ‘is indeed the analogy between the medieval Christian 
conceptualization of Christendom versus non-Christendom and that of 
Islam.’203 
 
While the diplomatic practice that was established during the Ottoman Empire 
can be said to be mostly shaped by the principles of Islamic international law, 
at the same time, it may be equally correct to suggest that the Ottomans 
devised their own method of diplomacy. In other words, the Ottoman Empire 
appeared to be structured based on the Islamic law tenents blended with the 
Turkish tradition. 
 
2.4 Historical Survey of the Contribution of Islamic Law to the 
Development of International Diplomatic Law. 
                                                 
202 The notion of jihad and when it can be resorted to against the non-Muslims is well 
discussed in HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), Pp. 36-39 See also AHA Abu Sulayman, The Islamic 
Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought 
(International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon 1987)  
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Many writers of international jurisprudence have always seen modern 
international law as a legal system that is deeply rooted in Western culture 
even when it has been overwhelmingly admitted that it has its roots firmly 
entrenched in and traceable to various ancient civilizations of the world.204 
This explains why the system of diplomatic immunities and privileges, being 
an integral aspect of international law, has also been perceived as ‘essentially 
Euro-centric based.’205 Perhaps, the demand of some commentators against 
‘the continued European and Christian underpinnings and influences on 
modern international law,’ to use the words of Baderin,206 justifies the need 
for further research into the contributions already made and most likely to be 
made by Islamic law towards the development of modern international law. 
Of course, it will be argued that some of the principles of Islamic siyar 
contributed into forming what is now known as the principles of international 
law. It is not a case of expression of mere optimism that the evidence to 
prove the possibility of  Islamic law influences ‘may yet be uncovered,’207 
when there are ample historical evidence pointing towards a significant 
contribution made by Islam jurisprudence. This contribution has received little 
or no mention by most Western literatures probably due to what Boisard has 
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described as ‘psychological prejudice’.208 The ICJ has equally attested to the 
contribution of Islam when it says: 
 
But the principle of the inviolability of the persons of 
diplomatic agent and the premises of diplomatic 
missions is one of the very foundations of long-
established regime, to the evolution of which the 
traditions of Islam made a substantial contribution.209 
 
The historical accounts regarding the genesis and development of modern 
international law along with its principles have always been fashioned around 
Western civilization. Oppehheim, for instance, just like many other Western 
scholars of international law, was unequivocal in his submission that 
international law ‘is a product of modern Christian civilisation.’210 This 
conclusion has been met with serious criticism by some commentators who 
would rather argue that modern international law owes its growth and 
development to the ‘coexistence of plural civilizations’ with each of these 
civilizations proudly attached to its culture and normative value system which 
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were considered to be of universal applicability.211 While it is not the intention 
here to dwell on how all the various civilizations have contributed to the 
making of the modern international law, this section intends to scrutinise the 
most probable influence of the Islamic civilization on the contemporary 
international law principles of which the concept of diplomatic immunity is 
one. 
 
It has been rightly argued that the contemporaneous existence of the Islamic 
civilization alongside the Western civilization coupled with the inevitable 
interactions between the two civilizations, point towards the possibility of 
influence.212 That the Islamic civilization had a legal influence on the West 
particularly at the time of its emergence from the Middle Ages can be gleaned 
from: the juristic writings of early Muslim jurists mostly, during the Abbasid 
Caliphate; the protracted contacts between Europe and Islam both in war and 
peace, most especially before and after the recapture of Spain and Sicily by 
the Crusaders; the peaceful interaction between the Christian and Islamic 
civilisations brought about through commercial transaction; and the military 
confrontation which though, appeared unending between the West and the 
East.  
 
In addition to the general acceptability, particularly amongst Western 
publicists, that the development of the principles of modern international law 
                                                 
211 O Yasuaki, ‘When Was the Law of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of 
International Law from An Intercivilisational Perspective’, (2000), 2, Journal of the History of 
International Law, p. 7 
212 MA Boisard, op cit., (1980), p. 430 
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was initiated by the West, it has equally gained tremendous currency that the 
creation of modern international law principles revolves around the likes of 
Francisco De Vitoria (1480-1546), Suarez (1548-1617), Alberico Gentili (1552-
1608), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767) who are 
referred to as the founders of international law.213 The most prominent 
amongst these names was of course, Grotius, writer of the famous book, De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis which came out in 1625. He was, on the strength of this 
book, singled out and styled by some Western historians of international law 
as “the father of international law.”214 Western commentaries touching on the 
origin of international law have often been noticed to concentrate heavily on 
the periods of the Greek civilization, the Roman era, and then swiftly conclude 
with the modern times. This historical account is always nicely manipulated in 
such a way that it thus appears as if the intervening period of about ten 
centuries between the Roman era and the period of modernity was of no 
significant momentum to the making of modern international law.215 It is 
perhaps, for this reason that the conclusion of Oppenheim that there was no 
form of intermediary link between the Roman period and modern times has 
not been allowed to go unchallenged.216 The assertion of Oppenheim that 
there was ‘neither room nor need for an International Law’217 during the 
Middle Ages underscores the essence of an in-depth scrutiny into the 
                                                 
213 See MN Shaw, op cit., (2008), Pp. 22-24 
214The prevalent assertion that Grotius is the father of modern international law has been 
strongly challenged by some other scholars such as Scott, who are of the fervent view that 
the renowned Spanish scholar, Francisco De Vitoria, is more deserving of that amiable 
position than Hugo Grotius. See JB Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco 
de Vitoria and His Law of Nations, (The Lawbook Exchange Limited, New Jersey 2000)      
215 M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), p. 62 
216 Ibid 
217 See L Oppenheim, op cit., (2005), Pp. 56 and 58      
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jurisprudential contribution of early Muslim scholars to the development of 
what now became  modern international law. To justify his submission that 
there arose no need for a law of nations at that period, he maintains that the 
Roman Empire ‘hardly knew of any independent civilised states outside the 
border of their Empire’218 as it almost absorbed the whole civilised ancient 
world. This submission cannot be seen or held to be congruent with the 
historical facts which point to the existence of the Islamic civilization in the 
medieval period and its interaction with other civilised nations of that epoch 
including the Byzantium Empire. If one of the core purports of international 
law is to regulate how independent States relate and deal with each other; 
and if history strongly supports the co-existence of the Islamic civilization in 
the Middle-Ages alongside other civilizations, it is only logical to conclude that 
the need for an international law cannot be more expedient. According to 
Oppenheim in his further account, the need for an international law only 
became paramount sometime between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
when Europe became ‘divided up into a great number of independent 
states.’219 It may therefore become necessary to ask at this stage that: what 
makes the period witnessing the fragmentation of Europe more deserving of 
the law of nations than the medieval period? This may appear to be a 
clandestine attempt not to give any credence to, or acknowledge the 
contribution of the Islamic civilisation to the making of modern international 
law thereby strengthening the highly contestable assertion that modern 
international law is the product of the Christian European civilization. 
                                                 
218 Ibid  
219 Ibid  
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Hugo Grotius became, though arguably, ’the father of modern international 
law’ for writing the De Jure Belli ac Pacis in the seventeenth century to satisfy 
the urgent need of the newly found ‘multitude of independent States 
established and crowded on the comparatively small continent of Europe’220 
with a view to salvaging them from plunging into what Oppenheim has 
described as ‘international lawlessness’.221 It is worth mentioning the famous 
Muslim jurist, Muhammad Ibn Hassan as-Shaybani (750–805 AD) who 
authored at the end of the eight century the world earliest treatise on 
international law. The book is entitled ‘Kitab as-Siyar al Kabir’ the original text 
of which, according to Khadduri, appears to have been lost but fortuitously 
preserved in the elaborate commentary of Sarakhsi (d. 490/1096) otherwise 
known as the ‘Sharh Kitab as-Siyar al-Kabir’.222 It was the admiration for this 
remarkable work that led Joseph Hammer von Purgstall after reviewing same, 
to designate this classic author as ’the Hugo Grotius of the Muslims.’223  
 
It however, remained unclear if, prior to the writing of Grotius’ famous 
treatise, there were traces of any standard legal work on international law 
imputable either to the Greeks or Romans that could have served as a source 
of influence or reference for Grotius. What remains evidently apparent is that 
that as at the time Grotius was putting together his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 
there was already in existence, and had been for more than 800 years, the 
                                                 
220 L Oppenheim, op cit., (2005), p. 63 
221Ibid. 
222M Khadduri, (tr.) The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar, (The John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore 1966), p. 38   
223 Ibid., p. 56. See also Jahrbucher der Literatur, (Wien, 1827), Vol. 40, p. 48 
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work of Shaybani which Weeramantry rightly refers to as ‘the world’s earliest 
treatise on international law.’224 Taking into account the perceived quest of 
Grotius to unify mankind under a universal rule, a quest which would have 
undoubtedly propelled him into an elaborate research of the diverse cultural 
bequests of various civilizations, one will admit the fact that Grotius, with his 
high level of erudition, could not have ignored valuable jurisprudential 
materials emanating from the world of Islam, a civilization which for almost 
ten centuries, unflinchingly, engaged the world of Christendom in both 
peaceful and belligerent interactions.225 Doubt as to whether or not Grotius 
was ever aware of the existence of the Muslim siyar might as well be put to 
rest by the amazement that surrounded Grotius’ discovery that the legal 
concept of postliminium has a place in the Islamic international law.226 
Weeramantry, in his analysis of the possible impact of the Islamic civilization 
upon Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis, has carefully outlined one of these 
possibilities in the following words: 
 
Grotius finalised his De Jure Belli ac Pacis in France, where he 
had fled after his escape from imprisonment in the fortress of 
Louvestein. In France he worked on his book in the chateau of 
Henri de Meme, where another friend, de Thou, ‘gave him 
facilities to borrow books from the superb library formed by 
his father’ (Encyclopaedia Britanica, 1947 edn, vol. 10, p.908). 
                                                 
224 CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p.130 
225 Ibid., p. 151 
226 See M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), note 3 p. 66 
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A ‘superb library’ in France in the early 1600s could not have 
been without a stock of Arabic books and other materials on 
Islamic civilisation. Moreover, if Grotius had no Arabic himself 
it is highly unlikely that he could not have found a translator in 
France.227   
 
It has been strongly argued that Grotius’ legacy to modern international law 
cannot be said to be free from the indirect influence of the several juristic 
endeavours of early Muslim scholars belonging to the glorious era of the 
Islamic civilization.228 This argument is based on Grotius’ acknowledgement of 
having been greatly influenced by one of his Spaniard predecessors, de 
Vitoria who himself was indebted to the prominent Spanish writers of 
international law that came before him such as King Alfonso X of Castle. It 
must however be noted that King Alfonso’s Las Siete Partidas of 1263 
unequivocally, proclaims the significant influence  Islamic law had on  
international law.229 It has also been observed that the fact that most of the 
prominent and earliest European scholars of international law like Vitoria, 
Ayala, Suarez and Gentili were known to have come from those parts of Spain 
and Italy that had strong influence of the Islamic legal system gives more 
weight and credence to the possibility of Islamic law influence on the 
                                                 
227 CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p. 152 
228 MA Boisard, op cit., (1980), p. 441 
229 Attention has been drawn to the relevant portion of King Alfonso’s Las Siete Partidas 
which acknowledges the influence of Islamic law by Nys while reviewing the Siete Partidas 
thus: “In the second Partida some chapters are given to military organisation and to war. As 
regards war, much is borrowed from the Etymologiae of St. Isidore of Seville . . .  and in 
many respects the influence of Musulman law is very apparent.” See Nys, 1964, Introduction, 
p. 62 
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development of modern law of nations.230 The analytical summation of 
Weeramantry on the implied influence of Islam on Grotius’ famous work is of 
particular interest:  
 
We must note also that Grotius was preceded not merely 
by one Spanish theologian who wrote on the laws of war, 
but many, such as Suarez and Ayala and others going all 
the way back to King Alfonso and beyond. All those writers 
wrote against the background of a dominant Islamic 
culture and could not have been unaware of or 
uninfluenced by it. For example, Suarez was born in 
Granada in 1548, barely half a century from the time when 
it was the last stronghold of the Moorish kings in Spain. 
Suarez’ De Legibus appeared in 1612 and there is reason 
to believe that Grotius read it with interest and was 
influenced by its seminal ideas.231  
 
The predominant power of the Muslim civilization spanning between the 
seventh and sixteenth centuries in the Mediterranean region presupposes a 
strong possibility that the West must have in one way or the other borrowed 
and learnt from the Islamic practice of international relations. The important 
role played by Spain and Sicily in the introduction of the Islamic civilization to 
                                                 
230 CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p. 158 Hamidullah, in his account, has given a vivid 
description of these famous writers thus: ‘they were all the product of the renaissance 
provoked by the impact of Islam on Christendom.’ See M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), p. 66. 
231 CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p. 157 
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Europe cannot be discarded if one is really keen about unravelling the reason 
why the initiative of permanent legation was taken by the commercial towns 
of Italy. Not only did Spain and Sicily serve as vital points of contact between 
Islam and Europe, they also became a point from where the Islamic 
intellectual and social influence spread across the entire Iberian Peninsula.232 
In recognition of Islamic law concept of freedom of the seas, the Islamic 
government in Spain allowed for the installation of foreign commercial agents 
thereby evolving for the first time, the European consulates right in the heart 
of the Islamic State.233 The eventual perfection of this system in the form of 
permanent legation in Italy following the Italian Renaissance of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries cannot, as such, be attributable to mere chance.234 
After all, it is a fact known to history that not only did the Norman conquest 
of 1061-1089 abruptly terminates the Islamic governance in Spain and Sicily, 
but also brought about what Boisard has described as ‘the phenomenon of 
two superimposed civilisations’235 through which the cultural treasure of the 
Islamic civilization along with its knowledge and techniques passed on to the 
West.236          
  
 
 
 
                                                 
232 See M Lombard, The Golden Age of Islam, (Markus Weiner Publishers, Princeton 2004) p. 
87; MA Boisard, op cit., (1980), p. 435 
233 See MA Bosard, op cit., (1980), p. 432 
234 Ibid p. 442 
235 Ibid p. 436 
236 Ibid p. 435 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has drawn our attention to how diplomatic practice generally 
with particular reference to the inviolability and immunity of diplomatic envoys 
appear to be historically universal among different civilizations of the world. 
This is evidenced from their long history of diplomatic relations. Moreover, the 
inter-civilizational contacts which gave each civilization the opportunity to 
borrow from each other, which in today diplomatic relations, have the 
potential of building a cross-cultural understanding amongst States which 
contribute immensely towards the development of international diplomatic 
law.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
                                                                                                              
 SOURCES OF ISLAMIC AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC 
LAWS: BETWEEN TENSION AND COMPATIBILITY. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The question of compatibility between the principles of Islamic siyar and 
modern international law has exacerbated a cornucopia of controversies 
amongst scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and international law. Exponents of 
the exclusivist theoretical view have always maintained that modern 
international law along with its principles do not and cannot accommodate 
any rules or principles of the Islamic international law due to the absence of 
any compatibility between the two legal regimes. Ford, for example, made it 
categorically clear without mincing words that ‘[t]he siyar cannot be said to 
be genuinely compatible with modern international jurisprudence with respect 
to treaty principles, customary law, general principles of law, precedent or 
even the teachings of eminent publicists.’1  He further argues that any 
attempts towards finding compatibility in the two jurisprudential systems will 
be tantamount to ‘merely whitewash[ing] genuine discrepancies between 
international norms and the principles grounding the siyar.’2 Bouzenita equally 
concludes that the fact that  Islamic international law and  modern 
international law originated from different historic and cultural developments 
                                                 
1 See CA Ford, op cit., (1995), p.500 See also M Berger, op cit., in P Meerts (ed), Culture and 
International Law (Hague Academic Coalition, The Hague 2008) p.107 and DA Westbrook, op 
cit., (1992-1993), p.883  
2 CA Ford, op cit., (1995), p. 500 
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with distinct sources, concepts and objectives, will ultimately make the two 
legal systems incompatible.3   Muslim publicists,4 including some non-Muslim 
commentators,5 on the other hand, have continually canvassed arguments in 
favour of a harmonious blend between the principles of Islamic international 
law and modern international law by expounding on all areas of compatibility 
between the two legal systems. Mahmassani, for instance, was very clear in 
his pursuit of this exposition that he states that ‘a sufficient explanation of the 
basic principles of the international law of Islam is necessary in order to bring 
out their similarity with modern principles, and to demonstrate that such 
universal principles, being based on the unity of mankind, are part and parcel 
of the tradition of Islam.’6  
 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this chapter will formulate the following 
issues for discussion. To start with, the chapter is divided into five sections. 
After these introductory comments, in the first section, I seek to discuss the 
two primary sources of Islamic siyar (the Qur’an and the Sunnah) to be 
followed by ijtihaad which is the manifestation of the rational sources of 
Islamic siyar in the second section. I also seek to examine how legal 
obligations can be extracted from these sources for the purpose of 
establishing Islamic siyar. In the third section, I seek to analyse the sources 
                                                 
3 AI Bouzenita, op cit., (2007), p. 44 
4 See S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: 
Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p.205 See also I Shihata, ‘Islamic Law 
and The World Community’, (1962) 4 Harvard Int’l C J p. 101; HM Zawati, op cit., (2001) p. 
6; and GM Badr,op cit., (1982), Pp. 58-59 
5CG Weeramantry,op cit., (1988) p. 166  
6 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 
117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p.205 
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of international diplomatic law relying on Article 38 of the SICJ. In the fourth 
section, I seek to consider a theoretical comparative overview of the sources 
of both legal systems and draw a conclusion on whether there is compatibility 
in their respective sources. And finally, in the fifth section, I seek to sum up 
the compatibility in the outcome of the sources of Islamic siyar and 
international law. 
  
 3.2. Sources of Islamic Diplomatic Law 
 Islamic diplomatic law, being an integral part of Islamic siyar, shares the 
same sources with it. Moreover, Islamic siyar has always been an inseparable 
component of  Islamic law, since it shares the same sources.7 Khadduri has 
correctly stated this position thus: ‘[t]he siyar, if taken to mean the Islamic 
law of nations, is but a chapter in the Islamic corpus juris, binding upon all 
who believed in Islam as well as upon those who sought to protect their 
interest in accordance with Islamic justice.’8 Before going into the different 
sources of Islamic law, it is important to first understand the terms ‘Shari’ah’ 
and ‘Fiqh’ within the context of Islamic law and the definitional connotation of 
sources in Islamic law. 
 
                                                 
7 See SS Ali, ‘The Twain Doth Meet! A Preliminary Exploration of the Theory and Practice of 
as-Siyar and International law in the Contemporary World’ in J Rehman and SC Breau (eds.), 
Religion, Human Right and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 
2007), p. 90;  AI Bouzenita, op cit., (2007), p. 24 See also S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague 
Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1968), p. 235; S Khatab and GD Bouma, Democracy in Islam (Routledge, London 
2007) p. 174; FA Hassan, op cit p.72; M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (The 
Lawbook Exchange Limited, New Jersey 2006) p. 47; and SS Ali and J Rehman, ‘The Concept 
of Jihad in Islamic International Law’, (2005)10 (3) JCSL p. 324 
8 M Khadduri, op cit., (1966), p. 6 See also Qureshi v. U. S. S. R. PLD (1981) SC p. 377  
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3.2.1 Islamic Law: Distinction between Shari’ah and Fiqh 
(Jurisprudence) 
The usage of the words Shari’ah and Fiqh as synonyms of Islamic law has 
generated some confusion in both the theoretical and practical understanding 
of Islamic law.9 Meanwhile, they are of different technical meanings which 
though, complement each other for a pragmatic perception of Islamic legal 
system. The word ‘Shari’ah’ literally means ‘a path to a watering place’ or a 
‘clear path to be followed’ and it emanates from the verb ‘shara’a’ meaning ‘to 
introduce’, ‘to enact’ or ‘to prescribe’.10 In its general usage, it connotes 
commands, prohibitions and principles meant to regulate the conducts of 
humanity as contained in the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s example (his 
Sunnah) which are binding on all believers.11 This term is also traceable to 
Qur’an 45:18 which says: ‘Then we put you, [O Muhammad], on an ordained 
way concerning the matter [of religion] [shari’atin minal-amr]: so follow it and 
do not follow the inclinations of those who do not know.’ In the literal sense, 
fiqh simply means intelligence or knowledge while technically it covers the 
whole of Islamic jurisprudence.12 Fiqh can thus, be defined as ‘knowledge of 
the practical rules of the Shariah which are deducible from the Qur’an and 
Sunnah by direct contact with them.13 It is the science of the Shari’ah. 
 
                                                 
9M Baderin, ‘Understanding Islamic Law in Theory and Practice’ (2009) 9 Legal Information 
Management, p. 186  
10
 See MH Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction  (Oneworld Publications, Oxford 2008) p. 14 
11 See Ibid; JL Esposito, op cit., (2003) Pp. 287-288; and C Glasse and H Smith, The New 
Encyclopedia of Islam  (AltaMira Press, 2001) p. 419  
12 See H Abd Al-Ati, The Family Structure in Islam,(ATP, Indianapolis, 1977), p. 13 
13See MH Kamali, op cit., (2003), p. 41  
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Baderin has carefully classified the usage of Shari’ah in relation to Islamic law 
into three different contexts. Firstly, there is the usage of shari’ah in the 
generic religious context, meaning the Muslims’ way of life generally.14 In 
other words, shari’ah is perceived as covering strictly legal and non-legal 
matters. Secondly, shari’ah could also be applied in a general legal context.15 
That is shari’ah is considered as a distinct legal system ‘with its own sources, 
methods, principles and procedures’ completely different from all other legal 
systems. The fear associated with this context, according to Baderin, is that 
the whole of the Islamic legal system might be considered to be ‘completely 
divine and thereby . . . (mis)represent[s] the whole system as inflexible and 
unchangeable.’16  
 
Thirdly, shari’ah can be seen from a specific context distinct from fiqh 
(jurisprudence).17 While analysing this context, Baderin distinguishes the 
usage of Sharia’h restrictively to mean ‘only the divine sources of Islamic law, 
namely the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad’18 from fiqh which 
represents the ‘human jurisprudential aspect of Islamic law’.19 It therefore 
means that Shari’ah, in a strict sense, will constantly remain immutable. But 
the fiqh, on the other hand, which is ‘a human product, the intellectual 
systematic endeavour to interpret and apply the principles of shari’ah’20 will 
always maintain its variability subject to time and circumstances, particularly 
                                                 
14 M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p. 186-187 
15 Ibid., p. 187 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid., Pp. 186-187 
18 Ibid., p. 187 
19 Ibid 
20 H Abd Al-Ati,op cit., (1977), p. 14  
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with respect to mu’aamalaat (inter-human relations).21 This distinction 
becomes particularly important as Abd Al-Ati concludes that ‘[m]uch of this 
confusion can probably be avoided if the analytical distinction between 
shari’ah and fiqh is borne in mind and if it is realized that Islamic law is held 
by Muslims to encompass two basic elements: the divine which is 
unequivocally commanded by God or His Messenger and is designated as 
shari’ah in the strict sense of the word; and the human, which is based upon 
and aimed at interpretation and/ or application of shari’ah and is designated 
as fiqh or applied shari’ah.’22 Without this distinction, Islamic law will be 
erroneously depicted as a completely divine legal system. 
   
3.2.2 Definitional Connotation of ‘Sources’ in Islamic Law 
The terms ‘daleel’ and ‘asl’ have often been used, though interchangeably, by 
scholars of Islamic jurisprudence as synonyms of the word ‘source’. The word 
daleel (pl. adillah) literally means ‘proof, indication or evidence’.23 It will 
however be ascribed a technical meaning when it serves as an indication of a 
source from where a rule of Shari’ah is deducible, hence the usage of the 
phraseology, ‘adillat al-Shar’iyyah24 (sources of Islamic law). The term ‘asl’ 
(pl. usuul) on the other hand, ordinarily means “something from which 
another thing originates.”25 Nyazee’s meaning of the term asl is in accord with 
Hamidullah’s understanding of usuul being a synonym of the words ‘roots’ 
                                                 
21 M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p. 187 
22 H Abd Al-Ati, op cit., (1977), Pp. 14-15 
23 MH Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (The Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge 
1991) p.9 
24 Ibid. 
25 IAK Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (Adam Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi 2006) 
p.33 
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and ‘sources’.26 In appreciation of the common usage of the two terms 
(‘daleel’ and ‘asl’), Kamali was quite explicit in his explanation that “Dalil in 
this sense is synonymous with asl, hence the sources of Shari’ah are known 
both as adillah and usul.”27  
 
Traditionally, the rules - ahkaam (sing. hukmu) of Islamic law are said to be 
derived from four different sources namely: the Qur’an, Sunnah (prophetic 
tradition), ijmaa’ (consensus of legal opinion) and qiyaas (analogical 
deduction).28 The practices of the Islamic rulers and caliphs, which include 
their official instructions to their commanders and statesmen, have also been 
added as a supplementary source of Islamic international law.29 But following 
the pattern of discussion in the foregoing section, there appears to be three 
basic elements constituting the Islamic legal system. They are sources, 
methods and principles. The sources are the Qur’an and the Sunnah of 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) which are basically divine and immutable. The 
ijmaa’ and qiyaas constitute the methods of Islamic law while the principles 
are made up of istihsaan (juristic preference), maslahah-mursalah 
(jurisprudential interest), saddudh-dharii’ah (blocking lawful means to an 
unlawful end), istishaabul-haal (presumption of continuity of a rule), ‘urf 
                                                 
26 M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961) p. 18 
27 MH Kamali, (1991), op cit., p.10. See also IAK Nyazee, op.cit, (2006), p. 144 
28 NA Shah, Women, The Koran and International Human Rights Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2006) p. 70 
29 See MC Bassiouni, ‘Protection of Diplomats under Islamic Law, (1980) 74 American Journal 
of International Law, p. 609; J Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the 
Threat from Terrorism: A Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilisation’ in the New World Order (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2005), p. 11 
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(custom)30 and many more which have been formulated into legal maxims.31 
Aside from the Qur’an and Sunnah which have been identified as forming the 
divine sources (adillah) of Islamic law, all the other sources aforementioned 
are manifestations of the human jurisprudential elements of Islamic law, 
otherwise known as ijtihaad.32 Meanwhile, the acceptability of these additional 
methods and principles of Islamic law has provoked considerable contention 
amongst the various madhaahib (plural of madhhab) – schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence.33 The sources, methods and principles of Islamic law will now 
be considered in seriatim. 
 
3.2.3 The Qur’an: 
The Qur’an is unanimously considered by the Muslims as a book containing 
the words of Allah which was revealed to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) through 
angel Gabriel, not as a whole, but in piecemeal, spanning through a period of 
                                                 
30 IAK Nyazee, op cit (2006), p. 144. See also M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p 189    
31 MH Kamali, ‘Qawa’id al-Fiqh: The Legal Maxims of Islamic Law’, (1998) 3 Muslim Law 
Journal, p. 
32This is a juristic tool resorted to by jurists through intellectual exertion with a view to 
expanding the law by having recourse to the primary sources of the Shari’ah so as to provide 
solutions to new legal problems. See A Khan, ‘The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The 
Second Era of Ijtihad’, (2003) 1 Uni. St. TLJ, p. 345  
33 The Sunni and the Shi’a schools constituted the two major divisions within the legal schools 
of Islam about three decades after the demise of Prophet Muhammad. The Sunni school 
which forms the majority is further divided into four major madhaahib namely: Hanafi School 
founded by Abu Hanifah Nu’maan ibn Thaabit (d. 767) with followers in Turkey, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya; Maaliki School founded by 
Maalik ibn Anas al-Asbahi (d. 795) with followers North Africa, West Africa and Kuwait; 
Shaafi’i School founded by Muhammad ibn Idris as-Shaafi’i (d. 820) Southern Egypt, Southern 
Arabia, East Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia; and Hanbali School founded by Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal (d. 855) with followers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The Shi’a School is sub-divided into 
three surviving schools of law thus: Ithnaa Ashariyyah School otherwise known as the 
‘Twelvers’; Zaydi School; and Ismaa’ili School also referred as ‘Sab’iyyah’ otherwise known as 
the Seveners. See MH Kamali, (2008) op cit Pp. 70-87; WB Hallaq, Origins and Evolution of 
Islamic Law (CUP, Cambridge 2005) Pp. 150-177; M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p. 189; and  NA 
Shah, op cit., p. 69   
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about twenty-three years.34 It remains the most authoritative source (daleel) 
of  Islamic law owing to the concordant view of Muslim scholar-jurists on the 
incontrovertibility of its divinity and form.35 It must be noted however, that 
the Qur’an being rated the most reliable source of  shari’ah does not 
necessarily make it a legal instrument, stricto sensu, since, the legal verses 
(aayaatul-ahkam) contained therein only constitute a small proportion of the 
more than 6000 verses of the Qur’an.36 The verses of the Qur’an dealing with 
legal matters (such as crimes, public, private and international law) fall within 
the range of between 350 and 600 verses most of which were revealed as 
answers to both empirical questions and anticipatory situations.37 The 
absence of unanimity amongst the Muslim juris-consults (fuqahaa’) on the 
numbers of legal enactments in the Qur’an is not unconnected with the 
differences in individual scholar’s understanding of and interpretation ascribed 
to a particular provision of the Qur’an. A learned scholar, for instance, can 
deduce a rule of law from a parable or historical contents of the Qur’an and 
hence, considers it as one of the ayaatul-ahkaam which may not be 
acceptable to another scholar.38 It has also been observed that some Western 
commentators, particularly adherents of the legal positivist theory, remain 
averse to the assertion that the legal-specific verses of the Qur’an are up to 
                                                 
34 M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), p. 19 
35 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 
117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p. 229 The scholars however, maintain 
divergent views regarding the interpretation ascribed to some verses of the Qur’an which 
precipitated the emergence of the branch of knowledge known as ‘’ilmut-tafseer al-Qur’an’ – 
science of exegesis of the Qur’an.  
36 See MH Kamali, (2008), op cit p. 19  
37 Ibid  See also IAK Nyazee, op.cit, (2006), p. 161;and M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p. 187      
38 See MH Kamali, (2008), op cit., p. 20 where he refers to the observation of As-Shawkaani 
in Irshaadul-Fuhuul, at p. 250  
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or more than 350 verses. Coulson, for instance, in his estimation of the legal-
specific verses of the Qur’an, concludes that ‘no more than approximately 
eighty verses deal with legal topics in the strict sense of the term.’39 To them, 
no legal ruling can possibly be deduced from a Qur’anic text or stipulation 
ingrained in morality.40 The degree of primacy consentaneously accorded the 
Qur’an as a source of Islamic law by the generality of the Muslim jurists and 
Muslim States is a confirmation that every other sources of Islamic law owe 
their legal cogency to it.41 
 
The texts of the Qur’an with respect to their meanings are classified into 
definitive (qat’ii) and speculative (zanni) stipulations. A few number of the 
Qur’anic texts fall within the definitive category.42 While those classified as 
speculative on the other hand, which are of course, overwhelming in number, 
consist of stipulations whose texts are in need of interpretation due to their 
susceptibility to multiple meanings. To derive rules from the provisions of the 
Qur’an therefore, it is required that one turns first to the Qur’an itself for a 
                                                 
39 See NJ Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1964) p. 
12 
40 See M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p. 187 
41 Ibid; ME Badar, ‘Islamic Law (Shari’a) and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court’, (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law, p. 415; HH Hassan, An Introduction to 
the Study of Islamic Law, (Adam Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 2005), p. 143; 
Article 1 of the Saudi Arabian Constitution (adopted by Royal Decree of King Fahd on March 
1992); Article 2(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and paragraph 
5 of the preamble to the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
42 An example of the qat’ii texts can be found in Qur’an 4:12 which states that: ‘And for you is 
half in what your wives leave if they have no child . . .’ This provision of the Qur’an is quite 
explicit as to the half share of the husband in the estate of his wife who dies without any 
child. The share of one-half assigned to the husband is considered to be a definitive text 
(qat’ii) which cannot be subjected to any interpretation or jurisprudential reasoning (Ijtihaad). 
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clearer interpretation; then the explanation of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh); 
and lastly the interpretation of the companions of the Prophet.43 
 
Considering the position of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as the person to 
whom the Qur’an was revealed, the task of proffering supplementary 
elaboration and explicit interpretation to make for proper application of the 
Qur’anic stipulations formed an integral part of his missions.44 Some of the 
Qur’anic stipulations on constitutional matters and international relations, for 
instance, are usually in the form of general principles the details of which are 
left within the complementary and elaborative domain of the Prophetic 
Sunnah. An example can be found in Qur’an 60:8-9 which contains the 
general principle upon which the inter-relation between Muslims and non-
Muslims is premised thus: 
 
Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you 
because of religion and do not expel you from your homes – 
from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward 
them. Indeed Allah loves those who act justly. Allah only 
forbids you from those who fight you because of religion 
and expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion – 
[forbids] that you make allies of them. And whoever makes 
allies of them, then it is those who are the wrongdoers. 
                                                 
43 Their close intimacy to the Prophet coupled with their exceptional knowledge of the Qur’an 
along with circumstances surrounding the revelation of its verses account for their unique 
position within the sphere of Islamic jurisprudence. 
44 A Khan, ‘The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad’, (2003) 1 Uni. St. 
TLJ, p.351 
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This additional part of Prophet Muhammad’s mission as reflected in his deeds, 
utterances and tacit approvals which culminated in what is known as his 
Sunnah became the second cardinal source of Islamic siyar.   
 
3.2.4 The Sunnah:  
This is the second fundamental source of Islamic law which is also classified 
as a divine source of law just like the Qur’an. The sunnah, being an 
embodiment of the life and traditions of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), it 
encompasses his sayings (qawl), his deeds (fi’l), or his tacit approvals (taqrir). 
The validity of the Sunnah as one of the sources of  Islamic law is derived 
from the Qur’an. One of such validating verses of the Qur’an reads thus: ‘O 
you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messanger . . . And if you 
disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger . . .’45 The 
argument that the Prophet never intended his sunnah to be binding when he 
warned his companions against writing down his sunnah in the following 
words: ‘Do not write what I say. Whoever has written anything from me other 
than the Qur’an, let him wipe it out’ has been faulted by the majority of 
Muslim scholars on the authority of another oft-cited tradition said to have 
been reported by ‘Abdullah bin ‘Amr who was in the habit of writing down 
every utterances of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) until he was warned against 
it. He reportedly went back to the Prophet (pbuh) to ask whether he should 
resume writing down his sayings to which the Prophet (pbuh) replied: ‘Write . 
                                                 
45 Qur’an 4:59. Also see Qur’an 59:7 
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. . I say nothing but the truth.’46 This tradition, according to the majority 
opinion, lifted the prohibition initially placed on the recording of the prophetic 
sunnah since the said prohibition, in the first place, was meant to repel the 
possibility of confusing the recording of the words of Allah with that of the 
Prophet (pbuh).47  
 
The ‘book and a candle’ similitude advanced by Weeramantry while stressing 
the complementary role of the sunnah to the Qur’an as a cardinal tool of the 
Islamic legal mechanism that: ‘The life and work of the Prophet provided the 
candle by the light of which the book is to be read. The book without the 
candle or the candle without the book would not achieve its purpose’48 is 
instructively revealing. Even though the Qur’an has been rated to transcend 
the sunnah in hierarchy, it has, however, been observed that substantial 
number of rules having direct relevance to Islamic international law are 
established by the prophetic sunnah.49 The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 AD) is 
a typical example of such prophetic sunnah which up till today remains an 
irresistible reference point when discussing the concept of diplomatic relations 
and immunities and the validity of international treaties under  Islamic siyar.  
 
The sunnah has, however, not enjoyed unassailable accuracy and authenticity 
as does the Qur’an which may also account for why it cannot be placed on 
equal hierarchical pedestal with the Qur’an despite its status of divinity. The 
                                                 
46 This tradition is cited in DW Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought  (CUP, 
Cambridge 1996) p. 91 
47 Ibid. 
48 CG Weeramantry, op cit ., (1988), p.35 
49 M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), p. 21 
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internal political discordance which threatened, if not totally debilitated the 
Muslims’ fraternity shortly after the demise of Prophet Muhammad has been 
identified as a major channel through which fabrications crept into some 
traditions that were ascribed to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).50 If the sunnah 
must retain its relevance as a source of Islamic law, the authenticity of its 
texts must not be compromised. Consequently, sometime between the 
second and third centuries of Islam, Muslim jurists came up with ways of 
ascertaining the genuineness of hadith which later became another sphere of 
knowledge otherwise known as the science of hadith (‘ilm-al-hadith). The 
outcome of this authenticating technique was what gave birth to the famous 
and widely acknowledged six Sunni collections of authentic traditions namely: 
Sahih al-Bukhaari,51 Sahih Muslim,52 Sunan Abu Daawud,53 Sunan at-
Trimidhi,54 Sunan an-Nasaa’i55 and Sunan Ibn Maajah.56 It must also be 
mentioned that out of these six collections, the first two are ranked to be 
most reliable.  
 
The fact that the prophetic sunnah serves as a source of legal obligations for 
Islamic siyar can be seen in the treaties, especially the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah 
                                                 
50 AB Atwan, The Secret History of Al-Qaeda (University of California Press,  California 2006) 
p. 68 
51 This collection was compiled by Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad bin Isma’il al-Bukaari (810-870 
AD). 
52 This is the collection of Abul Husayn Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj Qushayri al-Nishapuri (821-875 
AD). 
53 This is the collection of Abu Daawud Sulayman ibn Ash’ath al-Azadi al-Sijistani (817-888 
AD). 
54 This is the collection of Abu Isa Muhammad ibn Isa ibn Sawrah ibn Shaddaad at-Trimidhi 
(824-892) 
55 This is the collection of Ahmad ibn Shu’ayb ibn Ali ibn Sinan Abu ‘Abdur-Rahman an-Nasaa’i 
(829-915) 
56 This is the collection of Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Yazeed ibn Maajah (824-887) 
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628 AD, signed by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh); the various missions he 
despatched to different kings and emperors; his verbal and written codes of 
conduct in warfare; and his exchange and respectful treatment of diplomatic 
envoys. The question as to whether a particular tradition is legal or non-legal 
or ascertaining the meaning of a text from the Qur’an or Sunnah, particularly 
when such stipulation is evidently speculative, falls within the preserve of 
legal reasoning (ijtihaad) which is discussed below. 
 
3.2.5 Ijtihaad: A Manifestation of Methods and Principles of Islamic 
Law 
With the demise of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) came an abrupt finality to the 
continuous flow of legal guidance from the Qur’an and extension of legal 
principles and rules. This was preceded by the expansion of the territorial 
stretch of the Islamic faith which needed to contend with increasing novel 
matters. The fact that the law must necessarily evolve to reflect the inevitable 
changes in times and conditions of the society is not only rightly depicted in 
the Islamic legal maxim that ‘the fatwa changes with changing times’ 
(taghayyur al-fatwaa bi taghayyir al-azmaan),57but has also captured the 
attention of the eleventh century Muslim scholar, al-Sam’aani who gave a 
remark that ‘... Fiqh is an ongoing science continuing with the passage of 
centuries and changing with the change of circumstances and conditions of 
                                                 
57 WB Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (CUP, Cambridge 2004) p. 166 
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men, without end or interruption.’58 All these necessitated the need for a 
functional ijtihaad. 
 
Ijtihaad which literally means ‘the expending of maximum effort in the 
performance of an act,’59 be it physical or mental has been variously defined 
by scholars of Islamic law. According to Al-Alwani, ijtihaad in its general 
context denotes the expenditure of mental and intellectual effort.60 For such 
intellectual effort to be referred to as ijtihaad in a strict legal sense, it should, 
in the words of Ramadan, be a ‘personal effort undertaken by the jurist in 
order to understand the source and deduce the rules or, in the absence of a 
clear textual guidance, formulate independent judgments.’61 What is, 
however, clear from these definitions is that ijtihaad is a process of human 
intellectual reasoning usually resorted to with a view to interpreting and 
giving meaning to inexplicit stipulations contained in the divine sources of  
Islamic law – the Qur’an and the Sunnah while at the same time relying on 
these sources.  
 
The juridical position of the concept of ijtihaad in Islamic jurisprudence 
remains unsettled amongst Islamic law writers. To those who perceive the 
Shari’ah as wholly divine, consisting of rules that are strictly immutable and 
                                                 
58 This quotation is cited in WB Hallaq, Law and Legal Theory in Classical and Medieval Islam 
(Variorum, Aldershot 1994) p. 197 
59 IAK Nyazee, op cit., (2006), p. 263 
60 TJ Al-Alwani, Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought (The International Institute of 
Islamic Thought, Virginia 2005) p. 68 
61 T Ramadan, Western Muslims and The Future of Islam (OUP, Oxford 2004) p.43. See also 
MK Masud, Shatibi’s Philosophy of Islamic Law (The Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad 
1995) p. 367 and IAK Nyazee, op cit., (2006), p. 263 
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uncompromisingly monolithic, ijtihaad may not be worthy of any significant 
role within the realm of the Islamic juridical system since it is basically 
founded upon the mechanism of independent human reasoning.62 Some 
scholars would rather see ijtihaad not strictly as an independent source of 
law, but as a juristic tool which gave rise to some legal methods generally 
referred to as non-divine sources of Islamic law.63 Other exponents of ijtihaad 
on the other hand, relying strongly on the authority of the famous hadith of 
Mu’aadh ibn Jabal,64 see it as the third in the echelon of the sources of 
Islamic law.65 This, however, lends credibility to Kamali’s remark that all other 
sources of  Islamic law aside from the Qur’an and Sunnah, such as consensus 
(ijmaa’), analogical reasoning (qiyaas), public interest (maslahah), equity or 
juristic preference (istihsaan) and custom (‘urf), are all manifestations of 
ijtihaad.66 These legal methods of Islamic law will be considered briefly. 
 
3.2.6 Ijmaa’ (Consensus of Opinion) 
                                                 
62 This opinion has been attributed to the traditionalists. They challenge the possibility and 
propriety of human rationality (Ijtihaad) as a valid source of law even when a direct solution 
to a pending legal question appears not to be forthcoming in the two divine sources of the 
Shari’ah. See A Khan, op cit., (2003), p. 362  
63 See A Khan, op cit., (2003), p. 363. See also M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p. 188. 
64 Mu’aadh ibn Jabal was one of the companions of Prophet Muhammad whom he deployed 
to Yemen as a judge. He asked him what will be his source of law when adjudicating on 
matters brought before him to which, he replied: ‘I will judge with what is in the book of God 
(the Qur’an)’. The Prophet probed further: ‘And if you do not find a clue in the book of God?’ 
Mu’aadh replied: ‘Then with the Sunnah of the Messenger of God’ The Prophet went ahead 
again to ask: ‘And if you do not find a clue in that?’ Mu’aadh responded again by saying: ‘I 
will exercise my own reasoning (ijtihaad).’ The Prophet was reported to be pleased with and 
approved of Mu’aadh’s response. See A Hasan, (trans) Sunan Abu Daawud (1984), Vol. III, 
Hadith No. 3585, p. 1019 
65 See T Ramadan, op cit., (2004), Pp. 44-45 where he refers to some classical scholars like 
Imam Al-Ghazali, as-Shaatibi, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, al-Khallaf and Abu Zahra who 
equally acknowledged the jurisprudential importance of ijtihaad as a third source of Islamic 
law. 
66 MH Kamali, op cit., (2008), p. 366 
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The fact that ijmaa’ is a product of ijtihaad is clearly noticeable from the 
technical meaning most scholars give to it as ‘the agreement of independent 
scholars of Muhammad’s (pbuh) community in a particular period upon a legal 
decision.’67 It can be deduced from this definition that ijmaa’ is simply the 
plurality of individual juristic opinions of Muslim jurists belonging to a 
particular age on a specific legal question. 
 
The concept of ijmaa’ finds it validity both in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). One of the often quoted references from the 
Qur’an is Quran 4:59 which enjoins obedience to God, His Messenger and 
‘those in authority among you.’68 And the Prophetic tradition that ‘My 
community shall never agree on an error’69 remains the most frequently cited 
authority from the sunnah which gives validity to ijmaa’. Resort to ijmaa’ 
becomes necessary when a new legal question finds no specific solution 
either in the Qur’an or the Sunnah. The fact that a validly constituted ijmaa’ is 
founded upon the unanimity of qualified Muslim jurists on a particular rule of 
law, gives such a rule of law an automatic status which is synonymous in 
authority to the provision of the Qur’an or the Sunnah. It must be noted 
however, that an ijmaa’ does not, like the Qur’an and Sunnah, enjoy 
                                                 
67This definition has been cited by GF Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (CUP, 
Cambridge 1985) p. 193 while referring to the work of Muhammad b. Hamza al-Ghaffari, (d. 
A.D. 1430/31), Fusul al-bada’i fi usul ash-Shara’i. Also see IAK Nyazee, op cit p. 183 and MH 
Kamali, op cit., (2008), p. 169 
68That part of the Qur’anic verse: “ulul-amr minkum” has been interpreted to mean the 
Muslim jurists by some commentators of the Qur’an. Other authorities from the Qur’an 
validating the concept of ijmaa’ are Qur’an 4:115 and Qur’an 4:83     
69 This hadith has been variously reported by Ibn Maajah, Al-Tirmidhi and Abu Daawud. 
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unqualified authority and observance since it can be possibly set aside, 
modified or outrightly abrogated by another validly constituted ijmaa’. 
 
Although the concept of ijmaa’ has received an overwhelming approval from 
the classical Muslim jurists albeit with varying conditions,70 yet this legal 
method has been and still being confronted with various theoretical questions 
touching on the practical feasibility of its universalistic connotation. The 
possibility and practicability of achieving an actual unanimity amongst the 
qualified legal scholars (mujtahidun) of any given age aside from the 
generation of the companions immediately preceding the death of Prophet 
Muhammad remains an unresolved question.71 Even where the unanimity is 
assumed to have been achieved, the question of ascertaining convincingly, 
that no dissenting opinion of at least a qualified jurist has been overlooked 
also begs for attention.72 With this, some writers have even gone as far as 
asking whether ijmaa’ is not a mere legal fiction devoid of practical feasibility? 
I must, however, admit that a broader analytical survey of these theoretical 
questions which have ever been controversial amongst classical Muslim 
scholars just as they are with modern writers is beyond the purview of this 
chapter. Nonetheless, mention must be made of some scholars such as Shah 
                                                 
70 The Shafi’i school of law’s acceptance of ijmaa’ is limited to obligatory duties alone. The 
Zahiri and Hanbali schools on the other hand would only approve of ijmaa’ if it is within the 
scope of the consensus of the companions of the Prophet alone. But to the Maliki school, 
ijmaa’ is just the consensus of the people of Madinah. While the Hanafis would accept as a 
valid ijmaa’ the consensus of the jurists belonging to any age. But according to the Shi’a 
juridical school, no ijmaa’ is valid save the consensus drawn from the Prophet’s household 
(ahl al-bayt). See MH Kamali, op cit., (2008) Pp. 182-183; KM Khan, ‘Juristic Classification of 
Islamic Law’, (1983-1984) 6 HJIL p. 34; and CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p.40  
71See FE Vogel, op cit., (2000), p. 48 This generation (era of the companions of the Prophet) 
has been exempted because of the few and identifiable numbers of the qualified scholars 
amongst them and more so most of them were resident in Madinah.  
72Ibid  
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Wali Allah Dihlawi (d.1762) who are of the view that the proper meaning of 
ijmaa’ does not envisage a universal consensus of all the qualified Muslim 
jurists but rather, it implies the consensus of learned scholars of different 
towns and localities.73 If one truly considers the difficulty and the seeming 
impossibility surrounding the feasibility of the universalistic theory of ijmaa’ on 
the one hand, and the significant role of ijmaa’ in evolving the law to meet 
the unrelenting demands of our changing world, on the other hand, one may 
want to agree with Dihlawi’s contention.     
 
3.2.7 Qiyaas (Analogical Deduction) 
This is another legal method emanating from the concept of ijtihaad. Qiyaas 
in its ordinary meaning connotes ‘measurement’. But technically it has been 
defined as the extension of the application of a certain legal rule (hukm) 
prescribed for a given case (asl) to a new case (far’) on the ground of 
common effective cause (‘illah) which is identical in both cases.74 From this 
meaning, four essential conditions can be deduced for an effective application 
of the legal process of qiyaas: the original case (asl) as stipulated either in the 
Qur’an or the Sunnah forming the basis for the analogical deduction; a new 
case (far’) to be ruled upon for which there is no definite ruling in either of 
the two divine sources; commonality of effective cause or ratio legis (‘illah) 
between the original and new cases; and subject to the fulfilment of the 
                                                 
73 MH Kamali, op cit., (2008), p. 190 
74 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 
117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p.231 
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foregoing conditions, the ruling (hukm) in the original case shall, by analogy, 
be extended to the new case.75  
 
The need to resort to the legal method of qiyaas will definitely become 
unnecessary once there are rulings (ahkaam) either in the Qur’an, Sunnah or 
ijmaa’ capable of proffering solution to the new case at hand. The only 
identifiable human element in the application of analogical deduction is the 
task of identifying the commonality of the effective cause or ratio legis (‘illah) 
between the original and the new cases.76  
 
Classical Muslim scholars have devised certain legal principles which usually 
serve as guides whenever it becomes necessary to apply any of the divine 
sources and the legal methods discussed above. These legal principles which 
form part of the juristic tools of ijtihaad have also been considered significant 
while discussing the sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Some of these legal 
principles have been identified as playing interpretative roles to any of the 
sources, while the others are of relevance to the legal methods.77 These legal 
principles are briefly considered below. 
 
3.2.8 Istihsaan (Juristic Preference) 
Juristic preference, generally referred to as istihsaan in Islamic law, just like 
ijmaa’ and qiyaas, is another products of ijtihaad. The ordinary meaning of 
                                                 
75 See M Baderin, op cit., (2009), Pp. 188-189 and MH Kamali, op cit., (2008), p. 200 
76 MH Kamali, op cit., (2008) Pp. 198-199 
77 See M Baderin, op cit., (2009), p. 189 
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the term ‘istihsaan’ being a derivative of the verb hasan which means to 
deem (something) good, makes clearer the rationale behind the concept of 
istihsaan that the core objectives of the Shari’ah (maqaasid al-shari’ah)78 
must not be compromised at the expense of literal application of the rules of 
the Shari’ah.79 It must, however, be mentioned that the fact that this legal 
principle has not been strictly pronounced or defined as a legal concept either 
by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) or any of his companions does not deplete its 
juridical relevance. This is so because, traces of its application have been 
noticed in some legal pronouncements and instructions made by some of the 
companions of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). The letter of instruction written 
by ‘Umar, the second Caliph, to Abu Musa al-Ash’ari, one of his appointed 
judges that: ‘Research similar cases, and when you find similarities that affect 
the ruling, apply the method of qiyas. Using the results of qiyas, select the 
ruling that adheres to the Islamic principles and ensures that your conscience 
is satisfied that justice has been served’80 attests to this assertion.  
 
The application of istihsaan has given rise to serious theoretical questions 
which stem from the absence of unanimity amongst the Islamic jurists on the 
                                                 
78 The primary purposes and objectives which have also been designated as necessities 
(daruraat) that must remain preserved, according to the Muslim jurists are: religion (ad-din), 
life (an-nafs), progeny (an-nasl), intellect (al-‘aql) and wealth (al-maal). These objectives, 
according to Imam al-Ghazzali, are meant ‘to promote the well-being of all mankind’ and that 
‘whatever ensures the safeguard of these five serves public interest and is desirable.’ See MU 
Chapra, The Future of Economics: An Islamic Perspective (The Islamic Foundation Leicester 
2000) p. 118 and IAK Nyazee, op cit., (2006), Pp. 199 and 202   
79 MH Kamali, op cit., (2008), p. 54  
80 This quotation has been cited in M Kayadibi, ‘Ijtihad by Ra’y: The Main Source of 
Inspiration Behind Istihsan’, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 24:1 p. 87 with 
references from Hatib, Al-Faqih, 1:200 and Ibn al-Qayyim, I’lam, 1:126 
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legal meaning ascribable to istihsaan.81 Proponents of this legal principle have 
generally equated it with the notion of equity owing to its preference for 
simplicity and easement of difficulties that may occur as a result of strict 
adherence to established precedents in the previous rulings of qiyaas. This 
understanding can be deduced from the simple, but rich definition given by 
Jassas amongst others that ‘istihsan is the departure from a ruling of qiyas in 
favor of another ruling which is considered preferable.’82 With the application 
of istihsaan, allowance is given for the adoption of ‘a more subtle – but 
ultimately more plausible – analogy’83 where the pre-existing ruling is capable 
of causing hardship. The idea of giving preference to a more plausible and 
equitable analogy will appear to be in keeping with the spirit of the Shari’ah 
and the clear intention of the law Giver (Haakim) as stipulated in the Qur’an 
thus: ‘Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship.’84 It 
therefore becomes clear that it can be argued that based on the application of 
istihsaan, Muslim States can enter into international treaties with non-Muslim 
States for an indefinite period once the treaties facilitate ease for the Muslim 
community. 
 
3.2.9 Maslahah (Public Interest) 
                                                 
81 See J Makdisi, ‘Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law’, (1985) 33, Am. J. Comp. L, p. 73 
82 See M Kayadibi, op cit., p. 75 See also MH Kamali, Istihsan: Juristic Preference and Its 
Application to Contemporary Issues, (Islamic Development Bank, IRTI, Jeddah 1997), p. 24 
and Jassas Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn `Ali al-Razi, Al-Fusul fi al-Usul, ed. Ajil Jasim al- Nashmi 
(Kuwait: Wizarat al-Awqaf wa al-Shu’un al-Islamiyyah, 1988), 4:234 
83 B Weiss, ‘Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad’, Am. J. Comp. L, 26 (2) p. 
202 
84 Qur’an 2:185 
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When one considers the ever increasing needs of modern times, vis-à-vis the 
exigency to preserve the fundamental objectives of the shari’ah (maqaasid al-
Shari’ah), the importance of the legal principle of maslahah as another 
instrument of ijtihaad will be well appreciated. Being a tool of interpretation 
rather than a material source of substantive law, its application dictates that 
when interpreting provisions from the Qur’an and Sunnah, the jurist is 
required to give consideration to how best his interpretation will promote and 
preserve the public interest or human welfare.85 
 
The application of maslahah, according to the Muslim jurists could come 
under any of these three categorisations – indispensables (daruriyyaat)86, 
needed (haajiyyaat)87 and complementary (tahsiniyyaat)88 depending on the 
needs of the community. The significance of maslahah to the juris corpus of 
Islam as a legal instrument used for the preservation of human welfare and 
public interest has been rightly summed up by Ibn Ashur in the following 
words: 
 
. . . the Shari’ah aims at preserving the order and regulating the 
conduct of human beings in it by preventing them from inflicting 
                                                 
85 NJ Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (OUP, Oxford 
2004) p. 101. See also JL Esposito and NJ Delong-Bas, Women in Muslim Family Law (2nd edn 
Syracuse University Press, New York 2001) Pp. 8-9   
86 These are indispensable interests the realisation of which is paramount to the sustainability 
of the social order of the community. According to the Muslim scholars, it consists of 
preservation and safeguarding of the five core objectives of the Shari’ah (religion, life, 
intellect, property and lineage).  
87 These are things needed for the achievement and effective functioning of the community’s 
interest. 
88 This consists of things that lead to the perfection of the community condition and social 
order 
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corruption and destruction upon one another. This objective can 
be achieved only by acquiring what is good and beneficial 
(masalih) and warding off what is evil and harmful (mafasid) as 
far as the meaning of maslahah and mafsadah can be 
understood.89 
 
The application of maslahah has also been identified as capable of 
forming the juridical basis for signing of international treaties and 
conventions which are eventually made into domestic legislations with a 
view to ensuring a peaceful co-existence between the Muslim State and 
other nations.90 
 
3.2.10 ‘Urf (Prevailing Local Custom) 
Custom, technically referred to as ‘urf, is another legal mechanism whose 
status within the Islamic jurisprudence has become controversial amongst the 
Muslim jurists. For instance, the failure of the Malikis to give much recognition 
to custom has been attributed to their strong affiliation to the customs of the 
people of Madinah, having elevated such customs to the status of the 
prophetic Sunnah.91 This perhaps, explains why some commentators conclude 
that custom has no binding effect in Islamic legal theory.92 The fact that it is a 
reflection of human behaviour, according to Libson, stands as a reason why 
                                                 
89 Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, Ibn Ashur: Treatise on Maqāṣid al-Shari’ah, (The 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, 2006), p. 116 
90Ibid., p. 131 
91 G Libson, ‘On the Development of Custom as a Source of Law in Islamic Law’, (1997) 4 (2) 
ILS  p. 134 
92 See NJ Coulson, op cit., (1964), p. 143  
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some Muslim jurists particularly of the pre-classical period fail to accord any 
recognition to it as one of the sources of Islamic law.93 Contrary to this 
understanding, Muslim scholars belonging to the post classical era have 
however acknowledged the relevance of custom in Islamic law.94   
 
In spite of these varying amounts of relevance given to custom by the Muslim 
jurists, it is however, still recognised as a law formulating method provided it 
does not in any manner, run contrary to the clear texts of the divine sources 
of Islamic law – the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition.95 It is also of 
importance to note that the origin of a particular practice need not necessarily 
be associated with the periods of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) or his 
companions to be validly pronounced as a custom under the Islamic 
jurisprudence. It suffices that such practice conforms to the fundamental 
principles of Islam.96 The protection and inviolability of diplomatic personnel is 
an age-long practice among different nations of the world and it has equally 
gained a huge recognition and acceptance under Islamic international law. 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) made it categorically clear when confirming the 
inviolability of the two emissaries sent to him by Musaylamah (al-kadhdhab) 
in his statement that: ‘. . . if it were not the tradition that envoys could not be 
killed, I would have severed your heads.’97 
                                                 
93 G Libson, op cit., (1997), p. 135 
94 NA Shah, op cit., (2006), Pp. 74-75 See also NJ Coulson, ‘Muslim Custom and Case-Law’ 
(1959) 6 Die Welt des Islams, p. 14 
95 See I Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and Elements’ (1996) 1 JIL Pp. 
34-35  
96 Ibid p. 35 
97 Ibn Hisham, As-Seeratu-n-Nabawiyyah, Vol. IV, (Darul al-Gadd al-Jadeed, Al-Monsurah), p. 
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3.2.11. Consistent Practices of the Caliphs and Islamic Rulers 
The practice of the caliphs, particularly those that are often referred to as the 
rightly guided caliphs,98 in their international dealings with other communities 
is so important that it cannot be ignored while discussing the sources of 
Islamic siyar. Aside from the conventional sources of Islamic law which have 
been discussed above, the instructions issued by the Caliphs for the guidance 
of their governors and military leaders and decisions which were made in the 
form of principles and rules incorporated in treaties with non-Muslims also 
represent legal authority in Islamic international law.99 The treaty which 
‘Umar ibn Khattab, the second caliph in Islam, signed with the Patriarch of 
Jerusalem in 638 AD, is one of the numerous examples of such treaties.100 
 
The practice of other Islamic rulers may also be considered a legal authority 
in Islamic international law provided the ‘practice has not been repudiated by 
the contemporary or later jurisconsults.’101  There are relevant precedents in 
the treaties and valuable decisions made by some of the Umayyad and 
Abbasid caliphs down to other Islamic rulers.102 For instance, there are series 
of treaties reportedly concluded between the Abbasid caliphs and the 
Byzantines for different reasons such as putting a stop to frequent violation of 
                                                 
98 The rightly guided caliphs are: Abu Bakr ibn Abi Quhafah (d. 634 D), ‘Umar ibn Kattab (d. 
644 AD), ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (d. 656 AD) and ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661 AD). Most writers 
considered ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Azeez (d. 720 AD), an Umayyad caliph, as one of the rightly 
guided caliphs. See AS Najeebabadi, The History of Islam,Vol. 2 (Darussalam International 
Publications Limited, London, 2001), Pp. 194 and 212  
99 See M Khadduri, op cit. (1966), p. 9; S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of 
International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), 
p.236 
100 M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1955), 
Pp. 213-214 
101 M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), p. 23 
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frontiers, settlement of boundaries disputes between the Abbasid and 
Byzantines governments etc.103  
 
In a nutshell, these treaties, decisions and instructions of the caliphs and 
other Islamic rulers will only become acceptable as legal authority in the 
Islamic international law provided they are not repugnant or contrary to the 
Qur’an or the Sunnah or the practice of any the rightly guided caliphs. 
  
3.3. Sources of International Diplomatic Law 
The pre-historic and universal nature of diplomatic law brings it within the 
special ambit of customary international law which now makes it an integral 
branch of contemporary international law particularly with the famous 
codifications of diplomatic practice in 1961 and 1963.104 It therefore follows, 
that a panoramic analysis of the sources of diplomatic law cannot be made in 
isolation of the sources of international law which are generally accepted to 
be embodied in the provisions of Article 38 (1) of the SICJ. Perhaps, this 
explains why most writers on diplomatic law have not deemed it necessary to 
expound on the sources of diplomatic law, not because it has no sources, but, 
may be, because its sources are already embedded in the generally acclaimed 
sources of international law. It is important, at least, to bear in mind that 
diplomatic relations, just like any other branches of humanities, cannot be left 
                                                 
103 M Khadduri,op cit., (1955), Pp. 216-218 
104 These are the 1961 VCDR and 1963 VCCR which codified customary diplomatic practice.   
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unregulated by law if its affairs were to be properly and judiciously 
managed.105  
 
Although, there is an overwhelming consensus amongst writers that 
diplomatic law is considerably sourced from the customary rules of 
international law,106 yet, one can still not lose sight of the invaluable 
significance of convention to diplomatic law, as the functionality of this body 
of law is only achievable when a State agrees to accept the personnel or 
representatives of the other State.107  It must be borne in mind, however, 
that while discussing about the sources of diplomatic law, we are, invariably, 
talking about the sources of international law. This is acknowledged by Hardy 
while discussing about the sources of diplomatic law that ‘we must remember 
that we are referring to international law, a system of law unique in the 
discretion which it leaves to its subjects in the choice and applications of 
given legal rules.’108 
 
Although, it has been expressed by Bederman that ‘[t]he ICJ statute’s 
articulation of sources thus may not be entirely authoritative or relevant 
today’,109 however, considerable number of international law writers have 
                                                 
105 See MJL Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law, (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1968) 
p.4  
106 See R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it, (OUP, Oxford 
1994) Pp. 86-87 and MJL Hardy, op cit., p.5 
107 MJL Hardy, op cit., (1968), p.4 
108 Ibid 
109 DJ Bederman, The Spirit of International Law, (The University of Georgia Press, Athens & 
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adopted the provision of Article 38 (1) of the SICJ as containing ‘the most 
authoritative and complete statement as to the sources of international 
law.’110 Similarly, in the words of Meldenson, it also ‘authorizes and requires 
the Court, without much ado, at least to have recourse to the sources 
specified in paragraph 1’111 of Article 38 which provides thus: 
 The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing  rules  expressly recognized by the 
contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings  of the most highly qualified publicists 
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
 
The sources of international law identified in the provisions of Article 38 
above will now be examined below: 
 
3.3.1. International Customary Law 
                                                 
110 See MN Shaw, op cit., (2008), p. 70 See also I Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, (OUP, Oxford, 2003), p. 5 and MO Hudson, The Permanent Court of International 
Justice, (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934), Pp. 601 ff 
111 M Mendelson, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law’ in 
V Lowe and M Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1996), p. 64  
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Within the international echelon, the source of international diplomatic law is 
known to have evolved largely from customary rules of international law.112 
Although, more recently, these customary rules have been, in the main, 
codified into what is now known as the VCDR and the VCCR. With the 
codification, notwithstanding, the significant of international customary law as 
a source of international diplomatic law still stands as expressly stated in the 
fifth paragraph of the preamble to the VCDR that ‘affirming that rules of 
customary international law should continue to govern questions not 
expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention.’ However, 
there remain arguments on the relevance of international customary law as a 
source of international law. Some commentators do not attach any value to it 
for reason of it being ‘too clumsy and slow-moving’113 as to accommodate the 
fast-evolving international law question,114 while others correctly maintained 
that because of its universal application, it stands dynamic as a process of law 
creation.115  
 
The ICJ has, in the course of shedding more light on what international 
customary law is, observed in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Malta)116 that:  
It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international 
law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio 
                                                 
112 MJL Hardy, op cit., (1968), p. 5 
113 MN Shaw, op cit., (2008), p. 73 
114 W Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University Press, 
New York 1964) p. 121-3 
115 A D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971) p. 12 
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jusris117 of States, even though multilateral conventions may have 
an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving 
from custom or in deed in developing them . . . 118 
 
These two elements have been identified as the objective one of ‘a general 
practice’ and a subjective one of ‘accepted as law.’119 The two constituents of 
customary international law will however, be considered below with a view to 
understanding to what extent they need to be proved in establishing the 
existence of the rule of customary law and the controversies surrounding 
them. 
 
A. The Objective Element of ‘a General Practice’ 
 The general requirement of the SICJ, as mentioned earlier, does not demand 
that all the States or even the majority of them must have necessarily 
practiced a particular custom for its rules to be regarded as established.120 
According to J. L. Kunz, for the practice to be firmly established as to form 
international customary law, it must be a continuous and repeated practice 
without interruption of continuity, albeit, that there are no clear indication in 
international law as to ‘how many times or for how long a time this practice 
                                                 
117 It is known as opinion juris sive necessitatis meaning ‘opinion that an act is necessary by 
rule of law’. The legal phrase was first propounded by a French writer, Francois Geny to 
identify legal custom from mere social usage. That is for a conduct or practice to attain the 
status of international customary law, nations must be shown to believe that in deed 
international law and not moral obligation mandate the practice or conduct. See BA Garner 
(ed.) Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn., Thomson West Publishing Co., USA 2004) p. 1125 and 
MN Shaw, op cit., (2008), p. 75   
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119 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 at p. 97 
120 AM Weisburd, ‘Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties’ (1988) 21 Vand. J. 
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must have been repeated.’121 However, Chodosh maintains that a practice 
need not be continuous as other distinguished scholars do not ascribe any 
weight to it.122 It has been indicated by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Case of S. S. Wimbledon123 and The S. S. Lotus124 that the rules 
of international customary law can be inferred from the practice of States 
even if repeated in less than a dozen.  
 
The view that the principles of customary international law need to be based 
on ‘broad participation’ of states for it to create a rule of international law has 
been strongly opposed by D’ Amato who gives precedential value to a single 
act between two or more States.125 It has been observed also by Tunkin that 
the element of repetition may not occur in some cases and yet, the rule of 
conduct will appear resulting from a singular precedent, even though, such 
occurrence could be rare.126 Moreover, not all elements of repetition do result 
in juridical customary norm of international law. It could, according to Tunkin, 
merely be a norm of international ethics or a norm of international 
                                                 
121 JL Kunz, ‘Nature of Customary International Law’, 47 Am. J. Int’l. L. 666  
122 HE Chodosh, ‘Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International 
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(1961) 49 Cal. L. Rev., p. 419  
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courtesy.127 In international diplomatic law for instance, the exemption of 
diplomatic baggage from customs inspection including privileges accorded by 
all states for diplomats in third countries are not international norms but 
norms of international courtesy.128  But this does not conclusively settle the 
requirement. According to Guzman, the duration and consistency of the 
practice must be ascertained that is to say: ‘How long must it have been 
going on?’129 Even though, it appears that one inconsistency in the act of a 
State may not out-rightly take away the issue of consistency in State practice, 
one still has to determine the amount of the inconsistency for it to be deemed 
insufficient.130 In addition, it remains unclear what amounts to ‘State practice’ 
for the purpose of establishing customary international law particularly, in a 
world that is made up of many independent states.131 These are the million 
dollar questions that must be answered before establishing what international 
customary law is.                
  
 
Although State practice need not be universal for the purpose of establishing 
international customary law, it is required that majority of States must 
participate in the practice.132 To figure out what constitute States practice, 
one may have to consider the prevailing arguments surrounding it. Actions by 
States are usually considered as part of State practice. D’Amato believes that 
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physical actions, without statements of either diplomats or UN officials, should 
alone be taken as constituting State practice.133 But the prevalent view is that 
statements and claims by States can also form integral part of State practice. 
Utterances by State which includes treaties, domestic laws, United Nations 
Resolutions and policy statements all constitute evidence of State practice.134 
In the words of Akehurst, state practice ‘covers any act or statement by a 
state from which view can be inferred about international law’ in addition with 
omissions and silence.135 The ICJ in the Case Concerning Rights of Nationals 
of the United States of America in Morocco136 relied on and used diplomatic 
correspondence to evaluate a claim of State practice. Also International 
customary could either stem from positive action of the State or manifest 
itself by abstaining from action. Abstinence from action has been found to be 
an action in itself as there is no denying the fact that it is capable of 
establishing customary norm of international law. 
  
B. The Subjective Element of ‘Accepted as Law’ 
When a practice becomes accepted and recognised as juridically binding by 
the States in addition to it being general, then international customary law 
can be said to be established. This legal position has been supported by the 
ICJ when it says that ‘for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must 
the acts concerned “amount to a settled practice”, but they must be 
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accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitas.’137 Once a State engages in a 
practice based on legal obligation, then it possesses the psychological 
element for establishing a norm of international customary law.138 This very 
important element of customary international law is known as opinio juris sive 
necessitates which is known for short as opinio juris. Brownlie sees it as ‘a 
necessary ingredient’139 for customary international law since it is the reason 
why a nation acts in accordance with a behavioural regularity.140  
 
It is not enough that the acting state has a sense of legal obligation, but that 
other States also have an equal belief that indeed, it has an unfettered legal 
commitment to act.141 The State will then be bound to act in accordance with 
such belief ‘even if only once, then it is to be inferred that they have tacitly 
consented to the rule involved.’142 It will then be taken that a norm of 
international customary law has been created based on the general 
agreement amongst States. The challenge of other states to this belief or 
declaring the acceptance of it ex gratia could prevent the creation of a new 
norm of customary international law.143  
 
However, the fact remains that classical international law considers State 
practice and opinion juris as very vital elements of customary international 
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law.144 This was the position of diplomatic relations before 1961 when it was 
mainly customary international law because its rules ‘were the product of 
long-established state practice.’145 The customary rules are now codified in 
the VCDR and VCCR. Although, one cannot say that the VCDR and VCCR 
contain fully all the relevant customary rules regulating diplomatic and 
consular relations.146 Nevertheless, the conventions do not out-rightly take 
away the relevance of customary rules of international law when deciding on 
diplomatic related matters particularly in cases where the provisions of the 
VCDR or VCCR seem inadequate.147  Perhaps, this falls within the observation 
of the International Court of Justice in the United State Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran148 when it held that ‘the obligations of the Iranian 
Government here in question are not merely contractual . . . but also 
obligations under general international law.’149 
 
3.3.2. International Treaties 
The significance of international treaties has become enormous as a source of 
international law. Treaties are generally believed to be binding amongst 
States that are parties to them, thereby limiting their effectiveness on general 
States co-operation as a whole. Treaties are thought to be the ‘plainest 
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source of international law’150in that it is  usually in the form of written 
agreements expressly and consciously made amongst sovereign States. The 
essence of a treaty has been clearly spelt out in the following words: ‘”treaty” 
means an international agreements concluded between states in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation.’151 The meaning of ‘treaty’ has been further extended to 
accommodate treaties concluded between States and international 
organizations or agreements between international organizations by the 1986 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations.152 Therefore, the legal 
capacity to conclude international conventions by the combined effect of the 
1969 VCLT and 1986 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or between International Organizations 
resides between the States and other subjects of international law.153  
 
The binding effect of a treaty comes with consent. That is, States come 
together consciously with the intention to be legally bound by the terms of 
the agreement.154 A treaty is not a merely gentlemen’s agreement which only 
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amounts to a political rather than a juridical commitment.155 This in effect 
means that once the consenting States ratify or accept or give accession to 
the agreement, they are not only expected to discharge the obligations 
contained in the treaty, a breach of its terms is also impermissible.156 The 
exception, of course, will be where the State(s) has entered reservation to 
any or some of the terms of the convention. With the consent given, it means 
the States have expressed their good will to be bound by the rules stipulated 
in the treaty. It is a general rule as stipulated in North Sea Continental 
Shelf157 that where a State does not give consent to or approve of a treaty, it 
is exonerated from any judicial commitments to it. It is of importance to 
stress, however, that where a treaty is a manifestation of customary law 
rules, then non-party members may be bound by the rules, not because it is 
treaty, but because it is a reflection of rules of international customary law.158   
But where a State is not desirous of pursuing the contents of a treaty any 
more, it can invoke the opt-out stipulations or clauses in the treaty. 
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It must, however, be made emphatic that treaty significantly owes its 
importance and validity to international customary law as it derives it legal 
competence from it. The pacta sunt servanda is a rule which has its origin in 
customary international law but entrenched within the ambit of international 
convention that parties must obey their contractual treaty.159 In some 
quarters it is believed that international customary law surpasses international 
treaty in hierarchy because, if not for international customary rule, treaty will 
ultimately loose it binding force.160   
 
Treaties have been known to be either bilateral or multilateral. Bilateral 
treaties, though, considered less cumbersome as a law making instrument, 
but the question of efficiency in attaining uniformity and equality of treatment 
amongst the 193 members of the United Nations when required to make an 
agreement on a single topic remains a problem.161 And in most cases, 
bilateral treaties are found to be in the form of ‘contract treaties’ such as 
bilateral investment treaties and extradition treaties which are viewed by 
some commentators as not competent enough to be a source of international 
law. Multilateral treaties on the other hand, as the name suggests, involve 
more than two countries in the agreement making process.  Multilateral 
treaties are often seen as law-making treaties which generally, give the 
authoritative source of international law. Law-making treaties, according to 
Shaw, ‘are intended to have effect generally, not restrictively, and they are to 
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be contrasted with those treaties which merely regulate limited issues 
between a few states.’162 The new rules created by these law-making treaties 
will necessarily involve the participation of large number of states and thus 
bind those states who give their consents to it. Although, most of the treaties 
are usually concluded amongst few States,163 but then, those that are 
concluded by overwhelming majority of States end up formulating rules that 
will eventually become general international law.164 A typical example is the 
VCDR which has the consent and approval of about 187 member States of the 
United Nations which, invariably, gives it a universal support.165 
 
3.3.3. General Principles of Law 
This is one of the sources of international law as embodied in Art. 38 (1) (c) 
of the SICJ and it is ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.’ The provisions of Article 38 (1) (c) which empowers the ICJ to apply 
‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ was, according to 
Lauterpacht, drafted in order to prevent the possibility of a non liquet.166 The 
ICJ cannot give judgments of non liquet (finding that an existing law does not 
cover a particular situation) since Article 38 (1) (c) has now empowered the 
international bench ‘through their principled application of legal reasoning’167 
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to fill any legal lacunae.  That is the courts or the tribunals might find 
themselves in a legal dilemma, not being able to decide some of the cases 
brought before them for adjudication due to lack of guidance in the treaty 
and  customary laws. It must be pointed out that for the courts or tribunals to 
apply the general principles of law in a particular case they have to ensure 
that the said principle similarly exists in every system of civilised law. This 
assertion has received support from Gutteridge in his remark that: 
 
If any real meaning is to be given to the words “general” or 
“universal” and the like, the correct test would seem to be 
that an international judge before taking over a principle from 
private law must satisfy himself that it is recognized in 
substance by all the main systems of law, and that in applying 
it he will not be doing violence to the fundamental concepts 
of any of those systems.168   
 
The words ‘recognised by civilized nations’ appear to be settled as all the 
member States, following the creation of the United Nations, most especially 
after the decolonisation process has been accomplished, are presumed to 
bear the mark of civilization.169 The unsettled phrase is ‘general principles of 
law’ which remain susceptible to multifarious meanings amongst international 
commentators and as such, has provoked diverse definitions.  
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169 MC Bassiouni, “A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law””, (1989-
1990) 11 Mich. J. Int’l L. p. 768; VD Degan, Sources of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Netherlands 1997), p. 67    
 .152 
 
 
A considerable amount of legal authorities maintain that general principles of 
law fall within the categories of subsidiary sources like judicial decisions and 
writings of publicists. Dixon, for instance makes the following assertion in his 
analysis of general principles of law that it ‘may therefore, be purely 
descriptive of general doctrines  or bundles of rights which form part of 
international law, but they are nothing to do with the law creating sources of 
international law.’170 But if one considers Art. 21 (1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court171 which further stresses the significance of 
general principles of law as a source, then one would see the flaw in viewing 
it as a subsidiary source.172  
 
Also a lot of ink has been split on whether general principles should be 
regarded in terms of rules accepted in domestic law of all civilized States or 
principles about the nature of international law that are accepted by States. 
Brownlie has, however, expressed acceptance of Oppenheim’s view that ‘[t]he 
intention is to authorize the Court to apply the general principles of municipal 
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jurisprudence, in particular of private law, in so far as they are applicable to 
relations of states.’173 As such, it will be wrong to assume that Article 38 
(1)(c) of the SICJ refers to the principles of international law as this 
interpretation was not contemplated.174 It has been interpreted, in other 
instance, to mean the general principles of international law such as the 
concept of pacta sunt servanda – that promise should be kept and the notion 
that international law is created by the consent of States.175 It should be 
noted that far before the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in 1920, the international tribunals had resorted to 
general principles of law based on both national and international laws.176 
One would rather agree with the conclusion of Malanczuk that ‘there is no 
reason why it should not mean both; the greater the number of meanings 
which the phrase possesses, the greater the chance of finding something to 
fill gaps in treaty law and customary law.’177  
 
In applying the general principles of law, the ICJ at times, in its judgements 
and advisory opinions employed the exact phraseology ‘general principles of 
law’ while in other cases, it resorted to the usage of some other terms such 
as ‘established principles’ and ‘general concepts of law.’178 However, these 
general principles are mainly common among the main legal systems of the 
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international community such as the common-law system, the Islamic legal 
system and the civilian legal system.179 The ICJ and tribunals have been 
found, in several occasions, to have applied these general principles of law in 
one or more of these three classifications: domestic principles commonly 
present within major legal systems of the world, principles that are 
international in origin and principles emanating from natural law.  
 
Firstly, some of these principles are well known within different domestic legal 
systems of the world and have been applied by judges of the ICJ while sitting 
as justices in their respective municipal courts. Among these principles are res 
judicata180 (a case already adjudicated upon cannot be heard again for the 
second time), estoppel181 (an established practice must not be discontinued) 
and nemo judex in causa sua182 (one should not be a judge in his own case). 
 
Secondly, the general principles of law that originate from the international 
domain, prominent among which is the concept of pacta sunt servanda 
(agreements must be observed).183 So important is this principle that it gives 
an inexorable support to the law of treaties that international agreement must 
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not only be observed, but remains binding among the respective parties. No 
wonder it occupies a considerable position in the preambles of the 1969 
VCLT.184 So also is the principle of reparation185 under international law.  
 
And lastly, is the principle of equity and humanity.186 Equity has been used by 
the courts for fairness and reasonableness in the dispensation of justice 
particularly to prevent the injustice that may arise due to the strict adherence 
to law.187 It should be noted however, that equity in a strict sense cannot be 
compared with general principles in that it is a concept according to Wallace 
that ‘reflects values, which may be hard to define.’188 He further contends 
that since equity does not contribute to substantive law, it therefore cannot 
be considered a source of law, ‘but it can, nevertheless, affect the way 
substantial law is administered and applied.’189 
 
Therefore, the ICJ may apply any of the general principles of law applicable 
internationally or within the realm of a particular civilized nation in any case 
brought before it, once there is a legal lacunae left unfilled by international 
treaty and international customary law. For instance, there are some 
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principles of law within the realm of Islamic jurisprudence in the judicial 
systems of many Muslim countries that would qualify as general principles of 
law that could be applied, if need be, in international dispute by the ICJ.190 
 
3.3.4. Judicial Decisions and Scholarly Writings 
The ICJ and other international tribunals have the leverage of applying 
‘judicial decisions . . . as subsidiary means for determination of rules of law’ 
according to the stipulation of Article 38 (1) (d) of the SICJ. However, the 
proviso which states that it is made ‘subject to the provisions of Article 59’ 
would appear to have watered down the overall effect of the concept of stare 
decisis.191 Article 59 of the SICJ provides that ‘the decision of the Court has 
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case.’ Meaning that the ICJ is not bound to follow its previous decisions; that 
is to say there is a universal consensus that international law does not 
accommodate what is known in common law as the rule of stare decisis. It 
should not be a surprise then that Bing Bing Jia came to the conclusion that 
precedents in the international courts could only serve as “persuasive” to the 
judges rather than having a “binding authority.”192 It has however, being 
argued that had the provision of Article 59 not been in place, the precedential 
                                                 
190 Examples of the Islamic law principles that could also be applied as general principles of 
law by the international court is discussed at Pp.158-160 of this dissertation. 
191 It is a short form of the Latin maxim ‘stare decisis et non quieta movere’ which means ‘to 
stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled points’. It is used to describe the doctrine 
of precedent where a court is expected to follow an earlier judicial decision particularly when 
a similar point arises again in litigation. See BA Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, 
Thomson West Publishing Co., USA 2004), p. 1443 
192
Bing Bing Jia  ‘Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Law and the Defense of 
Duress in Murder or Other Cases Arising From Armed Conflict’, in S Yee and W Tieya (eds.), 
International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essays In Memory of Li Haopei (Routledge, 
New York 2001) Pp. 83-95  
 .157 
 
effect of the principle of stare decisis mentioned in Article 38 (1)(d) would 
have remained in full application.193    
 
Nonetheless, the ICJ does consider its previous decisions with the sole aim of 
seeking guidance in subsequent matters even though they are only expected 
in the words of Wallace ‘to apply the law and not to make the law.’194 Various 
judgments and advisory opinions of the international court remain today, a 
source of reference and provide a remarkable influence on the development 
of international jurisprudence. It could be said that the judges are, in effect, 
creating new laws which are obviously innovative and command general 
acceptability. For instance, the Genocide Case195 where reservations to 
treaties was considered; the Reparation for Injuries Case196 which reiterates 
the legal personality of the United Nations and international institutions; 
Nottenbohm Case197 which establishes a genuine link between individual and 
claimant State; and Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case198 which states the 
baselines from which the territorial sea may be drawn, all attest to this fact. It 
will thus, remain uncertain if the decisions of the court could still be regarded 
as “subsidiary” means of determining the law in the face of these classical 
decisions. This is because, according to Lauterpacht, ‘respect for decisions 
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given in the past makes for certainty and stability, which are of the essence of 
the orderly administration of justice.’199 
 
Another subsidiary means by which dispute may be settled by the ICJ is the 
‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations.’ This also 
forms part of Article 38 (1) (d) of SICJ. Truely, legal scholars do not create 
the law; rather, they explain by shedding more light on existing laws through 
their legal writings which have the potentiality of influencing decision makers 
in practice.200 However, it may be difficult to determine who among the 
scholars would be rated as one of ‘the most highly qualified publicists’, 
particularly in a world consisting of many nations with multicultural identities. 
The determination of this will be subjective and may be, according to Boczek, 
‘susceptible to bais.’201  
 
Over the years, there had been an intense reliance on the scholarly works of 
publicists the likes of Gentili, Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel and which, up till 
today, continues with the prolific international law writers of our century. The 
theoretical frameworks of legal scholars have greatly impacted most of the 
decisions of the international tribunals but not that much with the judgments 
of the ICJ.202 The reason, perhaps, could be as a result of the increase in ‘the 
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substantive law of international law’ in state practice and customary 
international law which has adversely affected the relevance of legal 
writers.203  Nevertheless, one can still not under-estimate the vibrant role 
played in the development of international law especially in ascertaining and 
emphasising the important areas where international regulations should be 
introduced. For instance, while delivering a dissenting opinion in the Case 
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,204 Judge 
Tarazi cited with approval the lecture delivered by Prof. Ahmed Rechid on 
“Islam and jus gentium” wherein he gave a vivid account of the inviolability of 
an envoy in Islamic law.  
 
3.4 The Possibility of Compatibility in the Legal Sources of 
International Diplomatic Law and Islamic Diplomatic Law. 
 
The compatibility or tension theory between the legal sources of Islamic 
international law – As-siyar and conventional international law remains 
controversial amongst different commentators even though the two legal 
regimes genuinely crave for an indistinguishable universal justice. Khadduri, 
for instance, holds the view that the sources of Islamic siyar are similar to the 
sources of international law due to the fact that ‘[t]he Qur’an represent the 
authoritative source of law; traditions are equivalent to custom; rules and 
principles expressed in treaties with non-Muslims fall in the categories of 
agreement; and the opinion of the caliphs and jurists, based on legal 
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deduction and analogy, may be regarded as reason.’205 While on the other 
hand, Ford, in his elucidation of the sources of international law and Islamic 
siyar could not find any genuine compatibility between them. According to 
him, he concludes that ‘[t]he siyar cannot be said to be genuinely compatible 
with modern international jurisprudence . . .’206   
 
There is the need to consider whether there is compatibility in the principles 
inherent in the sources of international diplomatic law and Islamic diplomatic 
law. This section will, therefore, be looking at how and to what extent the 
sources of Islamic law are compatible with the sources of international 
diplomatic law. 
  
3.4.1. The Analogy of International Treaty 
The basic and fundamental principle behind every international treaty is that 
it must be respected and obeyed. Hence, the traditional Western maxim in 
conventional international law, ‘pacta sunt servanda’ – every pact must be 
fulfilled. In the same vein, Islamic international law requires that once a 
Muslim State enters into a treaty arrangement with any other State, be it a 
Muslim State or a non-Muslim State, it is legally required that all the terms of 
the treaty must be fulfilled. The basis of its fulfilment, just as pacta sunt 
servanda in conventional international law, is also found in the old Arabic 
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adage ‘Al-‘aqd shari’at al-muta’aqideen’, meaning that ‘the contract is the 
Shari’ah of the parties’.207   
 
The obligation to fulfil all contractual agreements when entered into is 
unequivocal in the Qur’anic provisions. For example, Qur’an 5:1 states that ‘O 
you who have believed, fulfil [all] contracts.’  Likewise, Qur’an 16:91 
stipulates thus ‘And fulfil the covenant of Allah when you have taken it, [O 
believers], and do not break oaths after their confirmation while you have 
made Allah, over you, a witness. Indeed, Allah knows what you do.’ Even for 
the non-Muslims, Allah stresses that the term of the treaty must be completed 
once they have not compromised their position by giving support to an 
adversary party thus: ‘Excepted are those with whom you made a treaty 
among the polytheists and then they have not been deficient toward you in 
anything or supported anyone against you; so complete for them their treaty 
until their term [has ended]. Indeed, Allah loves the righteous [who fear 
Him].’208 Allah states further that ‘So as long as they are upright toward you, 
be upright toward them. Indeed, Allah loves the righteous [who fear Him].’209 
The unequivocal statement of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) to Abu Jandal ibn 
Suhayl when the latter became a Muslim and sought to defect from the 
Makkan camp to join the Muslims immediately after the Treaty of 
Hudaybiyyah was that: ‘O Abu Jandal have patience and be disciplined; for 
God will soon provide for you and your other persecuted colleagues a way out 
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of your suffering. We have entered with the Quraysh into a treaty of peace 
and we have exchanged with a solemn pledge that none will cheat the 
other.’210 With this statement, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) understood the 
importance of fulfilling the terms of a treaty and, as such, stressed the 
importance and implication of violating a treaty once it has been entered into. 
 
The legal position of treaty under Islamic law has been well articulated in the 
famous case of Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO211 where it was carefully stated that: 
 
Muslim law does not distinguish between a treaty, a contract of 
public or administrative law and a contract of civil or commercial 
law. All these types are viewed by Muslim jurists as agreements or 
pacts which must be observed, since God is a witness to any 
contract entered into by individuals or collectivities; under Muslim 
law, any valid contract is obligatory, in accordance with the 
principles of Islam and the Law of God, as expressed in the Koran: 
“Be faithful to your pledge to God, when you enter into a pact” 
 
An overwhelming majority of the Muslim jurists are of the view that a Muslim 
State can validly enter into a binding treaty with a non-Muslim State for an 
indefinite period of time or for a specified period to be determined by the 
Islamic leader.212 The view canvassed by Khadduri that a peace treaty cannot 
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be entered for more than ten years with the non-Muslim213 has been said to 
represent the extreme views of al-Shafi’i.214   There are authoritative views, 
according to Ibn Rushd (1198 AD), attributed to Abu Hanifah, Malik Ibn Anas 
and Ibn Hanbal that a peace treaty can be for an indefinite period as long as 
it serves the interest of the Muslim State.215 The important thing is that such 
treaty must subsist for the interest of the Muslims. It is to be noted, however, 
that a treaty that contains some terms that are repugnant to Islam may still 
be executed under Islamic international law, although with some reservations 
and provided it is for the overall interest of the Muslims.216 The historical basis 
for this assertion could be found in the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah 628 AD which 
Prophet Muhammad signed with the non-Muslims of Makkah even though 
some of the terms of the treaty appeared unfavourable to the Muslims. But 
the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah later turned out, as expected by Prophet 
Muhammad, to be “a manifest victory” (fathaan mubeenan).217 This may 
probably be the reason why almost all of the Muslim States are parties to the 
1961 VCDR and 1963 VCCR which regulate the immunities and activities of 
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the diplomatic and consular personnel which are to the benefit of the 
generality of the Muslim community (ummah).  
 
3.4.2. The Analogy of International Customary Law 
International customary rule amongst nations will remain a source of 
international law provided it evidences a general practice accepted as law. In 
essence, customary international law must be a general practice and such 
practice must be legally binding. On the other hand, according to Islamic law, 
once a customary practice does not derogate from the fundamental tenets of 
Islam, then it becomes a law formulating method regardless of whether it 
originates from the era prior to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) or not. That is 
why in interpreting contractual obligation, Islamic law gives allowance to the 
prevailing customary practice at the time and place of the contract.218  
 
Most Muslim countries, going by their legal systems, do consider customary 
practice in their judicial decisions.219 The rule of reciprocity for instance, which 
forms the basis of universal international order and which is deeply embedded 
in international customary law, also occupies an important position in Islamic 
diplomatic law.220 It was embraced by Islamic legal system to ‘make justice 
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reign, establish standards of fairness and impartiality.’221 The Muslims have, 
however, been discouraged from reciprocating where the fundamental moral 
principles will be breached as it is clearly stated in the Qur’an that: ‘And if you 
punish, let your punishment be proportionate to the wrong that has been 
done to you; but if you show patience that is indeed the best (course) for 
those who are patience.’222 A typical example can be drawn from the 
provision of the Qur’an which states that ‘How can there be for the polytheists 
a treaty in the sight of Allah and with His Messenger, except for those with 
whom you made a treaty at al-Masjid al-Haram? So as long as they are 
upright toward you, be upright toward them. Indeed, Allah loves the 
righteous [who fear Him].’223 At least every State would want to be treated in 
the same way they treat others. 224 That is, to reciprocate in the spirit of one 
good turn deserves another. 
 
Meanwhile, Islam has been known to observe and continuously respect 
whatever customary norm that has developed within the international arena 
in as much as it is not in conflict with the basic principles of Islamic law.225   
 
3.4.3. The Analogy of General Principles of Law: 
The general principles of Islamic law, being one of the major legal systems of 
the world, are capable of renewing the rules of international law considering 
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the fact that these are principles of a legal system that have been ‘tested 
within the shelter of more mature and closely integrated legal systems.’226 
The stipulation in Article 38 (1) (c) of the SICJ deliberately empowered the 
international bench to draw from generally acknowledged and highly refined 
legal principles belonging to various legal systems of the world when 
adjudicating. They are particularly expected to utilise and apply these general 
legal principles as ‘a tempting set of rules which these might be encouraged 
to adopt, as a last resort,’227 rather than resort to judgments of non liquet. 
The prerequisite for electing persons into the international judiciary, according 
to Art.9 of the SICJ, is the possession of individual qualifications. It is further 
required ‘that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of 
civilizations and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.’ 
The fact that Islamic law was recognised as constituting one of the main 
forms of civilizations and being one of the major legal systems of the world at 
the League of Nations in September, 1939 and subsequently at the United 
Nations Conference in San Francisco in April, 1945 which was eventually 
adopted as Art.38 of the SICJ, concludes the relevance of its general 
principles.228  
 
Islamic jurisprudence has equally evolved time-honoured principles of law 
which could be applied by the ICJ, whenever the need arises, to resolve 
international disputes particularly those involving Muslim countries. Prominent 
                                                 
226 G Schwartzenberger, Foreword to B Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, (CUP, Cambridge 2006), p. xi 
227 Ibid 
228 S Mahmassani, op cit., p. 222 
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among these general principles is the international law principle of pacta sunt 
servanda which is also a fundamental tenet of Islamic law. The basic principle 
in Islamic law regarding any treaty, agreement or contract is that once it has 
been concluded, it must be fulfilled. Also, the legal principle of istihsaan – 
juristic preference which has been likened to the Western concept of equity 
due to its preference for simplicity and easement of difficulties gives a lucid 
picture of one among the various principles of law that could be of use to the 
International Court of Justice. One could therefore, see reason in the 
international tribunal’s decision in Eritrea v. Yemen that ‘in today’s world, it 
remains true that the fundamental moralistic general principles of the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah may validly be invoked for the consolidation and support of 
positive international law rules in their progressive towards the goal of 
achieving justice and promoting the human dignity of mankind.’229  
 
Similarly, the juristic method of maslahah – public interest is another principle 
of Islamic law which the Muslim States have applied and still apply as one of 
the legal justifications for ratifying and signing international treaties with non-
Muslim countries.230 The juristic principle of maslahah allows for the existence 
of a mutual and peaceful relation between Muslim State and a non-Muslim 
State in as much as there is no prevalence of a physical or ideological warfare 
between them. This does appear as one of the reasons why most of the 
Muslim nations are signatories to all the diplomatic related conventions – for 
instance, the 1961 VCDR, 1963 VCCR, 1969 VCLT and 1973 UN Convention 
                                                 
229 Eritrea v. Yemen 119 ILR, 417. 
230
 Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, op cit., (2006), p. 131 
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on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents to mention but view. 
 
The above general principles of Islamic law can, if utilized, according to 
Kelsay and Johnson, ‘prove to be ones that readily harmonize with and 
accommodate modern international norms’.231       
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In sum, we have analysed the legal sources in the two jurisprudential systems 
and most importantly, investigated by bringing out the compatibility in the 
principles surrounding the sources of the two legal regimes. We have also 
indicated how Islamic siyar enjoins the Muslim State to strictly comply with 
the terms and conditions of any treaty once entered into; how it gives validity 
to international customs that have evolved amongst different nations; and 
how it has contributed, through its numerous legal principles, to the general 
principles of law thereby rescuing the international tribunals and the ICJ from 
falling into legal oblivion.  
 
We can see that the principles of Islamic international law are readily 
available to consolidate and expand the scope of contemporary international 
law. In addition, these Islamic law principles are also there to facilitate the 
overall protection of diplomatic institution with the hope that this will 
                                                 
231 J Kelsay and JT Johnson, Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives of 
War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, (Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 200 
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‘encourage the development of common ground between the different legal 
systems of the world to ensure global peaceful and harmonious international 
relations’232 in the words of Baderin.  
 
 
                                                 
232 MA Baderin (ed.), International Law and Islamic Law, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 
p. xvi 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A MACROSCOPIC OVERVIEW OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC LAW AND ISLAMIC LAW 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the early period, just as it used to be the practice in Islam, envoys were 
assigned tasks abroad and once these tasks have been accomplished, they 
were to return home immediately.1 The beginning of the sixteenth century 
marked the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions, particularly 
among European nations.2 It then became imperative that ‘suitable 
immunities and privileges’3 be found with cogent legal justification.  The 
rationale for the inviolability and jurisdictional immunity accorded foreign 
representatives along with their diplomatic premises could be traced back to 
the three popular theoretical justifications of diplomatic immunities – 
exterritoriality4, representative character and functional necessity.5 Extensive 
scholarly discussions have been recorded on the theoretical justifications of 
diplomatic immunity. This chapter, therefore, intends to examine these 
justifications with the view to extracting a common theoretical basis for 
diplomatic inviolability and immunities in Islamic diplomatic law and 
international diplomatic law. This chapter will also examine the different forms 
                                                 
1 B Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Netherlands, 1988), p. 6 
2 F Przetacznik, “The History of the Jurisdictional Immunity of the Diplomatic Agents in 
English Law”, (1978) 7 Anglo-Am. L. Rev., p. 353  
3 MG Fry, et al, Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy, (Continuum, London 2002), 
p. 542 
4 It is traditionally known as ‘extraterritoriality’ but commonly shortened and referred to as 
exterritoriality as used above. 
5 GV McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problem (St Martins Press, New 
York, 1989), Pp. 27-28 
 .171 
 
of diplomatic privileges, immunities and facilities to diplomatic missions and 
their various personnel as understood under  international diplomatic law on 
the one hand; and consider on the other hand, whether under  Islamic 
diplomatic law the concept of diplomatic immunity exists, particularly as 
confirmed by the making of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 AD); and if it 
does exist, is it compatible with the principles of diplomatic immunity as 
understood under  modern diplomatic law? This chapter will further consider 
how Islamic siyar perceives the relationship between the concept of Aman – 
safe conduct and diplomatic immunity. 
 
4.2. The Theoretical Justifications Underlying Diplomatic 
 Inviolability and Immunities 
 
4.2.1 Diplomatic Inviolability and Immunities under International 
Law 
International law has set certain standards, ‘whether administrative, 
legislative or judicial,’6 which the receiving state will have to put in place 
before hosting diplomatic personnel of other states. These standards which 
are made up of international and national laws are known as diplomatic 
privileges and immunities. What makes a diplomat deserving of these 
immunities? In answer to this question, scholars of international law have 
come up with three major theoretical considerations that form the bases for 
diplomatic privileges and immunities (personal representation, exterritoriality 
and functional necessity) and each of them will be considered in seriatim.   
                                                 
6 MJL Hardy, op cit., (1968), p. 9  
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A) Representative Character Theory. 
The representative character theory as propounded by the classical writers 
including Grotius became popular with the establishment of permanent 
diplomatic missions. That was between the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.7 This theory represented a generally accepted position amongst the 
conflicting schools of law – the natural law school and the positivist law 
school - that maintained views on the subject. Grotius, while conveying the 
view of the natural law school, said: ’. . . it is natural to suppose, that nations 
have agreed, in the case of ambassadors, to dispense with that obedience, 
which every one, by general custom, owes to the laws of that foreign country, 
in which, at any time, he resides. The character which they sustain, is not 
that of ordinary individual, but they represent the Majesty of the Sovereigns, 
by whom they are sent, whose power is limited to no local jurisdiction.’8 The 
approach of the legal positivism is depicted also by Bynkershoek in the 
following words: ‘The sole reason why ambassadors are exempted from the 
power of those to whom they have been sent is that they should not, while 
performing the duty of their office, change their status and become subject to 
another while they are acting as the representatives of their prince who is 
generally a rival.’9 With the diplomatic institution made permanent, the 
ambassador then required the kind of protection that befits the state organ 
                                                 
7 RA Wilson, ‘Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction: Essential to Effective 
International Relations’ (1984) 7 Loy. L. A. Int’l & Comp. L. J., p. 114 
8Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Published 1625, (Classics of International Series, Ed. Scott, 
1925), Section 4  
9Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum Liba Singularis, Published 1721, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1946), p. 44  
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he represents abroad. That brings us to the rudiment of the representative 
theory which fundamentally ‘traces immunity to the sovereignty of the state 
which sends the agent.’10 Since the sending State does not owe any 
allegiance to the receiving State, it therefore follows that the diplomatic agent 
of the sending State will not be bound by the law of the receiving State.11 
That is, any wrong done to the diplomatic agent of a sovereign State will 
essentially, be considered an affront to the foreign State itself.12 The diplomat 
is the alter ego of his sovereign.13 The U.S. Chief Justice Marshall has 
carefully delineated the rationale of the representative character theory in the 
case of The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon14 where he said, in part, that: 
 
The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive 
exemptions from the territorial jurisdiction which are admitted to 
attach to foreign ministers, is implied from the consideration that, 
without such exemption, every sovereign would hazard his own 
dignity by employing a public minister abroad. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the representative character theory was for long 
adopted in the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708.15 It was a reaction to the 
arrest of Andrei Artemonovich Matveev, the Russian Ambassador to England 
                                                 
10 M Ogdon, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity, (John Byrne & Co., Washington D.C. 
1936), p. 105  
11 B Sen, op cit., (1988), p.97  
12 CE Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, (University of Arizona Press, 1967, 
Arizona), p. 3 
13 Bergman v. De Sieiyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y 1946)  
14 (1812)11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 138. Also available at: 
http://www.uniset.ca/other/css/11US116.html [accessed 4 August, 2010]  
15 JC Barker, op cit., (2006), p. 45 
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that necessitated the emergence of the Act16 which provided that no judicial 
proceedings could be brought against diplomats or their servants and that it 
was an offence to commence proceedings.17 The Act endured up till the 
enactment of the Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964. 
 
In modern day diplomatic practice, it is doubtful if personal representative 
theory will be considered relevant any more in view of the criticisms levelled 
against it. With States now overwhelmingly embracing democracy, 
sovereignty has moved from the hands of monarchies into the hands of the 
people and their elected officials.18 In democracy, the power of sovereignty is 
said to be shared amongst the three arms of government: the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary. Thus, some critics see the difficulty in identifying 
on whose behalf the diplomat is acting.19 This can, however, be counter-
argued by the fact that the the so-called separation of power arrangement in 
democracy is an internal arrangement of each State. A representative abroad 
is naturally representing the interest of the State as a geo-political entity. He 
is, thus representing all the three arms of government, even though he was 
appointed by the Executive arm.20 Some other commentators also see the 
personal representation theory as being too wide and too fallacious for the 
                                                 
16 Ibid 
17 H Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8th edn., (Routledge, Oxon, 2011), p. 131 
18 CE Wilson, op cit., (1967), p. 4 
19 Ibid. 
20 Indeed in some democracies, like that of Nigeria, under the Constitution, while the 
Executive arm appoints ambassadors, the National Assembly (the Legislative arm) still has to 
assess and approve each candidate for the diplomatic posts. 
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business of conducting international business.21 However, this theory did not 
out-rightly fade away with the emergence of modern day politics.  One could 
still trace, to some extent, the representative character in the VCDR which 
states amongst others, that the functions of diplomatic mission shall consist of 
‘[r]epresenting the sending State in the receiving State.’22 
 
B) Exterritoriality Theory: A Fictional Justification of Immunity 
This theory, though considered to be the oldest, had a relatively short run in 
the history of international law.23 Going by this theoretical reasoning, a 
diplomat, his home and his office are legally resident within the territory of 
the sending State even though they are physically resident abroad.24 This is 
what the French jurist, Pierre Ayrault, considered in 1576 that the diplomat ‘is 
held to be absent and to be present in his own country.’25 It should not be a 
surprise then that as far back as 1883, James Lorimer had declared in his 
treatise of international law that ‘an English ambassador, with his family and 
his suite, whilst abroad in the public service, is domiciled in England.’26 
Moreover, the theory of exterritoriality presupposes that the receiving State 
may not enter the premises of the sending State due to want of personal 
jurisdiction thus, making it impossible for the diplomat to appear in its court 
                                                 
21 H Rieff, Diplomatic and Consular Privileges, Immunities and Practice (Ettemad Press, 1954) 
p. 26 
22 Art. 3 VCDR 
23 GV McClanahan, op cit., (1989), p. 30  
24 MS Ross, ‘Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches to Address 
the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities’, (1989) 4 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, p. 178 
25 This is cited in M Ogdon, op cit., (1936), p. 68 
26 CE Wilson, op cit., (1967), p. 6 
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of law.27 The New York Supreme Court in Wilson v. Blanco28 while giving 
judicial recognition to the theory, affirmed that the rule ‘derives support from 
the legal fiction that an ambassador is not an inhabitant of the country to 
which he is accredited, but of the country of his origin, and whose sovereign 
he represents, and within whose territory he is, in contemplation of the law, 
always abide.’ Similarly, an English Court in The King v. Goerchy29 held that 
‘an ambassador is not subject to the courts of the country to which he is sent 
but is believed, by legal fiction, to still be a resident of his own country.’    
 
In spite of the increasing and widening scope of disparagement held against 
the entire theoretical analysis, it is interesting to note that occasionally the 
philosophy of exterritoriality, though moribund, still finds a place in diplomatic 
expressions. For example, in April, 1987 the then US Secretary of State, 
George Shultz, while commenting on the security situation of the US Embassy 
in Moscow, has this to say: ’[The Soviets] invaded our sovereign territory, and 
we’re damned upset about it.’30 
 
Legal scholars and commentators, however, agree that the exterritoriality 
theory is nothing but an ‘explanatory fiction’31 which, by the assessment of 
Ogdon, ‘does not provide the actual reasons for determining rights and 
duties, it is of little value as a guideline in determining the scope and limits of 
                                                 
27 Barnes, ‘Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development under 
International Law and Application in United State Practice’, (1960) 43, Dept. St. Bull, p. 175 
28 (1889) 4 N. Y. S  714 
29 (1765) 96 Eng. Rep. 315 
30 State: The Newsletter, May 1987, p. 8 
31 E Young, ‘The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations’, (1964) 40 Brit. Y. B. Int’l 
L., p. 170 
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diplomatic privileges and immunities.’32 This explains why states failed to put 
it into practice despite the fact that the theory is acknowledged as forming 
the rationale for diplomatic immunities.33 In fact, the fictional element in the 
entire approach makes the acceptance of the theory to modern minds much 
more difficult.34 Furthermore, the theory has an expansive and broad 
construction of diplomatic immunity in that it prevents States from restricting 
the privileges and immunities of diplomats.35 Finally, the presumed grant of 
unrestricted privileges and immunities that has the tendency of surpassing 
the ordinary immunities granted to the diplomat could, in the words of 
Wilson, ‘result in dangerous consequences.’36 Since the theoretical analyses in 
both the representative character and exterritoriality have failed in providing 
sufficient and pragmatic justification for diplomatic immunity, then legal 
scholarship moved on to consider what is to be known as the ‘functional 
necessity theory.’    
 
C) Functional Necessity Theory: A Practical Justification of 
Immunity. 
Modern trends dictate that for the diplomatic envoy to carry out his/her 
function efficiently, without any interference, intimidation and fear of civil or 
criminal prosecution, he/she needs to be guaranteed all necessary privileges 
and immunities in the country of his accreditation. This is the functional 
                                                 
32 M Ogdon, op cit., (1936), Pp. 102-103 
33 Hurst, ‘Diplomatic Immunities – Modern Developments’, (1929) 10, Brit. Y. B. Int’l L. p. 13 
34 MJL Hardy, op cit., (1968), p. 10  
35 VL Maginnis, ‘Limiting Diplomatic Immunity:  Lessons Learned from the 1946 Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations’, (2002-2003) 28, Brook J. Int’l L. p. 
994 
36 RA Wilson, op cit., (1984), p. 117 
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necessity theory which became generally popular amongst legal scholars in 
the early twentieth century. One could see the basis for this theory in the 
statement of de Vattel that a diplomat should be free from domestic 
jurisdiction and that ‘he be not liable to be diverted from his functions by any 
chicanery.’37 Likewise, Justice Wills, J. in the case of Parkinson v. Potter38 was 
very instructive when he declares that extension of exemption from the 
jurisdiction of the courts was essential to the duties which an ambassador 
must perform. No wonder, since the post war period, international law jurists 
have generally taken “functional necessity” as the theoretical basis for 
granting privileges and immunities.39 
 
Essentially, the theory of functional necessity derives its essence and 
popularity from the important functions performed by the diplomats.40 More 
so, this theory gives considerable allowance for the restriction of the entire 
scope of diplomatic immunity.41 It is necessary that diplomatic immunity 
should be in place for a smooth conduct of foreign affairs. This is because 
those activities which are very crucial to the diplomatic process would then 
receive the protection of diplomatic immunity. Meanwhile, other activities that 
are not essential to diplomatic process do not require immunity as they are 
                                                 
37 E de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Trans. by J Chitty, (Philadelphia, 1849), p. 471 
38 (1885) 16 Q.B.D. p. 152 
39
 Y Ling, ‘A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Member 
Representatives and Official with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of Diplomatic 
Agents’, (1976) 33, Wash. & Lee L. Rev., p. 94 
40 F Przetacznik, ‘The History of Jurisdictional Immunity of the Diplomatic Agents in English 
Law, (1978) 7 Anglo-Am. L. Rev., p. 357 
41 SL Wright, ‘Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the Vienna Convention to Deter 
Violent Criminal Acts’, (1987) 5 B. U. Int’l L. J.  p. 200 
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not of functional necessity.42    
 
The popularity gained by this theory is reflected in the preamble of the 1961 
VCDR to the effect that ‘the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not 
to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions 
of diplomatic missions as representing States.’43 In other words, it can rightly 
be said that immunities and privileges are not granted specifically to 
diplomatic agents rather, they are for the diplomatic tasks and functions they 
are to discharge.  
 
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of functional necessity theory over 
and above the theory of exterritoriality, some commentators still attribute 
some shortcomings to it. The functional necessity theory is, though, 
‘fashionable but somewhat question- begging.’44 It has been criticised for 
being ‘disturbingly vague’45 in its failure to specify the limits of essential 
immunities to the accepted practice of diplomacy.46 Although the restrictions 
imposed on diplomatic immunities are supposed to be limited ‘to what he [the 
diplomat] needed to accomplish his mission’47 in strict compliance with the 
functional approach, but in practice, private acts of diplomats equally enjoy 
absolute immunity.48 This, according to Maginnis, could be as a result of the 
                                                 
42 TA O’Neil, ‘A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity:  The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978’, 
(1980) 54 Tul. L. Rev. p. 669 
43 Paragraph 4 of the preamble to the VCDR 
44 I Brownlie, op cit., (1984), p. 345 
45 CE Wilson, op cit., (1967), p. 22 
46 RA Wilson, op cit., (1984), p. 118 
47 LS Frey and ML Frey, op cit., (1999), p. 339 
48 VL Maginnis, op cit., (2002-2003), p. 996 
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fact that ‘states are fearful that their diplomats could face unjust political 
prosecution or be rendered unduly cautious in carrying out their functions.’49 
It has also been argued that if breaking the laws of the receiving State is 
what the diplomat requires to efficiently conduct international relations, then 
the theoretical rationale of functional necessity stands betrayed.50 
 
4.2.2 Justification for Diplomatic Immunity in Islamic International 
 Law (Siyar) 
Islamic history has not recorded any theoretical transformation of legal 
justifications regarding diplomatic immunity similar to that obtained under 
international law. However, what appears to be predominant as the legal 
rationale for the practice of diplomatic immunity under Islamic international 
law is the functional necessity theory. One of the Hanafi jurists, Sarakhsi, was 
quoted by the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan in Re: Islamisation of Laws 
Public Notice No. 3 of 198351 as saying that ‘if somebody claim (sic) to be an 
envoy and has in his possession the necessary credentials he shall be granted 
immunity till the completion of his ambassadorial duty and till return.’52 This is 
predicated on the fact that ‘[w]ithout such immunity they cannot satisfactorily 
perform their functions.’53  This point was also emphasised by Zawati when 
he says that ‘[t]o enable them to exercise their duties and functions, 
diplomatic agents enjoy full personal immunity under Islamic international 
                                                 
49 Ibid 
50 MS Ross, op cit., (1989), p. 179 
51 PLD 1985 Federal Shariat Court, 344 
52 Ibid., p. 354 
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law.’54 It is also pertinent to state that the largest international Islamic 
organisation, otherwise known as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘OIC’) confirms the functional justification of 
diplomatic immunity in Islamic international law. Article 13 of the 1976 
Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference states that ‘immunities and privileges are accorded to the 
representatives of Member States, not for their personal benefit, but in order 
to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with 
the organization.’55   
 
One can still not completely rule out the importance of what seems like the 
representative character theory in Islamic international law. One of the 
renowned authors56 on this subject gave the following remarks while advising 
the king on how the ambassadors should be received that: ‘Whatever 
treatment is given to an ambassador, whether good or bad, it is as if it were 
done to the king who sent him, and kings have always shown the greatest 
respect to one another.’57 This therefore, gave an indication that since 
diplomatic envoys are representatives of their sovereigns in the receiving 
countries; it necessarily implies that diplomatic immunity should be accorded 
to them.  
 
                                                 
54 HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 79 
55
 It was adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul, 
Republic of Turkey, from the 13th – 16th Jamad Al-Awal, 1396H (12th – 15th May, 1976) 
56Hassan ibn ‘Ali, Hubert Darke (tr.), Siyar Al-Muluk or Siyasat-Nama (The Book of 
Government or Rules for Government), (Persian Heritage Foundation, London, 2002)  
57Ibid., p.99 
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One can therefore, reasonably conclude that there is compatibility concerning 
the rationale for diplomatic immunity in the two jurisprudential systems 
(Islamic siyar and international law). More so, as it has been established in 
the legal instruments applicable to the two legal systems – the 1961 VCDR 
and the 1976 Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference that diplomatic immunity is not granted for the 
personal benefit of the diplomatic personnel but rather for representing his or 
her country abroad and particularly to make allowance for efficient discharge 
of his or her diplomatic responsibilities.  
     
4.3. Codification of Diplomatic Immunities and the Protection of 
Diplomatic Personnel  
 
4.3.1. Movement in the Direction of Uniform Codification. 
The notion of diplomatic immunities and privileges has gone through several 
phases in the history of its codification. Different States, particularly in the 
eighteenth century, developed their own kinds of immunities and privileges in 
diplomatic practice. The United States and United Kingdom, for instance, saw 
no justification for restricting and confining the scope of diplomatic 
immunities hence, the need to safeguard and protect the diplomats remains 
absolute.58 While States like Italy had taken the view since 1922 that absolute 
immunity has not only ended, but has also become ‘one of the political 
doctrines that have been suspended’ in the sense that acts outside the 
                                                 
58 E Satow, Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice, (5th edn., Longman Group Limited, London 
1979), p. 107 
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diplomatic business will not be accorded diplomatic immunity.59 The 
divergence went as far as some States refusing to grant diplomatic immunity 
to their citizens who happened to be diplomatic agents of another State, while 
some States refused to accord them any diplomatic recognition.60 Yet, other 
States granted full diplomatic privileges and immunities to diplomats 
regardless of whether the ambassadors are of their own or not. They also 
extended this diplomatic shield to cover those working with the diplomat – 
counsellors, first secretaries, drivers, typists, clerks and cleaners.61 
 
Based on these variations and precarious status of diplomatic privileges and 
immunities, several jurists and a considerable number of international lawyers 
mooted the idea of having a uniform protection for diplomatic personnel by 
States signing a multilateral convention. This is what led to the establishment 
of the 1961 VCDR. 
 
4.3.2. The Making of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations: 
In an effort towards realising the uniform codification of diplomatic law, the 
American States on the 20th of February, 1928 signed among themselves the 
Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officers.62 Though, regional in scope, the 
treaty contained generally the functions and immunities of diplomatic agents. 
The Convention, by its preamble, embraces the functional necessity theory as 
                                                 
59 See Comina v. Kite, F. It. Vol. 1 (1922) 343  
60 E Satow, op cit., (1979), p. 107 
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid p. 108 
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forming the rationale for diplomatic immunities.63 Also important in an effort 
to find a universal convention for international diplomacy was the attempt by 
the Harvard Law School towards the publication of the Harvard Research 
Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in 1932.64 In spite 
of this effort, which is of ‘great persuasive authority,’65 various States still 
clinch on to the provisions of their respective local laws on diplomatic 
relations. 
 
The United Nations International Law Commission (hereinafter referred to as 
ILC)66 sprang into action, as a matter of priority, to consider the codification 
of diplomatic and consular relations and immunities during its first session in 
1949.67 The ILC was mandated in 1953 by the General Assembly Resolution 
685 to undertake the codification of diplomatic law.68 By 1954, the ILC took 
up the task of considering a draft expected to become ‘a universal 
comprehensive law’69 on diplomatic related matters. In the preparation of the 
draft, all member States of the United Nations, parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice as well as members of the Specialised Agencies 
                                                 
63 B Sen, op cit., (1988), p. 103 
64 26, A.J.I.L (1932) (Suppl.), 19 
65
 E Satow, op cit., (1979), p. 108 
66 The International Law Commission (ILC) was created in 1947 by the General Assembly 
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were all present.70 The final draft was eventually submitted in 1958 after 
much deliberation, for adoption not by the General Assembly, but by a 
specially convened conference in Vienna.71 
 
Between the 2nd of March and 14th of April, 1961, eighty-one States met at a 
Conference in Vienna to discuss and adopt the final draft of the Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations. The Convention that is made up of fifty-three articles 
along with two Optional Protocols on acquisition of nationality and obligatory 
settlement of disputes72 was ultimately adopted and ratified by 113 States in 
April 18, 1961.73 With the Convention came an authority of codification of 
diplomatic law particularly within the recondite domain of customary rule. 
Today, not less than 185 states are signatories to the 1961 VCDR which 
confirms the general acceptability and in fact, the universality of diplomatic 
relations,74 out of which 57 Muslim States are parties to the VCDR. This 
represents not less than one-third of the entire membership of the VCDR. 
Although one may say that the Vienna Convention indeed ‘constitutes the 
modern law in regard to the privileges and immunities of diplomats’75 
however, the extent of the application of its system of immunities amongst 
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Organizations, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), Pp. 8 – 9. See The Work of the 
International Law Commission, (United Nations, New York, 1988), Pp.41 ff   
72 United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Official Documents, 
2 vols. A/Conf. 20/14 
73 E Satow, op cit., (1979), p. 108 
74 R Cohen, ‘Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD’  in J. 
Melissen, Ed. Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, (Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), p. 14  
75 E Satow, op cit., (1979), p. 108 
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different States remains a matter of substantial divergence.76 That is why the 
question of uniformity in the application of the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention appears unsettled. Nevertheless, it can still be rightly argued in 
line with the submission of Denza in his authoritative treatise entitled 
‘Diplomatic Law,’77 that ‘the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is 
probably the most successful product so far of the United Nations ‘legislative 
process’ . . .’ It was further stressed that ‘[t]he Vienna Convention is without 
doubt one of the surest and most widely based multilateral regimes in the 
field of international relations.’78  
 
The VCDR has carefully sets out certain inviolabilities and immunities to be 
enjoyed by the diplomatic agent so as to guarantee the fulfilment of his/her 
diplomatic functions without any hindrance or fear of intimidation. These 
immunities are examined in Section 4.3.3 below. 
 
4.3.3. Diplomatic Immunities According to the 1961 Vienna 
Convention          
The 1961 VCDR consists of fifty-three Articles out of which twelve deal 
directly with personal immunity. The Convention outlines different categories 
of immunities and inviolabilities given to various classes of diplomat.79 The 
                                                 
76 Article 47 (2) (a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention provides that ‘(a) [w]here the receiving 
States applies any of the provisions of the present Convention restrictively because of a 
restrictive application of that provision to its mission in the sending State; (b) [w]here by 
custom or agreement States extend to each other more favourable treatment than is required 
by the provisions of the present Convention’, such actions, for purpose of this Convention, 
will not be regarded as discrimination.   
77 E Denza, Diplomatic Law, (Oceana Publications, New York, 1976), p. 1 
78 J Brown, op cit., (1988), p. 54 
79 These are articles 29 – 40 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.  
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various categories of these diplomatic immunities and privileges as they apply 
to diplomatic personnel and their family members are summed up under the 
following headings: i) personal inviolability of the mission’s members; ii) 
inviolability of the mission premises and private residence;  iii) inviolability of 
the mission’s archives; iv) freedom of communication; v) protection of 
diplomatic bag and couriers; vi) freedom of movement; vii) immunity from 
criminal and civil jurisdiction; viii)                                                                                           
exemption from taxation; ix) exemption from customs duties; x) exemption 
from social and security obligations; and xi) exemption from personal and 
public services. They will be discussed one after the other. 
 
4.3.3.1 Personal Inviolability 
It is a fact accepted extensively among jurists and international law writers 
that the inviolability of the diplomatic envoy is ‘the oldest established and the 
most fundamental rule of diplomatic law.’80 This principle has been associated 
with the concept that the diplomatic agent81 is representing the sovereign, as 
such, any injury brought against him embodies corresponding affront to the 
sovereign.82 The core essence of diplomatic inviolability in the VCDR, going by 
the spirit of the preamble, is in conformity with the functional necessity theory 
which is ‘to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic 
                                                 
80 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 136 
81 The word “diplomatic agent” as defined by Article 1 (e) of the 1961 VCDR ‘is the head of 
the mission or member of the diplomatic staff of the mission’. See J Brown, ‘Diplomatic 
Immunity: State Practice Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, (1988) 37, 
I.C.L.Q. Pp. 54-55   
82 B Sen, op. cit., (1988), p. 107 
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missions…’83 That is why it is so guaranteed by Article 29 of the VCDR84 that 
the diplomatic agent ‘shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.’ In 
addition to that, Article 29 also requires the receiving State to ‘take all 
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.’  
 
The provisions of Article 29 are expected to serve as a means of protection 
for the diplomatic agent from all forms of hindrances and restrictions that 
may occur in the receiving State. Although, the Article contains no express or 
implied concept or scope of inviolability.85 It however, provides a double-
pronged protection. Firstly, the authorities of the receiving State are not 
allowed under any circumstances to detain or arrest a diplomatic agent. 
Secondly, the Article makes it an obligation on the receiving State to protect 
the diplomatic agent.86 Once a State has accepted the creation of a diplomatic 
relation with another State, it then becomes a must that the State takes ‘all 
appropriate steps’ towards the prevention of physical attack or violence 
against the dignity and freedom of its diplomatic personnel.87 According to 
some writers, it is not common to find a diplomatic personnel being arrested 
                                                 
83 The fourth paragraph of the preamble of the VCDR 
84Article 29 of the VCDR states that: “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He 
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with 
due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom 
or dignity.”  
85 R Vark, ‘Personal Inviolability and Diplomatic Immunity in Respect of Serious Crime’, (2003) 
Juridica International VIII, Pp. 111-112 
86 L Oppenheim, op cit., (2005) Pp. 561-562. The incidence of the Libyan People’s Bureau in 
London where a diplomatic agent fired shots into the crowd of demonstrators killing a British 
policewoman, Constable Yvonne Fletcher and injuring eleven people depicts a classical 
example. The British government understanding the implication of inviolability of diplomatic 
personnel and mission did not arrest or prosecute the perpetrator but eventually precipitated 
a severance of diplomatic relations with the Libyan government by declaring its diplomats 
persona non grata. See GV McClanahan, op. cit., (1989), p. 5; LS Farhangi, ‘Insuring Against 
Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity’, (Jul., 1986), Vol. 38 No. 6, Stanford Law Review, Pp. 1523-
1524 
87 RG Feltham, Diplomatic Handbook (5th ed., Longman Group Limited, London 1988), p. 42 
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or detained for committing an offence even though there seems to be a right 
to self-defence.88 But where it thus occurs, reparation or an apology becomes 
necessary.89 A public apology was, for instance, received when a Third 
Secretary of the American Embassy was assaulted at Nanking by a Japanese 
soldier in January 26, 1938.90   
 
The immunity contained in Article 29, by extension, also covers members of 
the families of diplomatic agents, provided they are not nationals of the 
receiving State.91 Similarly, the concept of inviolability is extended to the 
members of the administrative and technical staffs of the mission including 
their respective family members. The immunity from civil and administrative 
jurisdiction is however, subject to acts performed within the scope of their 
duties and obligations.92 It is important to note that some Muslim States such 
as Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, Qatar and Sudan have, meanwhile, entered 
reservation to the application of Article 37(2) of the VCDR.93 They have made 
the reservation either to the effect that members of the administrative and 
                                                 
88 CJ Lewis, State and Diplomatic Immunity (3rd ed., Lloyd’s of London, London 1990) p. 135; 
The ILC, long before the Vienna Conference for Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, a 
Conference which ushered in the VCDR, has maintained that personal inviolability does not 
exclude self-defence and, in exceptional circumstances, other measures to prevent a diplomat 
from committing a crime. See R Vark, op. cit., p. 111; I.L.C. Yearbook, 1958, Vol. II, p. 97   
89 In the celebrated Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
the ICJ ordered reparation against the government of Islamic Republic of Iran for having 
violated in several respects the diplomatic inviolability and ‘obligations owed by it to the 
United States of America under international conventions in force between the two countries, 
as well as under long-established rules of general international law.’ See United States of 
American v. Iran (1980) ICJ Reports, p. 44, para. 95 (1)    
90 B Sen, op. cit., (1988), p. 107 
91 Article 37 (1) VCDR 
92Article 37 (2) VCDR 
93 See The United Nations Treaty Collection available at 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
3&chapter=3&lang=en [accessed 06 August, 2011] 
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technical staffs of the mission do not have any diplomatic immunity94 or 
Article 37(2) shall only apply on the basis of reciprocity.95 And finally, also 
immune for official functions only are members of service staff of the mission 
which includes maintenance and domestic employees.96 Also included in this 
category are their family members. 
 
4.3.3.2 Inviolability of Mission Premises and Private Residence 
In practice, there does not appear to be a clear-cut distinction between the 
‘residence of the ambassador’ and the ‘premises of the embassy’ until very 
recently.97 With the rate at which the numbers of diplomatic staff have 
increased in recent times, it has become impossible to accommodate the 
numerous diplomatic staff of the embassy in the ambassador’s residence.98 It 
therefore became necessary to physically separate the private residence of 
the diplomatic personnel from the diplomatic mission premises that serve as 
chancery building.99 However, international law writers had always referred to 
the two premises (the mission and the residence of the diplomats) as 
enjoying the ‘franchise de l’hotel’.100 This means that the premises of the 
mission shall be used solely for the purposes of the mission’s functions as 
designated by the sending State. Moreover, the VCDR gives the definition of 
the premises of the mission as including both: ‘the buildings or parts of the 
                                                 
94 Egypt, Morocco and Qatar do not apply the provisions of Article 37(2) 
95 For instance, Iraq and Sudan will only apply Article 37(2) on the basis of reciprocity. 
96 Libya, for example, will not be bound by Article 37(3) of the VCDR except on the basis of 
reciprocity. 
97 E Satow, op. cit., (1979), p. 122 
98 Ibid 
99 Ibid p. 122-123 
100 B Sen, op cit., (1988), p. 110 
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buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for 
the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of the 
mission.’101  
 
However, the reasons for attributing inviolability to the premises of the 
mission and the residence of the diplomat are quite different. As for the 
premises of the mission, it is granted inviolability as a ‘form of State immunity 
attaching to a building used for government purposes.’102 Meanwhile, the 
inviolability with respect to diplomatic residence comes by virtue of the 
diplomatic status. But still, the notion of inviolability thus appears to be 
applicable to both the premises of the mission and the residence of the envoy 
in equal degree.103 The premises of the mission and the residence of the 
envoy have gained universal recognition that they shall remain inviolable.104 
The protection of inviolability of the premises of the mission comes from 
Article 22 of the VCDR which proscribes the agents of the receiving state from 
entering the premises of the sending mission without the consent of the head 
of the mission. In the event of an emergency, such as fire outbreak or gun 
shot from inside the mission, it was argued before the ILC, that it would 
amount to ‘outright foolishness, if . . . the local authorities were not able to 
go in and deal with the matter.’105 After all, for the purposes of averting and 
                                                 
101 Article 1(i) of 1961 VCDR 
102Sir G Fitzmaurice, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 1 (United Nations, 
1957) p. 53 
103 This is contained in Article 30 of the VCDR states that: ‘The private residence of a 
diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the 
mission.’ 
104 B Sen, op cit., (1988), p. 111 
105 MJL Hardy, op cit., (1968), p. 44 
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eliminating grievous harm to human life and property, it is only proper that 
‘[i]n such emergencies, the authorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
must, if possible, be obtained.’106 Despite these arguments, according to 
Denza, the ILC maintained and concluded ‘that this would be inappropriate 
and unnecessary’107 as ‘it would be dangerous to allow the receiving state to 
judge when “exceptional circumstances” existed.’108 Therefore, under no 
circumstances would the agent of the receiving state enter unto the premises 
of the mission without the express authorisation of the head of the mission. 
Not even to serve a writ of summons, for that will amount to an infringement 
of the respect due the mission109 However, where the receiving State strongly  
‘believes its essential security to be at risk,’110 it may take the option of 
violating Article 22 of the VCDR. As it happened in 1973 when the Iraqi 
ambassador was confronted with the mission’s illegal smuggling of arms by 
the Pakistani authorities to which he refused to give consent when requested 
by the Pakistanis to conduct a search of his Embassy. The Pakistanis 
maintained that ‘their concerns for national security overrode all consideration 
of diplomatic immunity.’ Therefore, in the presence of the ambassador, a raid 
was carried out by armed policemen and large consignments of arms were 
found kept in crates. The Iraqi ambassador and an attaché were thus 
declared persona non grata by expelling them from Pakistan and in return, 
                                                 
106 Yearbook of the I. L. C., 1957, Vol. II, p. 137; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/91, p.2, Article 12 
107Yearbook of the I. L. C., 1958, Vol. I, p. 129. Cited in E Denza, op cit., p. 83 
108E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 84  
109 See Commentaries on Article 20 adopted by the International Law Commission at its tenth 
session. 
110 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 84 
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recalled their ambassador from Iraq.111 It thus appeared that the action of the 
Government of Pakistan was justified ex post facto as an act of self-defence 
which was a reprisal for the breach of Article 41(3).112  
 
The receiving State is ‘under a special duty to take all appropriate steps’ 
towards the protection of the premises of the mission from being entered into 
or damaged by any private person and prevent any injury to its dignity.113 
Although, ‘a special duty’ is not define by the VCDR, the ILC’s commentary on 
the 1958 draft suggests that: ’The receiving state must, in order to fulfil this 
obligation, take special measures – over and above those it takes to discharge 
its general duty of ensuring order.’114 The receiving State owes it a duty to 
protect the mission premises from attack resulting from mob violence or 
demonstration. On September 9, 2011 a group of about 30 protesters invaded 
the Israeli Embassy in Cairo and threw documents belonging to the Embassy 
out of the window.115 Although, the Egyptian security eventually came in to 
arrest the situation, the act of forcefully entry into the Embassy, alone, 
signifies a violation of diplomatic relation. To this effect, the Israeli Deputy 
Ambassador remarked ‘[t]hat the government of Egypt ultimately acted to 
rescue our people is noteworthy and we are thankful. . . [b]ut what happened 
is a blow to the peaceful relations, and of course, a grave violation of 
                                                 
111 See The Friday Times website: http://www.thefridaytimes.com/04032011/page26.shtml 
[accessed on 15/03/2011]; See also The Observer, 11 February 1973. 
112 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 268 
113 Article 22(2) of the VCDR 
114Yearbook of the I.L.C. 1958, Vol. II, p. 95 
115 The Guardian, Egyptian Protesters Break into Israeli Embassy in Cairo, Saturday 10 
September, 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/10/egyptian-protesters-israeli-
embassy-cairo [accessed on October 9, 2011]  
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accepted diplomatic behaviour between sovereign states.’116 It has also been 
stated in United States v. Hand117 that an attack upon the house of an envoy 
is equivalent to an attack upon his person. 
 
It is the practice of the British Government to pay, on the basis of ex gratia 
claims, for damage to diplomatic premises in London even though the British 
Government is not directly liable.118 Immediately, any damage is inflicted 
either upon the British diplomatic mission or its personnel, claims are always 
reciprocally resorted to.119 It does not matter that the premises of the mission 
is rented or leased by the sending State or by individual member of staff in 
respect of his residence, the most important thing is that rule of inviolability 
covers the whole premises and they must be protected. 
 
4.3.3.3 Inviolability of the Mission’s Archives 
The rule of inviolability, by Article 24 of the VCDR, also extends to diplomatic 
archives and documents of the mission at any time and wherever they may 
be. The Article states thus: ‘The archives and documents of the mission shall 
be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be.’ That is the receiving 
State shall have no power to seize, detain for examination or compel to 
                                                 
116 The Guardian, Israel Evacuates Ambassador to Egypt after Embassy Attack, Saturday 10 
September, 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/10/egypt-declares-state-alert-
embassy?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 [accessed October 09, 2011]  
117 Moore, Digest, Vol. VI, p. 62 
118 A typical example was the payment the British Government made to the Nigerian High 
Commission in London for damage resulting from a car bomb explosion in March 1973 which 
could not be linked to any deliberate attack on the mission premises. It was even argued that 
there was no failure on the part of the British police to take appropriate steps to protect the 
mission. See E Satow, op. cit., (1979), p. 111  
119 Ibid 
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tender in evidence any documents emanating from the missions’ archives. It 
could also be construed from Article 24 of the VCDR that the sending State 
shall prevent others from unlawfully interfering with documents and archives 
of the diplomatic mission. This is because, without respecting the inviolability 
of these documents, in the words of Vattel, ‘the ambassador would be unable 
to perform his duties in security.’120 
 
The term ‘archives’ was not given any definition the 1961 VCDR. However, it 
has been argued that considering ‘the diversity of modern methods of 
recording and storing information,’121 an appropriately wider construction 
should be given to it. Nevertheless, the meaning of “consular archives” in the 
VCCR is given to include all the papers, documents, correspondence, books, 
films, tapes and registry of the consular post, together with the ciphers and 
codes, the card-indexes and any article of furniture intended for their 
protection or safekeeping.122 The meaning provided in the VCCR may equally 
suffice while interpreting the word ‘archives’ as used in the VCDR. 
 
4.3.3.4 Freedom of Communication 
The right to freedom and security of communication, from a functional 
perspective, is highly necessary for diplomatic mission in the performance of 
its primary duties. The right to free flow of communication from the sending 
State to the diplomatic mission has been considered ‘probably the most 
                                                 
120 This is cited in E Denza, op cit., p. 108 
121 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 110 
122 Article 1(1) (k) of the VCCR 
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important of all the privileges and immunities accorded under international 
law.’123 The importance of this right is clearly depicted by Vattel in his writing 
in the eighteenth century as reported by Murty thus: 
 
The couriers whom ambassador sends or receives, his papers, his 
letters and despatches, are all so essentially connected with the 
embassy that they must be regarded as inviolable; for if they were 
not respected it would be impossible to attain the proper object of 
the embassy, nor could the ambassador fulfil the duties of his with 
due security.124   
 
The general principle of freedom of communication is guaranteed in Article 27 
of the VCDR which prescribes that: ‘The receiving State shall permit and 
protect free communication on the part of the mission for all official 
purposes.’125 This Article imposes dual obligations which the receiving State 
must discharge. First, the receiving State is expected to allow free and 
unhindered flow of official information in and out of the diplomatic mission. 
And second, it shall also ensure the inviolability of the communication. This 
communication which must strictly be for official purposes may take the form 
of couriers and messages in code or cypher to the government of the sending 
State and to its various diplomatic missions and consulates wherever they 
                                                 
123 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 119; E Satow, op cit., (1979), p. 116 
124
 BS Murty, The International Law of Diplomacy: The Diplomatic Instrument and World 
Public Order, (New Haven Press, New Haven 1989), p. 385 
125There is also identical provision in Article 35 of the 1961 VCCR.  
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may be situated.126 In addition, the freedom of communication with the 
nationals of the sending State residing within the receiving State and with the 
international organisations must also be safeguarded. 127  
 
The question of diplomatic wireless transmitter was quite controversial at the 
Vienna Conference. The richer States are of the view that the installation of 
wireless transmitters on the missions’ premises which already are inviolable, 
implied that no consent of the receiving State is therefore, needed.128 
Meanwhile, the other States that do not have the means of installing wireless 
transmitters fear that the installed wireless might be used against their 
interests.129 However, at the end, it was a provision that ‘the mission may 
install and use a wireless transmitter only with the consent of the receiving 
state’130 and it shall be the responsibility of the sending State to observe 
international telecommunications regulations.131 Once the consent to use a 
wireless transmitter is granted to a diplomatic mission, it then behoves the 
mission to respect the local laws of the receiving State in compliance with the 
provisions of Article 41 paragraphs 1 and 3.132 
 
                                                 
126 RG Feltham, op cit., (1988), p. 39 
127 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 120; Yearbook of the I. L. C. 1957 Vol. Pp. 75-76 
128 E Satow, op. cit., (1979), p. 116-117 
129 Ibid  
130 Article 27 (1) 1961 VCDR 
131 UK Treaty Series, No. 41 (1967), para. 261; Yearbook of the I. L. C. 1957 Vol. II p. 138 
132 Article 41 (1): “Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all 
persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the 
receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.” (3) 
“The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the 
functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general 
international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending and the 
receiving State.”  
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4.3.3.5 Protection of Diplomatic Bags and Couriers 
The official correspondence of the diplomatic mission whether carried by mail 
or through personal courier is also declared inviolable as it forms part of the 
freedom of communication.  It is also viewed that part of this freedom of 
communication ‘enables them [diplomatic missions] to receive instructions 
from their sending State and send home reports of what they have done, 
said, and observed.’133 If the sending State is to perform its diplomatic 
functions freely without any political interference or restrictions, there has to 
be a high degree of confidentiality in its official correspondence coupled with 
speedy despatch. Therefore, once an official correspondence is designated as 
diplomatic bag134 or carries clear external marks of its character whether 
accompanied or unaccompanied,135 the receiving State has to, by the 
provisions of the 1961 VCDR, protect its inviolability by not opening or 
detaining it.136 In other words, the receiving State has to prevent its agents or 
private members of its State from violating this protection. Even while 
traversing the territories of third countries, the inviolability of the official 
despatches of the diplomatic mission must be respected. However, the 
following States which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
                                                 
133 AB Lyons, ‘Personal Immunities of Diplomatic Agents’ (1954) Brit. YB Int’l L  p. 334  
134 Diplomatic bags have been defined as ‘usually large sacks sealed with the official stamps 
of the sending country and a label identifying the contents as diplomatic.’ A Zeidman, ‘Abuse 
of the Diplomatic Bag: A Proposed Solution’, (1989-1990) 11 Cardozo L. Rev., p. 427 
(Footnote 3)  
135 ILC, Report on the 41st Session (1986), A/41/10, Article 3, paragraph 1, point (2) 
136 See Article 27 paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of the 1961 VCDR which state: 
(2)The official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable. Official 
correspondence means all correspondence relating to the mission and its functions. 
(3)The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained. 
(4)The package constituting the diplomatic bag must bear visible external marks of 
their character and may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for 
official use 
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Yemen out of the 57 Muslim States seem to believe that the protection given 
to diplomatic bag is rather too absolute. Consequently, they have made a 
reservation concerning the application of Article 27 to the effect that if a 
diplomatic bag is believed to contain unauthorised articles it could be opened 
in the presence of the representatives of the sending State, otherwise the bag 
will have to be returned to its origin unopened.137 
 
The inviolability granted diplomatic bag has been, of recent, grossly abused 
and likely to be misused in carrying out or sponsoring series of criminal acts 
against other States or their citizens.138 There are cases where diplomatic 
bags have been used to smuggle such things as drugs139 and black market 
commodities.140 Even human beings had also been disguised for ‘diplomatic 
article’ provided it is marked as diplomatic pouch. An example is that of the 
former Nigerian Minister of Transportation, Alhaji Umaru Dikko who was 
kidnapped and dumped in a crate designated for the Ministry of External 
Affairs, Federal Republic of Nigeria by the Nigerian High Commission, London. 
The kidnap attempt was, however, aborted by the quick intervention of the 
                                                 
137See The United Nations Treaty Collection available at 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
3&chapter=3&lang=en [accessed 06 August, 2011] It must be noted, however, that the 
practice of challenging a consular bag where it is suspected to have contained unauthorised 
contents is still in operation. See E Satow, op cit., (1979), p. 117 Also see Article 35 of the 
1963 VCCR. 
138 Goldberg, ‘The Shoot-Out at the Libyan Self-Styled People’s Bureau: A Case Supported 
International Terrorism (1984) 30 S. Dak. L. Rev. p. 1 
139 In May, 1982, it was reported that a Thai diplomat smuggled up to twenty million dollars’ 
worth of heroin into the United States in diplomatic bags. See New York Time, May 2, 1982, 
p. A34, col. 1 
140 See New York Time, Dec., 2, 1988, p. D1, col. 1 which disclosed that two million dollars 
were laundered into the United States by using the Yugoslav diplomatic channels.  
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British government.141 These instances have, however, given credence to the 
assertion that ‘just as absolute power corrupts absolutely, so total diplomatic 
immunity can undermine totally the duties of foreign diplomats to “respect 
the laws and regulations of a host country”.’142 
 
Several suggestions by some countries towards amending the VCDR believing 
that the absolute inviolability of diplomatic bag contained therein could be 
limited was met with rejection fearing that it might ‘limit the bag’s utility.’143 
This is because despite some instances of abuse, the inviolability of diplomatic 
bag ‘needs to be preserved and safeguarded in the interest of all states.’144 
 
The 1961 VCDR also protects the diplomatic couriers while they discharge 
their duties. It provides that ‘[t]he diplomatic courier, who shall be provided 
with an official document indicating his status and the number of packages 
constituting the diplomatic bag, shall be protected by the receiving state in 
the performance of his functions. He shall enjoy personal inviolability and 
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.’145 Similarly, a person 
could also be designated an ad hoc courier which implies that his diplomatic 
immunity ceases once he delivers the diplomatic bag.146 Also, captains of 
                                                 
141 See The Economist, Nigeria Kidnapping, July 14, 1984, Pp. 55-56; Also see Davenport, 
Mercenaries Held After Kidnap of Doped Nigerian, The Times (London), July 7, 1984, p. 1, 
col. 2 
142 Brett, ‘Giving the Diplomatic Rules Some Teeth’, The Times (London), April 28 1984 at 
page 8 col. 2 
143 A Zeidman, op cit., (1989-1990), p. 433 
144 B Sen, op cit., (1988), p. 136 
145 Article 27(5) of the VCDR 
146 Article 27(6) of the VCDR 
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commercial flights could also take responsibility of diplomatic bag, but they do 
not have diplomatic status.147 
     
4.3.3.6 Immunity from Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction 
It is generally accepted that after the rule of personal inviolability, came the 
immunity of diplomats from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving 
State.148 This immunity is widely defined as ’the freedom from local 
jurisdiction accorded under international law by the receiving state to [foreign 
diplomats and to] the families and servants of such officers.’149 In essence, 
the word ‘immunity’ has been defined by the ILC as ‘the privileges of 
exemption from, or suspension of, or non-amenability to, the exercise of the 
jurisdiction by the component authorities of the territorial State.’150 The 
diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction gets full support from the 
functional necessity theory in that it gives to the diplomatic agent 
uninterrupted relations amongst nations.151 Hence, Article 31 (1) of the VCDR 
clearly sets out, without any exception, the immunity of a diplomatic agent 
from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.152 The diplomatic agent 
needs to be protected by way of diplomatic immunity from the jurisdiction of 
the receiving State commencing penal proceedings against him and members 
                                                 
147 Article 27(7) of the VCDR 
148 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 149 
149 Reports on Legislative History of the Diplomatic Relations, (96th Cong. 1st Session, 1979), 
12 
150 Draft articles of the jurisdictional immunity of States and their property as discussed by 
the ILC at its 1982 session, UN doc. A/CN.4/L.345, paragraph 18, note 22: draft Article 2, 
par. 1(a). 
151 DB Michaels, International Privileges and Immunities: A Case for Universal Statute 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1971), p. 50 
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of his family provided they are not residents or nationals of the receiving 
State.153 Thus, the immunity granted to the diplomat and his immediate 
family members can be said to be absolute.  
 
Moreover, this immunity applies to prohibit the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
as well as civil jurisdiction of the receiving State in respect of acts which the 
diplomat performed in his official capacity.154 With regards to certain private 
acts, a diplomatic agent is, however, subject to local jurisdiction. This is 
contained in Article 31 (1) (a-c) of the 1961 VCDR which stipulates 
exceptional cases where a diplomatic agent will be subject to the civil 
jurisdiction of the receiving State provided they are acts performed in his 
private capacity. These are acts relating to: 1) real property situated in the 
receiving State; 2) actions where the diplomatic agent is involved privately as 
administrator, executor, heir or legatee; and 3) actions relating to 
professional or commercial activity outside the official function of the 
diplomatic agent.155   
  
The fact that a diplomatic agent cannot under any circumstances be tried or 
punished by the local criminal courts of the receiving State does not give him 
the licence to flout with impunity the laws and regulations of the receiving 
State. Truly, he may be immune from criminal prosecution, but going by the 
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famous decision of the court in Empson v. Smith156 which says ‘it is 
elementary law that diplomatic immunity is not immunity from legal liability,’ 
he could be prosecuted provided he submits to the jurisdiction of the 
receiving state or whenever his duties are terminated. In the case of 
Dickinson v. Del Solar, Lord Hewart C.J (as he then was) observed that: ‘Even 
if execution could not issue in this country while Mr. Del Solar remains a 
diplomatic agent, presumably it might issue if he ceases to be a privileged 
person, and the judgment might also be the foundation of proceedings 
against him in Peru at any time.’157  This shows that criminal proceedings 
against a diplomatic agent does not necessarily become null and void merely 
because of diplomatic immunity but rather, it could be stayed until such a 
time when the diplomat loses his immunity.158 After all, the limitation of time 
does not apply to criminal liability. Similarly, the diplomatic agent can be 
prosecuted and punished by the judicial authorities of his home State if he is 
found to have committed any crime particularly the more serious offences.159 
This is so as some nations empower their courts to prosecute and punish 
crimes committed by their citizens even if it was committed abroad.160 Once 
an offence, particularly a more serious one, is committed by a diplomat, the 
receiving State may request his home government to recall him back home 
for the purpose of prosecuting him.161  
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The approach of the receiving State to offences committed by diplomatic 
agents depends on the direct consequence of the offence on the State. For 
instance, where a diplomat commits the offence of espionage or terrorism, it 
is always the practice of States that such a diplomat will be declared persona 
non grata or expelled.162 But in the case of other offences such as drunken 
driving, sexual offences, drug abuse, over speeding and parking violation, 
diplomats have been able to successfully claim diplomatic immunity.163  
However, the British government has the practice of informing heads of 
missions regarding any violation of its laws and in case of serious offences, 
they will usually request that the offender be recalled or his diplomatic 
immunity waived.164 
 
While reiterating the international customary law practice, the ILC accepted165 
that the diplomatic agent is not under an obligation to appear as witness in 
the court of law.166 That is, he is exempted from liability if he fails or refuses 
to give evidence as a witness. It should be stated, however, that the sending 
State may permit a diplomatic agent to give testimony in a case provided the 
case does not directly relate to his diplomatic duties. For instance, diplomats 
from United Kingdom usually have to be expressly instructed for them to give 
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evidence in local courts167 and such evidence, though, not connected to their 
official functions, must be for the purpose of establishing justice.168  
 
4.3.3.7 Freedom of Movement 
The freedom of movement of diplomatic agent is so vital to some of the 
functions of diplomatic relations that it cannot be over-looked. Prior to the 
World War II, all members of the diplomatic community enjoyed unrestricted 
movement within the territory of the receiving States. But after the World 
War II, all the Communist States of Eastern Europe particularly the Soviet 
Union imposed a travel restriction of 50 kilometres from the capital on 
members of diplomatic missions. China later joined in also imposing travel 
restriction on diplomats within its territory. They need to get an express 
permission from the State to travel beyond these limits.169 The United 
Kingdom, the United States including other Western States reciprocated by 
imposing a similar travel restriction on diplomats from Eastern Europe.170 This 
limited diplomatic freedom of movement has been the established diplomatic 
practice between the West and the East although with varying alteration.171 
 
At the 1961 Vienna Conference, the Final Report of the ILC with regards to 
diplomatic freedom of movement was accepted without any reservation. This 
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168 E Denza, op cit., (1976), p. 170 
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led to the unanimous adoption of the provisions contained in Article 26 of the 
1961 VCDR which provides that: 
   
Subject to its law and regulations concerning zones entry into 
which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, 
the receiving State shall ensure to all members of the mission 
freedom of movement and travel in its territory. 
 
It thus appears unambiguous that aside from the receiving State 
adopting specific regulations to the contrary on grounds of national 
security, the diplomatic agents exercise and enjoy unrestricted 
freedom of movement in the territory of the receiving State. However, 
the Saudi Arabian representative at the 1961 Conference on Diplomatic 
Intercourse and Immunities did mention that while accepting the 
provisions of Article 26 of the 1961 VCDR, the conference has to 
recognise the fact that for the past 1,300 years, the cities of Mecca 
and Medina, being the birthplaces of Islam, had remained and still 
remain ‘accessible only to members of the Muslim faith.’172 This 
restriction, had not been imposed by the Saudi Arabian Government, 
but had been historically and firmly established ‘over 1,300 years by all 
the governments, without exceptions.’173 It was thus unanimously 
accepted, though tacitly, by all diplomatic missions that the restriction 
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does not constitute any hindrance to the freedom of movement of 
diplomatic personnel within the meaning of Article 26 of the 1961 
VCDR.174 Where a diplomatic agent goes beyond the permitted zone 
ignoring the police request in that regard, the receiving State has the 
option to declare him persona non grata.175  
 
4.3.3.8 Immunity from Taxation 
Usually, States levy taxes on their citizens and even on aliens who are 
resident within their territorial jurisdictions but these fiscal impositions 
do not generally, extend to diplomatic missions and their personnel. 
This, of course, is heavily linked to the functional necessity theory of 
diplomatic immunity. The diplomatic missions and its members enjoy 
diplomatic exemption from the payment of dues and taxes to public 
authorities mainly to enable them carry out their diplomatic functions 
without any hindrance from the public authorities of the receiving 
state. As a diplomatic envoy, free from the territorial supremacy of the 
receiving State, he is also expected to be exempt from all direct 
personal taxes. The members of the family of the diplomatic agents as 
well as members of administrative and technical staff including their 
families, provided they are not nationals or permanent residents of the 
receiving State, are equally exempted from these fiscal charges. The 
1961 VCDR in Article 34 provides the general immunity from taxation 
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in the following words: ‘A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all 
dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal.’176 At 
the same time, it also furnishes some exceptional cases where the 
diplomat will not be entitled to tax exemption.  
 
Firstly, where the taxes are indirect, that is where they ‘are normally 
incorporated in the price of goods or services,’177 in such a situation, it 
will be administratively impossible for an exemption or refund 
arrangements to be made. Such case will usually involve excise duties, 
taxes on sale or purchase, value added tax as well as airport tax. The 
United Kingdom is, however, known to make refunds of value added 
tax to diplomatic personnel in respect of three items namely: cars, 
spirits (for heads of mission only) and fine furnishings provided that 
these commodities are manufactured in the United Kingdom.178  
Secondly, the diplomat is expected to pay taxes and dues on private 
immovable property situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
receiving State ‘unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for 
the purposes of the mission.’179 This clause rightly suggests that once 
the diplomatic mission premises is held in the name of a member of 
the mission, the premises becomes exempt from any fiscal imposition. 
Also, a diplomat is to pay inheritance tax in respect of the deceased 
                                                 
176 A similar provision is also contained in Article 49 of the 1963 VCCR which states thus: 
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estate if he inherits such estate.180 The only exception is where the 
estate belongs to a diplomat or any of his family members who dies 
within the tenure of his office in the receiving State.181 The reason 
being that the receiving State has ‘territorial jurisdiction’ in respect of 
all immovable properties including matters of succession or inheritance 
of estates within its boundaries.182 The third category of exception to 
diplomatic tax immunity are ‘dues and taxes on private income having 
its source in the receiving State and capital taxes on investments made 
in commercial undertakings in the receiving State.’183  These are 
privately earned income or capital within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the receiving State by the diplomatic agent having no connection with 
his official functions. It is only reasonable that taxes are imposed on 
such income or profit privately earned by the diplomat while excluding 
salaries and emoluments which come to him from his home 
government as income for his official duties.184  
 
4.3.3.9 Exemption from Customs Duties 
The diplomatic missions enjoy exemption from custom duties as provided in 
the two Conventions (the VCDR and the VCCR).185 That is, they are entitled to 
import articles that are meant for official use without having to pay customs 
or any other similar duties on them. The same thing applies to articles that 
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are imported for personal use by the diplomat and his family members. 
However, these articles will only be brought in customs duties-free ‘subject to 
such laws and regulations as it (the receiving state) may adopt.’186 Even 
though there is no restriction on the frequency of their importation, the items 
must necessarily correspond to the needs of the mission.187 Also, the items 
must not be passed on to a third party in the name of gifts.188  
 
It has been argued by Denza that the period preceding the emergence of the 
Vienna Convention witnessed ‘the grant of customs privileges to members of 
diplomatic missions’ not as ‘a legal requirement of customary international 
law’ but as ‘a matter of courtesy, comity or reciprocity only.’189 This argument 
does not appear convincing enough to Dembinski in the sense that ‘the 
exemption from paying customs duties is not a superfluous privilege granted 
to foreign envoys, but a logical consequence of the other immunities, 
important for the efficient functioning of the external mission.’190 He proffers 
two main reasons for the functional necessity implication of the diplomatic 
exemption from customs duties. By submitting the baggage of a diplomat to 
the authority of the receiving state, it would amount to the imposition of 
restriction on his luggage and also constitute an unnecessary inhibition on the 
habits and traditions of the diplomat.191  
   
                                                 
186 Ibid 
187 L Dembinski, op. cit., (1988), p. 219 
188 Ibid  
189 E Denza, op. cit., (1976), p. 211; E Satow, op. cit., (1979), p. 137 
190 L Dembinski, op. cit., (1988), Pp. 218-219 
191 Ibid 
 .211 
 
Nevertheless, diplomatic missions have to consult the laws and regulations of 
the receiving State in order to ascertain the limits imposed on the importation 
of certain goods and also the procedure attached to their clearance. This 
information can always be obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the 
Ministry of External Affairs. 
 
4.4 The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 AD) and the Concept of 
Diplomatic Immunity under the Islamic Siyar. 
In discussing the principles of Islamic diplomatic law, many scholars of 
Islamic jurisprudence are of the view that the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 
AD) establishes the legal basis for its application.192 It is important to note 
that, although, prior to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, Islam recognised and 
acknowledged the fact that diplomatic envoy must be protected. It was the 
first treaty that, by implication, confirmed the principles of diplomatic 
immunity and also established the legal validity of international agreements. 
It may therefore, be proper for the Muslim scholars to always refer to the 
Treaty of Hudaybiyyah as a classical model for Islamic diplomatic law. It is, 
therefore, necessary to evaluate the events leading to the formation of the 
Treaty of Hudaybiyyah and its terms as they apply to the Muslims 
(represented by Prophet Muhammad) on the one hand and the Makkans 
(represented by Suhayl bin Amr) on the other. Then, the diplomatic concepts 
of immunity under Islamic diplomatic law will be discussed by looking at the 
various kinds of immunities guaranteed. It should be noted, that the Muslim 
States, in recognition of the universal importance of guaranteeing protection 
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for diplomatic personnel, have also codified these immunities and privileges 
particularly in Articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the 1976 Convention of the 
Immunities and Privileges of the Organization of Islamic Conference. 
Likewise, the concept of Aman (safe conduct) will also be considered in order 
to ascertain whether it grants diplomatic immunity to diplomatic personnel. 
 
4.4.1 Events Leading to the Making of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah  
The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, though not pre-meditated, came into being in 
628 AD. It was the year the Muslims numbering about one thousand five 
hundred under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) left Madinah for 
Makkah to perform the lesser pilgrimage (‘Umrah).193 They had their camp 
located at a place called Al-Hudaybiyyah, which was not far away from the 
city of Makkah. To manifest their peaceful intention, they carried no weapons 
but had with them seventy sacrificial animals to be used for the pilgrimage 
rituals. Information got to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) that the Makkans, 
who, at that time, were still pagans, had maintained a barricade against the 
Muslims from entering Makkah. They also sent out their forces to fight the 
Muslims. The reaction of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) to the war-mongering 
attitude of the Makkans portrayed the peaceful relations established by Islam 
against the antagonistic attitude of the Makkans in the following words: 
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Shame on the Quraysh! War has corrupted them. What good 
would it do them if they cleared the way between me and the 
other Arabs. If they kill me, then this is what they wanted. And if 
Allah grants me victory over them, they will enter into Islam in 
large numbers. And if they do not, they will fight as long as they 
have strength. So what do the Quraysh think?194 
 
In addition to the verbal commitment to peace, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) 
once sent Khirash ibn Umayyah as an envoy to the Makkans to explain the 
peaceful mission of the Muslims which was worship.195 Khirash’s visit failed 
after an attempt was made on his life despite the fact that he was an 
emissary who was expected to be protected from molestation or being 
killed.196 Again, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) intended to despatch ‘Umar bin 
Khattab as an envoy to Makkah to negotiate further on behalf of the Muslim 
community. But ‘Umar politely refused, pleading with Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh) that he had none of his clansmen, the Banu ‘Adiyy ibn Ka’b, left in 
Makkah, and moreover, the Quraysh might use that opportunity to descend 
heavily on him in revenge for his numerous offences against them.197 
Consequently, ‘Uthman bin Affan was otherwise chosen and charged with the 
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diplomatic task of conveying the peaceful intention of the Muslims to the 
Makkans. The imprisonment of ‘Uthman by the Makkans which was later 
rumoured that he had been killed was met with great rage for vengeance. 
The Muslims pledged to storm Makkah in revenge for the death of ‘Uthman 
even though they initially did not have the intention of fighting.198 For Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) strongly believed in the sacrilegious position of a 
diplomatic envoy that he must not be killed or imprisoned. However, ‘Uthman 
eventually returned unhurt and the need for war was therefore, averted. 
Although the diplomatic mission for which he went was unsuccessful, but he 
was able to meet with some Muslims residing in Makkah by giving them 
assurance of the impending victory and moral support.199 
 
4.4.2. The Making of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah 
 After a multiple exchange of emissaries between the Makkans and Prophet 
Muhammad, the Makkans eventually sent Suhayl ibn ‘Amr to arrange and 
execute a treaty, which is to be known as the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, with 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). This treaty was to become, in the eyes of the 
Muslim scholars, a model of Islamic diplomatic law and a paradigm of 
subsequent treaties (both domestic and international treaties) under  Islamic 
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law.200 With the refusal of Suhayl to accept and give in to any concessions 
coupled with the acquiescence and leniency exhibited by Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh) particularly in the face of Suhayl insulting posture,201 the peaceful 
negotiation still went ahead uninterrupted.202 The Muslims understanding and 
acceptance of the principle of diplomatic inviolability will not allow for any 
unpleasant reaction towards a rude diplomatic envoy.203  
 
The terms of the treaty were that peace was to be maintained for ten years 
between the Muslims and the Makkans and that anyone from amongst the 
Quraysh moving into Muhammad’s (pbuh) camp without the permission of his 
guardian shall be returned by the Muslims. While on the other hand, if a 
Muslim emigrates from Muhammad’s (pbuh) camp to Makkah, he shall not be 
returned. It was also agreed that the Muslims should return to Madinah 
without having to perform the ‘Umrah that year, but could come as pilgrims 
the following year, and that they will be allowed to stay in Makkah for only 
three days. Also indicated in the pact was the freedom of any tribe to seek 
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alliance with either the Makkans or the Muslims without any inhibition or 
intimidation.204  
 
The Muslims were at first dissatisfied with the entire treaty for having given 
too much to the Makkans in utter disregard to the yearnings of the Muslims. 
This position was usefully chronicled by Hamidullah thus: ‘There were some 
... provisions which were apparently humiliating and seemed to be 
disadvantageous for the Muslims. But the Prophet (peace be upon him) 
accepted them.’205 However, they submitted to the command and 
farsightedness of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) which eventually, paid off in the 
words of Haykal that: ‘Indeed, the treaty even made it possible two months 
later for Muhammad to begin to address himself to the kings and chiefs of 
foreign states and invite them to join Islam.’206 
 
This was the position between the Muslims and the Makkans until after two 
years when the treaty was violated. The Quraysh was reportedly held to have 
violated the treaty by attacking Muhammad’s (pbuh) ally, the Banu Khuza’.207 
This was considered to be a fundamental breach of the Treaty of 
Hudaybiyyah on the part of the Makkans which eventually led to the conquest 
of Makkah in 630 AD, described by Haykal as ‘the greatest victory of Islamic 
history’208 devoid of any violence or bloodshed. 
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The diplomatic ingenuity displayed by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) throughout 
the making of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah coupled with the exemplary 
patience exhibited by his companions culminated into an indelible success. 
The success of the treaty confirms the importance of diplomacy in Islam. It 
also further establishes the precedential value of international treaty. The 
exchange of diplomatic emissaries between the Makkans and Prophet 
Muhammad was prominent in the making of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, 
particularly, the mission of Suhayl ibn ‘Amr that was sent to conclude the 
treaty.  He was treated with utmost respect and held as an inviolable 
ambassador throughout the formation of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. It could 
be rightly concluded that the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah and its negotiating 
history, in the words of Bassiouni, ‘demonstrate the sanctity of emissaries, 
that a violation of an ambassador’s is a casus belli, and that no ambassador 
may be detained or harmed.’209   
 
 
4.4.3 Legal Authority of Islamic Diplomatic Immunities 
The Islamic diplomatic immunities derive its legal authority, first, from the 
Qur’an which happens to be the prime source of the Islamic jurisprudence. 
The Prophetic traditions, otherwise known as the Sunnah, also establish the 
validity of diplomatic immunities in Islamic law as indicated by several 
statements of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Likewise, the practices of the 
Muslim Caliphs, starting from the period of the first four caliphs, up to the 
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present Muslim countries confirm the legitimacy of diplomatic protection. For 
the purpose of clarity, each of these legal sources will be briefly considered: 
 
4.4.3.1 Text from the Qur’an: 
The incidence that validates the exchange of emissaries and further confirms 
diplomatic immunity, according to Bassiouni,210 is cited in Qur’an 27:23-24 of 
the Qur’an. It occurred when Bilqees bint Sharahil, the Queen of Saba’,211 in 
response to the letter of Prophet Sulayman (992-952 BC), sent emissaries 
with gifts to be presented to Prophet Sulayman. The Qur’an recounts the 
incidence when Bilqees said: 
 
But indeed, I will send to them a gift and see with what [reply] the 
messengers will return.212 
 
While declining the gifts which were considered as a sort of bribery, Prophet 
Sulayman restrained himself from visiting his annoyance or anger on the 
envoys, because he understood the importance of their personal inviolability. 
He appreciated the essence of ‘diplomatic communication between Muslim 
and non Muslim heads of State.’213 As such, it will be considered sacrilegious 
to harm or detain the envoys of another sovereign. He eventually sent them 
back with the gifts they brought by saying: 
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Do you provide me with wealth? But what Allah has given me is 
better than what He has given you. . . Return to them, for we will 
surely come to them with soldiers that they will be powerless to 
encounter, and we will surely expel them therefrom in humiliation, 
and they will be debased.214 
  
4.4.3.2 The Prophetic Tradition 
 
The Sunnah has numerously established the fundamental principles of 
privileges and immunities that are granted to diplomatic envoys under Islamic 
siyar. This is as a result of the exchange of diplomatic envoys between 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and other nations. According to historical record, 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) sent different emissaries to various places 
including Makkah, Byzantium, Egypt, Persia and Ethiopia either for religious or 
political reasons. He equally warmly received delegations and embassies in his 
mosque at a place designated as Ustuwanaat al-Wufuud (the pillar of 
embassies).215  He so much held the respect and inviolability accorded foreign 
ambassadors in high esteem to the extent that while he was on his death bed 
he was reported to have instructed his companions to award gifts to envoys 
as he himself used to during his lifetime.216 Moreover, Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh) cherished the honouring of guests generally to the extent that he was 
reported as saying that: ‘Whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day should 
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be hospitable with his or her guests.’217 Meaning that as a Muslim, you are 
required to be hospitable to your guest, even if he or she is a non-Muslim.   
 
Apparently, diplomatic interactions exist between countries usually on the 
basis of international agreement duly signed or given accession to by the 
representatives of the countries. The validity of this international agreement 
in Islamic Siyar also has its origin in the various treaties entered into by 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) followed by his statement, the like of which was 
said to Abu Jandal that: ‘We have entered with the Quraysh into a treaty of 
peace and we have exchanged with a solemn pledge that none will cheat the 
other.’218 Meaning that, once a treaty has been concluded, it is legally 
required that it must be fulfilled. 
 
4.4.3.3 Consistent Practice of Muslim Heads of State 
Flowing from the two divine sources, the generality of the Muslim heads of 
States (the Caliphs, Sultans and the current heads of the Muslim countries) 
also acknowledge and establish diplomatic protection and immunity in their 
international transactions. The clear instruction of Abu-Bakr (632-634 AD), 
the first Caliph after Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), to Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan that 
‘in case envoys of the adversary come to you, treat them with hospitality’219 
indicates the extent of the Prophet’s companions’ understanding of diplomatic 
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privileges.220 The rule has been established throughout the Caliphates that 
foreign emissaries can enter the Muslim States and have access to diplomatic 
protection and privileges provided ‘they abstained from doing acts injurious to 
the Muslim states such as spying or buying weapons for shipment to Dar al 
Harb.’221   
 
It is no surprise, therefore, that the generality of the Muslim States under the 
auspices of the OIC came together to recognise the inviolability and 
immunities of the diplomatic personnel of individual State members222 This 
was made in addition to their being signatories to the two famous diplomatic 
and consular conventions, the 1961 VCDR and 1963 VCCR.  
 
4.4.4 Diplomatic Immunities under the Islamic Siyar 
4.4.4.1 Personal Inviolability 
The inviolability of emissaries has been a pre-modern universal concept 
although with varying degree of recognition attached to it. Perhaps, Bassiouni 
was right when he said that the ‘inviolability of envoys was ill recognized in 
Arabia Peninsula’223 before the emergence of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). 
However, the coming of Islam did not only widen the scope of diplomatic 
intercourse, but it also accorded the diplomatic personnel along with their 
                                                 
220 Evidence of the diplomatic interactions of the Islamic eras, starting from the periods of the 
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family full personal inviolability.224 Personal inviolability requires that the 
diplomats are not to be killed or maltreated,225 but should be respected. The 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was reported to have granted this immunity to 
the two ambassadors of Musaylamah – Ibn Al-Nawwaaha and Ibn Aathaal, 
regardless of their impertinent mannerism saying: ‘By God, if it were not the 
tradition that envoys could not be killed, I would have severed your heads.’226 
Likewise Wahshi’s mission as the ambassador of the people of Ta’if was 
generously received by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) despite the fact that he 
was the one who killed Hamzah, the uncle of the Prophet, at the battle of 
Uhud.227 This generous reception led to Wahshi’s acceptance of Islam.228 In 
the words of Saif, ‘[t]he Prophet, stressing the diplomatic immunity of 
ambassadors, did not hold their earlier antagonism against them,’229 but 
instead he cheerfully received and welcomed them into the newly found faith 
of Islam. The Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan was correct when it held that 
Prophet Muhammad never permitted any [diplomatic] representatives to be 
maltreated, ‘rather he showed them greatest honour and respect and granted 
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225 A Iqbal, The Prophet’s Diplomacy: The Art of Negotiation as Conceived and Developed by 
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immunities to them inter alia from imprisonment and death, however, hostile 
was their behaviour and threatening their language.’230 
 
The rule that diplomatic envoy must not be detained was expressly canvassed 
in the case of Abu Rafi’, the Makkan emissary that was sent to Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) in Madinah soon after the battle of Badr in 624 AD. He 
eventually became a Muslim and would not want to return to Makkah. The 
Prophet (pbuh) discouraged his refusal to return to Makkah by saying: ‘I do 
not break a covenant or imprison envoys [you are an ambassador], but 
return, and if you feel the same as you do just now, come back.’231 It was 
reported that Abu Rafi’ later returned back to Madinah not as an envoy, but 
as a Muslim emigrant. It is in recognition of the above principle that it has 
been adopted as Muslim States practice, which also was in accordance with 
Article 10 (a) of the 1976 Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference that provides that representatives of 
member States shall be guaranteed ‘immunity from personal arrest or 
detention.’ 
 
The inviolability of diplomatic envoy was deemed so important that its 
violation either by way of detention or arrest could result in a casus belli. A 
vivid example was the case of ‘Uthman ibn Affan that was sent as an 
emissary to the Quraysh during the Hudaybiyyah episode. The Prophet 
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Muhammad (pbuh) was so much convinced about the sanctity of diplomatic 
envoy that he found it difficult to believe that ‘Uthman could be killed, harmed 
or detained by the Quraysh. However, when the news got to the Muslims that 
‘Uthman had been killed, it was not only deemed casus belli, for which the 
Muslims were fully prepared to go to war, but also led to the detention of the 
Makkan’s envoy that was sent to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).232 This 
incidence confirms the statement of Tabari (838-923 AD) that ‘only under 
extraordinary circumstance may envoys be detained and imprisoned, and that 
would be in the form of specific reprisals in kind.’233 Eventually, the news was 
confirmed to be mere rumour, and when the safety of ‘Uthman was 
ascertained, the Muslims wasted no time in releasing the detained Makkan 
envoy.234  
 
Another limitation to personal inviolability of diplomatic personnel is when an 
envoy acquired, through the act of spying, military intelligence report that 
could be inimical to the interest of the Muslim army, it will then become 
necessary to retain him until he purges himself of those information.235 Even 
then, this may not warrant the maltreatment, imprisonment or death of a 
diplomatic envoy.236    
 
4.4.4.2 Immunity from Court’s Jurisdiction 
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In addition to the granting of diplomatic inviolability, Islamic law also exempts 
the diplomatic envoy from the jurisdiction of its court. In other words, an 
emissary is not answerable to the court of his host for the offence he must 
have committed during his ambassadorial responsibility. The case of the two 
emissaries sent to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)by Musaylimah is of great 
relevance. After reading the content of Musaylimah’s letter to Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh), they were asked by the Prophet: ‘Do you also say what 
he (Musaylimah) has said’? They replied: ‘We say exactly what he 
(Musaylimah) said.’237 However, these words which could be taken as a direct 
contempt of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) never bothered him as they (the two 
emissaries) were considered as ordinary means of diplomatic communication, 
and more so, they possessed diplomatic immunity. 
 
Thus, it remains very clear that under the Islamic Siyar where a non-Muslim 
who claims to be an emissary enters the territory of Islam and commits an 
offence, once he is able to produce a genuine letter of credence from his ruler 
confirming his status, he is automatically covered by diplomatic immunity.238 
In a situation where the non-Muslim is unable to produce a letter of credence 
from his ruler, both him and his belongings will be taken as Fay’ (proceeds of 
the State from the enemy property other than war booty).239  
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In this regard, Abu Hanifah (699-767 AD), the eponym of the Hanafi Law 
School of Islamic jurisprudence, further maintains that a musta’min (a non-
Muslim having security and safety passage within an Islamic State) who 
commits one of the huduud240 offences cannot be held liable or punishable 
under the huduud laws.241 But in the case of theft, he will be liable to return 
the stolen property, and if he has consumed or misplaced it, then he is liable 
to pay compensation up to the value of the stolen property.242 The court will 
not impose the hadd punishment of amputation on them.243 In support of this 
view was Abu Yusuf (d. 798 AD), one of the famous students of Abu Hanifah, 
who argues that considering the fact that a musta’min does not acknowledge 
the supremacy of  Islamic law in the first instance, it will therefore be 
inappropriate to subject him to punishment under the hudud laws.244 To 
further buttress the argument that an envoy who commits an offence in the 
receiving State will be immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving 
State, Hamidullah says that ‘even if the envoy, or any of his company, is a 
criminal of the state to which he is sent, he may not be treated otherwise 
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than as an envoy...’245 No doubt, diplomatic immunity should not be taken as 
a licence of impunity whereby diplomats will be free to commit offence at will 
just because they are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of their host.  The 
opinion expressed by Munir that ‘. . . diplomats are immune from criminal 
jurisdiction in the receiving state but this immunity is not absolute as the 
Quranic verse 5:45246 does not exempt any one even a diplomat’247 may 
appear convincing, but one wonders if it is strong enough to overturn the 
long-established rule of the Islamic diplomatic immunity. The rule is ‘By God, 
if it were not the tradition that envoys could not be killed, I would have 
severed your heads.’248 Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) exercised restraint in 
enforcing the death penalty against the two envoys of Musaylamah for 
committing a serious offence just because of their diplomatic status.  
                
4.4.4.3 Freedom of Religion 
Generally, the Qur’an prohibits the imposition of Islam or any of its dictates 
on a non-Muslim.249 Therefore, freedom to pray and involve in other religious 
practices are also granted to diplomatic personnel under Islamic diplomatic 
law. History has it that when the Christians of Najran visited Prophet 
Muhammad in Madinah, they were allowed to have their Christian service 
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right in the mosque of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).250 It was even recorded 
that these Christians faced toward the direction of the east while praying.251 
The fact that they belong to a different faith does not take away their 
diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
  
4.4.4.4 Exemption from Taxation 
The properties of foreign diplomats are exempt from custom duties and all 
other form of taxation once they are within the Muslim State provided that 
the Muslim envoys are also accorded the same exemption while in foreign 
State by way of reciprocity.252 The issue of reciprocation has, however, been 
usefully illustrated by Shaybani that ‘if the foreign States exempt Muslim 
envoys from custom duties and other taxes, the envoys of such States will 
enjoy the same privileges in the Muslim territory; otherwise they may, if the 
Muslim State so desire, be required to pay ordinary dues like foreign 
visitors.’253 This, in effect means that the diplomats will only be exempted 
from taxation once it has been agreed upon by the two countries. Generally, 
the Qur’an requires that good or positive conduct should be rewarded with a 
good one too.254   
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It is also important to stress that for any item brought into a Muslim territory 
by a diplomatic envoy to qualify for tax exemption, it must not be for 
commercial purposes. According to the author of Kitab al-Kharaj,255 once the 
item is commercialised, one-tenth of tax becomes payable after the sale of 
the commodity.256 This exception has been clearly echoed in Article 10 (g) of 
the 1976 Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference which provides that ‘except that they shall have no 
right to claim exemptions from custom and excise duties on articles imported 
other than their personal baggage.’ This type of exception is also directly 
compatible with the provisions of Article 34 (d) of the VCDR that ‘dues and 
taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and capital 
taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State’ 
do not form part of the exemption from taxation. 
 
4.4.4.5 Other Privileges are Guaranteed 
The other principles of diplomatic immunity such as freedom of movement; 
freedom of communication; protection of diplomatic bags and couriers; and 
inviolability of diplomatic mission and archives are equally guaranteed under 
Islamic Siyar based on jurisprudential principles. Moreover, it is a basic 
principle under the Shari’ah that nothing will be considered prohibited except 
it is categorically mentioned as such in a sound and explicit nass257 from 
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Allah.258 Therefore, whatever is not specifically prohibited either in the Quran 
or the Sunnah will automatically fall under the general principle of the 
permissibility of things and within the gamut of Allah’ favour.259 Prophet 
Muhammad was reported to have said in this regard that: 
 
What Allah has made lawful in His Book is halal and what He has 
prohibited is haram, and that concerning which He is silent is 
allowed as His favour. So accept from Allah His favour, for Allah is 
not forgetful of anything.260 
 
Therefore, once these diplomatic principles are required for the effective 
transaction of diplomatic matters which are protected under the public 
interest – maslahah, and provided that they are not prohibited by the 
Shari’ah, they are definitely covered by the Islamic law.   
 
4.4.5 Complementary Role of Aman (Safe-Conduct) to Diplomatic 
Immunities. 
Islamic Siyar has a temporary pledge of protection which is available for the 
benefit of a non-Muslim, otherwise known as must’amin to stay within the 
Muslim territory. This pledge of protection which guarantees security of life 
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and property is known as Aman (safe-conduct).261 It is supported by the 
authority of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In the Qur’an, Allah says: 
  
And if any one of the polytheists seeks your protection, then grant 
him protection so that he may hear the words of Allah [i.e., the 
Qur’an].Then deliver him to his place of safety.262 
 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) gave his approval to the Aman granted by some 
Muslim women to the polytheists. He categorically gave his authority to Umm 
Hani’ Bint Abi Talib’s grant of aman to the two polytheists at the conquest of 
Makkah when Ali Ibn Abi Talib263 threatened to have the polytheists killed 
when he said: ‘We have given security to those to whom you have given it.’264 
In fact, on several occasions the companions of the Prophet would come 
seeking clarification concerning the status of a non-Muslim within the Muslim 
territory. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) had never wavered in encouraging 
his companions that it is permissible to grant the Aman to the non-Muslim 
within Muslim territory if he applies for it.265 
 
There are two identifiable ways by which Aman can be put into use, according 
to the Muslim jurists. There is the individual Aman, otherwise known as 
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unofficial Aman, which can be granted by any sane and mature Muslim, male 
or female, including the blind. The Muslim jurists are not unanimous 
concerning the eligibility of a Muslim to grant Aman. The majority of Muslim 
jurists consisting of Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali jurists are of the view that a 
Muslim slave can validly grant Aman. However, Abu Hanifah and Abu Yusuf, 
on the other hand, will allow a slave the authority to grant Aman only if he is 
permitted to part-take in war by his master.266 The Aman granted by a minor 
or a person of unsound mind is also disregarded by Muslim jurists.267 But 
where there is evidence that the Aman is given by a discerning minor, 
according to Malik Ibn Anas, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Muhammad Ibn al-
Hasan, such Aman will be held valid. Meanwhile, Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf and 
al-Shafi’i still consider such Aman to be invalid since it is granted by a 
minor.268 Once a valid Aman is given to a non-Muslim within the Muslim 
territory, it becomes enforceable by and binding on the entire Muslim State.269 
 
There is also the collective Aman, otherwise known as the official Aman. It is 
mainly granted by the Head of State or his representatives to a non-Muslim 
State usually based on a treaty of peace (muwaada’a or muhaadana).270 Once 
granted, it opens up the facilitation of peaceful negotiations by visiting 
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emissaries between Muslim and non-Muslim countries271 and gives allowance 
to both ‘Muslims and non-Muslims to cross frontiers and travel in each other’s 
countries on the basis of reciprocity.’272 It was further stated by Boisard that 
the ‘very liberal Muslim legislation facilitated the passage of foreigners across 
the Muslim world and that of Muslims to the outside.’273 
 
The stay of a musta’min (the beneficiary of Aman) within the Muslim territory 
is for a limited period of time. It is the opinion of the Maliki and Shafi’i jurists, 
based on the provisions of Qur’an 9:2274 that the length of Aman should not, 
as a rule, exceed four months. But the Hanafi jurists are of the view that 
Aman should not go beyond the period of one lunar year, otherwise the 
musta’min will be treated as a dhimmi (non-Muslim living under Islamic rule), 
and hence, he would be liable to the payment of jizya (annual poll tax).275 
However, Hanbali jurists, opine that the musta’min should not be subjected to 
the payment of jizya even where he stays beyond the period of one lunar 
year.276 There is no specific formality for the acceptance of a request for 
Aman. One can draw an inference of Aman from any means of assent, 
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including non-verbal.277 Meanwhile, a musta’min could have his grant revoked 
if he violates any of the terms of the Aman or commits crimes278 
 
It ought to be noted that the principle of Aman, though, viewed as a factor 
fostering peaceful relationship between the Muslim and non-Muslim States, is 
generally distinct from diplomatic immunity. This distinction stems from the 
limitations imposed by the Islamic jurisprudence on what the beneficiary of 
Aman (musta’min) can and cannot do.279 The musta’min may be subject to 
the criminal jurisdiction of the Muslim State where he is found to have 
committed any offence, since the grant of Aman is not synonymous with 
diplomatic immunity.280 The Islamic concept of diplomatic immunity, unlike 
the principle of Aman, is considered to be absolute from the point of view of 
the Qur’an and Sunnah.281 Nevertheless, the significance of Aman to Islamic 
concept of diplomatic immunity cannot be over emphasised. It was 
remarkably stressed by Lambton that:  
 
Ambassadors and diplomatic envoys automatically enjoyed the 
status of a musta’min, but from the end of the 6th/12th century 
onwards the institution of aman tended to be superseded by the 
treaties beginning to be made between Islamic and Christian 
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powers, which gave greater security and more rights than the 
institution of aman.282 
 
Also, Basiouni gave a clear and valuable description of the complementary 
nature of Aman to the principle of diplomatic immunity in the following words: 
 
The diplomat is the beneficiary of Aman, a legally binding privilege 
that obligates the state to protect the beneficiary until his 
departure from its territory. The state may revoke the Aman and 
expel the beneficiary, but may not violate it. The beneficiary who 
violates its terms may be prosecuted, but not if he is a diplomat, 
who in addition to benefitting from the Aman, is also the 
beneficiary of other forms of legal protection and privileges.283 
     
In addition, Istanbuli gave an insight into how the concept of Aman benefits 
the ambassador within an Islamic territory when he says that: 
 
The ambassadors were granted immunities and certain privileges. 
They benefitted from the principle of Aman, accorded to any 
foreigner who sought safety entry into a Muslim country, and from 
the traditional immunity granted to foreign envoys.284 
 
                                                 
282 AKS Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of 
Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists, (OUP, Oxford),  p. 209-210 
283 MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), p. 610 
284 Y Istanbuli, op cit., (2001), p. 127 
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It could therefore be right to say, in this regard, that Aman is now a 
component of the privileges granted under Islamic diplomatic setting. It is no 
longer a privately arranged or granted privilege as between a citizen of an 
Islamic State and non-Muslim immigrant. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
It can be gleaned from the above discussion that Islamic siyar recognises the 
functional necessity and representative character theories as the prevailing 
justifications for diplomatic immunity just as they are equally recognised by 
international diplomatic law. It has also been shown that all the principles of 
diplomatic immunity that are highlighted in the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 
VCCR are similarly acknowledged by Islamic siyar. This, in essence, signifies 
the compatibility in the principles of diplomatic immunity as contained in 
international diplomatic law and Islamic siyar. The fact that some of the 
principles of Islamic diplomatic immunities discussed in this chapter have 
been codified by the provisions of the 1976 Convention of the Immunities and 
Privileges of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference just as they were 
reduced into laws in the VCDR and the VCCR, confirms the compatibility 
between Islamic diplomatic law and international diplomatic law.  Moreover, 
one may also draw an analogical conclusion that since the entire provisions of 
the VCDR and VCCR are not in anyway repugnant or contradict any principles 
and main objectives of Islamic law, it therefore means that the codification of 
the VCDR and VCCR in international diplomatic law can as well be considered 
a codification in Islamic diplomatic law. In essence, it may not amount to a 
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mistatement to say that diplomatic immunities have also been codified in 
Islamic law. This conclusion, however, coincides with the assertion made by 
Lewis that ‘the rights and immunities of envoys, including those from hostile 
rulers, were recognized from the start, and enshrined in the Shari’ah.’285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
285 B Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1988), p. 76 See also S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil 
Des Cours: Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p. 266 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES IN MUSLIM STATES AND ISLAMIC LAW 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The generality of the Muslim States1 have signed and ratified the two globally 
recognised diplomatic and consular legal frameworks: the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 
VCCR. Most of the Muslim States, particularly those that have adopted the Islamic 
legal system, are expected to observe diplomatic immunities as enchrined under 
Islamic siyar in addition with the various international diplomatic and consular 
treaties they have entered into. The Muslim States are, of course, required by 
Islamic law to observe the terms and conditions of treaties once entered into with 
other States. Needless to say that the diplomatic immunities guaranteed under 
Islamic siyar and particularly entrenched in the two Vienna Conventions have been 
grossly abused by the diplomats themselves. The alarming proportion of these 
abuses of diplomatic immunities, definitely call for a serious attention.  
 
It is in the light of this observation that this chapter will be discussing diplomatic 
practices in some Muslim States, particularly, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Libya.2 This discussion will focus on the application of 
                                                 
1
 The Muslim States are as listed by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. See Chapter 1, page 29, 
footnote 47 of this dissertation. 
2 It was formerly known as the ‘Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’, but following the adoption by the General 
Assembly of resolution 66/1, the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations formally notified 
the United Nations of a Declaration by the National Transitional Council of 3 August 2011 changing 
the official name to ‘Libya’. 
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diplomatic law in Pakistan with the recent criminal act perpetrated by Raymond 
Davis, an American, in 2011 all in the name of the so-called diplomatic immunity. 
The United States government maintained, as at the time he committed the offence, 
that he had diplomatic immunity being a diplomatic staff of the United States 
Embassy. On the other hand, the Pakistani authority denied the fact that Davis had 
any diplomatic or consular immunity.  Islamic law implications of the 1979 seizure of 
the embassy of the United States in Tehran and the 2011 attacks on the British High 
Commission in Iran will also be evaluated. The purpose is to ascertain the illegality 
of the failure of the Iranian authority to provide adequate protection for diplomatic 
missions and personnel in accordance with Islamic siyar. This chapter will again 
consider the 1983 shoot-out from the Libyan People’s Bureau leading to the death of 
a British woman police officer, Yvonne Fletcher, with a view to examining the extent 
of abuse of diplomatic immunity also under Islamic siyar. 
 
5.2 Diplomatic and Consular Immunity under Pakistan Law 
 
5.2.1 Legal Efficacy of Diplomatic Immunity in Pakistan: 
The provisions of the VCDR and VCCR were statutorily recognised and locally 
enacted in Pakistan by the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 19723 (hereinafter 
referred to as DCP Act) which gave them legal efficacy under the Pakistan legal 
system. Section 2(1) of the DCP Act particularly enforces the two Conventions by 
stating that:  
                                                 
3 It was originally enacted in Pakistan as Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Ordinance XV of 1972 
(gazetted on 4-5-1972) but later re-enacted and repealed on September 12, 1972 by Diplomatic and 
Consular Privileges Act as No 9 of 1972. See A. M. Qureshi v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics PLD 
(1981) SC at p. 396 
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Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time 
being in force, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 1961, set out in the First Schedule and the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, 1963, set out in the Second Schedule shall, subject 
to the other provisions of this Act, have the force of law in Pakistan. 
 
It is, however, interesting to note that Pakistan endorsed these two treaties without 
any reservation and objection. In recognition of the general principles of diplomatic 
immunity, once a certificate confirming the diplomatic status of a person is issued or 
authorised to be issued by the government of Pakistan, it thus becomes a conclusive 
evidence of fact.4 This was further reiterated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 
Ghulam v. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission, 
Islamabad5 when it states that ‘the certificate issued by or under the authority of the 
Federal Government, in respect of diplomatic status of the agency for International 
Development is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. The said certificate . 
. . cannot, therefore, be allowed to be disproved.’6 In other words, it is usually not 
sufficient to claim diplomatic immunity either by asserting diplomatic status or by 
producing a diplomatic passport in the law court. What is legally required for a plea 
of diplomatic immunity to be validly made before a Pakistani court is the production 
of a certificate confirming his or her diplomatic status which is normally issued or 
                                                 
4 See Section 4 DCP Act. 
5 (1986) 19 SCMR (SC) 907 (Pak.) See also British High Commission Diplomatic Enclave v. Sajjad 
Anwar, 2000 YLR (Lahore) 1833, 1839–40 (Pak.) 
6
 (1986) 19 SCMR (SC) at p. 915 
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authorised to be issued by the Pakistani government. In Sher Zaman v. The State,7 
the accused in this case successfully pleaded diplomatic immunity on the ground 
that he was a member of the German embassy in Pakistan. In admitting his petition, 
the Lahore High Court held that: 
 
The record of the case reveals that there is a certificate to show that Sher 
Zaman was an employee of the German Embassy for the last nine years 
since the issue of the certificate. In view of the above . . . the petitioner . 
. . would be in his right to claim immunity against his trial by the Courts in 
Pakistan.8  
 
It should be noted however, that it is not binding on the government of Pakistan to 
issue or authorise the issuance of this certificate, as Section 4 of the DCP Act is not a 
mandatory provision but an enabling one.9 
 
The VCDR makes it abundantly clear that ‘without prejudice to their privileges and 
immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to 
respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State.’10 This, in essence, means 
that diplomatic immunities should not and cannot be taken as a licence to violate the 
laws of the receiving State. Diplomatic agents are expected to be under the legal 
obligation to respect the local laws of the host State. Although, diplomats have been, 
                                                 
7 (1977) P.Cr.L.J. (Lahore), p. 686 
8 Ibid., p. 687 
9 T Hassan, ‘Diplomatic or Consular Immunity for Criminal Offences’, (2011) 2:1 Virginia Journal of 
International Law Online, p. 27 
10 Article 41 (1) of the VCDR. There is also a corresponding provisions in Article 55 (1) of the VCCR  
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arguably, said to enjoy absolute immunity,11 unlike the consular officers.12 However, 
this absolute immunity could be curtailed particularly when a diplomat is involved in 
a serious crime, such as murder, criminal conspiracy, terrorism, espionage etc.13 In 
which case, the receiving State may have to approach the diplomat’s home country 
to withdraw by waiving the diplomatic immunity so that the diplomat could be 
prosecuted in accordance with the laws of the receiving State.14 In the event that 
the sending State refuses to waive diplomatic immunity for a diplomat who is 
involved in any of the serious offences, the least action that could be taken by the 
receiving State is to declare the particular diplomat as persona non grata under 
Article 9 of the VCDR.  
 
5.2.2 Diplomatic Implication of Raymond Davis’ Case: 
There was an incident that almost led to a major foreign policy issue between 
Pakistan and the United States. It was the shooting of two Pakistanis by an 
American, Raymond Davis, out of the consulate in Lahore on January 27, 2011. He 
claimed that the shooting of the two men was in self-defense as they were 
attempting to rob him.15 Davis was immediately arrested and kept in prison custody 
pending his appearance in court.  On 28 January, 2011, he was charged with the 
                                                 
11 O Engdahl, Protection of Personnel in Peace Operation: The Role of the ‘Safety Convention’ against 
the Background of General International Law, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 2007), 
p. 51 
12 See Article 43 (1) of the VCCR which provides that ‘consular officers and consular employees shall 
not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State 
in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.’ Once the criminal acts are not 
committed during the performance of their consular functions, they may be liable to prosecuted. 
13 See TJ Gardner and TM Anderson, Criminal Law, 11th edn. (Wadsworth, Belmont, 2012), p. 160 
14 Article 32 (1) of the VCDR 
15 US Man Raymond Davis Shot Pakistan Pair in ‘Cold Blood’ BBC News, 11 February, 2011 available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12427518 [accessed 12 June, 2012] 
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offence of qatl-i-amd (intentional murder) under section 302 of the Pakistani Penal 
Code (hereinafter referred to PPC).16  
 
The arrest of Davis led to a serious controversy between the governments of 
Pakistan and the United States concerning his diplomatic status. This episode almost 
plunged the Pakistan-U.S diplomatic relations into a state of confusion. In fact, the 
incidence snowballed into public criticism and resentment that took the form of 
public demonstrations across Pakistan against the United States which added fuel to 
the already inflamed anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. The United States 
vigorously argues in favour of diplomatic immunity for Raymond Davis by stressing 
in a Press Release dated January 29, 2011 that ‘[t]he diplomat, assigned to the U.S. 
Embassy in Islamabad, has a U.S. diplomatic passport and Pakistani visa valid until 
June 2012’, as such, the Embassy called ‘for the immediate release of a U.S. 
diplomat [Raymond Davis] unlawfully detained by authorities in Lahore.’17   Mr 
Crowley who is the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State emphatically maintained that 
‘[Raymond Davis] is a U.S. diplomat. He was assigned to the Embassy in Islamabad. 
He has immunity. And we again call for his release.’18 The President of the United 
States, Barak Obama, in stressing the importance of the principles of the VCDR said 
that ‘. . . if our diplomats are in another country, then they are not subject to that 
country’s local prosecution. We expect Pakistan, that’s a signatory and recognizes 
                                                 
16 Pakistan Penal Code, Act XLV of 1860 available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html [accessed 14 June , 2012] 
17 Press Release, U.S. Embassy in Pak., ‘U.S. Calls for Release of American Diplomat’ (Jan. 29, 2011), 
available at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr_11012901.html [accessed 12 June, 2012] 
18 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, (February 9, 2011) available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/02/156277.htm#PAKISTAN [accessed 12 June, 2012] 
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Mr. Davis as a diplomat, to abide by the same convention.’19 The United States 
House of Representative by a resolution presented to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, threatened to freeze all monetary assistance meant for Pakistan if Davis is 
not released on the basis of his diplomatic status and in accordance with 
international standards of diplomatic practice.20 
 
The Pakistani government was, however, reluctant in taking a decisive stance as to 
the diplomatic status of Davis, perhaps, due to political repercussion and possibly, 
public backlash.21 Most political parties in Pakistan had warned that if Davis was not 
brought to justice, they would not hesitate to storm the U.S. Consulate in Lahore 
and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad.22 But then, the Pakistani government remained 
non-committed to the making of any pronouncement on the diplomatic status of 
Davis which made them leave the entire matter, which was then ‘sub judice before 
the court’,23 to be resolved by judicial pronouncement.24  
 
As expected, the court would have been confronted with the question of determining 
the diplomatic or consular status of Davis vis-a-vis the offence of murder committed 
by him. It is also possible that the court would have been given the opportunity to 
                                                 
19 J Tapper and L Ferran, ‘President Barak Obama: Pakistan Should Honor Immunity for ‘Our 
Diplomat’’ ABC News (February 16, 2011) available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/raymond-davis-
case-president-barack-obama-urges-pakistan/story?id=12922282 [accessed 12 June, 2012] 
20 T Hassan, op cit., (2011), Pp. 19-20 
21 See T Hassan, op cit., (2011), p. 23 
22 S Ashraf, ‘Raymond Davis Affair: A Case with Global Ramification’, (3 March, 2011) 33, p. 2 also 
available at http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/7868/RSIS0332011.pdf?sequence=1 
[accessed 15 June, 2012] 
23 Ibid 
24 H Yusuf, ‘Dealing with Davis: Inconsistencies in the US – Pakistan Relationship’, (March 28, 2011) 
103, Asian Pacific Bulletin, p. 1 also available at 
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/19853/APB%20no.%20103.pdf?seque
nce=1 [accessed 15 June, 2012]   
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scrutinise the different positions maintained by the United States and Pakistan in 
view of their respective diplomatic and consular practices including applicable laws. 
The court would have also called for evidence of the credential appointing Mr. Davis 
as either a diplomatic or consular officer from the United States and a certificate 
issued or authorised to be issued by the Pakistani authority confirming the 
appointment of Davis as a diplomatic or consular staff of the United States. 
Meanwhile, the Pakistan Foreign Office chose not to issue the diplomatic certificate 
in favour of Davis in spite of the concerted pressure mounted by the United States 
authority. But then, assuming the court concludes that Davis is protected from 
prosecution under the diplomatic or consular immunity as a result of his diplomatic 
or consular status, it is very much doubtful if that would have finally exonerated 
Davis from the criminal jurisdiction of the Pakistani court. After all, it is generally 
accepted that ‘immunity is not a license to break the law or a get-out-of-jail-free 
card.’25 Moreover, it is a common diplomatic practice amongst several nations that 
diplomatic immunity should not be a licence to commit criminal offence or to kill as 
in this present case.26   
 
The Pakistani authority will be acting within the confines of the law if it were to call 
upon the United States government to waive the immunity of Davis so as to legally 
commence criminal prosecution against him. This will be in accordance with Article 
32 (1) of the VCDR.27 It must be noted, however, that the United States may as well 
decide not to waive immunity in respect of the accused diplomat since the provision 
                                                 
25 H Kopp and CA Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service, 2nd edn., 
(Georgetown University Press, 2011), p. 68 
26 S Ashraf, op cit., (2011), p. 2 
27 See also Article 45 (1) of the VCCR. 
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of waiver is not mandatory. But the Pakistani government will be making a good 
case by invoking the application of the principle of reciprocity which generally 
operates amongst nations with regards to diplomatic and consular relations. Firstly, 
the Pakistani DCP Act provides that:  
 
If it appears to the Federal Government that the privileges and 
immunities, accorded to the mission or a consular post of Pakistan in the 
territory of any State, or to persons connected with that mission or 
consular post, are less than those conferred by this Act on the mission or 
consular post of that State or on persons connected with that mission or 
consular post, the Federal Government may, by notification in the official 
State or, as the case may be, from all or any of the consular posts of that 
State, or from such persons connected therewith as it may deem fit.28 
 
This provision requires the government of Pakistan to extend equal treatment to 
diplomatic missions or consular posts of other States within its territory in 
accordance with the spirit of the two Vienna Conventions. Secondly and most 
importantly, the Pakistani government may advance the argument that the United 
States has clearly marked out procedures of dealing with the waiver of immunity in 
respect to any diplomatic agents, administrative and technical staff of any embassies 
and consular officers that are involved in criminal offence within the United States. 
The guide, otherwise known as ‘Diplomatic and Consular Immunity – Guidance for 
Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities’ provides that: 
                                                 
28 Section 3 of the DCP Act, 1972 
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The U.S. Department of State will, in all incidents involving persons with 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction, request a waiver of that immunity 
from the sending country if the prosecutor advises that but for such 
immunity he or she would prosecute or otherwise pursue the criminal 
charge.29 
 
This procedural guidance has been implemented several times by the United States 
on issues of diplomatic concerns. The U.S. State Department was very quick to 
request a waiver of immunity when in January, 1997 an intoxicated Georgian 
diplomat, Gueorgui Makharadze, killed a 16-year-old girl in New York in a drink-
driving accident. The Georgian authority unhesitatingly waived the diplomat’s 
immunity which legally allowed the United States to prosecute him.30 At the end of 
the prosecution, he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for manslaughter.31    
 
In a more related case that happened in January, 2003 when the Pakistani 
government was asked to withdraw the diplomatic immunity in respect of its 
permanent representative to the UN, Munir Akram, by the U.S. States Department. 
Misdemeanour assault charges were to be brought against him for having allegedly 
                                                 
29 United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, ‘Diplomatic and Consular 
Immunity: Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities’, Publication No. 10524 (Revised 
July 2011), p. 14 available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150546.pdf [accessed 17 
June, 2012] 
30 Ardeshir Cowasjee, ‘A Diplomatic Tangle’, 6th February, 2011, Dawn.Com Opinion, available at 
http://dawn.com/2011/02/06/a-diplomatic-tangle/ [accessed 17 June, 2012] 
31 Ibid 
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assaulted and injured his girlfriend, Marjiana Mihic, after an argument.32 The 
Pakistani government wasted no time in waiving diplomatic immunity as requested 
by the United States, even though the incident was resolved after the girlfriend 
withdrew the charges against the diplomat in court.33 It can, thus, be said that the 
United States insistence on blanket immunity for Raymond Davis, even though his 
immunity was unlikely to be ascertained, was legally and morally unjustifiable. 
Meanwhile, diplomatic relations dictate a give and take situation between nations. In 
the words of Khurram Baig, ‘[i]f the U.S. can ask for a waiver of immunity when it 
feels inclined to do so, and invokes it when it suits itself,’34 what stops other nations 
from doing the same thing whenever the situation so demands?  The policies and 
procedures regarding the grant of diplomatic or consular immunity for criminal 
offences laid down by the United States can be emulated by the Pakistani authority, 
in the spirit of reciprocity, which is also firmly established in the Pakistani law.35  
 
5.2.3 Intervention of the Islamic Law 
This legal discourse is just a theoretical analysis of Davis’ case which was suddenly 
finalised by Islamic law principle of badl-i-sulh which has been defined under the 
Pakistan law as ‘the mutually agreed compensation according to the Shari’ah to be 
paid or given by the offender to a wali in cash or in kind or in the form of moveable 
                                                 
32 J Preston, ‘U.S. Asks Pakistan to Lift U.N. Envoy’s Immunity After a Violent Quarrel’, The New York 
Times, January 08, 2003 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/08/world/us-asks-pakistan-
to-lift-un-envoy-s-immunity-after-a-violent-quarrel.html [accessed 17 June, 2012]  
33 A Cowasjee, ‘A Diplomatic Tangle’, 6th February, 2011, Dawn.Com Opinion, available at 
http://dawn.com/2011/02/06/a-diplomatic-tangle/ [accessed 17 June, 2012] 
34 K Baig, ‘Raymond Davis, America and Justice’, The Express Tribune, February 20, 2011 available at 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/121295/raymond-davis-america-and-justice/ [accessed 17 June, 2012]  
35 T Hassan, op cit., (2011), p. 36 
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or immoveable property.’36 It was, indeed, a timeous intervention. The court did not 
determine the issue concerning Davis’ diplomatic immunity, even though, Davis was 
later reported to be a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) contractor responsible for 
providing security for CIA spies travelling in Pakistan.37  
 
While waiting for the court to play its legal role in deciding whether Davis could 
claim diplomatic immunity, which did not happen, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
Yusaf Raza Gilani, suggested the possibility of resolving this diplomatically sensitive 
matter under Islamic law by offering to pay compensation to the families of the two 
men that were killed.38 It was also reported that the families of the dead men had 
been under intense pressure from some religious parties not to accept the payment 
of financial compensation, otherwise known as ‘diyat’39 from the accused person.40 
Nevertheless, on Wednesday, 16 March, 2011, family members of the two men that 
were killed, Faizan Haider and Fahim Shamshad, announced to the court that they 
have pardoned Davis by accepting financial compensation from him.41 Ordinarily, if 
                                                 
36 Section 310 of the PPC 
37 J Ditz, ‘Raymond Davis a CIA Contractor, US Confirms’, AntiWar.Com, February 21, 2011 available 
at http://news.antiwar.com/2011/02/21/raymond-davis-a-cia-contractor-us-confirms/ [accessed 18 
June, 2012] 
38 The Express Tribune ‘Kerry Meets Political Leadership’ February 16, 2011 available at 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/119713/court-to-decide-raymond-davis-immunity-gilani/ [accessed 18 
June, 2012]. See also ‘Raymond Davis and Lahore Shootings-Unanswered Questions’  BBC News 
South Asia, 16 March, 2011 available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12491288 
[accessed 18 June, 2012]  
39 Diyat is defined in Section 299 (e) of the PPC as the compensation specified in Section 323 [of the 
PPC] payable to the heirs of the victim. 
40 ‘CIA Contractor Ray Davis Freed Over Pakistan Killings’ BBC News South Asia, 16 March, 2011 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12757244 [accessed 18 June, 2012] 
41 Los Angeles Times, ‘CIA Contractor Raymond Davis Freed in Pakistan Killings’, March 17, 2011 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/17/world/la-fg-pakistan-davis-freed-20110317 
[accessed 19 June, 2012] 
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the relatives of the victims had not compounded their rights of retaliation (qisaas)42 
by accepting the diyat under Islamic law, the murder trial brought against Davis 
would have ended up differently. That is to say, if at the end of the trial, Davis were 
to be found guilty of the offence of qatl-i-amd (intentional murder), he would have 
been sentenced to death or life imprisonment under qisaas by virtue of Section 302 
of the PPC. The PPC allows the wali43 to voluntarily and without duress waive the 
right of qisaas provided it is to the satisfaction of the court.44 That was exactly what 
the relatives who stood in as the wali of the victims in this case did in exercise of 
their right which is sanctioned ‘by Sharia [Islamic law] and Pakistan law, and neither 
you nor I nor the court can snatch this right from them. They used their right, and 
the court released him.’45   With the payment of $2.3 million to the relatives of the 
victims as ‘blood money’ (diyat) which was unequivocally acknowledged by them,46 
the court made an order of acquittal in favour of Raymond Davies pursuant to 
Section 345 of the Pakistan Code of Criminal Procedure47 read in conjunction  with 
Section 310 of the PPC. 
 
One may want to consider the relevance of the provisions of Section 311 of the PPC 
to the determination of Davis’ case. Section 311 of the PPC provides that:  
                                                 
42The word ‘qisas’ has been defined as ‘punishment by causing similar hurt at the same part of the 
body of the convict as he has caused to the victim or by causing his death if he has committed qatl-i-
amd in exercise Of the right of the victim or a Wali’ in Section 299 (k) of the PPC. 
43 Section 299 (m) of the PPC defines the ‘wali’ to mean ‘a person entitled to claim qisas.’ 
44 Section 307(1)(b) of the PPC. 
45 This was a statement made by Rana Sanaullah, the Punjab Provincial Law Minister and reported in 
Los Angeles Times, ‘CIA Contractor Raymond Davis Freed in Pakistan Killings’, March 17, 2011 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/17/world/la-fg-pakistan-davis-freed-20110317 
[accessed 19 June, 2012] 
46 The Washington Post, March 17, 2011 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/cia-contractor-
raymond-davis-freed-after-blood-money-payment/2010/08/19/AByVJ1d_story.html [accessed 19 
June, 2012]  
47 The Pakistan Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was amended by Act 2 of 1997. 
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Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 309 or Section 310, where 
all the wali do not waive or compound the right of qisas, or [if] the 
principle of fasad-fil-arz the Court may, having regard to the facts and 
circumstances of the case, punish an offender against whom the right of 
qisas has been waived or compounded with [death or imprisonment for 
life or] imprisonment of either description for a term of which may extend 
to fourteen years as ta'zir. 
 
The question that quickly comes to mind is: why did the court not apply the 
provisions of Section 311 of the PPC while determining the case of Raymond Davis? 
Firstly, we have to understand that the two wali in Davis’ case unanimously 
compounded the right of qisas, and this will definitely take the case out of the 
contemplation of Section 311 of the PPC. The second condition which has to be 
considered was whether the offence committed by Davis amounted to fasad-fil-arz 
as envisaged by Section 311 of the PPC. The interpretation of the meaning of ‘fasad-
fil-arz’ has been given to include anyone of the following points: i) the past conduct 
of the offender; or ii) whether he has any previous convictions; or iii) the brutal or 
shocking manner in which the offence has been committed which is outrageous to 
the public conscience; or iv) if the offender is considered a potential danger to the 
community; or v) if the offence has been committed in the name or on the pretext 
of honour.48 It thus appears, considering the facts of Davis’ case, that points i, ii, iv 
and v listed above may not be applicable to his case. Point iii seems to be relevant 
                                                 
48 See the explanation of Section 311 of the PPC at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html#f125` [accessed 04 April, 
2013] 
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to the offence committed by Raymond Davis, particularly when one considers the 
extent of public indignation it caused. One would have expected the court to move a 
step further in deciding whether the offence committed by Davis amounts to fasad-
fil-arz.  
 
The court was, at least, expected to have ‘regard to the facts and circumstances of 
the case’ of Davis before arriving at its decision. Although, the application of Section 
311 appears to be discretionary, but still, such discretion must be seen to be 
exercised judiciously. For instance, in Abdul Ghafoor v. State,49 the Lahore High 
Court went ahead to sentence the accused person to 10 years imprisonment under 
Section 311 of the PPC despite the fact that the legal heirs of the deceased and the 
accused had reached a compromise in accordance with Section 310 of the PPC. The 
punishment was awarded on the basis that the offence in question amounted to 
‘fasad-fil-arz’. The case of Abdul Ghafoor appears to be distinguishable with Davis’ 
case which would have worked against an automatic acquittal for Raymond Davis. 
   
Thus, this discussion has shown how the court, in applying a segment of the Islamic 
criminal law, based upon the application by the wali, has succedded in bringing a 
case that would have otherwise led to a diplomatic impasse between Pakistan and 
the United States to an abrupt finality. Even if the court had found in favour of Davis 
that he was, indeed, a diplomatic or consular agent of the United States as at the 
time he committed the offence; and his home country, the United States, also 
agreed to waive his diplomatic immunity under the principle of reciprocity, the 
                                                 
49  (2000)  PCRLJ  1841 
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matter would have probably ended in the same way. The fact that he had, for the 
sake of argument, diplomatic immunity should not be taken as licence to kill or 
commit criminal offence. Moreover, the way this case ended has shown how the 
Islamic law may be used in resolving a diplomatic crisis between two States. In other 
words, it has gone to show the relationship that could possibly occur between 
Islamic law and international diplomatic law in resolving what could have led to 
international imbroglio. Hassan was actually correct when he said in his concluding 
remarks that ‘[t]he matter has thus been settled judicially through the application of 
Islamic law principles without having to deal with politically sensitive and legally 
contentious issues involved in the determination of diplomatic status and 
immunity.’50  
  
5.3 Revisiting the 1979 Iranian Hostage Case under Islamic 
 International Law 
 
It has been more than three decades ago, precisely, on November 4, 1979, that 
some Iranian militant students otherwise known as the ‘Muslim Student Followers of 
the Imam’s Policy,’ invaded the American Embassy in Tehran and held 52 of its 
personnel as hostages for 444 days. It was said that the decision of the United 
States in October, 1979 to admit the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, 
into the United States for a life-saving medical treatment was conspicuously 
contributory to this incidence.51 As soon as the news was publicized, it then became 
                                                 
50 T Hassan, op cit., (2011), p. 39 
51 See A Rafat, ‘The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: Aspects of the Case 
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran’, (1980-1981) 10 Denv. J. Int’l. L & 
Pol’y, p. 426 
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apparent, according to Daugherty,52 that that the seizure of the United States 
embassy ‘iwould jeopardize the safety and security of all Americans in Iran.’53 Aside 
from the thirteen female and the African-American hostages that were released 
within the first month,54 and later another hostage that was released due to illness, 
the rest members of the diplomatic and consular staff of the United States were not 
released until January 20, 1981. 
  
After considering ‘innumerable pleas, resolutions, declarations, special missions and 
even sanctions’55 to secure the release of the hostages without success, the United 
States also turned to the judicial arm of the United Nations, the International Court 
of Justice, on 29 November, 1979 for a judicial pronouncement. The ICJ, by its 
unanimous decision of 15 December, 1979, gave an interim order directing that the 
US Embassy be restored back to the US government, the hostages be released and 
given full diplomatic protection with freedom and facilities to leave Iran.56 Also, on 
24 May, 1980, the Court finally gave judgment on the merits of the case in which 
Iran was found to be in contravention of its obligations under international 
conventions and under long-established rules of general international law, as such, it 
                                                 
52 Now a Professor of Political Science, he was then assigned to the United States embassy, in Tehran 
and he happened to be one of those taken as hostage by the Iranian militants in 1979.  
53 WJ Daugherty, ‘Jimmy Carter and the 1979 Decision to Admit Shah into the United States’, (2003) 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_01-03/dauherty_shah/dauherty_shah.html 
[accessed 17 October, 2011] 
54 See New York Times, Nov. 19, 1979, col. 6, p. 1 where it was reported that a woman and two 
African- American men were released on November 18, 1979. Another ten female and an African-
American hostages were again released on November 19, 1979. See New York Times, Nov. 20, 1979, 
col. 4, p. 1  
55 LH Legault, ‘Hostage-Taking and Diplomatic Immunity’, (1980-1981) 11, Man. L. J., p. 359 
56 See Order of 15 December, 1979, I.C.J Reports, (granting provisional measures) Pp. 10-11 
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is under an obligation to make reparation to the United States.57 Iran, however, 
chose to defy both the interim order58 and judgment of the ICJ.  
 
It is important to mention that throughout the entire trial, the United States hinged 
their legal arguments mainly on well-acknowledged principles of diplomatic immunity 
which are viewed and understood from the Western legal perspective. The fact that 
Iran is an Islamic Republic calls for additional argument from the view point of 
Islamic law by the United States. After all, it has been argued by Weeramantary that  
Islamic international law which is equally ‘rich in principles relating to the treatment 
of foreign embassies and personnel’59 would have, possibly, had a three-fold effect 
on Iran if the United States had availed itself the opportunity of canvassing it before 
the Justices of the ICJ. The three-fold effect, according to Weeramantary, is as 
follows: 
 
[I]ts persuasive value would have been immensely greater; it would have 
shown an appreciation and understanding of Islamic culture; and it would 
have induced a greater readiness on the Iranian side to negotiate from a 
base of common understanding.60 
 
We must not forget the general references made by two of the judges of the ICJ 
(Waldock and Tarazi) to the contribution of the Islamic jurisprudence to the body of 
                                                 
57 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1980, para. 95, p. 
44 
58 Ibid., para. 75, p. 35 
59 CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), p. 166 
60 Ibid 
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diplomatic immunity and inviolability. The ICJ as per Justice Waldock, in the lead 
judgment did not mince words when it says that: 
 
[T]he principle of the inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agent and 
the premises of diplomatic missions is one of the very foundations of 
long-established regime, to the evolution of which the traditions of Islam 
made a substantial contribution.61  
  
Likewise, Tarazi, while delivering a dissenting opinion,62 cited with approval a 1957 
lecture delivered by Professor Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law faculty confirming 
the respect conferred on diplomatic personnel under  Islamic law as follows: 
 
In Arabia, the person of the Ambassador has always been regarded as 
sacred. Muhammad consecrated this inviolability. Never were 
Ambassadors to Muhammad or to his successors molested.63 
 
It would then be of paramount interest to examine the framework of basic Islamic 
legal structures and principles of international law concerning the invasion and 
detention of the United States diplomatic mission and personnel in Tehran. 
Considerng the fact that not much has been written concerning how  Islamic siyar 
views the Iranian invasion of the United States embassy, this section will, therefore, 
                                                 
61 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1980 at para. 86, 
p. 40 
62 It must be noted that the dissenting opinion of Justice Tarazi only related to the grounds of the 
jurisdiction of the Court and the issue of the responsibility of the Iranian Government in the matter of 
reparations 
63
 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (1980), 19 I.L.M. 553 (I.C.J.) 
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survey the facts surrounding the i) seizure of the embassy and the hostage taking 
crisis; ii) the applicable international conventions between Iran and the United States 
and their legal implications under the Islamic siyar; iii) the rational for taking 
members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff as hostages; and iv) the 
jurisprudential justification of the rational, if any, under  Islamic siyar.  
 
5.3.1 Seizure of the Embassy  
It was in November 4, 1979 that some Iranian student demonstrators stormed the 
United States Embassy in Tehran, the Iranian capital, and likewise the American 
Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz which led to the detention of 52 members of the 
American diplomatic and consular staff. Although, two of the hostages did not 
possess either diplomatic or consular status, but they were nationals of the United 
States. These students who described themselves as the ‘Muslim Student Followers 
of the Imam’s Policy’64 were said to be agitated by the resolve of the United States 
to admit the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, into the United States.65 
Consequently, the hostage takers threatened that unless the Shah is extradited 
along with his wealth, they would not hesitate to put the hostages on trial for the 
offence of espionage.66  
 
                                                 
64 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1980 at para. 17, 
p. 12 
65 A Rafat, op cit., (1980-1981), p. 426; BVA Roling, op cit., (1980), p. 125;   
66 A Rafat, op cit., (1980-1981), p. 428 
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Nevertheless, it remains clear that United States would not have extradited the Shah 
due to the absence of any extradition treaty between the two countries.67  
   
5.3.2 Iranian Government Endorses Students’ Action: 
The Iranian authority, particularly, Imam Ayatollah Khomeini has been severally 
alleged to have backed and directly endorsed the entire actions of the students 
regarding the seizure of the US Embassy.68 It has been argued that not only was the 
Iranian Government in cooperation with the student demonstrators by not 
preventing them from entering the embassy, it also gave a mark of approval to and 
showering encomium on the US Embassy hostage takers.69 The Iranian Foreign 
Ministry, for example, was recalled as saying that: ‘[t]oday’s move by a group of our 
compatriots is a natural reaction to the U.S. Government’s indifference to the hurt 
feelings of the Iranian people about the presence of the deposed Shah, who is in the 
United States under the pretext of illness.’70 He further said that ‘[if] the U.S. 
authorities respected the feelings of the Iranian people and understood the depth of 
the Iranian revolution, they should have at least not allowed the deposed Shah into 
the country and should have returned his property.’71 In a pronouncement attributed 
to the then Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr Ibrahim Yazdi, that the students’ action 
‘enjoys the endorsement and support of the government, because America herself is 
                                                 
67 R Falk, ‘The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard Questions’ (1980) 74 AJIL, Pp. 411 – 412 
See also M Whiteman, Digest of International Law 6 (1968) , Pp. 732 -737; J Rehman, op cit., (2005), 
p. 124 
68 A Rafat, op cit., (1980-1981), p. 427 
69 Ibid., para. 71, Pp. 33-34 
70 ‘Tehran Students Seize U.S Embassy and Hold Hostages’, The New York Times, November 5, 1979 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/991104onthisday_big.html? [accessed 22 
November, 2011] 
71 Ibid  
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responsible for this incidence’72 was also regarde as a general ratification to the 
entire hostage incidence.  
 
The then President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, decided to explore the 
possibility of resolving the imbroglio through diplomatic process by instructing his 
Attorney-General, Mr Ramsey Clark, accompanied by Chief Counsel for the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, William Miller, to go and deliver a message to 
Ayatollah Khomeini requesting the release of the hostages.73 Khomeini and members 
of the Revolutionary Council refused to meet with the emissary sent by the United 
States. It was related that while Clark was en route, the Tehran Radio broadcast the 
speech made by Ayatollah Khomeini on 7 November, 1979 forbidding any member of 
the revolutionary council from holding any discussion with them while also 
maintaining that ‘the US embassy in Iran is our enemies’ centre of espionage against 
our sacred Islamic movement . . . Should the United States hand over to Iran the 
deposed shah . . . and give up espionage against our movement, the way to talks 
would be opened on the issue of certain relations which are in the interest of the 
nation.’74  The final seal of the Iranian Government approval to the taking of the US 
Embassy was set when he decreed that ‘those people who hatched plots against our 
                                                 
72 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1980 at para. 70, 
p. 33 
73 The choice of Clark may not be unconnected to the fact that he happened to be a relentless critic 
of the former Shah of Iran and more so, he was known to have indicated his support for the Islamic 
revolution during his meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini while he (Khomeini) was in exile. See LS 
Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operation as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, (OUP, 
New York/Oxford, 1993), 117. According to Phillips, the US rested their trust on the ‘anti-shah 
credentials of these two liberals (Clark and Miller)’ whom they thought could give them credibility by 
having the crisis resolved through diplomatic means. See A Phillips, op cit., p. 13 
74 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1980 at para. 26, 
p. 15 
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Islamic movement in that place do not enjoy international diplomatic respect.’75 
Khomeini’s declaration that ‘[t]he noble Iranian nation will not give permission for 
the release of the rest of them (the hostages). Therefore, the rest of them (the 
hostages) will be under arrest until the American Government acts according to the 
wish of the nation’76 depicted, in an obvious fashion, the lucid intent of the State of 
Iran in ratifying the acts perpetrated by the Iranian students.   
 
The possible legal implication one could deduce from these official statements is that 
the hostage takers have hence become the agents of the Iranian government. One 
may not, as it appears, require any further prove to draw an inference of collusion 
between the Iranian authority and the hostage takers, particularly, as there are 
ample evidence confirming the complicity of the Iranian Government. It would seem 
difficult for the Iranian Government, if it does, to claim lack of responsibility just 
because it did not officially carry out or direct the seizure of the United States 
Embassy and the detention of its personnel. The Iranian authorities can at best be 
described according to the remark of Rafat as ‘wholehearted participants in the 
violation of international law that had occurred.’77 In Islamic law, an act may be 
deemed validly constituted by an unauthorised agent, provided such act is eventually 
ratified by the principal78 following the principle that says ‘subsequent ratification has 
the same effect as a previous authorization to act as an agent.’79 Therefore, the 
                                                 
75 Ibid., para. 73, p. 34 
76 Ibid 
77 A Rafat, op cit., (1980-1981), p. 427 
78 M Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, (John Wiley & Son Ltd., England, 2007), p. 348 
79 This is a quotation in S Mahmassani, ‘Transactions in Shari’a’ in M Khadduri and HJ Liebesny (eds.), 
Origin and Development of Islamic Law,  (The Lawbrook Exchange Limited, New Jersey, 2008), p. 
187 
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Iranian Government should be held accountable for the acts perpetrated by the 
Iranan demonstrating students. 
 
5.3.3 The Iranian Violation of International Treaties 
The Iranian Government and the United States of America have entered into 
international obligations specifically relating to the protection of diplomatic and 
consular premises and personnel. These international obligations are variously 
contained in the VCDR,80 VCCR,81 1973 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents,82 and 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights83 
between the United States and Iran. Sovereign nations have been able to interact 
peacefully and maintain regular connection among themselves due to the age-long 
international community’s legal method in the form of treaties and covenants. It has 
been alleged according to the application filed by the United States before the ICJ in 
November 29, 1979 that the Islamic Republic of Iran has grossly violated their 
                                                 
80 The VCDR was signed by the Islamic Republic of Iran in May 27, 1961 and also signed by the 
United States of America in June 29, 1961. See 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en 
[accessed 2 December, 2011 
81 The VCCR was signed in April 24, 1963 by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of 
America. See http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
6&chapter=3&lang=en [accessed 2 December, 2011] 
82 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at New York 
and open for signature on 14 December, 1973 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1035, No. 15410) 
The Convention was ratified by the Islamic Republic of Iran in July 12, 1978 while the United States 
of America signed in December 28, 1973 See 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20ii/chapter%20xviii/xviii-7.en.pdf [accessed 2 
December, 2011] 
83 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights was signed between the Governments of 
the United States of America and Iran at Tehran in August 15, 1955 and entered into force in June 
16, 1957 
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international obligations stipulated in these treaties to ensure the safety and 
inviolability of their diplomatic mission and personnel in Iran.84  
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has, by all legal implications, under the contemporary 
conventional international law, likewise under  Islamic siyar, covenanted with the 
United States to respect and discharge the following obligations: 
a. Protect the inviolability of the diplomatic premises and the correspondence 
and archives;85 
b. Safeguard the inviolability of diplomats and protect them from arrest and 
detention;86 
c. Guarantee the diplomatic and consular immunity from criminal prosecution;87 
d. Ensure immunity from criminal prosecution of the administrative and technical 
personnel of the mission;88 
e. Guarantee the freedom of movement of the diplomatic and consular staff;89 
f. Co-operate in the prevention of crimes against the internationally protected 
person;90 and 
g. Give the most constant protection and security to the nationals of the United 
States and their consular representatives within the territory of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.91      
                                                 
84 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1980 at para. 8 
(a), p. 5-6 See also A Rafat, op cit., Pp. 425-426 
85 Articles 22, 24 and 27 of the VCDR and Articles 31 and 33 of the VCCR. 
86 Article 29 of the VCDR and Article 40 of the VCCR 
87 Article 31 of the VCDR; Article 43 of the VCCR and Article XVIII of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States 
of America. 
88 Article 37 of the VCDR 
89 Article 26 of the VCDR and Article 34 of the VCCR 
90 Article 2 (3), 4 and 7 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
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Iran, being a State that proclaims to be Islamic by its Constitution and its governing 
system,92 cannot claim to be oblivious of the fundamental importance of covenants 
in the Islamic legal system. Even though, Iran has an overwhelming majority 
following the Shi’a Imamiyyah sect of Islam,93 the fact remains true that in both the 
Sunni94 and Shi’a schools of law, the religious importance and the binding nature of 
contract is ever intact. After all, the Islamic jurisprudence attaches great value to the 
concept of agreements to the extent that they are not only considered legally 
binding on Muslims, they are equally held with much sense of religiousness. The 
maxim ‘Al Muslimun ‘inda shurutihim (Muslims are bound by their stipulations)’ is 
generally accepted as traditional rule by all the madhaahib – Muslim schools of 
law.95  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
91 Articles II (4) and XIII of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America 
92 Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed the Iranian Islamic Revolution in February, 1979, but Iran was 
properly voted, constitutionally as an Islamic State in December 3, 1979. See MC Bassiouni, op cit., 
(1980), p.622  
93 The Shi’a Imamiyyah is the predominant sect in the Islamic Republic of Iran, although there are 
numerous denominations within the Shi’a sect. One of the core principles within the Shi’a Imamiyyah  
sect is that Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) bestowed his succession on his son-in-law who was also his 
cousin, ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (d. 661). They also hold the view that the position of Imam which started 
with ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, then continued with his male heirs up to the twelfth Imam, Muhammad ibn al-
Hassan al-Askari, who was said to have disappeared miraculously upon God’s command in the year 
873-74 AD. This, perhaps, explains why the Shi’a Imamiyyah sect is sometimes referred to as al-
Ithna-Ashariyyah, the Twelvers. See S Akhavi, ‘Shiite Theories of Socia Contract’, in A Amanat and F 
Griffel (eds.), Shari’a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context, (Stanford University Press, 
California, 2007), p. 140. See also MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), p. 617    
94 The sunni, otherwise known as ahlu-sunnah wal-jama’ah, which means the people of the tradition 
of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and the consensus of the ummah, forms the largest group in Islam 
95 S Habachy, ‘Right, and Contract in Muslim Law’, (1962) 62, Columbia Law Review, p. 459 
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The contractual principles of Islamic law are carefully and clearly stated in the 
international arbitral proceedings of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company96 
thus: 
 
Moslem law does not distinguish between a treaty, a contract of public or 
administrative law and a contract of civil or commercial law. All these 
types are viewed by Moslem jurists as agreements or pacts which must be 
observed, since God is a witness to any contract entered into by 
individuals or by collectives. Under Moslem law, any contract is obligatory 
in accordance with the principles of Islam and the Law of God . . .97  
 
Regardless of whether it is an agreement between individual Muslim and the Muslim 
State or between a Muslim State and a non-Muslim State, it remains sacrosanct. The 
Imam of a Muslim State is particularly under a duty to discharge his covenants to 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. According to the tradition of Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh) quoted by the Hambali jurist, Ibn Taymiyah, that: ‘For everyone who has 
committed a breach of faith there shall be a flag [of disgrace]. On the day of 
judgment it will be hoisted. It height will be in proportion to the enormity of his 
breach of faith. No breacher of faith is more unjust than an amir [prince] who breaks 
his covenants.”98 In fact, a Muslim State is expected to be a model for it citizens in 
fulfilling and discharging all contractual obligations it has lawfully granted to any 
                                                 
96 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), (1963) 27 I.L.R. 117  
97 Cited in S Habachy, op cit., (1962), p. 452 
98 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu’at Fatawa, (1908-1911), p. 331 
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foreign country.99 The legal sanctity and authority of covenants in Islamic law are 
firmly rooted in the two prime sources of the Islamic jurisprudence and therefore, 
receive unanimous approval from the generality of the Muslim schools of law. 
According to a classical expression attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah that ‘If proper 
fulfilment of obligations and due respect for covenants are prescribed by the 
Lawgiver, it follows that the general rule is that contracts are lawful . . . since the 
Lawgiver recognizes the legality of their objectives.’100  
 
When the Qur’an says: ‘O you who have believed, fulfil [all] contracts,’101 it is 
generally understood that it incorporates all forms of obligations, contracts and 
covenants that are made between man and man and ‘spiritual covenants between 
man and God.’102 It is mandatory that all obligations must be discharged once they 
are agreed upon. Particularly relevant to this discussion is the verse of the Qur’an 
that categorically forbids any violation of the treaties entered into between the 
Muslims and non-Muslims that: ‘Excepted are those with whom you made a treaty 
among the polytheists and then they have not been deficient toward you in anything 
or supported anyone against you; so complete for them their treaty until their term 
[has ended]. Indeed, Allah loves the righteous [who fear Him].’103 This means that 
once the non-Muslims remain faithful and do not breach their covenants, then, the 
Muslims are duty bound to respect the terms of the agreements until their 
                                                 
99 S Habachy, op cit., (1962), p. 451 
100
 This is a quotation from S Habachy, op cit., (1962), p. 460 
101 Quran 5:1 
102 JND Anderson and NJ Coulson, ‘The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations’, (1958) 33 N.Y.U.L. 
Rev. p. 923 See also PN Kourides, ‘The Influence of Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern 
Legal System: The Formation and Binding Force of Contracts’, (1970) 9 Colum. J. Transnat’l L., p. 394 
103 Qur’an 9:4 
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expiration. In fact, Allah describes those who violate covenants as those who are 
faithless.104   
 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) entered into a treaty with the non-Muslims of Makkah 
which was known as the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 AD), and he tenaciously 
observed the terms of the treaty to the latter. That treaty, according to Muslim 
jurists, later became a paradigm that authenticates the validity of all forms of legal 
instruments between the Muslim and the non-Muslim States.105 In the same vein, 
there are numerous statements of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) giving authority to 
the validity of covenants and treaties in Islamic law, more so, if such treaties do not 
contain any unlawful objects according to the Shari’ah. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) 
is reported to have said that: ‘The Muslims are bound by their obligations, except an 
obligation that renders the lawful unlawful and the unlawful lawful.’106  It is 
considered sacrilegious for a Muslim to violate a treaty or a term in a treaty once it 
has been agreed upon, regardless of whether the other party is a non-Muslim. 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was very blunt in informing Abu Jandal that ‘[w]e have 
entered with the Quraysh into a treaty of peace and we have exchanged with a 
solemn pledge that none will cheat the other’107 when he requested to join the 
Muslims in Madinah immediately after signing of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. The 
third caliph in Islam, Uthman ibn ‘Affan (579–656 AD), was said to have entered into 
                                                 
104 See Qur’an 2:100 that says: ‘Is it not [true] that every time they took a covenant a party of them 
threw it away? But, [in fact], most of them do not believe.’ 
105 GW Heck, When the World Collide: Exploring the Ideological and Political Foundations of the Clash 
of Civilizations, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2007), p. 170 
106 Tirmidhi, Sahih, VI, 104 (Cairo 1931) 
107 Cited in MH Haykal, op cit., p. 354 
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a treaty with the people of Nubia promising not to wage war or prepare to wage war 
against them or attack them on basis of the treaty that binds the two of them.108  
 
It is, of course, a proven fact that the State of Iran is a signatory to all these treaties 
which, by implication, means that all the terms of the treaties deserve to and must 
be observed.109 It is also rightly assumed that the objects and terms of these 
treaties are not in any way contradictory to the core objectives of the Shari’ah 
(maqaasid al-shari’ah). In other words, these treaties, both under the conventional 
international law and the Islamic international law, must be observed to the latter 
since they have become applicable in themselves.110 The failure of the Iranian 
Government to provide adequate security to the United States Embassy especially on 
November 4, 1979 when it was desperately needed to protect the US mission and its 
numerous personnel from the students' incursion definitely constituted a breach of 
these international treaties both under the Islamic siyar and international law.  
 
It is important to mention that assuming the Iranian Government was right in its 
allegation of espionage against the United States, it would have justifiably refused to 
observe the terms of the treaties it had with the United States. The Iranian 
Government refusal to fulfil the terms of the treaties would have been well 
supported by the Qur’anic verse that says: ‘If you [have reason to] fear from a 
people betrayal, throw [their treaty] back to them, [putting you] on equal terms. 
                                                 
108 M Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), p. 102 
109 See footnotes 78, 79,80 and 81 of this Chapter confirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
indeed a signatory to the following treaties: VCDR; VCCR; 1973 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; and 
1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
110MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), p. 615 
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Indeed, Allah does not like traitors.’111 In addition, such refusal to observe the terms 
of the treaties which Iran had with the United States would have received legal 
justification from Article 60 (2) (b) of the VCLT which provides that: ‘A material 
breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: . . . a party specially 
affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the 
treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State.’ 
The Iranian Government would have, in compliance with the foregoing verse of the 
Qur’an and the provisions of the VCLT, made their position known to the United 
States that they do not want to be bound by the provisions of the VCDR and the 
VCCR anymore due to the activities of the United States which they found to be a 
gross violation of Article 41 of the VCDR.112 Having said this, the Iranian Government 
would have still been held liable to the United States under Islamic law and 
international law for invading the United States Embassy and detaining their 
diplomatic personnel. 
   
5.3.4 Violation of Diplomatic Immunity 
The protection of diplomatic envoys has been known and practiced since the ancient 
times up till the present modern States.113 Certainly, there have been series of cases 
involving the violation of diplomatic inviolability ranging from kidnap, arrest, 
detention to even killing of diplomatic personnel. It is, however, doubtful if there is 
any violation of diplomatic immunity that can be likened to the taking and eventual 
detention of the United States Embassy and its personnel by Iran on 4 November, 
                                                 
111 Qur’an 8:58 
112 Article 41 of the VCDR provides that: ‘Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the 
duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the 
receiving States. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.’ 
113 LH Legault, op cit., (1980-1981), p. 359 
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1979. It is not surprising when Barker makes an unequivocal submission that 
‘[u]ndoubtedly, the most significant failure to protect diplomats in history concerned 
the seizure and subsequent occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran in 
1979.’114 The occupation of the US Embassy by the Iranian students demonstrators 
was described by Adib-Moghaddam as ‘the most explicit rejection of international 
‘norms of appropriate behaviour,’ and here specifically the institutions of 
international law.’115 Richard Falk has also made a similar submission in 1980 when 
he said that ‘Ayatollah Khomein’s refusal to honor the rules of international law 
relating to diplomatic immunity is among the most serious charges brought against 
his leadership. Even Hitler, it is alleged, never violated the diplomatic immunity of his 
enemies.’116  
 
It seems clear that the seizure of the US Embassy in Iran could not have been 
condoned or in any way made permissible under the Islamic legal system. If one is 
to place the Iranian acts of forceful entry into the US Embassy; the acts of detaining 
personnel of the US Embassy; the acts of seizing and searching the documents and 
archives of the US Embassy; and the acts of restriction imposed on the freedom of 
movement of the US diplomatic personnel on the platform of Islamic law, being a 
legal system officially proclaimed to be adopted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, it 
will not be a surprise that Iranian would have been held responsible were they to be 
prosecuted under the Islamic legal system. The reason, of course, is obvious. As we 
know that under Islamic siyar, the diplomatic envoys must not only be respected, 
                                                 
114 JC Barker, op cit., (2006), p. 8 
115 A Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy, 
(Routledge, Oxon, 2006), p. 25 
116 R Falk, op cit., (1980), p. 411 
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but must actually be protected from all forms of molestation or maltreatment. This 
principle of Islamic siyar was further buttressed by Hamidullah that ‘[diplomatic] 
envoys, along with those who are in their company, enjoy full personal immunity: 
they must never be killed, nor be in any way molested or maltreated.’117 
Coincidentally, this represents the general position of how the diplomatic personnel 
should be treated according to the Shiite and the Sunni schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence.118  
 
There are, of course, authorities in the two primary sources (the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah) of Islamic law confirming kind treatment and protection for the diplomatic 
envoys. The Islamic principles of diplomatic immunity and inviolability which have 
been examined in much detail in the Chapters 2 and 4 may not be out of place to 
again mention a bit of them as supporting evidence for diplomatic protection.   
According to the Qur’an, the decision of Prophet Sulayman to send the emissaries of 
Bilqees (the Queen of Sheba) back along with their gifts, which were considered as 
bribery and an insult to his personality, exhibited the kind of respect he had for 
foreign messengers.119 He did not hold them responsible for offering him a bribe, but 
rather, he sent them out of his domain which could be said to be another way of 
declaring them as persona non-grata. Hence, the Qur’anic narration, according to 
Bassiouni, signifies that ‘the emissaries were immune from the wrath of the host 
state and were not held responsible for the acts or messages sent by their head of 
                                                 
117 M. Hamidullah, op cit., (1961), p. 147 
118 MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), p. 618 
119 See generally Qur’an 27:35-37 
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state.’120 He further concludes that ‘expulsion is the only sanction to be taken 
against them.’121 Therefore, it is required as it is imperative, according to the Qur’an, 
for all Islamic States to ensure and guarantee ’the personal safety and well-being of 
diplomats and their family’ within their territories.122  
 
The Prophetic traditions further elaborated the Qur’anic injunctions regarding ways 
and how the diplomatic envoys should be treated. An incidence that comes to mind 
is the case of the two emissaries sent to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) by Musaylimah 
who also claimed to be a prophet of God.  In spite of the annoying message  the 
two diplomats brought to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) which could have led to their 
incarceration or even extermination, rather, Prophet Muhammad said to them: ‘By 
God, if it were not the tradition that envoys could not be killed, I would have 
severed your heads.’ 123 Also was the case of Wahshi, the one who murdered 
Hamzah, the uncle of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in the battle of Uhud. He was 
accorded diplomatic immunity when he visited Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as an 
ambassador of the people of Taif. It was further said that he embraced Islam on 
that account.124 The detention of foreign envoy was specifically discouraged by 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). It was narrated by Abu Rafi’ who was designated as the 
Makkans envoy to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in Madinah immediately after the 
battle of Badr (624 AD), and upon seeing Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), Islam was 
cast into his heart straight away to the extent that he requested never to return 
back to Makkah. The Prophet blatantly rejected his request by saying: ‘I do not 
                                                 
120 MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), p. 610 
121 Ibid, Pp. 610-611 
122 J Rehman, op cit., (2005), p. 117 
123Ibn Hisham, As-Seeratu-n-Nabawiyyah, Vol. IV, (Darul Gadd al-Jadeed, Al-Monsurah), p. 192 
124 HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 80 
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break a covenant or imprison messengers, but return, and if you feel the same as 
you do just now, come back.’125 The request of Abu Rafi’ was rejected by Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) on the basis of diplomatic inviolability as he was, then, an 
ambassador of the Makkans, he deserved not to be detained in Madinah. It was 
reported that Abu Rafi’ later came back, not as diplomatic envoy, but as a Muslim 
emigrant.126 
 
It is precisely clear from the foregoing authorities in the Qur’an and the Prophetic 
traditions that diplomatic envoys must be respected and particularly protected 
throughout the duration of their stay within any Muslim State. The Islamic Republic 
of Iran, not being an exception, owes it a duty to safeguard and protect the 
inviolability of all diplomatic missions and their personnel within its territorial 
sovereignty. Moreover, since the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of ‘framing 
the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria’ as specified in its 
Constitution,127 it is also expected that Iran will be totally committed to the principles 
of diplomatic immunity as contained under Islamic international law.  Islamic 
international law imposes it as a duty on the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide 
adequate protection against the invasion and seizure of the United States Embassy. 
There is no doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran has indeed contravened the 
principles of diplomatic immunity as contained in the Islamic diplomatic law.  
 
 
                                                 
125 Partial Translation of Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 14, Jihad (Kitab al-Jihad), Hadith Number 2752 
http://www.muslimaccess.com/sunnah/hadeeth/abudawud/014.html [accessed 29 December, 2011] 
126 Ibid 
127 Article 3 (16) 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
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5.3.5 Basis of the Iranian Justification under the Islamic Law: 
However, the Iranian Government claimed justification for the demonstrating 
students’ invasion of the United States Embassy in November 4, 1979. But then, 
there is a need to critically evaluate the justification of the Iranian Government, and 
consider how justifiable it was under Islamic law? It is to be noted though, that the 
Iranian Government neither put up appearance nor filed any Counter-Memorial 
before the ICJ.128 Iran never participated in the entire judicial proceedings, but 
rather, it sent the two letters dated December 9, 1979 and March 16, 1980 which 
emanated from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran to the ICJ. These letters 
which were almost similar in contents contained the reasons why the Iranian 
Government felt that ‘the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the 
case’129 brought by the United States.  
 
The letter of 9 December 1979 stressed in paragraph 2 by drawing the attention of 
the Court to the ‘deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors 
and their masters, the examination of whose numerous repercussions is essentially 
and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran.'130 As far as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is concerned, the entire question before the ICJ 
 
                                                 
128 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, (1980) I.C.J 
Reports, para 5, p. 5  
129 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, (1980) I.C.J 
Reports, para 10, p. 8; Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v. Iran), Order of Dec. 15, 1979, [1979] I.C.J. Rep. Pp. 10-11 
130 Ibid  
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Only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an over-all problem, 
one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, inter 
alia, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in 
the affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and 
numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and 
in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.131 
 
It was further mentioned in the letter that the dispute between the Iranian 
Government and the United States Government is not predicated on ‘the 
interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American 
Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more 
fundamental and more complex elements.’132 Therefore, according to Iran, it will be 
improper for the ICJ to ‘examine the American Application divorced from its proper 
context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the 
United States over the last 25 years.’133  
 
In addition, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, 
issued a decree on 17 November 1979 which may be considered as an approval and 
justification for taking over the United States Embassy by saying that: 
 
                                                 
131 Ibid 
132 Ibid, para 10, Pp. 8-9 
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[the American Embassy was a ‘centre of espionage and conspiracy’ and 
that ‘those who hatched plots against our Islamic movement in that place 
do not enjoy international diplomatic respects’.134 
 
It can as well be inferred from the above statement that since the US Embassy had 
been used as a place to spy on and conspire against the Islamic Republic of Iran, it 
will then be justified to detain its diplomatic and consular staff and therefore, seize 
the entire embassy.  
 
In summary, one could say that the Iranian Government relied on the following 
justifications as the basis for its action: 
 A continual interference by the United States in the affairs of Iran and the 
numerous crimes committed against the Iranian people for more than 25 
years. 
 The use of the United States Embassy as a ‘centre of espionage and 
conspiracy’ against the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
Regarding the first justification, there are impressive examples in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) which made it abundantly clear that it will 
amount to violating the immunity of diplomatic envoys if the diplomats should be 
subjected to punishment or detention by the host country for any offence they might 
have allegedly committed.135 Rather, the diplomats should be seen as ‘ordinary 
                                                 
134 Ibid, para. 73, p. 34  
135 See J Rehman, op cit.,  (2005), p. 119  
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means of diplomatic communications’ between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
United States.136 
 
The second justification by the Iranian Government is that the United States 
Government was using its Embassy in Iran as a spy nest which, according to the 
Iranian Government, automatically took away the United States enjoyment of 
international diplomatic respects.137 Truly, according to the Islamic law of crime, 
espionage is an offence, but it does not go to the extent of stripping diplomatic and 
consular staff of their immunity. One has to understand that espionage as an 
offence belongs to the ta’azir138 (discretionary) category of crimes as it is not 
considered haraam (prohibited) under the Islamic Criminal law.139 It does not fall 
under the huduud140 (determined) and qisaas141 (retaliation) offences. As for the 
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 MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), p. 610 
137 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, (1980) I.C.J 
Reports, para 73, p. 34 
138 Since the fulfilment of the principle of Shari’ah demands that all forbidden or sinful acts do not go 
unpunished howbeit that these acts do not fall within the ambit of either the huduud or qisaas 
offences, the Islamic penal system empowers the state and the judges to impose punishments on 
these forbidden acts which are accordingly designated as Ta’azir. By reason of its flexibility, offences 
that are most likely to fall under Ta’azir have been considered to be much wider in scope than those 
of huduud or qisaas. See SH Ibrahim, ‘Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure Under Islamic Shari’a’ in 
M. A. Abdel Haleem et al, (Ed.), Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari’a, (I. B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd.London 2003), Pp. 20-21 See also R Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: 
Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century, (CUP, Cambridge, 2005), p. 65 
139 MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), Pp. 623-624 
140 A fuller explanation of huduud is given in Chapter 4 footnote 240 at page 217 of this dissertation. 
This explains why vast majority of Muslim scholars fully support the usage of the term ‘hadd’ to 
describe crime whose punishment is specified and decreed by the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet otherwise known as ‘uquubaat muqaddarah. See SH Ibrahim, op cit., p. 18    
141 Unlike huduud offences which in the main are considered to involve the rights of God (huquq-
llaah), qisaas offences also referred to as retaliation concern the rights of man. The offences that fall 
under the qisaas are five, namely: (a) murder (b) voluntary killing (c) involuntary killing (d) 
intentional physical injury or maiming and (e) unintentional physical injury or maiming. See M 
Tamadonfar, ‘Islam, Law, and Political Control in Contemporary Iran’, (2001) 40 Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, p. 212   
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huduud and qisaas offences, there are fixed penalties for them in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).142  
 
However, it is trite in Islamic law that ta’azir offences, being discretionary in nature, 
could generally be waived, particularly, by diplomatic immunity.143 In other words, 
since espionage is classified as one of the ta’azir offences, it therefore, follows that 
any detention or arrest of internationally protected person for the commission of 
espionage will be rendered nugatory. The Iranian Government would have 
contravened Islamic international law for detaining the American diplomats for 
allegedly committing the offence of espionage. Even if the American diplomats were 
involved in the act of spying in Iran, the most appropriate action to be taken by the 
Iranian regime, according to Islamic siyar, would have been to expel them from 
Iran. This action is, however, compatible with the provisions of Article 9 (1) of the 
VCDR which provides that: 
 
[t]he receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its 
decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any 
member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or that 
any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any 
such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person 
concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person may be 
                                                 
142 G Benmelha, ‘Ta’azir Crimes’ in MC Bassiouni (ed), The Islamic Criminal Justice System, (Oceana 
Publications, London, 1982), Pp. 211-25 at p. 212 
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declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the 
receiving State. 
 
The purported justifications put forward by the Islamic Republic of Iran can, at best, 
be described, according to Rehman, as ‘national, political and economic 
grievances’144 which may not constitute an arguable legal defence under  Islamic 
siyar and  conventional international law. For instance the lamentation of Ayatollah 
Khomeini that: ‘[w]hat kind of law is this? It permits the US Government to exploit 
and colonize peoples all over the world for decade. But it does not allow the 
extradition of an individual who has staged great massacres. Can you call it law?’145 
appeared to be morally and politically defensible, but will fall short of the principles 
of diplomatic immunity under both legal systems. Rehman further stressed that 
although ‘there was a sense of unfairness, injustice and exploitation perpetuated by 
successive United States governments,’146 but then, the relevance of the Iranian 
claims to Islamic international law remains very much doubtful. Meanwhile, the 
justifications canvassed by the Iranian Government, though not legally viable, but at 
the same time, indict international law of its ‘arbitrariness and one-sidedness’ which 
call for a critical attention.  
 
5.3.6 The 2011 Invasion of the British High Commission in Tehran 
Since 32 years ago when the American Embassy in Tehran was invaded and 52 of its 
personnel were detained, the Iranian demonstrators have again triggered ‘one of the 
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145 Time, January 7, 1980, p. 27  
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worst crises in bilateral relations’ according to the report carried by The Guardian 
newspaper.147 On Tuesday 29 November, 2011 the British Embassy and the British 
diplomatic compound in Tehran were both the targets of public demonstration. The 
protestors, mostly students, went into the embassy, shattering windows, ransacking 
offices, setting ablaze the embassy vehicle, looting and damaging embassy 
properties and removing and replacing the British flag with the Iranian flag.148 The 
demonstration was initially meant to commemorate the first anniversary of the 
assassination of a senior Iranian nuclear scientist, Majid Shahriari, when they 
eventually, stormed the British Embassy mainly to protest the UK Government’s 
decision to cut off all dealings with the Iranian Central Bank as a result of the 
Iranian nuclear programme.149  
 
This incidence may not be comparable with the 1979 United States Embassy seizure 
which was adorned with governmental approval, particularly when one considers the 
rate at which the Iranian Government quickly condemned the attack by saying that: 
‘The foreign ministry regrets the protests that led to some unacceptable behaviours. 
. . We respect and we are committed to international regulations on the immunity 
and safety of diplomats and diplomatic places.’150 But then, one would have 
expected the Iranian Government to provide adequate and special measures to 
protect the embassy and its personnel before the attacks took place. Had they done 
                                                 
147 The Guardian,  British Embassy Stormed: Cameron Threatens Iran with ‘Serious Consequence’ 
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that, Iran would have been vindicated and seen by the international community to 
have complied with the terms embedded in the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions 
as well as upholding the principles of diplomatic immunity entrenched in Islamic 
international law. Moreover, it is a fundamental precept in Islamic law that individual 
and State are strictly bound by the terms of the treaties they made to other 
individuals and States, be they Muslims or non-Muslims.151 Allowing the 
demonstrators to gain access to the premises of the embassy, in the words of the 
British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, would amount ‘to a grave breach of the 
Vienna Convention which requires the protection of diplomats and diplomatic 
premises under all circumstances.’152  
 
Nonetheless, the Iran security precautions prevailed by evacuating the protestors 
from the twin diplomatic properties and arresting several of them.153 However, there 
remains a big scepticism in the minds of some people that ‘[t]he idea that the 
Iranian authorities could not have protected our [the British] embassy or that the 
assault could have taken place without some degree of regime consent is fanciful.’154 
Consequently, the British Government, abruptly, decided to severe diplomatic ties 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran by recalling all their diplomats from Iran, and then 
ordering the closure of the London office of the Iranian Embassy.155 The fact that 
there are in existence international treaties between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
                                                 
151 See Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963) cited in S 
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154 The Guardian, Britain Expels Iranian Diplomats After Attack on Embassy, Thursday 1 December, 
2011 
155 Ibid; The Daily Telegram, December 1, 2011, (para. 8), p. 29 
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the United Kingdom regarding the protection and safety of their respective diplomats 
and diplomatic facilities, and the Islamic Republic of Iran having desecrated those 
commitments should be held accountable under  Islamic international law.    
 
5.4 The 1984 Libyan Bureau Shoot-Out: An Abuse of Diplomatic 
Immunity in Islamic International Law? 
 
Among the reasons for maintaining a strong diplomatic relations with nations is 
mainly for the purpose of implementing the foreign policy of the sending State within 
the territory of the receiving State.156 Meanwhile, diplomatic law has put in place 
diplomatic immunity for the personnel of the foreign States to ensure and guarantee 
smooth and efficient dispensation of their diplomatic transactions.157 However, it is a 
common knowledge that some Muslim States have also contributed, in no small way, 
in the flagrant abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities.158 The statement of 
Rehman that ‘a number of cases [i.e. abuses of diplomatic immunity] have emerged 
from the Islamic world’ cannot be distanced from the truth.159  These abuses 
happened regardless of the unambiguous provisions of the VCDR that diplomatic 
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 282 
 
immunity does not operate as a licence to disregard or flout the local laws of the 
receiving State.160  
 
The abuses of diplomatic protection, according to Farahmand, mostly occur in three 
different dimensions, namely: ‘1) the commission of violent crimes by diplomats; 2) 
the illegal use of diplomatic bag; and 3) the promotion of state terrorism by foreign 
governments through the involvement of their embassy in the receiving state.’161 It 
may also be necessary to include the commission of traffic offences by some 
diplomats particularly in countries like the United States that hosts the United 
Nations and some specialised agencies in the state of New York.162 This section will, 
however, focus mainly on violent crimes committed by diplomats with specific 
reference to the infamous 1984 Libyan People’s Bureau shoot-out.  
 
It is almost three decades ago that a woman police constable, Yvonne Fletcher, was 
killed by gun shots from the then ‘Libyan People’s Bureau’, which is now known as 
the Libyan Embassy, London163 in one of the most publicised abuses of diplomatic 
immunity. On April 17, 1984, a peaceful demonstration was organised by about 70 
                                                 
160 Article 41(1) of the 1961 VCDR provides that: “Without prejudice to their privileges and 
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Libyans in London, protesting against the government of Col. Muammar Gaddafi for 
ordering the hanging of two Libyan students of Tripoli University.164 The 
demonstration was staged on the pavement in St. James’ Square, London facing the 
Libyan People’s Bureau.165 Also demonstrating on that day was a group of Gaddafi’s 
supporters.166 The British police were also present to avert any public disorder. In 
addition, it must be mentioned that a day before the incidence, the British 
ambassador in Tripoli and the Foreign Office in London were both advised by the 
Libyan regime that Libya ‘would not be responsible for its consequences’ should the 
demonstration be allowed to take place.167 Surprisingly, shots of ammunition were 
heard and believed to be from inside the Libyan People’s Bureau directed towards a 
crowd of demonstrators, killing a British policewoman, Constable Yvonne Fletcher, 
who was on duty in the square. Several people, running to almost a dozen, were 
also seriously wounded.168 
 
Immediately after this sad incidence, the British authorities sent words to the Libyan 
Government requesting that permission be given to the police to enter the Libyan 
Bureau for the purposes of questioning the occupants and searching for evidence. 
                                                 
164 Col. Gaddafi was determined on crushing any opposition against his regime which he strongly 
believed must survive. On 16 April, 1984 two students of Tripoli University were killed by public 
hanging for engaging in ‘anti-revolutionary activity’. See Y Ronen, op cit., p. 274 
165 The Times (London), April 18, 1984, p. 1, col. 1 
166 Smith, Libya’s Ministry of Fear, Time, April 30, 1984, p. 36 
167 R Higgins, op cit., (1985), p. 643. Also see JS Beaumont, ‘Self-Defence as a Justification for 
Disregarding Diplomatic Immunity’, (1991) 29 Can. Y.B. Int’l L., p. 393  
168 See JC Sweeney, ‘State Sponsored Terrorism: Libya’s Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and 
Immunities’, (1986) 5:1 Dick. J. Int’l L., p. 135; SL Wright, ‘Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for 
Amending the Vienna Convention to Deter Violent Criminal Acts’, (1987) 5 B. U. Int’l L. J., Pp. 179-
180; AM Farahmand, op cit., (1989), p. 98; J Rehman, op cit., (2005), p. 127; AJ Goldberg, ‘The 
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This request was never conceded by the Libyan authorities.169 The British 
Government, apparently, severed diplomatic relations with the Libyan regime and 
consequently, gave the Libyan diplomats seven days within which to leave the 
United Kingdom.170 The Libyan diplomatic personnel were thus declared persona non 
grata in accordance with Article 9 of the VCDR. It was said that upon the departure 
of the Libyan diplomats, the British police entered the Libyan Bureau, and in the 
presence of a representative from Saudi Arabian Embassy, carried out a search 
which led to the discovery of spent cartridges from a submachine gun and seven 
handguns.171 It is worth mentioning also that when the Libyan diplomats were 
leaving the United Kingdom their bags and couriers were given due protection.172  
 
In fact, Britain display of maturity and exercise of adequate respect for diplomatic 
immunity in the face of this unfortunate provocation perpetrated by the ‘Libyan 
People’s Bureau’ cannot but be acknowledged. Of course, Islamic siyar guarantees 
immunities and privileges to diplomats and diplomatic missions as elaborately stated 
in the preceding chapter173 However, these immunities and privileges, going by the 
functional theoretical justification under conventional diplomatic law and Islamic 
diplomatic law, should be for the purpose of discharging their diplomatic duties 
efficiently without any intimidation or unnecessary distraction. Also, Libya being an 
active member of the OIC signed and ratified the provisions of the 1973 Convention 
                                                 
169 See JC Barker, International Law and International Relations, (Continuum, London, 2000), p. 160. 
See also The Foreign Affairs Committee Reports, (1985) 34, I.C.L.Q., p. 610 
170 The Foreign Affairs Committee Reports, (1985) 34, I.C.L.Q., p. 610 
171 Ibid, p. 614; JC Barker, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: A Necessary Evil 
(Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996), p. 4  
172
 AJ Goldberg, op cit., p. 1 
173 See particularly chapter 4 paragraphs 4.4 
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of the Immunities and Privileges of the OIC.174 Although, the provisions of 1973 
Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the OIC mainly applied to member 
States of which Britain is not. But then, the fact that Article 13 of the 1973 
Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the OIC provides that ‘immunities 
and privileges are accorded to the representatives of Member States, not for their 
personal benefit, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their 
functions in connection with the organization,’ implies the general justification for 
the exercise of diplomatic immunity under Islamic international law. How can the 
killing of Fletcher by the Libyan People’s Bureau be justified as safeguarding the 
independent exercise of their diplomatic functions? Or how would they connect their 
diplomatic functions with the shooting of peaceful demonstrators? Definitely, they 
are incomparable as they are not connected in any way.  
 
Moreover, Libya has equally, on behalf of its diplomatic personnel, covenanted to 
‘respect the laws and regulations’ of the United Kingdom.175 It further covenanted 
that its diplomatic mission will not be used ‘in any manner incompatible with the 
functions of the mission as laid down in the Convention or by other rules of general 
international law.’176  Islamic law requires Libya, being a Muslim State, to comply 
with these legal commitments as they are bound to perform the terms and 
conditions of the treaties they have signed in good faith. After all, Muslims, 
according to Weeramantry, ‘were obliged to honour their treaties even with non-
believers “to the end of their term” . . . and “not to break oaths after making them” . 
                                                 
174 It was adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul, Republic 
of Turkey, from the 13th – 16th Jamad Al-Awal, 1396H (12th – 15th May, 1976) 
175 Article 41(1) of the 1961 VCDR 
176 Article 41(3) of the 1961 VCDR 
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. . Pacta sunt servanda was the underlying doctrine.’177 As such, Libya cannot be 
said to have acted in compliance with the principles of diplomatic immunity as 
stipulated in Islamic siyar and international diplomatic law. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In summary, we have seen how some Muslim States practices (the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and Libya for instance), in their diplomatic relations with other States, as we 
have mentioned above,  may appear not to be compatible with the principles of 
diplomatic immunity as stipulated in the two Vienna conventions – 1961 VCDR and 
1963 VCCR. It must be emphasised also that such practices have equally been found 
to contravene the laid down principles diplomatic immunity according to Islamic 
siyar. What we need to note is that  Islamic siyar frowns at any action on the part of 
the diplomatic personnel that could amount to an abuse of diplomatic immunities 
and similarly condemns any contravention of its principles. The Pakistani case of 
Raymond Davis has shown clearly the possible relationship that could exist between 
Islamic law and diplomatic law in resolving what initially appeared to be diplomatic 
conflict.  
 
We must acknowledge that there are many Muslim States that are up to task in 
defending the principles of diplomatic immunity178 mainly because of their 
                                                 
177 CG Weeramantry, op cit., (1988), at p. 141  
178 For instance, the Egyptian Government acted quickly in rescuing the Israeli Embassy from attacks 
in the hands of demonstrators in 2011. The said rescue earned the Egyptian authority a beautiful 
remark from the Israeli Deputy Ambassador thus: ‘‘[t]hat the government of Egypt ultimately acted to 
rescue our people is noteworthy and we are thankful. . .”  See The Guardian, Israel Evacuates 
Ambassador to Egypt after Embassy Attack, Saturday 10 September, 2011 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/10/egypt-declares-state-alert-
embassy?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 [accessed on January 25, 2012]  
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commitments to various diplomatic treaties and probably, due to the compatibility 
between  Islamic diplomatic law and  international diplomatic law.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTIONS: JIHAAD AND 
ISLAMIC LAW VIEW POINTS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The terrorist attacks on modern diplomatic missions have increased in recent 
years.1 Diplomats and diplomatic facilities have been soft targets for terrorist 
attacks possibly, because they are on the front line of the so-called ‘world-
wide war’ often perpetrated by non-state actors against various States.2 
International diplomatic relations have been greatly disturbed by the 
incessant terrorist crimes usually perpetrated in the form of murder, arson, 
kidnap and even detention often committed against diplomatic agents of 
foreign countries. In fact, since the attack on the World Trade Centre on 
September 11, 2001,3 terrorism has gradually but sophisticatedly become a 
global catastrophe requiring a global challenge.4 A recent statistical survey, 
for instance, indicates that between 1969 and 2009 there were approximately 
38,345 terrorist incidents around the world, with 7.8 percent (2,981) of these 
attacks directed against the United States.5 Out of these terrorist attacks that 
                                                 
1
 B Zagaris and D Simonetti, ‘Judicial Assistance under U.S. Bilateral Treaties’ in MC Bassiouni 
(ed.), Legal Responses to International Terrorism: U.S. Procedural Aspects, (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Netherlands, 1988), p. 219 
2
 BM Jenkins, ‘Diplomats on the Front Line’, (1982), Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 
California, p. 1  
3 J Rehman, op cit., (2005), p. 71 
4 DA Schwartz, ‘International Terrorism and Islamic Law’, (1991) 29, Colum. J. Transnat’l L., 
p. 630 
5
 See D Muhlhausen and JB McNeil, ‘Terror Trends: 40 Years’ Data on International and 
Domestic Terrorism’, (Heritage Special Report) p. 1, May 20, 2011 available on 
http://report.heritage.org/sr0093 [accessed on 01/02/2012] 
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were directed against the United States, 28.4 percent were directly against 
the diplomatic offices of the United States.6 
 
It has been suggested that quite considerable amount of terrorist attacks are 
recently ‘perpetrated by or upon Muslims, or within Islamic lands.’7 Also 
attesting to this fact is the submission of Esposito that ‘the most widespread 
examples of religious terrorism have occurred in the Muslim world.’8 However, 
this should not and cannot be understood to mean that terrorism originated 
from amongst the Muslims and the Arab world.9 According to historical 
account, terrorism is as old as human history.10 These attacks that are often 
carried out by small groups within the Muslim community (ummah) cannot be 
taken as representing the voice of the generality of the Muslim population. 
Surprisingly, these groups of Muslims often rely on the general concept of 
jihaad as a basis for declaring war mostly against the ‘Anglo-Americans and 
their allies.’11 It should be borne in mind that these groups of Muslims are 
mostly non-State individuals or organisations. These attacks on diplomatic 
personnel and facilities have generally provoked the following questions: (a) 
Is it legal for non-State actors either as a group or an individual to collectively 
or unilaterally declare Jihaad? (b) Even when Jihaad is declared, can 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 2 
7
 DA Schwartz, op cit., (1981), p. 630 
8
 JL Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, (Oxford University Press, Inc., New 
York 2002), p. 151 
9
 Khadduri (spelt as Elie Kedourie), ‘Political Terrorism in the Muslim World’ in B Netanyahu 
(ed.), Terrorism: How the West Can Win, (The Jonathan Institute, New York, 1986), p. 70 
See generally B Lewis, ‘Islamic Terrorism?’ in B Netanyahu (ed.), op cit., Pp. 65 - 69 
10
 See RD Law, Terrorism: A History, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009), Pp. 1 and 5;  AK 
Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, (2002/03) 27 
International Security, p. 34  
11
 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 47 
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diplomatic envoys and diplomatic missions be targeted for attacks? (c) Is the 
maiming or killing of unarmed civilians justified in Jihaad? (d) How realistic is 
the concept that divides the world into dar-al-harb (the abode of war) and 
dar-al-Islaam (the abode of Islam)? (e) What are the responses of Muslim 
States to these terrorist attacks and how are the violations of the principles of 
international diplomatic law treated, strictly based on the criminal jurisdiction 
of  Islamic law? These are the questions to be carefully considered in this 
chapter from Islamic law points of view. The issues will be analysed by using 
directives from the Qur’an, the prophetic instructions and advices from the 
Caliphs to military commanders as contained in Islamic siyar. Before going 
into these issues, we may need to first look at the definition of terrorism in 
contradistinction with the meaning of the Islamic concept of jihaad.  
 
6.2 Defining Terrorism 
 
The definition of terrorism has given rise to much controversy amongst policy-
makers, international lawyers, academics, national legislators, regional 
organisations and even the United Nations.12 Perhaps, this definitional 
ambiguity may be traced to the general aphorism that ‘one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter.’13 Yet, it is very much important that a clear-
cut definition of terrorism be given as noted by the former President of 
Lebanon, Emile Lahoud, that ‘[i]t is not enough to declare war on what one 
                                                 
12
 See B Golder and G Williams, ‘What is ‘Terrorism’? Problem of Legal Definition’, (2004) 
27(2) UNSW Law Journal, p. 270. See also J Weinberger, ‘Defining Terror’, (2003) 4 Seton 
Hall J. Dipl. & Int’l Rel., p. 63 
13
 E Rosand, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the 
Fight Against Terrorism’, (2003) 97 AJIL, p. 334 
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deems terrorism without giving a precise and exact definition.’14 One begins 
to wonder whether it is sufficient, particularly at this era of political sensitivity, 
to generalise the definition of terrorism to cover ‘[w]hat looks, smells and kills 
like terrorism is terrorism.’15 Definitely not, for such generalisation will be too 
far-reaching. The fact remains that once an act is not terrorism, it can never 
be terrorism.  
 
Then, what is terrorism? No wonder, ‘terrorism’ has been viewed as a 
‘chameleon-like’ in character16 due to it adaptability to different definitions to 
the extent that any effort made in the direction of comprehending the 
definition of terrorism has been likened to a ‘quest for the Holy Grail.’17 Thus, 
Bassiouni appears to be correct in his estimation when he said that ‘the 
pervasive and indiscriminate use of the often politically convenient label of 
‘terrorism’ continues to mislead this field of inquiry.’18  
 
Under international law, terrorism is perceived as a crime which precipitates 
serious violations of individual and collective rights.19 Such activities as armed 
assault on civilians, indiscriminate bombings, kidnapping, focused 
                                                 
14
 Beruit Wants Terrorism Defined, ALJAZEERA, Jan. 13, 2004, available at 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/854F5DE3-FC2D-4059-8907-7954937F4B6C.htm. 
[accessed February 10, 2012 
15
 This was in a speech delivered by the former British Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir 
Jeremy Greenstock, following the pathetic incidence of September 11, 2001. See  J Collins, 
‘Terrorism’ in J Collins and R Glover (eds.), Collateral Language: A User’s Guide to America’s 
New War, (New York University Press, New York, 2002), Pp. 167 - 168 
16
 A Roberts, ‘Can We Define Terrorism?’,  (2002) 14 Oxford Today, p. 18 
17
 G Levitt, ‘Is “Terrorism” Worth Defining?’, (1986) 13 Ohio N. U. L. Rev., p. 97 
18
 MC Bassiouni, ‘A Policy-Oriented Inquiry into the Different Forms and Manifestations of 
“International Terrorism”’ in MC Bassiouni (ed.), op cit., p. xvi   
19  J Rehman, op cit., (2005), p. 71 
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assassination, hostage-taking and hijacking have been generally considered 
by the international community to be illegal and criminal in nature.20 In spite 
of the proliferation of instruments both regionally and internationally 
condemning terrorism,21 there is still no universally accepted definition of 
terrorism in international law.22 The question of terrorism in international law, 
however, remains problematic and very much complicated. The complications 
do occur usually when it comes to the question of differentiating a terrorist 
from a freedom fighter.23 Labelling someone or a particular group as terrorists 
appears to depend on ‘political persuasion and nationalistic sentiments.’24 
After all, Usama Bin Laden was once considered a freedom fighter, with the 
support of the American CIA (Criminal Investigation Agency), when he was 
fighting against the Russian communist occupation in Afghanistan.25 In the 
same way, Nobel Peace Prize laureates Yasser Arafat, Nelson Mandela and 
                                                 
20
 AP Schmid, ‘Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism’, (2004) 16:2, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, p. 197 
21 Some of these instruments are: The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism, 16 November 1937, 19 League of Nations Official Journal (1938), p. 23; 1963 
Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; 1970 
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; the 1971 Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation; 1973 
New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons; 1979 New York Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; 1997 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing; 1999 Convention on the 
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism; 1999 Organisation of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating 
of Terrorism; 1971 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form 
of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance; 1999 
Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism; 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism; and 1987 South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’s Regional Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism. 
22 M Williamson, Terrorism, War and International Law: The Legality of the Use of Force 
Against Afghanistan in 2001 (Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2009), p. 49 
23 J Rehman, op cit., (2005), p. 73  
24 Ibid, 74 
25 PA Thomas, ‘September 11th and Good Governance’, (2002) 53 N. Ir. Legal Q., Pp. 385-
386 
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Menachem Begin were, at different point in their careers, famously labelled as 
terrorists.26  
 
Most African and Muslim States generally have always maintained that 
terrorism does not and cannot include those struggling against armed 
occupation and foreign aggression.27 However, majority of the Western States 
including the United States and Israel, on the other hand, contend that ‘state 
terrorism’ cannot be included in the definition of terrorism.28 These constitute 
a crucial point in arriving at a common universal definition of terrorism.   
Many scholars have, in their quest for a universal definition of terrorism, come 
to the conclusion that since States and regional organisations cannot be 
unanimous on the definition of terrorism, it would then be difficult to have or 
invoke a universal criminal jurisdiction on it.29 In a recent article written in 
1997, Higgins concludes that ‘[t]errorism is a term without legal significance. 
It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of 
individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are 
unlawful, or the targets protected, or both.’30 It therefore means that different 
countries will have to adopt different definitions of terrorism depending on 
                                                 
26 See H Gardener, American Global Strategy and the ‘War on Terror’, (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, England, 2005), p. 74 See also O Elagab, International Documents Relating to 
Terrorism, (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1995), p. iii  
27 G Levitt, op cit., (1986), p. 109 
28 R Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’ in R Higgins & M Flory (eds.), 
Terrorism and International Law, (Routledge, London, 1997), p. 16  
29
R Baxter, op cit., 380; R Mushkat, ‘’Technical’ Impediments on the Way to a Universal 
Definition of International Terrorism’, (1980) 20 Indian Journal of International Law, Pp. 448-
71; R Higgins, op cit., in R Higgins and M Flory (eds.), Terrorism and International Law, 
(Routldge, London and New York, 1997), Pp. 14-19 
30
 R Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’, in R Higgins and M Flory (eds.), 
Terrorism and International Law, (Routledge, London and New York, 1997), p. 28 See also J 
Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, (Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 
1990), p. 13 
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how it is perceived by individual countries. Needless to say too that 
international definition of terrorism will have to endure lack of a unanimous 
acceptance from the international community.31 
 
However, for the purpose of this discussion which focuses on whether the 
principles of jihaad sanction the acts of terrorism particularly against 
internationally protected persons, we may not have to belabour the issue 
concerning the universal definition of terrorism. Rather, we may want to 
agree with the argument canvassed by the United States Government that 
‘[c]onvening a conference to consider this question (i.e., the universal 
definition of terrorism) once again would likely result in a non-productive 
debate and would divert the United Nations attention and resources from 
efforts to develop effective, concrete measures against terrorism.’32 It 
suffices, at least, that categories of acts that are identified and condemned by 
the international community as forming tha acts of terrorism are domestically 
criminalised with the intent to prosecute or extradite the perpetrators in 
cooperation and with the understanding of other States.  
 
6.3 The Meaning and Legal Implication of Jihaad in Islamic Law 
                                                 
31
 JM Lutz and BJ Lutz, Global Terrorism, 2nd edn (Routledge, London & New York, 2008), p. 
14 
32 United Nations General Assembly, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, The 
Secretary-General’s Report, A/48/267/Add.I, 21 September, 1993, p. 2 
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‘To equate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism uncritically with extremism is to 
judge Islam only by those who wreak havoc.’33 The correctness of this 
statement becomes interestingly relevant in view of the prevailing 
misunderstanding surrounding the usage of the word “Jihaad” in a way that 
makes it appear as a synonym of terrorism.34 That is why it may be correct to 
assume that in Islam, the concept of jihaad appears to be the most 
misinterpreted, misused, misunderstood and often quoted out of context. As 
one Western author writes, though erroneously that: ‘By now most 
Westerners know that jihad is associated with violence and is synonymous 
with terrorism . . . it is a powerful religious concept and dictate and is used as 
justification for terrorism.’35 There is need to mention, however, that this view 
does not portray the general opinion of commentators from the West, not 
even after the attacks of September 11, 2001 when the Western press and 
the public appeared to put the blame at the door-step of Islam and the 
Muslims.36 Otherwise, it may amount to making sweeping generalisations 
about what terrorism and jihaad connote without availing oneself the benefit 
of a profound research. In addition, the concept of jihaad in Islamic legal 
                                                 
33 JL Esposito, ‘Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace’ (originally published in the journal 
Current History January, 1994) available at http://islam.uga.edu/espo.html [accessed 11 
March, 2012] 
34 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 13 
35 M Cappi, A Never Ending War, (Trafford Publishing, Victoria, 2007), p. 138. David Bukay 
also claims that Islam and most especially Jihaad is the root cause of terrorism as ‘[a]ll 
Muslims suicide bombers justify their actions’ by referring to it. D Bukay, ‘The Religious 
Foundations of Suicide Bombing: Islamist Ideology’, (2006) XIII Middle East Quarterly, p. 27 
[article online] available at http://www.meforum.org/1003/the-religious-foundations-of-
suicide-bombings [accessed 14 March, 2012]    
36 SC King, Living with Terrorism (Authorhouse, Bloomington 2007), Pp. 70-71 Also, Robert 
Pape, a renowned authority on suicide terrorism, asserts that “suicide terrorism is mainly the 
product of foreign military occupation . . . It is not, as the conventional wisdom holds, mostly 
a product of religious extremism independent of political circumstances.” RA Pape, ‘Methods 
and Findings in the Study of Suicide Terrorism’, (2008) 102 American Political Science 
Review, P. 275   
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system has been variously depicted to mean ‘holy war’ to the extent that, 
according to Mushkat, 
  
Islamic law enjoins Moslems to maintain a state of permanent 
belligerence with all non-believers, collectively encompassed in the 
dar al-harb, the domain of war. . . . The Moslems are, therefore, 
under a legal obligation to reduce non-Islamic communities to 
Islamic rule in order to achieve Islam’s ultimate objective, namely 
the enforcement of God’s law (the Shari’a) over the entire world. 
The instrument by which the Islamic state is to carry out that 
objective is called the jihad (popularly known as the “holy war”) 
and is always just, if waged against the infidels and the enemies of 
the faith.37 
  
The compatibility of Islamic law with the modern norm of international law 
has been a subject of deep controversy partly due to the scepticism 
surrounding the acceptance of the concept of jihaad owing to the pejorative 
connotations it has acquired particularly in the minds of most Westerners. A 
lot have been written on the concept of jihaad by classical and modern 
scholars of Islamic jurisprudence.38   Meanwhile, there is the need to mention 
                                                 
37 R Mushkat, ‘Is War Ever Justifiable? A Comparative Survey’, (1987) 9 Loyola L. A. Int’l & 
Comp. L. J., Pp. 302-303  
38 For instance, see: Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, al-Ahkaam al-Sultaaniyyah wal-Wilayaat al-
Diniyyah (Dar al-Fikr Lil-Tiba’a wal-Nashr, Cairo, 1983), Pp. 32-58; Abu al-Walid Muhammad 
Ibn Rushd, Bidaayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihaayat al-Muqtasid, 2 vols. (Dar al-Ma’rifa, Beirut, 
1986), Pp. 380-407; Abu Ya’la al-Farraa’, al-Ahkaam al-Sultaaniyyah, (Matba’at Mustafaa al-
Baabi al-Halabi, Cairo, 1938),  Pp. 23-44; ‘Alaa al-Din al-Kaasaani, Kitaab Badaa’i al-Sanaa’i fi 
Tartib al-Sharaa’i, 7 vols. (al-Matba’a al-Jamaaliyyah, Cairo, 1910), Pp. 7:97-142 
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that the term ‘Jihaad’ is not in any way identical with the phrase ‘holy war’ or 
analogous to the concept of crusade as understood in the Western 
Christendom.39 This, perhaps, explains why Peters was swift in rebutting the 
allegation of Khadduri that ‘the jihad was equivalent to the Christian concept 
of the crusade’40 when he asserts that the ‘’Holy War’ is thus, strictly 
speaking, a wrong translation of jihad, and the reason why it is nevertheless 
used here is that the term has become current in Western literature.’41 
Moreover, ‘Harb al-Muqaddasah’ which is the Arabic equivalent of the English 
phrase, ‘Holy War’ is not mentioned anywhere in the Qur’an or the authentic 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).42 Jihaad, in a literal sense, is an 
Arabic expression derived from the verb jahada which, means to strive or 
exert oneself in doing things to the best of one’s ability.43  It shares a similar 
origin with the term ijtihaad which refers ‘to the exertion of intellectual effort 
in order to develop an informed opinion on a new issue or problem.’44 
Basically, the concept of jihaad signifies self-exertion and peaceful persuasion 
for the sake of God in contradistinction to violence or aggression.45 While in 
the legal context, it means to ‘struggle for the cause of God by all means, 
                                                 
39 See HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 13 
40 M Khadduri, op cit., (1966), p. 15 
41 R Peters, Jihad in Mediaeval  and Modern Islam, (E. J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1977) 
p. 4 
42 J Badawi,’Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations: An Integrative Approach’, (2003) 8 J. Islamic L. & 
Culture, P. 38 
43 Ibid. See also HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), Pp. 13-14; S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague 
Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1968), p. 280; NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 14; J Rehman, ‘Islamic Criminal Justice 
and International Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective into Modern Islamic State Practices’, 
(2006) 2 J. Islamic St. Prac. Int’l L., p. 21; N Mohammad, ‘The Doctrine of Jihad: An 
Introduction’, (1985) 3 Journal of Law and Religion, p. 385; DA Schwartz, op cit., (1991), Pp. 
641-642  
44 J Badawi, op cit., (2003), p. 39 See also P Ahmed, ‘Terror in the Name of Islam-Unholy 
War, Not Jihad’, (2007/2008) 39 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, p. 769 
45 J Rehman, op cit., (2006), p. 19  
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including speech, life and property.’46 According to al-Kaasaani, ‘jihad is used 
in expending ability and power in struggling in the path of Allah by means of 
life, property, words and more’47  just as it has been expressly stated in the 
Qur’an that: 
 
O you who have believed, shall I guide you to a transaction that 
will save you from a painful punishment? [It is that] you believe in 
Allah and His Messenger and strive in the cause of Allah with your 
wealth and your lives. That is best for you, if you only knew.48 
 
In a more general context, jihaad has been further defined Professor Esposito 
as:  
 
the obligation incumbent on all Muslims, individuals, and the 
community to follow and realize God’s will: to lead a virtuous life 
and to spread Islam through preaching, education, example, and 
writing. Jihad also includes the right, indeed the obligation, to 
defend Islam and the Muslim community from aggression.49    
 
Shah, in his explanation of the kinds of jihaad, views the concept of jihaad 
from two main perspectives: the internal jihaad and the external jihaad. He 
                                                 
46 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 
117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p. 280 
47 Al-Kaasaani, op cit., vol. 7, p. 97 
48 Qur’an 61: 10-11 
49 JL Esposito, op cit. in L Richardson (ed.), The Roots of Terrorism (Routledge, Oxon, 2006), 
p. 149 
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stresses that the internal jihaad, which is a process of self-purification, ‘is a 
search for self-satisfaction by winning the pleasure and blessing of God’.50 
While on the other hand, he considers external jihaad as a ‘search for self-
protection in several ways, including self-defense, self-determination, and the 
search for how to remove obstructions hindering self-protection.’51 In 
essence, jihaad could be sum-up as a search for self- satisfaction and self-
protection.52 According to Khaddduri, he identifies four ways by which jihaad 
obligation may be fulfilled by a Muslim namely: by his heart; his tongue; his 
hands; and by the swords.53 Also, the outward and inward aspects of jihaad, 
according to Ahmed,54 have been illustrated with reference to a statement 
attributed to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) when his companions were 
returning from a military campaign that: ‘We have returned from the lesser 
jihad (al-jihaad al asghar- the physical fight against injustice) to the greater 
jihad (al-jihaad al akbar-the struggle against evil with oneself).’ When asked: 
‘What is the great jihad?’ He [Prophet Muhammad] replied: ‘The jihad against 
the soul.’55 The authenticity of this statement is, however, subject to vigorous 
debate particularly among the Sunni scholars.56  Jihaad, therefore, came to be 
                                                 
50NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 14  
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid. See also DE Arzt, ‘The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and 
Ridda’, (2002) 8 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., p. 20 
53 M Khadduri, op cit., (1955), p. 56 
54 P Ahmed, op cit., (2007-2008), p. 770  
55 See Ali b. Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri, The Kashf al-Mahjub, (the Oldest Persian Treatise 
on Sufism by al-Hujwiri) trans. RA Nicholson, (Luzac, London, 1976), p. 200. Also cited in AA 
An-Na’im, Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International 
Law (Syracuse University Press, New York, 1990), p. 145; P Ahmed, op cit., (2007-2008), p. 
770.  
56
 ‘Azzam vehemently criticised this narration ‘which people quote on the basis that it is a 
hadith, is in fact a false, fabricated hadith that has no basis. It is only a saying of Ibrahim Ibn 
Abi 'Abalah, one of the Successors, and it contradicts textual evidence and reality.’  He also 
quoted Ibn Taymiyyah as saying that: ‘This hadith has no sources and nobody whomsoever 
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seen from three different positions: a) personal jihaad, which is also known as 
jihaadun-nafs – to strive towards emancipating oneself from all kinds of evil 
plots; b) verbal jihaad - to stand firmly and speak the truth in the face of 
injustice just as Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was reported to have said that 
‘the best form of jihad is to speak the truth in the face of an oppressive 
ruler;’57 and c) physical jihaad – to engage in physical force against 
oppression and transgression.58 Thus, the use of force or what has been 
termed ‘physical force’ only forms an aspect of what is called jihaad’. Meaning 
that jihaad as a whole cannot be a synonym of violence. But then, can one 
really say whether this aspect of jihaad, in other words, the use of force, is 
purposely enjoined on Muslims in self-defense against persecution and 
aggression or for the purpose of launching offensive wars against the non-
Muslims in the name of proselytisation? In answering this question, we may 
have to consider whether jihaad is indeed a defensive or an offensive war. 
 
6.3.1  Jihaad as a Defensive War  
Islamic law enjoins the Muslims to embark on the use of force as self-defense 
to repel all forms of aggression and oppression against the Muslim 
                                                                                                                                            
in the field of Islamic knowledge has narrated it.’ See A ‘Azzam, Ilhaq bil Qalifah – Join the 
Caravan, (1988), Pp. 26-27 available at http://www.hoor-al-
ayn.com/Books/Join%20the%20Caravan.pdf [accessed 26 March, 2012]. See DE Streusand, 
‘What Does Jihad Mean?’, (1997) IV:3 Middle East Quarterly, Pp. 9-17 available on line at 
http://www.meforum.org/357/what-does-jihad-
mean?iframe=true&width=100%&height=100% [accessed 26 March, 2012]; A McGregor, 
‘”Jihad and the Riffle Alone”: ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and the Islamic Revolution’, (2003) 23:2, 
Journal of Conflict Studies also available at 
http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/219/377 [accessed 26 March, 
2012]. 
57 Cited in AA An-Na’im, op cit., (1990), p. 145 quoting from Al-Kaya Al-Harasiy, Ahkam al-
Qur’an, (Al-Maktaba al-‘Ilmiya, Beirut, 1983)  
58 P Ahmed, op cit., (2007-2008), p. 770 
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community. This assertion is supported by array of Qur’anic verses coupled 
with historical facts. It may be argued that, in Islam, the general rule is to 
maintain and spread peace, while war, which is an aberration, will only be 
resorted to in exceptional and unavoidable conditions.59 This argument 
comports with the ideological rationale behind the concept of jihaad which 
are, as stated by Ibn Taymiyyah, ‘to defend Muslims against real or 
anticipated attacks; to guarantee and extend freedom of belief; and to defend 
the mission of Islam.’60 In other words, war, according to Islamic law, will 
only be allowed if the sole objective is to protect the Islamic faith and to 
preserve the lives of the Muslims.  
 
There are some earliest Quranic verses that were revealed to Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) shortly after his emigration (hijrah)61 to Madinah 
emphasising the condition under which jihaad could be fought.62 At that time, 
Madinah, being the first Islamic community to be established, was persistently 
under the fear of invasion from the non-Muslims.63 These Qur’anic verses 
marked the genesis of armed struggle in Islam, ‘with the express purpose to 
defend the religious belief of the Muslims and to avoid extermination at the 
                                                 
59 See HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 12; SS Ali and J Rehman, ‘The Concept of Jihad in 
Islamic International Law’, (2005) 10 Journal of Conflict & Security Law, p. 331 
60 Shams al-Islam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, ‘Qaa’ida fi Qitaal al-Kuffaar’, in Muhammad 
Haamidal-Faqi, Majmu’at Rasaa’il Ibn Taymiyyah, (Matba’at al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah, 
Cairo, 1949), Pp. 116-117  
61 That was on September 9, 622 AD when Prophet Muhammad and his followers migrated 
from Makkah to Madinah in order to escape from the Makkans persecution. 
62 JL Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, (OUP, Oxford, 2002), p. 120 
63 SS Ali and J Rehman, op cit.,(2005), Pp. 331-332 
 302 
 
hands of the then dominant group [the idolatrous Arabs].’64 It was revealed 
to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) that:  
 
Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being 
fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is 
competent to give them victory. [They are] those who have been 
evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, 
"Our Lord is Allah." And were it not that Allah checks the people, 
some by means of others, there would have been demolished 
monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the 
name of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support 
those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in 
Might.65 
 
The verses clearly indicate that for one to engage in jihaad, either individually 
or collectively, it must be for the purpose of redressing a wrong and in 
defense of the community.66 Notable defensive jihaads in the more recent 
time include the Afghan resistance against the Russian invasion in 1979 and 
the Palestinian struggle against Israel.67 The defensive nature of jihaad is 
further contextualised in another verse of the Qur’an which says: 
                                                 
64 Ibid., p. 332 
65 Qur’an 22:39-40 
66 AL Silverman, ‘Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Islamic 
Norms for the Use of Political Violence’, (2002) 44 J. Church & St., p. 78 
67 SC Tucker (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Middle East Wars: The United State in the Persian 
Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, vol. 1(ABC-CLIO Ltd., 2010), p. 653   
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Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not 
transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.68 
 
According to the Qur’anic commentary of Ibn Katheer (d. 1373),69 these 
verses, that is Qur’an 22:39-40 and 2:190 are the first Qur’anic injunction 
authorising the use of physical force against the unbelievers.70 The instruction 
to ‘fight in the way of Allah’ is not based on the non-acceptance of Islam, as 
‘there shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion,’71 but rather it is 
purely based on the continuation of aggression and oppression. According to 
Badawi, he asserts that there is ‘[n]o single verse in the Qur’an, when placed 
in its proper textual and historical context, permits fighting others on the 
basis of their faith, ethnicity or nationality. To do so, contravene several 
established values and principles’72 in the Islamic jurisprudence. Once the 
enemies desist from their hostile and aggressive pursuit, and opted for peace, 
the Muslims are also expected to immediately bring their jihaad to an end and 
embrace peace.73 Just as it is stated in the Qur’an that: ‘And if they incline to 
peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the 
Hearing, the Knowing.’74 This verse and other similar verses of the Qur’an 
confirm the peaceful relationship that could exist and does exist between the 
                                                 
68 Qur’an 2:190 
69 His full name was Abu Al-Fidaa’ Isma’il ibn Katheer. He  was the author of the famous 
commentary on the Qur’an named ‘Tafseer al-Qur’an al-‘Azeem’ 
70 Abu Fidaa’ Isma’il ibn Katheer, Tafseer al-Qur’an al-‘Azeem, Vols. 1&2 (Dar al-Marefah, 
Beirut, 1995), Pp. 233 & 235 respectively. 
71 Qur’an 2:256 
72 J Badawi, op cit., (2003), p. 40 
73 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 17 
74 Quran 8:61 
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Muslims and the non-Muslims contrary to the view of some scholars who 
argue that ‘in theory dar al-Islam was in state of war [permanently] with the 
dar al-harb.’75 One may want to doubt the exactitude of this statement in 
view of the Qur’anic verse that states that: 
 
Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because 
of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being 
righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, 
Allah loves those who act justly.76 
 
Jihaad, in the opinion of Mahmassani, is seen from an Islamic point of view as 
‘a defensive measure, on ground of extreme necessity, namely to protect the 
freedom of religion, to repel aggression, to prevent injustice and to protect 
social order.’   
 
6.3.2 Can Jihaad be Offensive?      
There are some Islamic scholars who contend that although the Islamic faith 
has to be spread peacefully, but where there are any impediments militating 
against the peaceful spread of Islam, then, violence or force will have to be 
resorted to.77   
 
                                                 
75 M Khadduri, op cit., (1966), p. 13 
76 Qur’an 60:8 
77 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 15 
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 They tend to provide justification for offensive jihaad in Islam. In canvassing 
their argument, they often refer to some verses of the Qur’an that are known 
as the ’sword verses’, claiming that these verses have abrogated the earlier 
Qur’anic verses (Qur’an 22:39-40 and 2:190), known as the ’peace verses’ 
that establish the defensive nature of the Islamic jihaad.78 As such, they 
allege that the ’sword verses’ legitimise absolute offensive war against the 
unbelievers. For instance, Quran 9:5 says: 
 
And when the inviolable months have passed, then kill the 
polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege 
them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush.79 
 
This verse should not and cannot be read in isolation. In fact, it should be 
read together with the previous and subsequent verses, that is Quran 9:1-15, 
in order to fully understand the textual and historical context inherent in the 
verse. Those verses including Qur’an 9:5 were revealed as a result of the 
Makkans breach of the treaty of Hudaybiyyah when the Banu Bakr, a tribe 
that was an ally to the Makkans, attacked the Banu Khuza’ah, a tribe that was 
in alliance with the Muslims.80 Surprisingly, the Makkans had to surrender to 
the Muslims without fighting, thereby rendering the application of these 
verses unnecessary. Moreover, if one thoroughly considers the “sword verse” 
and the “peace verses”, one would see that the “sword verse” appears to be 
                                                 
78 JL Esposito, op cit., (2002), p. 121 
79 Qur’an 9:5 
80 M Munir, op cit., (2003) p. 375 
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absolute (mutlaq) while the “peace verses” are qualified (muqayyad).81 The 
“peace verses” are qualified in the sense that they provide specific reasons for 
declaring jihaad against the polytheists, while the sword verse does not 
provide any reason for waging war. Since the “peace verses” and the “sword 
verse” convey the same ruling, which is the declaration of war, and the same 
subjects, according to the Muslim jurists, the conditions in the “peace verses” 
will automatically apply to the “sword verse”.82 This takes away the question 
of the “sword verse” abrogating the “peace verses”.  
 
Moreover, the contention of Abdur-Rahman bin Zayd bin Aslam that Qur’an 
9:5 has abrogated the peace verses was considered ‘not plausible’ by Ibn 
Katheer83 because Allah has specifically instructed the Muslims to ‘fight 
against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively.’84 
Meaning that, in the words of Ibn Katheer, ‘[y]our [the Muslims] energy 
should be spent on fighting them [the polytheists], just as their energy is 
spent on fighting you, and on expelling them from the areas from which they 
have expelled you, as a law of equality in punishment.'85 Esposito has rightly 
made a concluding remark while explaining the essence of Qur’an 9:5 that 
‘[a]lthough this verse has been used to justify offensive jihad, it has 
traditionally be read as a call for peaceful relations unless there is interference 
                                                 
81 See M Munir, op cit., p. 378 who also cited W Zuhayli, Al-‘Alaqaat Al-Dawliyyah fi Al-Islaam 
(1984), p. 94 
82 MH Kamali, op cit., (1991), p. 111 
83 Abu Al-Fidaa’ Isma’il Ibn Katheer, Tafseer Al-Qur’an Al-‘Azeem Vol 1 (Dar Al-Ma’rifah, 
Beirut, Lebanon, 1995), p. 233  
84 Qur’an 9:36  
85 Abu Al-Fidaa’ Isma’il Ibn Katheer, op cit., p. 233 
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with the freedom of Muslims.’86 In a similar way, Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian 
scholar, was very clear in his condemnation of those who erroneously 
interpret Qur’an 9:5 to mean an outright extermination of the unbelievers 
when he says that: ‘Some people may feel differently, taking the order to 
mean that when the truce was over, the Muslims were meant to kill all 
unbelievers. They may quote in support of their view the next verse which 
states: ‘When these months of grace are over, slay the idolators wherever 
you find them.’ (Verse 5) But this view is wrong.’87 Obviously, the reasons for 
enmity between the Muslims and the polytheists were not as a result of their 
different beliefs, but rather due to the Makkans hostility, persecution and 
aggression towards the Muslims.88 
 
Those who argue in support of the offensive jihaad theory also refer to Qur’an 
9:29 to buttress their argument thus: 
  
Fight against those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day 
and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger 
have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth 
[i.e., Islam] from those who were given the Scripture . . .89 
 
                                                 
86 JL Esposito, op cit., (2002), p. 35 
87 Sayyid Qutb, In the Shade of the Qur’an Vol. VIII Surah 9 available at 
http://archive.org/details/InTheShadeOfTheQuranSayyidQutb [accessed 05 April, 2013] 
88 A Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York, 2011), p. 48 
89 Qur’an 9:29 
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The understanding of some Muslim scholars about this verse is that it has 
outrightly abrogated all the peace verses in the Qur’an; as such, it marks the 
final stage of Muslim-non-Muslim relations.90 They interpreted the verse in a 
way that envisages a permanent and universal warfare to extinguish, through 
the use of offensive force, if possible, all forces of immorality and unbelief.91 
Apparently, the reasons for the revelation of Qur’an 9:29 were not, in any 
way, obscure. In the summer of 630 AD there was information that the 
Byzantine Empire, which was predominantly Christian, was getting prepared 
to launch an offensive attack on the Muslims. As expected, Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) set out with about 30 men with intention of stopping, in a 
defensive approach, the Roman soldiers from reaching Madinah.92 On 
reaching Tabuk, when it was discovered that the Christian forces had already 
withdrawn, the Muslim forces rather than going after them, they had to 
retreat back to Madinah, as the expedition was not an offensive battle.93 From 
the Qur’anic context, war or the use of force is only permissible in Islam for 
the purpose of self-defense. It will be wrong to take Qur’an 9:29 out of its 
specific historical context as if it has general application under Islamic law.94 
Shah rightly concludes that: 
 
                                                 
90 See S Qutb, Fi Zilaal al_Qur’an, vol. 3, (Daar al-Shuruq, Cairo, 1417/1996), Pp. 1619-1650 
91 O Bakircioglu, ‘A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Concept of Jihad’ (2010) 59(2), International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 432 
92 See Ibid, p. 65. See also Abu Al-Fidaa’ Isma’il Ibn Katheer, op cit., Vol 2, Pp. 360 - 361; HA 
Adil, Muhammad, the Messenger of Islam: His Life and Prophecy (Islamic Supreme Council of 
America, Washington, 2002), Pp. 533-537 
93 M Munir, op cit., (2003), p. 378 
94 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 20 
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For Muslims, it is irrelevant whether these hostile groups were 
Christians, Jews, or Pagans. The Prophet Muhammad fought his 
own tribe, Quraish, as it threatened and attempted, during the 
battle of Badr, to conquer Madina where Prophet Muhammad had 
migrated. Keeping in view the Koranic and historic contexts, the 
most probable interpretation is that verse 9:29 addresses those 
unbelievers who either were aggressors or there was a well 
founded fear that they would attack Muslims.95    
 
While discussing the ‘sword verses’ that command the Muslims to fight 
against the non-Muslims, it has been argued that such verses cannot be 
interpreted to mean an indiscriminate military jihaad against all non-Muslims. 
Rather, the ‘sword verses’ are meant for non-Muslims who attacked or 
threatened to attack the Muslim community since ‘wars of aggression in 
general, and terrorism in particular, are diametrically opposed to the very idea 
of the Qur’an.’96 This statement has been reverberated by Sachedina that ‘it is 
not unbelievers as such who are the object of force, but unbelievers who 
demonstrate their hostility to Islam by, for example, persecution of the 
Muslims.’97 In addition, the Qur’an states that: 
 
                                                 
95 Ibid 
96 O Bakircioglu, op cit., (2010), p. 427 
97 AA Sachedina, ‘The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History,’ in JT Johnson 
and  J Kelsay (eds.), Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in 
Western and Islamic Tradition (Greenwood, New York, 1990),  P. 43 
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Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because 
of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being 
righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, 
Allah loves those who act justly.98 
 
The jihaad, according to the Sunni jurists, is generally considered as a 
collective duty (fard Kifaaya), which, if carried out by a sufficient number of 
Muslims, the remaining Muslims who do not participate in it will not be held 
accountable.99 If the generality of the Muslims refuse to embark on the 
jihaad, when it becomes necessary, they will be considered as sinners, with 
the exception of women, children, disable and elderly people.100 This view is 
supported by a Qur’anic verse that says: 
 
And it is not for the believers to go forth [to battle] all at once. For 
there should separate from every division of them a group 
[remaining] to obtain understanding in the religion and warn [i.e., 
advise] their people when they return to them that they might be 
cautious.101 
 
                                                 
98 Qur’an 60:8 
99 HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 15; S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of 
International Law, Recueil Des Cours: Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), 
p. 281; RH Salmi et al, Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices, (University 
Press of America, Maryland, 1998), p. 71 
100 R Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, (Markus Weiner Publishers, Princeton, N.J., 
1996), p. 3 
101 Qur’an 9:122 
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Jihaad may also become an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) when there is an attack 
on the Muslim territory which makes it a duty on all the inhabitants of the 
attacked territory, without an exception, to fight against such occupation.102 
The Muslim jurists have cited the Qur’anic verse which says: ‘Go forth, 
whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the 
cause of Allah. That is better for you, if you only knew’103 to buttress this 
statement.104   
 
Having stated the two instances that may warrant the use of force based on 
the Islamic principles of jihaad, the next questions that need to be answered 
are: who declares the call for jihaad, is it the public or the government? What 
are the pre-conditions that must be fulfilled before the public could exercise 
their right to declare the call for jihaad? These questions have become 
necessary in view of the multiple attacks, in the form of suicide missions; 
killings; injuries; arsons; and kidnapping, being perpetrated particularly 
against diplomats and diplomatic facilities of non-Muslim countries and their 
allies from the Muslim countries. These attacks, which, in most cases, have 
been unleashed in the name of jihaad, have often been declared by non-state 
individuals or organisations. These are the issues to be considered in the 
preceding section.     
 
                                                 
102 Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Qurtubi, al-Jami’,li Ahkaam  al-Qur’an, 20 vols. (Dar al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1988), 8:186; al-Kaasaani, op cit., p. 98 were cited in HM Zawati, op cit., 
p. 15. Also see ; RH Salmi et al, op cit., (1998), p. 71  
103 Qur’an 9:41 
104 See the explanation given in respect of Qur’an 9:41 in Abu Al-Fidaa’ Isma’il Ibn Katheer, 
op cit., Vol 2, Pp. 373-374 
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6.3.3. Who Declares the Call for Jihaad? 
When it becomes necessary to resort to physical jihaad or the use of force in 
self-defence either due to an actual invasion or a threat of aggression on the 
Muslim territory, there has to be a declaration of jihaad. Both the classical and 
modern jurists are unanimous that the decision to initiate war according to 
Islamic jurisprudence must be taken by the legitimate authority.105 Basically, 
at the earliest time in Islam, the sole legitimate authority that must declare 
the commencement of jihaad was Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) who, according 
to the Qur’an, was commanded to ‘urge the believers to battle.’106 The 
responsibility of initiating jihaad was placed upon Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), 
perhaps, due the fact that jihaad was then, just as it is now ‘an issue of public 
safety.’107 The Muslims have been advised to refer all issues concerning public 
safety to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) or to those in position of authority 
amongst them. The Qur’an states that: ‘And when there comes to them 
information about [public] security or fear, they spread it around. But if they 
had referred it back to the Messenger or to those of authority among them, 
then the ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it would have known 
about it.’108 
 
Following the demise of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), the power to declare 
jihaad devolved upon the Imam or Caliph,109 being the head of the Muslim 
                                                 
105 A Al-Dawoody, op cit., (2011), p. 76 
106 Qur’an 8:65 
107 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 22 
108 Qur’an 4:83 
109 Qur’an 4:59 says ‘O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those 
in authority among you.’ 
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polity.110 It is not for the individual Muslims or an organisation(s), not even 
the ‘ulama (Islamic jurists) to declare jihaad without the definite directive of 
the Caliph or the Islamic head of state.111 In fact, it is an act of disobedience, 
according to the Shari’ah, to initiate jihaad without the authorisation of the 
Caliph or the head of the Muslim polity.112 Abu Yusuf was very clear on this 
point when he says that ‘no army marches without the permission of the 
Imam.’113 Ibn Qudamah (d. 1223 AD),114 a renowned Hanbali scholar, 
expresses the need for a Muslim leadership before the commencement of 
jihaad thus: 
  
Declaring Jihad is the responsibility of the Ruler and consists of his 
independent legal judgment. It is the duty of the citizens to obey 
whatever the Ruler regards appropriate.115  
 
It was further stated by al-Jaza’iri that for jihaad to remain valid it must be:  
 
A pure intention that it is performed behind a Muslim Ruler and 
beneath his flag and with his permission . . . And it is not allowed 
                                                 
110 See N Muhammad, op cit., (1985), p. 390; NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 21-22; HM Zawati, 
op cit., (2001), p. 14; A Mikaberidze, Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical 
Encyclopedia (ABC-CLO, LLC, California, 2011), p. 827; NJ DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From 
Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, (I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., London, 2007), p. 203 
111 Shaykh MH Kabbani, ‘Jihad in Islam’ in Vincent J. Cornell (ed.),  Voices of Islam: Voices of 
the spirit vol. 2(Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2007), p. 219 
112 S Saleem, ‘No Jihad without a State’, Renaissance Monthly, December 1999 
113 Abu Yusuf Ya’qub Ibn Ibraahim, Kitaab al-Kharaaj, (Daar al-Hadaatha, Beirut, 1990), p. 
349 
114 His full name was Mawaffaq ad-Deen ‘Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi and he 
was born in Palestine in the year 1147 AD. 
115 See Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, vol. 9, p. 184 
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for Muslims to fight without a Ruler because Allah says: “O ye who 
believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger, and those charged 
with authority among you” (Qur’an 4:59).116   
 
Similarly, the Shi’ite jurists hold a slightly different view from the Sunni jurists 
by saying that the call to jihaad can only be proclaimed by a rightful Imam in 
his capacity as a divinely appointed leader of the community.117 Hence, since 
according to the Shi’a doctrine, the twelfth Imam who has disappeared, 
otherwise known as “the Hidden Imam”, since 874 AD will only surface at the 
approach of the Last Day, it therefore means that combative jihaad has to 
continuously remain in abeyance.118 However, they are of the opinion that in 
view of the absence of the Imam, the only jihaad that could be embarked 
upon has to be defensive.119 This view, according to the opinion of some 
Shi’ite jurists is resolvable in that all legitimate forms of jihaad were defensive 
and therefore can be waged, even in the absence of the Imam.120    
  
There are, of course, exceptional situations that may warrant or necessitate 
the declaration of jihaad by non-State actors (individuals or group of 
individuals) notwithstanding the existence of an Islamic head of State. Once 
                                                 
116 Abubakr Jaabir Al-Jazaa’iri, Minhaj Al-Muslim, (Maktabah Al-‘Uluum Wal-Hukm, Al-Madinah 
Al-Munawarah, 1995), p. 292. See also, Abu’l-Hasan ’Ali Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkaam Al-
Sultaniyyah, 1st edn., (Daaral-Kitab Al-’Arabi, Beirut, 1990), p. 52 
117 SM Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran, (I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., London, 
1999), p. 42 
118 See JO Pearson ‘Islam, Christianity and the Crusade: Rival Monotheism and Monotheistic 
Rivals’ in John Wolffe (ed.), Religion in History: Conflict, Conversion And Coexistence 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004), p. 55. See also M Khadduri, op cit., (1955), 
Pp. 66-67; MG Knapp, ‘The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam’, (2003) 33:1, Parameters, 
U.S. War College Quarterly, p. 86  
119 JL Esposito, op cit., (2002), p. 39 
120 Ibid  
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there is a physical attack on a Muslim land and the Muslim leader or the 
Islamic head of state appears to be incapable or refuses to declare a 
defensive jihaad to protect the lives and properties of the Muslims, then the 
Muslims in that country will have to take up the responsibility of initiating a 
defensive jihaad.121 The recent Afghanistan war against the Russian 
occupation of their land in 1979 serve as a typical example of a defensive 
jihaad declared not by the Muslim ruler, but by the consensus of Afghan 
Muslim religious leaders.122 It was a jihaad that drew Muslims from around 
the world and from all works of life migrating into Afghanistan with the 
intention of defending ‘their coreligionists and the faith and to resist 
aggression against the dar al-Islam (House of Islam).’123 The defensive jihaad 
embarked upon by the Afghans, which was a kind of collective and self-
defensive war against the Russian invasion, was said to be compatible with 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations124 which provides that: 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations.’125   
 
                                                 
121 See SH Hashmi, ‘9/11 and the Jihad Tradition’ in DJ Sherman and T Nardin (eds.), Terror, 
Culture, Politics: Rethinking 9/11 (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2006); NA Shah, op 
cit., p. 23 
122 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 23; M Sageman, Understanding Terror Network, (University of 
Pennsylvania, 2004), p. 2; R Edward and S Zuhur, ‘Jihad’ in Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), The 
Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq Conflicts, vol. 1 (ABC-CLIO, LLC, California, 2010), p. 653  
123 FA Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (CUP, Cambridge, 2005), p. 80 
124 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p.23 
125 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, (San 
Francisco, 1945), Pp. 10-11. Also available online: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf [accessed 22 April, 2012] 
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Can individual or an organisation declare jihaad against other nation(s) relying 
on the exceptional situations given above as justification for such declaration, 
even though there was no actual physical attack from invader(s)?  It is very 
much doubtful if such a declaration can ever be legitimate in Islamic law. This 
is because, as stated earlier, there must be an actual physical attack on the 
Muslim State from a non-Muslim State. In addition, the Muslim ruler must be 
unwilling to mount a defensive attack against the invading state. Not until 
then, the declaration of jihaad will remain the prerogative of the Islamic head 
of State. Reference will, for instance, be made to the two declarations of 
jihaad made by Al-Qaeda126 in 1996127 and 1998.128 Usama bin Laden,129 who 
was the leader of Al-Qaeda, issued out jihaad declarations both in 1996 and 
1998 calling on all Muslims of the world ‘to kill the Americans and their allies, 
civilians and military.’130 The 1998 declaration further stresses that it ‘is an 
individual duty of every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and 
                                                 
126 Al-Qaeda is generally known as an international terrorist network led and established by 
Usama bin Laden in 1988. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-
qaida.htm [accessed 22 April, 2012] 
127 This is a fatwa released by Usama bin Laden entitled ‘Declaration of War against the 
American Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places’ first published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi, a 
London-based newspaper, in August, 1996 which was substantially the same as the 1998 
declaration. See PBS Newshour, August, 1996      
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html [accessed 23 April, 
2012] 
128 This is the 1998 jihaad declaration by Usama bin Laden and his associates entitled ‘Jihad 
against Jews and Crusaders World Islamic Front Statement’ [23 February 1998] available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm [accessed 23 April, 2012]. The 
Arabic language text of this document: World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and 
Crusaders: Initial “Fatwa” Statement also available at 
http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm [accessed 23 April, 2012] 
129 He was shot dead by the American forces on May 2, 2011 during a raid on his hitherto 
secret residence in Abbottabad, Pakistan. See The Guardian, Monday 2 May, 2011 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-dead-obama [accessed 23 
April, 2012] 
130 The 1998 jihaad declaration, see  footnote 128 
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the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip and in order for their armies to 
move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any 
Muslim.’131 Several verses of the Qur’an were cited in the 1996 and 1998 
declarations wherein the Muslims were reminded of their duty to Allah and 
Islam concerning waging jihaad against the infidels.  
 
Most attacks that were launched against diplomats and diplomatic missions 
were, for instance, most likely, inspired by these two declarations of jihaad by 
Al-Qaeda,132 prominent among which were the two attacks on the United 
States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania both of 
which occurred on 7 August, 1998. Not less than 200 people lost their lives in 
the two attacks, leaving more than 1,000 people with severe injury.133 The 
1996 and 1998 declarations of jihaad made by Usama bin Laden in 
collaboration with leaders of extremist groups in Pakistan, Egypt and 
Bangladesh remain inconsistent with the classical traditions of the Islamic 
jurisprudence. In fact, Shah rightly concludes that: 
 
                                                 
131 Ibid  
132 A car bomb that was detonated outside the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan on 15 June, 
2002 which killed 11 people was linked to Al-Qaeda terrorist network. See The Telegram, 15 
June, 2002 available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/1397397/Karachi-car-bomb-kills-11-
outside-US-consulate.html [accessed 23 April, 2012]. The double bombing of the British 
Consulate in Istanbul along with the HSBC Bank on 15 November, 2003 which left at least 27 
people dead including top UK diplomat, Consul-General Roger Short, was also linked to Al-
Qaeda. See BBC News, Thursday, 20 November, 2003 available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3222608.stm [accessed 23 April, 2012]  
133 See BBC News, 7 August, 1998 available online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/7/newsid_3131000/3131709.stm 
[accessed 23 April, 2012] 
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The declarations of Al-Qaeda in 1996 and 1998 have no Koranic 
foundation on two counts: No Muslim state was under attack 
requiring declaration of jihad in self-defense, and there was no 
situation where a Muslim land was under attack and the ruler was 
on the side of the invader, justifying individual declaration of 
jihad.134 
 
Jihaad, according to Islamic jurisprudence, is to be seen and used in the last 
resort as a defensive mechanism and not to be used for aggressive warfare. 
Moreover, since jihaad, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, is ‘a defensive war 
against unbelievers whenever they threatened Islam,’135 it therefore means 
that peace, if desired by the non-Muslims, should ordinarily characterise the 
normal and permanent interaction between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. 
 
6.3.4 Civilians and Diplomatic Envoys during Jihaad 
The Islamic jihaad is now being executed by groups and organisations 
purportedly fighting for Islam, such as Al-Qaeda, as if it is a war between 
Muslims and non-Muslims simpliciter. Jihaad is now being embarked upon by 
members of these notorious organisations as if the killing of civilians (Muslims 
and non-Muslims) and those with diplomatic immunity are legitimate targets. 
Undoubtedly, these are Muslim groups as they always make references to 
Islamic sources (the Qur’an and Sunnah) to justify their actions, but the truth 
is that their actions regarding the practice and conduct of jihaad clearly 
                                                 
134 NA Shah, op cit., (2008), p. 58 
135 See MF Sharif, ‘Jihad in Ibn Taymiyyah’s Thought’, Vol. 49:3 The Islamic Quarterly, Pp. 
183-203  
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contradict the rules and norms in Islamic jurisprudence.136 Perhaps, this 
explains why Al-Qaeda’s violent activities, in the words of Ahmed, have been 
found to be unacceptable to the classical norms of Islamic jihaad on five 
major grounds: 
 
i.  Individual and organizations cannot declare a jihad, only 
states can officially declare wars. 
ii. Even in war, one cannot kill innocent women and children. 
iii. One cannot wage war against a country in which Muslims 
can freely practice their religion (i.e., the United States). 
iv. Prominent Muslim jurists around the world have condemned 
bin Laden’s ideology and tactics. Their condemnation forms 
a consensus, known in Islamic jurisprudence as ijma, which 
has authority only next to the divine injunctions. 
v. The welfare and interest of the Muslim community, known in 
Islamic jurisprudence as maslaha, is harmed by bin Laden’s 
actions. Thus, such actions are un-Islamic.137 
 
Islamic law of armed conflict is clear when it comes to determining those who 
are the combatants (ahl al-qitaal) and the non-combatants (ghayr ahl al-
qitaal). The combatants are those who are actively engaged in war or 
                                                 
136 P Ahmed, op cit., (2007-2008), p. 772 
137 Ibid., Pp. 772-770  
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preparing to engage in war either as military officers or volunteers.138 The 
non-combatants, on the other hand, are those who do not fight and are 
indifferent to the effects of war. This includes children particularly those 
below the age of fifteen,139 women (provided she is not Queen of the 
enemy),140 the very old, the monks, the sick and the disabled persons,141 
diplomats, peasants and merchants.142  These categories of persons are 
protected under Islamic law from any kind of attack in times of war, unless 
they are found to have compromised their immunity by partaking in the fight 
or by providing assistance to the enemies.143 Surprisingly, Ibn Taymiyyah 
(d.1328), whose legal pronouncements on the issue of jihaad have often been 
misinterpreted or quoted out of context by some radical Muslim groups, says 
that non-combatants who do not participate in the war efforts either by deeds 
or by words, such as ‘women, children, the monk, old man, the blind and the 
chronically ill should not be killed according to the majority of the scholars.’144 
The immunity given to non-combatants is based on the Islamic law principle 
that ‘everything is immune from attack unless it is explicitly permitted to be 
attacked.’145 The immunity granted to those who are not directly engaged in 
active combat or providing any kind of assistance to the enemies is 
                                                 
138 See Wahba al-Zuhayli, Athar al-harb fi al-fiqh al-Islami: diraasa muqaarana  (Dar al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 1981), p. 503 cited in SH Hashmi, ‘Saving and Taking Life in War: Three Modern 
Muslim Views’, (1999) Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2 The Muslim World, p. 169  
139 S Mahmassani, Al-Qanun wa al-‘Alaqat al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islam (Dar al-Ilm lil Malayin, 
Beirut, 1972), p. 239 
140
 A Al-Dawoody, op cit., (2011)p. 113 
141 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: 
Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), p. 301 
142 See HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 44 
143 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: 
Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), Pp. 302-303  
144 Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Siyasa al-Shari’yyah fi Islah Al-Ra’i wa Al-Ra’iyyah edited by Ali b. 
Muhammad al-Imaran (Saudi Arabia, 2008), p. 158  
145 NA Shah, Islamic Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, (Routledge, Abingdon, 2011), p. 47 
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particularly authorised in various verses of the Qur’an and specific Prophetic 
instructions given to Muslim fighters. When the Qur’an, for instance, says 
‘Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress,’146 that 
could also mean that the Muslims are restrained from fighting those who do 
not fight them, otherwise it could amount to transgression (‘i’tidaa’).147 In 
other words, going by the dictate of this verse, women, children, elderly, 
monks, sick and the disabled should not be targeted in the course of physical 
jihaad, in fact, they are to be protected. 
 
Similarly, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was reported to have issued instruction 
to the Muslim fighters when they were dispatched against the advancing 
Byzantine force that: 
 
In avenging the injuries inflicted upon us molest not the harmless 
inmates of domestic seclusion; spare the weakness of the female 
sex; injure not the infants at the breast or those who are ill in bed. 
Refrain from demolishing the houses of the unresisting inhabitants; 
destroy not the means of their subsistence, nor their fruits-trees 
and touch not the palm.148      
 
                                                 
146 Qur’an 2:190 
147 See M Munir, ‘The Protection of Civilians in War: Non-Combatant Immunity in Islamic 
Law’, Pp. 6-7 available at: http://works.bepress.com/muhammad_munir/13 [accessed 28 
April, 2012] 
148 See AH Quadri, Islamic Jurisprudence in Modern World, (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Sons, 
Lahore, 1973), p. 278 
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There was another incidence where Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) saw a 
woman that was killed in the battle of Hunayn (630 AD) and upon inquiry he 
was informed that the woman was killed by one of his military commanders 
who claimed that he killed her because she struggled to get his sword off him 
in order to kill him. He (the Prophet) immediately warned him that never 
should a woman be killed in battle as they are incapable of fighting.149 
 
The companions of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) were relentless in adhering to 
his instructions regarding the protection of non-combatants in the conduct of 
jihaad. The instruction given by Abu Bakr bin Abi Qahafah (d. 634 AD) to 
Yazid bin Abi Sufyan (d. 640 AD) while he was the commander of the Muslim 
army that was to confront the Roman army in Syria was that: ‘I prescribe ten 
commandments to you: do not kill a woman, a child, or an old man, do not 
cut down fruitful tress, do not destroy inhabited areas, do not slaughter any 
sheep, cow or camel except for food, do not burn date palms nor inundate 
them, do not embezzle, nor be guilty of cowardliness.’150 The instructions 
given by Abu Bakr, were considered by Bosworth as ‘humane precepts [that] 
served like a code of laws of war during the career Mohammedan 
conquest.’151      
 
                                                 
149 See hadith 9383 in Abd al-Raziq ibn Hammam al-Sana’ani, Al-Musannf, 2nd edn., Vol. 5 (Al-
Maktab al-Islami, Beirut, 1982), p. 201 
150 This statement was related by Imam Malik. See Jalaludeen al-Sayuti, Tanweer al-Hawalik, 
Sharh a’la Muwatta’ Malik, Vol. II (Al-Halabi Press, Cairo (nd)), p. 6 
151 SR Bosworth, Mohammed and Mohammedanism (Book Tree, India n. d.), p. 185 
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The diplomatic personnel have a special kind of protection in Islamic law 
bestowed on them by the provisions of the Qur’an,152 numerous traditions of 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)153 and the practice of the various Muslim 
States.154 Such protections as personal inviolability, immunity from court’s 
jurisdiction, freedom of religion and exemption from taxation are all 
guaranteed under Islamic diplomatic law.155 It is trite both in the classical and 
modern periods of Islamic history that diplomatic envoy must not be 
imprisoned, maltreated, injured or killed while he or she is within the Muslim 
territory.156 If Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) could not severe the heads of the 
two diplomatic envoys of Musaylimah (the false prophet), despite the verbal 
confirmation of their believe in the prophethood of Musaylimah, which was 
considered a culpable offence according to Islamic law, what justification 
would Al-Qaeda and the likes have in targeting diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities in their attacks. At least, it is obvious that out of all the  Muslim 
States, none has been attacked by a non-Muslim State as at the time Usama 
bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and other similar organisations declared their global 
jihaad particularly against the United States of America and their allies. Even 
if the declaration of jihaad by Al-Qaeda were legitimate, without conceding, is 
it permissible or do they have the authority to injure or kill non-combatant 
civilians (women, elderly, children, religious priest etc); and non-Muslims that 
are protected in Muslim countries such as those enjoying diplomatic 
                                                 
152 See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3.1 of this dessertation 
153 Ibid., paragraph 4.4.3.2 of this dessertation 
154 Ibid., paragraph 4.4.3.3 of this dessertation 
155See M Munir, ‘Immunity or Impunity: A Critical Appraisal of the Immunity of Diplomats in 
International Law and Its Status in Sha’ria’ (2000) XXII:35, Journal of Law and Society, Pp. 
48-49. See also MC Bassiouni, op cit., (1980), 609-610  
156 See HM Zawati, op cit., (2001), p. 79 
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protection or those with valid entry visas which may be considered as having 
aman – safe conduct? The justification put forward by Al-Qaeda that:    
 
The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their 
government and that they voted for their president. . . The 
American Congress endorses all government measures and this 
proves that the entire America is responsible for the atrocities 
perpetrated against Muslims.157 
 
One wonders if this justification can withstand the overwhelming authority in 
the main sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and the authentic Prophetic 
traditions as quoted above. The fact that the Qur’an and the Sunnah do not 
endorse the killing of non-combatants and diplomatic envoys cannot be over-
emphasised. 
 
6.3.5 The Reality of the Concepts of Dar al-Islaam and Dar al-Harb 
 The division of the world into two belligerent camps – dar al-Islaam and dar 
al-harb – was formulated by majority of the Muslim jurists consisting of Imam 
Abu Hanifah (d. 767 AD),158 Imam Malik (d. 795 AD)159 and Imam Hambal (d. 
855 AD),160 in the second century after death of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), 
                                                 
157 Osama bin Laden (November 3, 2001) in B Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the World: The 
Statement of Osama bin Laden (Verso, London, 2005), Pp. 140-141 
158 His full name was Nu’aman ibn Thabit ibn Zuta ibn Marzuban and he was born in the city 
of Kufah in Iraq. 
159 He was born in Madinah and his full name was Malik ibn Anas ibn Malik ibn Abi ‘Amir al-
Asbahi 
160 His full name was Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal Abu ‘Abdullah al-Shaybani and he 
was originally from Basra, Iraq 
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precisely, in the era of the Abbasid and Umayyad dynasties.161 This was made 
possible because at that time, the Muslims were united under a single 
caliphate.162 The Islamic empire later became fragmented into different 
autonomous caliphates, and later independent states which of course, 
threatened the relevance and practicability of this dichotomy. The relations 
between dar al-Islaam, as abode of peace, and dar al-harb, as the world of 
unbelievers, in the words of Tibi, ‘were defined in terms of war, according to 
the authoritative commentaries of Islamic jurists.’163 This division has thus, 
been erroneously used as the basis of a permanent State of war between the 
Muslim States and the non-Muslim States.  
 
The dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb are concepts which distinguish territories 
that are strictly under the governance of Islamic law from those that are not 
so governed. Aside from the Muslim citizens, there were also non-Muslim 
residents of dar al-Islaam. These were people who had acquired the status of 
dhimmi, (those given protection) on the condition that their poll taxes, 
commonly referred to as jizyah, had to be paid.164 Diplomatic immunity and 
inviolability were granted to non-Muslim foreign envoys during their visitation 
to the Muslim territories. Aman (safe-conduct) was equally granted to non-
Muslim from dar al-harb that was visiting dar al-Islaam for peaceful purposes 
(e.g. for commercial transactions). The rest of the world that had belligerent 
                                                 
161 M Munir, op cit., (2003), Pp. 403-404; O Bakircioglu, op cit., (2010),  (p. 431 
162 A Al-Dawoody, op cit., (2011), p. 92 
163 B Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam Versus 
Global Jihad, (Routledge, Oxon, 2008), p. 47 
164 JE Campo, Encyclopedia of Islam (Infobase Publishing, New York, 2009), p. 182 
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relations with dar al-Islaam are described as dar al-harb 165 and most likely, 
with the exception of a territory referred to as dar al-hiyad (the abode of 
neutrality) which was ascribed to the people of Abyssinia (now known as 
Ethiopia) by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) on the condition that they did not 
attack the Muslims.166 In a nutshell, dar al-harb can be described as a 
territory which does not tolerate the freedom to practice Islam and where the 
lives and properties of the Muslims are not safe. 
 
There are controversies among modern Islamic scholars regarding the 
meaning of dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb, most especially with ‘[t]he growth 
of Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries during the last decades of the 
twentieth century [which] has accentuated old dilemmas and created new 
ones.’167 There are those with the most radical view who contend that dar al-
Islaam is any country that is governed purely by the Shari’ah.168 One wonders 
if such country exists today. Not even the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with its 
monarchical system of Islamic government. It will definitely be impossible, 
they further argue, for the Muslims to remain under the territories of dar al-
Islaam since all the ‘Muslim countries are . . . ruled by corrupt apostate 
regimes.’169 Yet, some Muslim scholars maintain the validity of the old 
concepts of dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb even when the prerequisites for 
                                                 
165 M Munir, op cit., (2003), p.404 
166 M Khadduri, op cit.,(1966), p. 18 
167 S Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fatwās of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihād, (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2006), p. 19 
168 Ibid 
169 Ibid 
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their application are lacking.170 This, in particular, forms the cornerstone of 
the rulings on jihaad to them. There are some other scholars who maintain a 
moderate position by defining dar al-Islaam as any country where the 
Muslims have the liberty to freely practice the tenets of Islam regardless of 
whether the country is a secular or non-Muslim State.  Boisard contends that 
‘a non-Muslim States which does not threaten the community of believers, 
respect justice, and guarantee freedom of worship, should not be considered 
dar al-harb.’171  
 
It must be understood that the creation of this universal dichotomy between 
dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb was neither Qur’anic nor contained in any 
Prophetic traditions.172 It was the creation of the medieval Islamic scholars 
based on their respective ijtihaad. If one may ask: Can the dar al-Islaam 
automatically take the rest of the world as dar al-harb with which jihaad 
becomes inevitable in the present world order? The likes of Al-Qaeda may 
want to answer this question in the affirmative. The answer, in my opinion, 
will be in the negative. First of all, as earlier stated, the two concepts of dar 
al-Islaam and dar al-harb never originated from the Qur’an or from the 
Sunnah which are the main sources of the Islamic jurisprudence. The Qur’an 
thus, recognises the existence of other nations beside the Muslim community. 
For instance, the Qur’an warns that: ‘And do not be like shewho untwisted 
her spun thread after it was strong [by] taking your oaths as [means of] 
                                                 
170 Ibid 
171 MA Boisard, Jihad: A Commitment to Universal Peace, (The American Trust Publication, 
Indianapolis, Indiana, 1988), Pp. 8-9 
172 See B Tibi, op cit., (2008), p. 47; NA Shah, op cit., (2008), Pp. 32 and 35 
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deceit between you because one community [nation] is more plentiful [in 
number or wealth] than another community [nation].’173 Secondly, this may 
also be impossible because of the absence of the relevant conditions that are 
necessary before a territory could be defined as either dar al-Islaam or dar al-
harb.  
 
Dar al-sulh, (abode of treaty) or Dar al-ahd (abode of truce) which is the third 
category was devised by Imam Shafi’i (d. 820 AD)174 in the second/eight 
century.175  He was the founder of the Shafi’i school of law.  Dar al-Sulh was 
interposed as a compromise between dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb to allow 
for ‘peaceful coexistence based on ‘armistice, diplomatic ties or peace 
agreements.’176  Non-Muslim States that are at peace with the Muslim States 
on the basis of the existence of peace treaties between them are considered 
to be in dar al-sulh. An example could be drawn from the treaty that was 
concluded by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) with the people of Najran who were 
Christians and likewise the people of Nawba and Armenia whom the Muslims 
exempted from paying tax.177  
 
                                                 
173 Qur’an 16:92 
174 He belonged to the Qurayshi clan of Makkah and his full name wss Abu ‘Abdullah 
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i 
175 A Al-Dawoody, op cit., (2011), p. 94; O Khalidi, ‘Living as a Muslim in a Pluralistic Society 
and State: Theory and Experience’, in ZH Bukhari et al (eds.), Muslims' Place in the American 
Public Square: Hope, Fears, and Aspirations, (AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, 2004), p. 43 
176 J Allain, ‘Acculturation through the Middle Ages: The Islamic Law of Nations and its Place 
in the History of International Law’ in A Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on the 
Theory and History of International Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 
2011), p. 404 
177 M Munir, op cit., (2003), p. 406 
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The majority of the Muslim jurists consisting of Hanafi, Maliki and Hambali, 
however, did not accept the validity of dar al-sulh. They maintained that once 
a non-Muslim territory signs a peace treaty with the Muslims and agrees to 
the payment of tribute, it henceforth becomes part of dar al-Islaam.178  
 
With the establishment of the United Nations, when all countries of the world 
have come together with the agreement ‘to live together in peace’179 with 
each other, that brought an end to ‘this whole theoretical, historical, 
circumstantial division’180 of the world, otherwise known as dar al-Islaam and 
dar al-harb. It therefore becomes doubtful if there is any country where the 
Muslims are not safe to profess their belief in Islam and establish regular 
prayers. That in itself makes the whole world come under dar al-Islam going 
by Abu Hanifah’s opinion.181  
 
The division of the world into dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb was, in fact, 
temporary and not permanent, quoting the words of Munir that presently 
‘Muslims are safe everywhere and can carry out their religious practices 
anywhere they want.’182 He says further that ‘Muslim states have signed 
almost every international convention, especially the UN Charter that gives 
                                                 
178 Mirza Iqbal Ashraf, Islamic Philosophy of War and Peace: Current Conflicts: Is Islam the 
Problem? (iUniverse Inc., Bloomington, 2008), p. 10; M Khadduri, ‘The Islamic Theory of 
International Relations and its Contemporary Relevance’, in JH Proctor (ed.), Islam and 
International Relations, (Pall Mall Press, London, 1965) p. 26; R Peters, Islam and 
Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History, (The Hague, Mouton, 1979), p. 11 
179 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations 
180 MH Kamali, ‘Methodological Issues in Islamic Jurisprudence’ (1996) 11:1 Arab Law 
Quarterly , p. 11 
181 A Al-Dawoody, op cit., (2011), p. 95 
182 M Munir, op cit., (2003), p. 407 
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equal status and sovereignty to every states.’183 Hence, jihaad, according to 
Islamic law, cannot be based on the theoretical dichotomy of the world into 
dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb, which does not seem to exist anymore. Rather, 
jihaad will continue to be used, whenever the need arises, as means of 
protecting Muslims against oppression, and to defend the freedom of religion 
and social order, and to prevent aggression and injustice.184 
 
Moreover, it has also become clear that this theoretical division of the world 
into dar al-Islaam and dar al-harb cannot be a basis for a permanent tension 
or state of war between the Muslim States and the non-Muslim States since 
Allah has enjoined the Muslims to remain ‘righteous towards them (the non-
Muslims) and acting justly towards them (the non-Muslims)’ once the non-
Muslims are not in war with them. It therefore means that in the absence of 
war or war-like situation, a peaceful diplomatic relations could and should be 
established between the Muslim States and the rest of the world.  
 
6.3.6 How is Terrorism Considered under the Islamic Criminal Law 
Modern Muslim State practices have condemned the acts of terrorism in all its 
manifestations and forms. In fact, there was a concordant criticism by 
individual Muslim States as reflected in one of the conferences of the then 
OIC which says that: 
 
                                                 
183 Ibid, Pp. 407-408 
184 S Mahmassani, op cit., in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours: 
Volume 117 1966/I (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1968), 279 
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Such shameful terrorist acts are opposed to tolerant divine 
message of Islam which spurns aggression, calls for peace, 
coexistence, tolerance and respect among people, highly prizes the 
dignity of human life and prohibits the killing of the innocent. It 
further rejected any attempts to allege the existence of any 
connection or relation between the Islamic faith and the terrorist 
acts, as such attempts are not in the interest of multilateral efforts 
to combat terrorism and further damage relations among people of 
the world. It stressed as well the need to undertake a joint effort 
to promote dialogue and create between Islamic world and the 
West in order to reach mutual understanding and build bridges of 
confidence between the two civilizations.185 
 
Truly, terrorism has gone global, to the extent that it cannot be taken as a 
mere domestic problem. However, nationality jurisdiction of domestic laws of 
various States is still sustained to a large extent.186 The current spade of 
terrorism, particularly in the Muslim countries, has continuously served as 
constant reminder of the efficacy of domestic counter-terrorism legislations 
which complement the various international conventions that were also 
created to combat terrorism. Virtually all the Muslim States are parties to 
most of the international conventions on terrorism. Some of these 
international conventions are the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of 
                                                 
185 Final communique of the ninth extraordinary session of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Doha, Qatar on 10 October 2001 available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56462.pdf [accessed 30 April, 2012] 
186 I Bantekas and S Nash, International Criminal Law (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 
2003), Pp. 23-24 
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Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; 
1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages; 1997 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; 1999 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; 
and 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism.187 Different Articles in these conventions provide for the 
domestication of the crimes of terrorism in individual States. For instance, 
Article 3(1) of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents provides that: 
 
Each State Party shall take such measure as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set forth in article 2 in the 
following cases: 
(a) when the crime is committed in the territory of that State or on 
board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
(c) when the crime is committed against an internationally protected 
person as defined in article 1 who enjoys his status as such by 
virtue of functions which he exercises on behalf of that State.   
 
                                                 
187 Article 3(1) of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; Article 2 of the 1979 International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages; Article 4 of 1997 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; Article 4 1999 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; and Article 5 of the 2005 International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism   
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Member States are thus conferred with the domestic jurisdiction to try 
offences that fall under the meaning of terrorism. This, in other words, means 
that States that are parties to these conventions can have local laws with the 
enabling jurisdiction to convict any person found guilty of the offence of 
terrorism. 
 
Modern scholars of Islamic jurisprudence are of the view that the traditional 
meaning of hiraabah, which forms one of the huduud offences, should be 
extended to incorporate the act of terrorism.188 This, to my mind, justified the 
argument canvassed by Crane that terrorists should be held to account under 
the Islamic crime of hiraabah in the following words: 
 
They [the extremists] are exhibiting the most serious crime 
condemned in the Qur’an, which is the root of almost all the other 
crimes, namely, arrogance.  They are committing the crime of 
hirabah, which is the attack on the very roots of civilization, and 
justifying it in the name of Islam.  There can be no greater evil and 
no greater sin.  If there is to be a clash of civilizations, a major 
cause will be the muharibun, those who commit inter-civilizational 
hirabah.189 
 
                                                 
188 See CS Waren, Islamic Criminal Law, (OUP, Oxford, 2010), p. 9; Nasir bin Ibrahim 
Mehemeed, ‘Criminal Justice in Islamic Shari’a: Concepts and Precepts’, in MA Abdel Haleem 
et al., Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Sharīʻa (I. B Tauris & Co. Ltd., 
London, 2003), p. 41 
189 RD Crane, ‘Hirabah versus Jihad’ available on 
http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_301_350/hirabah_versus_jihad.htm [accessed May 11, 
2012] 
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Ibn Hazm (994 – 1064 AD), a Spanish Muslim jurist, has meticulously defined 
a hiraabah offender as: 
 
One who puts people in fear on the road, whether or not with a 
weapon, at night or day, in urban areas or in open spaces, in the 
palace of a caliph or a mosque, with or without accomplices, in the 
desert or in the village, in a large or small city, with one or more 
people . . . making people fear that they’ll be killed . . . whether 
the attackers are one or many.190 
 
Aside from the two countries, Saudi Arabia191 and Iran,192 that, most 
probably, embrace the classical Islamic law in their legal systems, there are 
some of the Muslim States such as Pakistan,193 Sudan194 and most of the 
northern States of Nigeria195 that have recently re-introduced the Islamic 
criminal law into their respective legal systems.196 According to the classical 
Islamic criminal law which forms part of the legal systems of these Muslim 
                                                 
190 Quoted in A Quraishi, ‘An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a Woman-
Sensitive Perspective’ in G Webb (ed.), Windows of Faith: Muslim Women Scholar-Activists in 
North America, (Syracuse University Press, New York, 2000), p. 130 
191 The Saudi Arabian legal system strictly applies the uncodified Hanbali School of law. See S 
Zuhur, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Threat, Political Reform, and the Global War on Terror, (March, 
2005), p. 15 also available at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi [accessed May 10, 2012]  
192 The Islamic Republic of Iran operates a criminal justice system based on the Twelver Shi’i 
School of law. See FE Vogel, ‘The Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law’ (2002) 43:1 
Harvard Int’l L. J., p. 54 
193 It was during the regime of Zia-ul-Haq that the Hudood laws were introduced ‘so as to 
bring it [the existing law] in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah.’ See NA Shah, op cit., (2006), p. 127  
194 KB Gravelle, ‘Islamic Law in Sudan: A Comparative Analysis’, (1999) 5 ILSA J. Int’l & 
Comp. L., p. 1 
195 See P Ostien, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook, 
(Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, 2007) 
196 FE Vogel, ‘The Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic Law’ (2002) 43:1 Harvard Int’l L. 
J., p. 54 
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countries, hiraabah, that is waging war against God and His Apostle and 
spreading corruption on the earth, being one of the huduud offences, has 
been generally argued to include the offence of terrorism. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia stresses in one of the counter-terrorism reports it submitted to 
the United Nations Security Council that: 
 
The commission of terrorist acts and support for such acts are 
included among the crimes of hirabah in the Islamic Shariah as 
applied by the Kingdom. This is the category that includes the most 
serious crimes and those for which the severest penalties are 
prescribed in the hirabah verses of the Holy Koran [Koran 5:33]. In 
accordance with the statutes in force in the Kingdom, the courts 
have jurisdiction to decide all cases relating to terrorism and, in 
accordance with its Statute, the Commission for Investigation and 
Public Prosecution investigates such crimes and prosecutes them in 
the courts.197 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran also made a similar commitment to combatting 
terrorism by saying that ‘[B]ased on the sublime teachings of Islam, which 
                                                 
197
 A Counter-Terrorism report submitted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the UN Security 
Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September, 2001 also 
available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/722/76/PDF/N0172276.pdf?OpenElement [accessed May 14, 
2012] 
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denounce and prohibit incitement to terrorist acts, Iran is determined to 
combat the culture of terrorism.’198  
 
The crime of and punishment for hiraabah is specifically mentioned in the 
Qur’an thus:  
 
Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His 
Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption is none but 
that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut 
off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land. That is 
for them a disgrace in this world; and for them in the Hereafter is a 
great punishment, except for those who return [repenting] before 
you apprehend them. And know that Allah is Forgiving and 
Merciful.199 
 
After introducing the meaning of the offence of hiraabah, that is, ‘wag[ing] 
war against Allah and His Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] 
corruption,’ the verses then prescribe four alternative punishments ranging 
from death, crucifixion, amputation of the hand and foot to exile depending 
on the circumstances of each case. For instance, terrorizing the public without 
killing and taking any property is punishable with banishment, which also 
                                                 
198 A Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN Security Council pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) as well as the country’s response to resolution 1624 
(2005) dated 13 March, 2007, p. 17 also available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/269/28/PDF/N0726928.pdf?OpenElement [accessed May 14, 
2012]  
199 Qur’an 5:33-34 
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implies life imprisonment according to the Hanafi jusrists;200 one that 
terrorizes the public by taking away their properties will have his right hand 
and left foot amputated; one that terrorizes by killing without taking any 
property will be sentenced to death by beheading; and the one that terrorizes 
the public by taking their properties and killing them will, of course, be 
beheaded and crucified thereafter.201  
 
Hiraabah is considered, in Islamic criminal law, to have the severest 
punishment. It is also extremely detrimental, in the words of the Maliki jurist, 
Al-Qurtubi, who says that:  
 
[B]ecause it prevents people from being able to earn living. For 
indeed, commerce is the greatest and most common means of 
earning a living, and people must be able to move in order to 
engage in commerce . . . But when the streets are terrorized 
(ukhifa), people stop travelling and are forced to stay at home. The 
doors to commerce are closed and people are unable to earn a 
living. Thus, God instituted the severest punishment for hirabah as 
a means of humiliating and discouraging the perpetrators thereof 
and in order to keep the doors of business open.202  
 
                                                 
200 SA Jackson, ‘Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition’, (2001) 91 The Muslim 
World, p. 300 
201 FE Vogel, op cit, (2002), p. 59 
202  Al-Qurtubi, Al-Jami’ li ahkam al-Qur’an 1 1 vols., K. Mays (ed.),  (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 
1419/1999), 3:88  
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According to the Saudi legal system, terrorism is considered a serious crime 
which, of course, attracts strict penalties. It is thus, stated that ‘[i]n as much 
as terrorist offences come under serious crimes included in the category of 
crimes against society (hirabah), the penalties imposed for them are severe, 
ranging up to execution. Saudi Arabia is known internationally for having the 
severest penalties for perpetrators of terrorist offences. The reason for this is 
its adherence to the provisions of the Islamic Shariah, which criminalizes all 
forms of terrorism.’203 Similarly, in Sudan, the severity of the punishment for 
committing any act of terrorism or participating in any terrorist activities is 
such that, upon conviction, the person might be executed or made to serve 
life imprisonment.204 It is not a surprise that those who engage in the acts of 
terrorism by waging illegitimate war against their own State’s governments 
and terrorising innocent people are usually considered as ‘Muhaaribun’ in 
Islam.205 Therefore, if one considers the strictness in the punishments set 
down for the act of terrorism by the Islamic criminal jurisprudence, which 
cannot be compared with the conventional penalties,206 it will, obviously, 
sound ridiculous to then equate Islam or the Islamic jihaad with terrorism.  
 
                                                 
203 A third report submitted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the UN Security Council 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September, 2001 dated 29 May, 
2003 also available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/384/65/PDF/N0338465.pdf?OpenElement [accessed May 14, 
2012]  
204 Articles 5 & 6 Terrorism (Combatting) Act, 2000 of Sudan See appendix VIII available at 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/210/61/IMG/N0221061.pdf?OpenElement [accessed May 14, 
2012] 
205 AN Kobeisy, Counseling American Muslims: Understanding the Faith and Helping the 
People, (Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2004), p. 30 
206 T Winter, ‘Terrorism and Islamic Theologies of Religiously-Sanctioned War’ in D Fisher & B 
Wicker (eds.), Just War on Terror?: A Christian and Muslim Response, (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, Surrey, 2010), p. 21 
 339 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has generally found that terrorist acts that were perpetrated 
against diplomats and diplomatic missions under the pretext of engaging in 
Islamic jihaad, are not sanctioned under Islamic law. This is so because the 
Islamic jihaad has some laid down rules which must be present before 
resorting to a physical warfare. For instance, it has been stated that for jihaad 
to be legitimate it has to be declared by a legitimate authority, that is, the 
Muslim State. Most importantly, it has also been established that according to 
Islamic law principles of jihaad, the immunity of diplomatic envoys and non-
combatants from attacks must be preserved throughout the warfare.  They 
must not be deliberately attacked; otherwise it will amount to committing an 
offence, known in Islamic criminal law, as hiraabah. Terrorist attacks’ violation 
of these rules and principles of the Islamic jihaad confirm their incompatibility 
with Islamic law principles as well as the principles of international law. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Forming a Bridge of Compatibility between Islamic Diplomatic Law 
and International Diplomatic Law  
This study has advanced, through comparative analysis, the compatibility between 
international diplomatic law and Islamic diplomatic law and thus, established that 
Islamic diplomatic law complements international diplomatic law due to their 
compatibility. The process of achieving greater compatibility between Islamic 
diplomatic law and international diplomatic law was arrived at by considering the 
historical and analytical jurisprudential comparative approaches. That is, by (a) 
examining the universality of diplomatic practice amongst various ancient 
civilizations from an historical perspective, particularly the contribution  made by 
Islamic civilization to modern diplomatic practice; (b) considering a theoretical 
comparative overview of the sources of the two legal systems; (c) evaluating 
different principles of diplomatic immunities and privileges and their theoretical 
justifications under Islamic diplomatic law and  international diplomatic law; (d) 
critiquing some Muslim States’ diplomatic practices on the basis of  Islamic 
diplomatic law; and (e) discussing various terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims 
on diplomatic missions and their personnel in the name of the Islamic jihaad and 
how they are treated under  Islamic law. These can be summed up under the 
following headings: i) historical compatibility; ii) compatibility in legal sources; iii) 
compatibility in principles; and iv) compatibility in Muslim States practices which will 
be discussed with recommendations.   
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7.2 Historical Compatibility 
This study has examined, at length, diplomatic relations and diplomatic inviolability 
in various ancient civilisations, such as the Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese, African 
and Islamic civilisations. The universalistic trend of diplomatic practice has been 
traced back to the times of the ancient world civilisations. The principle of diplomatic 
immunity, for instance, has been deeply engrained in the customary fabrics of these 
ancient communities. The fact that different governments have been in the habit of 
observing the principle of extending immunity to diplomatic envoys for many 
centuries confirms the universality of diplomatic relations. Ogdon was, in fact, 
correct when he concludes that: 
These practices of ancient peoples in different periods and under peculiar 
circumstances exhibit a fundamental relationship between the function of 
the embassy and the reason why diplomatic immunity was allowed to 
thrive. . . . The importance of the embassy seems in itself to have been 
reason enough for receiving an ambassador, for communicating with him,   
and for allowing him freedom to return with a message to his native 
camp.1 
Hence, the phrase in the preamble of the 1961 VCDR which states that: ‘Recalling 
that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of 
diplomatic agent’ cannot be more correct.  
 
Although, there may be some variances in the manner in which each of these 
ancient civilisations dispensed the principles of diplomatic immunity whenever they 
                                                 
1 M Ogdon, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity: A Study in the Origin, Growth and Purpose of the 
Law, (John Byrne, 1936), Pp. 19-20  
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received diplomats from foreign territories, and the reception protocols that were to 
be observed by incoming diplomatic envoys. For instance, in ancient China, it was a 
requirement that once an envoy has been able to imbibe and demonstrate all the 
necessary protocol, including the kotow ritual, which portrayed nothing but 
subjugation, he/she henceforth, enjoyed diplomatic privileges throughout his stay 
within the ‘Celestial Empire.’ Looking at the history of diplomatic practice and 
diplomatic immunity in all the ancient civilisations discussed in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, it may be correct to suggest that throughout Islamic history there was 
no reported incidence of maltreatment or killing of any diplomatic envoy, perhaps, 
with the exception of some isolated cases that were recorded, for instance, during 
the Ottoman Empire.2 Moreover, Islamic civilisation has greatly contributed in its 
dealings with other nations, particularly with the Western world, to the making of 
what is now known as international diplomatic law. This has been made possible 
owing to the friendly interaction that existed between Islamic civilisation and 
Western civilisation, which may be due to their contemporaneous existence.  All 
these facts have confirmed the historical compatibility between Islamic diplomatic 
law and international diplomatic law.  
 
7.3 Compatibility in Legal Sources 
 
A ground of commonality has also been found to exist between Islamic diplomatic 
law and international diplomatic law by examining, with clear precision, the different 
sources of the two legal regimes. It is quite important to stress that notwithstanding 
                                                 
2 Sometime in 1439, Dubrovnik’s emissaries sent to Sultan Mehmed, were imprisoned for their refusal 
to pay tribute until a charter was granted in 1442 imposing the annual payment of 1,000 ducats. See 
F Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1978), p. 
155  
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the fact that the sources of the two legal systems are sourced from different origins, 
this should not be taken as forming the basis of their incompatibility. Truly, the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, being the main sources of Islamic diplomatic law, are mainly 
divine in nature, since they are formulated in accordance with divine command. Yet, 
there are other non-divine legal principles and methods of Islamic law which are 
manifested in the form of ijmaa’ (consensus of opinion), qiyaas (analogical 
deduction), istihsaan (judicial preference), maslahah (public interest),‘urf ( custom) 
constituting what is known as the legal mechanism of ijtihaad. While on the other 
hand, international diplomatic law has international treaties, international customary 
law, general principles of law, judicial decisions and scholarly writings as its sources 
which are mainly human creation having originated from Article 38 of the SICJ. In as 
much as the sources of the two legal systems have been found to overlap each 
other in many aspects, it therefore opens up the possibility of their compatibility.  
After all, the differences in the origin of the sources of municipal law and 
international law do not, necessarily, make them incomparable. The municipal law, 
for instance, may be considered as evidence of compliance or non-compliance with 
international obligations.3  Moreover, it can thus, be asserted that Islamic law gives 
full respect to all the legal sources of international diplomatic law, in as much as 
they are in conformity with the fundamental objectives of Islamic law. It has been 
sufficiently shown that there is compatibility in the principles emanating from the 
sources of Islamic diplomatic law and international diplomatic law. 
  
7.4 Compatibility in Principles 
                                                 
3 See the case of Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, p. 19. See 
also Malanczuk, op cit., p. 64 
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The general principles of diplomatic immunity as contained in the 1961 VCDR and 
1963 VCCR were highlighted and compared with the principles of diplomatic 
immunity as obtained under the Islamic law in Chapter 4. The study also considered 
all the three theoretical justifications for diplomatic inviolability (exterritoriality, 
representative character and functional necessity) by looking at the most prevalent 
ones in the two legal systems. The findings in this study strongly impugn the 
incompatibility theory by suggesting close relationship between the legal 
justifications for and the principles of diplomatic inviolability in both the Islamic and 
international diplomatic law. This goes to confirm the compatibility between Islamic 
diplomatic law and international diplomatic law in relation to their legal purposes. 
The codified principles of diplomatic immunity specified in the 1961 VCDR and the 
1963 VCCR representing the foundational principles in international diplomatic law 
have also been found to be closely related to the Islamic principles of diplomatic 
immunity. Such principles include personal inviolability, immunity from the court’s 
jurisdiction, freedom of religion and exemption from taxation. Some other privileges 
such as freedom of movement, protection of diplomatic bags and couriers, freedom 
of communication, inviolability of mission’s archives and inviolability of mission 
premises and private residence, though not explicitly mentioned, but then, they are 
generally covered by the Islamic law principle that whatever is not specifically 
prohibited either in the Qur’an or in the Sunnah should be deemed permissible.4 
Once these principles of diplomatic immunity set out in the VCDR and the VCCR are 
capable of serving the general interest of the Muslim community, which 
automatically bring them within the general contemplation of maslahah, the Muslim 
                                                 
4 Y al-Qaradawi, op cit., (2001), p. 6 
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States will, therefore, be under the obligation to apply and observe them.  In 
addition, Islamic law imposes a legal obligation on any Muslim State that enters into 
an agreement or treaty with another States, be it a Muslim State or a non-Muslim 
State, to discharge the terms of the agreement to the latter. No wonder, the Muslim 
States are parties to the two universally recognised conventions on diplomatic and 
consular relations5 and all other related treaties. And most importantly, the two legal 
systems crave for a peaceful interrelations and co-existence among different States 
of the world. 
 
7.5 Compatibility in Muslim States Practices  
The failure of some Muslim States to strictly adhere to and observe the principles of 
diplomatic immunity as clearly stated in the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 VCCR, as well 
as their flagrant abuse of diplomatic privileges should not and cannot be blamed on 
the principles of Islamic law. This is so because all the principles of international 
diplomatic law with regards to diplomatic privileges and immunities are in conformity 
with the principles of Islamic law. The fact that one or two Muslim States have 
chosen to act differently should not be taken as implying incompatibility between the 
principles of Islamic diplomatic law and international diplomatic law.  After all, the 
Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March, 2003 was criticized by many international 
law commentators as illegal, since it was predicated on a fallacious ground that Iraq 
was in possession of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).6 Even at that, it will be 
incorrect to, therefore, suggest that international law has failed or that there are 
                                                 
5 These are the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 VCCR 
6 Klaus Dodds, ‘Geopolitics’, in GH Fagan and R Munck eds., Globalization and Security, (ABC-CLIO, 
LLC, California, 2009), p. 149  
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some inadequacies in international law simply because the United States and United 
Kingdom have failed to adhere to and observe the principle of international law by 
respecting the sovereignty of Iraq. In the same way, it will also be erroneous to 
attribute the failure of the governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran7 and Libya8 
to respect and observe the terms of the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 VCCR to some 
inadequacies in the Islamic diplomatic law. It has been argued that had the Islamic 
Republic of Iran been tried under the Islamic judicial system, it is most certain that 
the law would have found Iran liable for failing to discharge its diplomatic 
commitments to the staff and mission of the US Embassy. 
 
Diplomatic privileges and immunities are granted to agents of foreign missions 
mainly for the purpose of discharging their diplomatic transactions freely and 
effectively without any interruption from the authority of the receiving State. 
Meanwhile, the diplomatic and consular agents of foreign nations, equally, owe the 
receiving State the duty not to disrespect its laws and regulations, and not to use 
their embassies in any manner incompatible with the provisions of the 1961 VCDR.9 
Of course, the act of killing innocent citizen or innocent public officer as in the case 
of shooting Constable Yvonne Fletcher, the British woman Police Officer, by 
someone from within the Libyan Peoples’ Bureau cannot be justified or be seen as 
part of diplomatic duties that are compatible with the 1961 VCDR. The decision of 
the British Government to cut all diplomatic ties with the Libyan regime by declaring 
the Libyan diplomats as persona non grata was not only consistent with Article 9 of 
                                                 
7 It refers to the 1979 seizure of the US Embassy by the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
8 Referring to the 1986 killing of a British woman police officer, Yvonne  Fletcher, by an alleged 
diplomat from the Libyan Embassy, London (popularly known as Libyan People’s Bureau)   
9 See Article  41 (1) and (3) of the 1961 VCDR 
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the VCDR, but also compatible with the principles of Islamic diplomatic law. Likewise 
the settlement in the Davis’ case based on the provisions of Section 345 of the 
Pakistan Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 310 of the Pakistan Penal Code was 
a clear indication of how Islamic law, through the application of a portion of its 
Islamic criminal jurisprudence, can positively interact with international law. At least, 
the payment of $2.3 million by Mr. Davis as blood money – diyah to the relatives of 
the two victims, which was voluntarily accepted by them has averted what would 
have degenerated into diplomatic upheaval.  
 
Similarly, the Muslim States have been unanimous in their condemnation of terrorist 
attacks that are unleashed on diplomats and diplomatic facilities, particularly those 
perpetrated by Muslims within the Muslim and non-Muslim States. This unanimous 
condemnation of terrorist attacks has been reached by the Muslim States not just 
because of their concession to the various relevant international treaties, but 
because it is strongly condemned as a criminal act under Islamic law. Of course, it 
will be wrong to equate such attacks with the Islamic concept of jihaad. It is a 
fundamental principle in the Islamic jihaad that diplomatic facilities and their 
personnel along with non-combatant should not be deliberately targeted for attacks. 
Definitely, jihaad and terrorism are two parallel lines that can never meet.          
7.6 Recommendations  
The findings of this study clearly show that there is much compatibility between 
Islamic law and international diplomatic law which may further enhance ‘the 
development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing 
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constitutional and social systems.’10 It can be recommended that this compatibility in 
the two legal regimes may also help in contributing to a further development of 
international diplomatic law so as to make it more readily acceptable to the 
generality of the Muslim States. This, however, does not mean that the two legal 
regimes do not have their differences which may be considered minimal as they do 
not affect the substance of the laws. In other words, what the international 
community needs at this present moment is a deep cross-cultural understanding of 
the various States so as to have a better diplomatic legal system. It is also important 
to point out that the fact that diplomatic missions and personnel belonging to the 
Western States are often targeted for terrorist attacks, mostly in the Muslim States 
by non-State actors, should not be taken as implying non-compatibility between the 
diplomatic principles in Islamic diplomatic law and international diplomatic law. 
 
It is also very important to mention that if the universal purpose and principles 
entrenched in the UN Charter11 must be achieved for the benefit of humanity, it is 
imperative that a meaningful dialogue among diverse civilizations be encouraged 
with a view to consolidating and harmonizing not just the various areas of 
congruency but also the perceived areas of tension. Perhaps, the appreciation of the 
need to engage the various civilizations of the world in a constructive dialogue must 
have impelled the UN General Assembly’s resolution 53/22 to proclaim the year 2001 
as “the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations”.12 The resolution 
further stresses not just the need to recognise ‘the diverse civilizational 
                                                 
10 See paragraph 3 of the preamble to the 1961 VCDR 
11 See Article 1(4) of the Charter of the UN http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml 
[accessed on the 30/12/09] 
12 A/RES/53/22 16 November 1998, p. 2 See on line http://www.un.org/documents/r53-22.pdf 
[accessed on the 30/12/09] 
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achievements of mankind’13 but also makes a strong reaffirmation ‘that civilizational 
achievements constitute the collective heritage of mankind, providing a source of 
inspiration and progress for humanity at large’.14
                                                 
13 Ibid. P. 1 
14 Ibid 
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GLOSSARY OF SOME ARABIC TERMINOLOGIES 
 
 
‘Ilmul-hadith -- Science of hadith 
‘Umrah -- Lesser pilgrimage 
‘Urf  -- Custom 
Ahl al-qitaal -- Combatants 
Ahlul-Kitaab -- Adherents to faith which have revealed scripture 
Aman  -- Safe-Conduct 
Asl  --  (pl. Usuul) Root or source 
Daleel  -- Proof indication or evidence 
Dar al-harb -- Abode of war  
Dar al-hiyad -- Abode of neutrality 
Dar al-Islaam -- Abode of peace 
Dar as-sulh -- Abode of treaty 
Daruriyyaat -- Indispensable interests 
Dhimmi -- Non-Muslim under the protection of Islamic law 
Diyat  -- Blood money 
Faqih  -- (Pl.Fuqahaa’) Muslim jurist  
Ghayr ahl al-qitaal -- Non-Combatants 
Haajiyyaat -- Things needed for effective functioning of the community 
Haraam -- Things declared prohibited in the Qur’an and Sunnah 
Hijrah  -- Migration of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) from Makkah to 
Madinah 
Hiraabah -- Highway robbery or the act of terrorism 
Huduud -- Prohibitions ordained by the Qur’an and Sunnah 
Hukmu -- Islamic ruling 
Ijmaa’  -- Consensus opinion 
Ijtihaad -- Independent reasoning 
Istihsaan -- Juristic preference 
Istishaabul-haal -- Presumption of continuity of a rule 
Jihaad  -- Legal warfare according to Islamic law 
Jizyah  -- Poll tax levied on non-Muslims  
Madhhab -- (Pl. Madhaahib) School of Islamic jurisprudence 
Maqaasid al-shari’ah - Objectives of the Shari’ah 
Maslahah -- Public interest 
Mu’aahadaat -- Treaties or contracts between States 
Mu’aamalaat -- Commercial or civil dealings in Islamic law  
Mu’aamalaat -- Inter-human relations 
Muhaaribun -- Those who terrorize innocent people  
Mujtahid -- Qualified legal scholar  
Musta’min -- non-Muslim having safety passage within an Islamic state 
Muwaada’a/ Muhaadana -- Peace treaty 
Nass  -- An explicit statement in the Qur’an or Hadith 
Qaadi al-Qudaat -- Chief Justice 
Qadhf  -- False accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse  
Qat’ii  -- Definitive texts of the Qur’an 
Qisaas  -- Retribution 
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Qiyaas -- Deduction of legal opinion from the Qur’an or Hadith by  
  analogical reasoning 
Rasul  -- Messenger of Allah. Generally it means a herald  
Ridda  -- Apostacy 
Saafir  -- A diplomatic envoy  
Saddudh-dharii’ah -- Blocking lawful means to an unlawful end 
Sariqah -- The offence of theft 
Shrub al-khamr Drinking of alcohol or any intoxicating substance 
Siyar  -- Generally refers to Islamic international law 
Sunnah -- Prophetic tradition 
Ta’azir  -- Crimes that are categorised as discretionary 
Tahsiniyyaat -- Complementary things to perfect community condition  
Taqrir  -- Tacit approval 
Ummah -- Muslim community 
Ustuwanaat al-Wufuud -- The pillars of embassies 
Zanni  -- Speculative texts of the Qur’an 
Zinah  -- Unlawful sexual intercourse  
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